[Cite as State v. Ridenbaugh, 2024-Ohio-3072.]
COURT OF APPEALS LICKING COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
JUDGES: STATE OF OHIO : Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J. : Hon. William B. Hoffman, J. Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J. : -vs- : : Case No. 2023 CA 00087 TEDDY E. RIDENBAUGH, JR. : : Defendant-Appellant : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Licking County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 23-CR-87
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: August 12, 2024
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
JENNY WELLS KATHERINE ROSS-KINZIE Licking County Prosecutor Assistant Public Defender BY: KENNETH W. OSWALT 250 East Broad St., Ste. 1400 Assistant Prosecutor Columbus, OH 43215 20 S. Second Street, 4th Floor Newark, OH 43055 Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00087 2
Gwin, P.J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Teddy E. Ridenbaugh, Jr. [“Ridenbaugh”] was
convicted after a jury trial of aggravated possession of methamphetamine and possession
of a fentanyl-related compound. On appeal Ridenbaugh contends that his convictions
must be reversed for plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel because a potential
juror twice mentioned that he knew of Ridenbaugh from his work at the jail, and the
prosecutor committed misconduct by telling the jury during closing argument that
Ridenbaugh was found on a bed in the room were the drugs where found. Ridenbaugh
further contends that his convictions are against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶2} Because we do not find a reasonable probability that the errors resulted in
prejudice, meaning that the error affected the outcome of the trial, and because we find
the jury did not lose its way finding Ridenbaugh guilty, we affirm the judgment of the
Licking County Court of Common Pleas.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶3} Daniel Quick was living in his mother's house at 555 Seroco Avenue. T.
171; 184.1 Officers with the Central Ohio Drug Enforcement ("CODE") task force began
watching this house for possible drug activity beginning in December, 2022. Id. at 156.
On February 16, 2023, officers obtained a search warrant for the property, which they
executed via a “breach and hold” on the morning of February 17, 2023. Id. at 157. When
they executed the warrant, seven people were in the home, including Ridenbaugh. Police
observed, "two people tried to run out the back, one was laying on the floor, two people
1 For clarity, the transcript of Ridenbaugh’s jury trial will be referred to as “T.__” signifying the page
number. Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00087 3
were found hiding inside the residence." Id. Quick and Ridenbaugh came outside when
police ordered them out. T. at 158. Police detained four of the seven occupants while they
searched the house. Id. at 133; 158.
{¶4} Quick’s mother owned the house. T. at 171. There were only two bedrooms
in the residence. T. at 161. The police searched Quick's bedroom, which included a
security monitoring system, that Detective Jarrod Conley of CODE, testified is common
for drug traffickers. T. at 159-160. The room was identified as Quick's because he was
found asleep in the bed in that room, and because it contained his personal possessions.
Id. Mail with Quick’s name and address was found inside the residence. T. at 173.
{¶5} The second bedroom was identified as Ridenbaugh’s. T. at 161; 170.
Among the clutter of trash and personal items, the second bedroom contained drug
paraphernalia in plain sight. T. at 110; 170. State’s Exhibits 3-E; 3-P; 3-R. The room also
contained drugs, in various locations, including inside a closed wooden box on a table,
with a syringe laying nearby. T. at 110-117. Drugs were also found inside a plastic
container that looked like a flashlight hanging on the wall. T. at 110-117; State's Exhibits
3-D; 3-J; 3-P; and 3-V.
{¶6} Items removed from the room associated with Ridenbaugh include a
syringe, smoking bong and snorting straw. T. at 115-116; State’s Exhibits 3-E; 3-P; and
3-R. A BB gun was also found on the bed. T. at 112; State’s Exhibit 3-F. A wooden box
containing bags of suspected methamphetamine and marihuana was located on a table
in the room. T. at 113-114; 122; State’s Exhibits 3-J; 3-M; 3-N; State’s Exhibit 4. Scales
were also recovered from the room. T. at 116; State’s Exhibit 3-T. A flashlight containing
baggies of suspected methamphetamine and fentanyl stuffed inside was found. T. at 116- Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00087 4
117; 122; State’s Exhibits 3-V; 3-X; 5; 6. A pizza box with Ridenbaugh’s name was located
inside the room. T. at 118; State’s Exhibit 3-Y. A very small amount of additional
methamphetamine, (.22 grams) which the police suspected was fentanyl, was also found
on the bedside table T. at 123; 142; 148; State's Exhibits 9; 10; and 12. No items of mail
addressed to Ridenbaugh were found during the search. T. at 173.
{¶7} The items were analyzed and weighed at the Central Ohio Regional Crime
Lab. T. at 134. The two baggies recovered from inside the plastic container found in the
bedroom, contained 17.7498 and 0.2589 grams of methamphetamine. T. at 122-123; 148;
State’s Exhibit 11. State’s Exhibit 4, recovered from the wooden box contained 9.6912
grams of methamphetamine. T. at 122; 148. State’s Exhibit 5 also recovered from the
plastic container contained 1.4003 grams of fentanyl-related compounds. T. at 122; 148.
{¶8} While he was detained, and after being read his Miranda rights, Ridenbaugh
spoke very briefly with Detective Conley. T. at 161; State's Exhibit 7. Ridenbaugh told the
officer that the gun found on the bed in the room was a BB gun. T. at 161. When asked
about the drugs in the room, Ridenbaugh told the detective, “they’d been there.” Id. at
171. He then says, “I don’t know, I don’t know.” Id. Ridenbaugh admits to the police he
periodically uses both methamphetamine and fentanyl throughout the day. Id. at 161-
162. Because he was worried about the few personal belongings he had in the room
getting stolen, Ridenbaugh asked Detective Conley if he could get him his shoes,
watch, and backpack, none of which contained any contraband, from the room. Id. at
162- 163; 171; State’s Exhibit’s 3-E; 3-K; 3-C.
{¶9} Ultimately, Ridenbaugh was indicted on a multi-count indictment stemming
in part from the search warrant and in part from a prior traffic stop on December 28, 2022. Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00087 5
He was charged with: Count One, aggravated possession of drugs, methamphetamine,
less than bulk amount, a fifth-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) / (C)(1)(a)
[relating to the traffic stop]; Count Two, possession of fentanyl related compound, less
than 10 unit doses or 1 gram, a fifth-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) /
(C)(11)(a) [relating to the traffic stop]; Count Three, aggravated possession of
methamphetamine, at least 5 times bulk amount but less than 50 times bulk amount, a
second-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) / (C)(1)(c) [relating to the search
warrant]; Count Four, possession of fentanyl related compound, at least 10-unit doses or
1 gram but less than 50-unit doses or 5 grams, a fourth-degree felony in violation of R.C.
2925.11(A) / (C)(11)(b) [relating to the search warrant]; and Count Five, aggravated
possession of drugs, morphine, less than bulk amount, a fifth-degree felony in violation
of R.C. 2925.11(A) / (C)(1)(a) [relating to the search warrant].
{¶10} Prior to the start of the jury trial, Ridenbaugh entered, and the judge
accepted, guilty pleas to the first two counts of the Indictment, which were related to the
traffic stop. T. at 9-17. Prior to deliberations, Count Five of the Indictment concerning
morphine was dismissed on motion of the state. Id. at 191-192. The two remaining counts
in the indictment were submitted to the jury, and they found Ridenbaugh guilty of both
counts, additionally finding the specific amount of each drug needed for the degree
charged. The court sentenced Ridenbaugh to 12 months on each of the fourth and fifth-
degree felonies (Count One, Count Two, and Count Four) and a minimum term of four
years, with a maximum of six years of mandatory prison time on the second-degree
felony, Count Three. The trial judge ordered all counts to run concurrently. Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00087 6
Assignments of Error
{¶11} Ridenbaugh raises four Assignments of Error,
{¶12} “I. MR. RIDENBAUGH'S RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL AND DUE PROCESS
OF LAW WAS VIOLATED WHEN HIS RIGHT TO THE PRESUMPTION OF
INNOCENCE WAS VIOLATED. FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE
U.S. CONSTITUTION; ARTICLE I, SECTIONS 10 AND 16, OHIO CONSTITUTION; R.C.
2901.05(A).
{¶13} “II. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT DENIED MR. RIDENBAUGH A
FAIR TRIAL AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW. FIFTH, SIXTH, AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENTS, UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION; ARTICLE I, SECTIONS 10 AND
16, OHIO CONSTITUTION.
{¶14} “III. MR. RIDENBAUGH WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL WHEN HIS TRIAL COUNSEL FAILED TO REQUEST A NEW JURY
PANEL AFTER THE ENTIRE VENIRE WAS EXPOSED TO INFORMATION ABOUT MR.
RIDENBAUGH'S INCARCERATION BEFORE TRIAL STARTED; FAILED TO OBJECT
TO THE STATE'S MISSTATEMENTS OF FACT IN ITS CLOSING ARGUMENT, AND
FAILED TO REQUEST CURATIVE INSTRUCTIONS OR A MISTRIAL REGARDING
EITHER ERROR. SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS, UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION; ARTICLE I, SECTIONS 10 AND 16, OHIO CONSTITUTION.
{¶15} “IV. MR. RIDENBAUGH'S CONVICTIONS WERE AGAINST THE
MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS,
U.S. CONSTITUTION; ARTICLE I, SECTIONS 10 AND 16, OHIO CONSTITUTION.” Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00087 7
I.
{¶16} In his First Assignment of Error, Ridenbaugh claims that a reference by a
prospective juror that the juror knew of him from having worked at "the jail" compromised
his presumption of innocence so much so that it constituted plain error. He contends that
the trial judge should have sua sponte declared a mistrial or given a curative instruction.
{¶17} Ridenbaugh cites to the following comments made during voir dire:
THE COURT: Uh -let's see. Do any of you know any of the people
who I have introduced you to - involved in the trial? Uh - let's see. [Potential
Juror]?
[POTENTIAL JUROR]: I work at the jail. I know of him. I don't think
I've ever interacted with him ---
THE COURT: Okay.
[POTENTIAL JUROR]: -- so, just - I work at jail so –
THE COURT: All right.
[POTENTIAL JUROR]: -- (indiscernible) there and I know of him.
THE COURT: Okay
T. at 31. Later the same potential juror stated,
[POTENTIAL JUROR]: - - no. I mean, like I said, I work at the jail. I
don’t think I’ve personally had any interactions with this individual, so I
believe I can be fair and impartial with the trial.
T. at 42. Ultimately, the juror was removed for cause. T. at 74. Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00087 8
Standard of Review – Plain Error
{¶18} A trial court may grant a mistrial sua sponte when there is manifest
necessity for the mistrial or when the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated.
United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 606-607 (1976), citing United States v. Perez, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824). The granting of a mistrial rests within the sound
discretion of the trial court as it is in the best position to determine whether the situation
at hand warrants such action. State v. Glover, 35 Ohio St.3d 18 (1988); State v. Hessler,
90 Ohio St.3d 108, 115–116 (2000). An abuse of discretion can be found where the
reasons given by the court for its action are clearly untenable, legally incorrect, or amount
to a denial of justice, or where the judgment reaches an end or purpose not justified by
reason and the evidence. Tennant v. Gallick, 2014-Ohio-477, ¶35 (9th Dist.); In re
Guardianship of S.H., 2013-Ohio-4380, ¶ 9 (9th Dist.); State v. Firouzmandi, 2006-Ohio-
5823, ¶54 (5th Dist.).
{¶19} If no motion for a mistrial is requested at trial, the failure to grant a mistrial
sua sponte is judged under a plain error standard. See State v. Jones, 115 Ohio App.3d
204, 208 (10th Dist. 1996) (finding no ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to request
mistrial where alleged error did not rise to the level of plain error). Accord, State v. Shaffer,
2004-Ohio-3717, ¶18 (5th Dist.); State v. Cowan, 2024-Ohio-2028, ¶56 (3rd Dist.); State
v. Howard, 2002-Ohio-2928, *3 (2nd Dist.); State v. Johnson, 2009-Ohio-3383, ¶30 (10th
Dist.); State v. Samueal, 2023-Ohio-3322, ¶16 (1st Dist.).
{¶20} “To establish plain error, [Ridenbaugh] must show that an error occurred,
that the error was obvious, and that there is ‘a reasonable probability that the error
resulted in prejudice,’ meaning that the error affected the outcome of the trial.” (Emphasis Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00087 9
omitted.) State v. McAlpin, 2022-Ohio-1567, ¶ 66, quoting State v. Rogers, 2015-Ohio-
2459, ¶ 22. Accord State v. Bailey, 2022-Ohio-4407, ¶ 8. These elements are
“conjunctive,” meaning “all three must apply to justify an appellate court’s intervention.”
Bailey at ¶ 9, citing State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27(2002). Intervention by an
appellate court for plain error “is warranted only under exceptional circumstances to
prevent injustice.” Id. at ¶ 8, citing State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91(1978), paragraph three
of the syllabus.
{¶21} The main distinction between plain-error review, which is the standard
employed when a defendant failed to object at trial, and harmless-error review, which is
employed when a defendant did object, is the party that bears the burden. See State v.
Jones, 2020-Ohio-3051, ¶ 17-18. Under plain-error review, the defendant bears the
burden to demonstrate the requirements for review whereas under harmless-error review,
the state bears the burden to demonstrate that the error did not affect the defendant’s
substantial rights. Id. at ¶ 17-18. See, State v. Bond, 2022-Ohio-4150, ¶7.
{¶22} In order to show that an error affected substantial rights, the defendant must
demonstrate “a reasonable probability that the error resulted in prejudice—the same
deferential standard for reviewing ineffective assistance of counsel claims.” (Emphasis
deleted.) State v. Rogers, 2015-Ohio-2459, ¶ 22, citing United States v. Dominguez
Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 81-83, (2004) (construing Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b), the federal analog
to Crim.R. 52(B)). Bond at ¶ 22.
{¶23} The Court in Rogers reaffirmed that even if an accused shows the trial court
committed plain error affecting the outcome of the proceeding, the appellate court is not
required to correct it. Id. at ¶ 23. The Supreme Court stated: Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00087 10
[W]e have “admonish[ed] courts to notice plain error ‘with the utmost
caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a manifest
miscarriage of justice.’” Barnes at 27, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 759 N.E.2d 1240,
quoting State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 372 N.E.2d 804 (1978), paragraph
three of the syllabus.
Rogers, ¶ 23; Accord, State v. Perry, 101 Ohio St.3d 118, 120 (2004).
Issue for Appellate Review: Whether the trial judge’s failure to sua sponte
declare a mistrial was an obvious error that affected the outcome of the trial
{¶24} The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution requires that a defendant accused of a state criminal violation shall be tried
before a panel of fair and impartial jurors. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968),
and State v. King, 10 Ohio App.3d 161(1st Dist. 1983). See, also, Ohio Constitution,
Article I, Section 10.
{¶25} The conclusions reached in a case should be generated only by evidence
and argument in open court, and not by any outside influence. Patterson v. Colorado, 205
U.S. 454 (1907). Further, when a juror refuses to consider the evidence or forms an
opinion as to guilt or innocence before all the evidence is presented, such activity
constitutes misconduct. State v. Taylor, 73 Ohio App.3d 827, 831(4th Dist. 1991). See
also, Carr v. State, 22 Ohio App. 78 (1st Dist. 1926); Busick v. State, 19 Ohio 198, 1850
WL 78(1850); and State v. Carter, 11 Ohio Dec. Rep. 123, 1890 WL 419(C.P. 1890);
State v. McMillen, 2009-Ohio-210, ¶ 122 (5th Dist.). However, the United States Supreme
Court has recognized: Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00087 11
[D]ue process does not require a new trial every time a juror has
been placed in a potentially compromising situation. Were that the rule, few
trials would be constitutionally acceptable.... [I]t is virtually impossible to
shield jurors from every contact or influence that might theoretically affect
their vote. Due process means a jury capable and willing to decide the case
solely on the evidence before it, and a trial judge ever watchful to prevent
prejudicial occurrences and to determine the effect of such occurrences
when they happen.
Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725,
738(1993).
{¶26} Ridenbaugh agrees that the Ohio Supreme Court has held a brief mention
to the jury that the defendant had been arrested and in custody at some point for his
aggravated murder charges did not erode the presumption of innocence in the same
manner as appearing for trial in jail clothing. State v. Williams, 2003-Ohio-4164. However,
Ridenbaugh cites State v. Collins, 2008-Ohio-3016 (8th Dist.) for the proposition that, in
certain instances, comments by a trial judge that a defendant was in jail violated the
defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial.
{¶27} We find Ridenbaugh’s reliance on Collins to be misplaced. In Collins, the
trial judge told the jury about Collins’ “incarceration” for “security purposes.” Collins,
2008–Ohio–3016 at ¶ 11, 16. In Collins, “the trial court not only made the initial error of
commenting on [Collins's] incarceration, but he compounded the problem exponentially
by adding that it was for ‘security purposes.’ Id. at ¶ 17.” State v. Robinson, 2013-Ohio-
4375, ¶ 72 (8th Dist.). In the case at bar, the comments were not made by the trial judge, Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00087 12
or even prompted by the state; rather, they were in response to a valid question posed to
the entire venire during voir dire. The comments were isolated and the prospective juror
who made the comments stated the fact he was familiar with Ridenbaugh from the juror’s
work at the jail would not influence the juror’s decision. T. at 42. The comments did not
imply that Ridenbaugh was in custody during the trial. “Evidence about a defendant’s
arrest and ensuing custody does not contravene the presumption of innocence,” and
while no specific curative instruction was requested or provided, the trial court fully
explained the presumption of innocence in the jury instructions. State v. Williams, 2003-
Ohio-4164, ¶ 75; State v. Messenger, 2021-Ohio-2044, ¶61 (10th Dist.).
{¶28} In addition, Ridenbaugh does not explain how the comments of the
prospective juror prejudiced him at trial in light of the voluminous admissible evidence
against him. Ridenbaugh has thus failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the
error resulted in prejudice, meaning that the error affected the outcome of the trial.
{¶29} We cannot find the trial judge abused his discretion in not sua sponte
declaring a mistrial. We find that Ridenbaugh has not demonstrated that any obvious error
occurred in the failure to sua sponte declare a mistrial, or that there is a reasonable
probability that the error resulted in prejudice, meaning that the error affected the outcome
of the trial. We decline to find a manifest injustice warranting the extraordinary step of
finding plain error in the trial judge’s failure to sua sponte declare a mistrial.
{¶30} Ridenbaugh’s First Assignment of Error is overruled.
II.
{¶31} In his Second Assignment of Error, Ridenbaugh contends that the
prosecutor misstated evidence presented during his trial, denying him a fair trial. Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00087 13
Ridenbaugh concedes his trial attorney did not object to the comments; therefore, we
must review this issue only for plain error. State v. Keenan, 66 Ohio St.3d 402, 405 (1993).
Standard of Appellate Review – Plain Error
{¶32} In State v. Knuff, the Supreme Court addressed the appropriate standard
of review for addressing claims of prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument,
We assess prosecutorial misconduct in closing arguments by asking
“‘whether the remarks were improper and, if so, whether they prejudicially
affected [the] substantial rights of the defendant.’” State v. Hessler, 90 Ohio
St.3d 108, 125, 734 N.E.2d 1237 (2000), quoting State v. Smith, 14 Ohio
St.3d 13, 14, 470 N.E.2d 883 (1984). A conviction may be upheld in the face
of a prosecutor’s improper remarks when it is “clear beyond a reasonable
doubt that the jury would have returned a verdict of guilty” regardless of the
comments. United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 511-512, 103 S.Ct.
1974, 76 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) (new trial unwarranted despite prosecutor’s
improper argument because of “overwhelming evidence of guilt and the
inconsistency of the scanty evidence tendered by the defendants”).
2024-Ohio-902, ¶238.
Issue for Appellate Review: Whether but for the prosecutor’s remarks during
closing arguments the jury would have acquitted Ridenbaugh
{¶33} Ridenbaugh cites the following remarks made by the prosecutor during
closing argument,
[A]gain, this is a trap house - this is a drug house - drug trafficking -
just drugs everywhere throughout the bedroom, throughout the house, Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00087 14
people fleeing out the back, people found in numerous locations in the
house. Uh - Mr. Quick and Mr. Ridenbaugh located in bedrooms without
their clothes on, sleeping. Uh - somebody in the basement -uh - throwing
drugs on the ground. Um - the - Miss Jarrett found in the bathtub hiding - uh
- it's just a drug - it's a drug world that this house was.
T. at 196. Then, in his rebuttal,
Um - but - out of those seven people in the house, only the Defendant
was found- uh - lying in his bed, according to Detective Conley. Uh - only
the Defendant requested personal items out of that room. Only the
Defendant acknowledged his items being in that room. Uh -it was his room.
It doesn't matter how many people where [sic] in the - uh - house - in the
drug house based upon Detective Conley's investigation and his interview
with -um - the Defendant.
T. at 205.
{¶34} The evidence presented during trial is that, "two people tried to run out the
back, one was laying on the floor, two people were found hiding inside the residence." T.
at 158. Quick and Ridenbaugh came outside upon police ordering them out. Id. Both
Quick and Ridenbaugh “came out no shirt, no shoes, clearly looked like they had been
asleep which is what we wanted for safety reasons." T. at 159-160. Police detained four
of the seven occupants while they searched the house. Id. at 133; 158.
{¶35} Quick was found on the bed inside his bedroom. Id. at 159-160. Because
he was worried about the few personal belongings he had in the bedroom getting stolen,
Ridenbaugh asked Detective Conley if he could get him his shoes, watch, and backpack, Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00087 15
none of which contained any contraband, from his bedroom. Id. at 162- 163; 171; State’s
Exhibit’s 3-E; 3-K; 3-C.
{¶36} Courts afford prosecutors wide latitude in closing arguments, and
prosecutors may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence at trial, commenting on
those inferences during closing arguments. State v. Hunt, 2013-Ohio-5326, ¶ 18 (10th
Dist.). We find the prosecutor’s statements to be based on reasonable inferences to the
evidence presented during the trial. Even if we were to assume arguendo that the
prosecutor’s statements were improper, Ridenbaugh is unable to demonstrate the type
of prejudice necessary to require reversal based on plain error from prosecutorial
misconduct. See State v. Guade, 2012-Ohio-1423, ¶ 20 (10th Dist.). “An improper
comment does not affect a substantial right of the accused if it is clear beyond a
reasonable doubt that the jury would have found the defendant guilty even without the
improper comments.” State v. McAlpin, 2022-Ohio-1567, ¶168, citing State v. Treesh, 90
Ohio St.3d 460, 464, (2001).
{¶37} Ridenbaugh was not deprived of a fair trial due to prosecutorial misconduct.
The evidence against him was overwhelming, and there is little chance that absent the
improper comments, the result of his trial would have been different. Any potential
prejudice was mitigated by the trial court’s instruction to the jury that closing arguments
are not evidence. McAlpin, 2022-Ohio-1567, ¶ 188, citing State v. Jones, 91 Ohio St.3d
at 353(2001).
{¶38} We find that Ridenbaugh has not demonstrated that any obvious error
occurred in the trial as a result of the comments made by the prosecutor during his closing
argument, or that there is a reasonable probability that the comments resulted in Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00087 16
prejudice, meaning that the error affected the outcome of the trial. We decline to find a
manifest injustice warranting the extraordinary step of finding plain error in the comments
made by the prosecutor during his closing argument.
{¶39} Ridenbaugh’s Second Assignment of Error is overruled.
III.
{¶40} In his Third Assignment of Error, Ridenbaugh argues he was denied the
effective assistance of trial counsel because counsel did not object to either the
statements made by the prospective juror during voir dire [Assignment of Error I], or to
incorrect statements made by the prosecutor during closing arguments [Assignment of
Error II].
Standard of Appellate Review
{¶41} To obtain a reversal of a conviction on the basis of ineffective assistance of
counsel, the defendant must prove (1) that counsel’s performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness, and (2) that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the
defendant resulting in an unreliable or fundamentally unfair outcome of the proceeding.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688 (1984).
{¶42} To show deficiency, a defendant must show that “counsel’s representation
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688. In addition, to establish
prejudice, a defendant must show “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
Id. at 694; Andtus v. Texas, 590 U.S. 806, 813-814 (2020). Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00087 17
{¶43} A defendant’s failure to satisfy one prong of the Strickland test negates a
court’s need to consider the other. Strickland at 697; State v. Madrigal, 87 Ohio St.3d
378, 389 (2000).
{¶44} “‘The failure to object to error, alone, is not enough to sustain a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel.’” State v. Fears, 86 Ohio St.3d 329, 347(1999), quoting
State v. Holloway, 38 Ohio St.3d 239, 244 (1988). A defendant must also show that he
was materially prejudiced by the failure to object. Holloway, 38 Ohio St.3d at 244. Accord,
State v. Hale, 2008-Ohio-3426, ¶233.
Issue for Appellate Review: Whether there is a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel’s failure to object, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
{¶45} In our disposition of Ridenbaugh’s First Assignment of Error, we found the
trial judge’s failure to declare a mistrial sua sponte based upon the comments of a
prospective juror did not prejudice Ridenbaugh’s substantial rights. Therefore, counsel
was not deficient in failing to move for a mistrial.
{¶46} Even if counsel’s performance at voir dire had been deficient, Ridenbaugh
cannot establish prejudice under Strickland. He has failed to establish a reasonable
probability that but for counsel’s allegedly deficient performance at voir dire, the result of
the trial would have been different. See, e.g., State v. Adams, 2004-Ohio-5845, ¶ 67.
{¶47} In our disposition of Ridenbaugh’s Second Assignment of Error, we found
that Ridenbaugh was not deprived of a fair trial due to prosecutorial misconduct.
Therefore, Ridenbaugh cannot establish prejudice under Strickland. He has failed to
establish a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s allegedly deficient performance Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00087 18
by failing to object to the prosecutor’s remarks, the result of the trial would have been
different. See, e.g., State v. Adams, 2004-Ohio-5845, ¶ 67.
{¶48} Ridenbaugh’s Third Assignment of Error is overruled.
IV.
{¶49} In his Fourth Assignment of Error, Ridenbaugh contends that his convictions
for Aggravated Possession of Methamphetamine, and Possession of a Fentanyl-Related
Compound as stated in Counts Three and Four of the indictment are against the manifest
weight of the evidence.
Standard of Review – Manifest Weight
{¶50} The term “‘manifest weight of the evidence’. . . relates to persuasion.”
Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶19. It “concerns ‘the inclination of the greater
amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than
the other.’” (Emphasis deleted.) State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387(1997),
superseded by constitutional amendment on other grounds as stated by State v. Smith,
80 Ohio St.3d 89, 102 at n.4 (1997); State v. Martin, 2022-Ohio-4175, ¶ 26.
{¶51} As to the weight of the evidence, the issue is whether the jury created a
manifest miscarriage of justice in resolving conflicting evidence, even though the
evidence of guilt was legally sufficient. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 386–387;
State v. Issa, 93 Ohio St.3d 49, 67 (2001).
{¶52} Weight of the evidence addresses the evidence's effect of inducing belief.
Thompkins, at 386-387; State v. Williams, 2003-Ohio-4396, ¶83. When a court of appeals
reverses a judgment of a trial court on the basis that the verdict is against the weight of
the evidence, the appellate court sits as a “thirteenth juror” and disagrees with the fact Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00087 19
finder’s resolution of the conflicting testimony. State v. Jordan, 2023-Ohio-3800;
Thompkins at 387, citing Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42(1982) (quotation marks
omitted); State v. Wilson, 2007-Ohio-2202, ¶25, citing Thompkins.
{¶53} In weighing the evidence, the court of appeals must always be mindful of
the presumption in favor of the finder of fact.” Eastley, 2012-Ohio-2179 at ¶ 21. “The
underlying rationale of giving deference to the findings of the trial court rests with the
knowledge that the [trier of fact] is best able to view the witnesses and observe their
demeanor, gestures and voice inflections, and use these observations in weighing the
credibility of the proffered testimony.” Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d
77, 80 (1984).
{¶54} When there is conflicting testimony presented at trial, a defendant is not
entitled to a reversal on manifest weight grounds merely because inconsistent evidence
was presented. “‘If the evidence is susceptible of more than one construction, the
reviewing court is bound to give it that interpretation which is consistent with the verdict
and judgment, most favorable to sustaining the verdict and judgment.’” Seasons Coal Co.,
Inc at fn. 3, quoting 5 Ohio Jur.3d, Appellate Review, §603, at 191-192 (1978); In re Z.C.,
2023-Ohio-4703, ¶14.
{¶55} The interplay between the presumption of correctness and the ability of an
appellate court to reverse a verdict based on the manifest weight of the evidence has
been stated as follows, “’Judgments supported by some competent, credible evidence
going to all the essential elements of the case will not be reversed by a reviewing court
as being against the manifest weight of the evidence.’” Seasons Coal Co., 10 Ohio St.3d
at 80, quoting C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Construction Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 279, 280 - 281. Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00087 20
See, also, Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co. v. Selz, 6 Ohio St.3d 169, 172 (1983); In re
Sekulich, 65 Ohio St.2d 13, 16 (1981). “The central question is whether ‘there is
substantial evidence upon which a jury could reasonably conclude that all the elements
have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.’ (Emphasis sic.) State v. Getsy, 84 Ohio
St.3d 180, 193-194, 702 N.E.2d 866 (1998), citing State v. Eley, 56 Ohio St.2d 169, 383
N.E.2d 132 (1978), syllabus, superseded by constitutional amendment on other grounds
as stated in Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 102 at n.4, 684 N.E.2d 668(1997).” State v.
Nicholson, 2024-Ohio-604, ¶71. A manifest-weight challenge should be sustained “‘only
in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’”
Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, (1st
Dist. 1983); Nicholson at ¶71.
Issue for Appellate Review: Whether the jury clearly lost their way and created
such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the convictions must be reversed and a new
trial ordered
{¶56} The drugs that supported the two counts decided by the jury were located
on February 17, 2023 during the execution of a search warrant at a home at 555 Seroco
Avenue. The drugs were recovered from the second bedroom in the home, which was
identified as Ridenbaugh’s. T. at 161; 170. Inside the room, a wooden box containing
bags of suspected methamphetamine and marihuana was found. T. at 110-114; 122;
State’s Exhibits 3-J; 3-M; 3-N; State’s Exhibit 4. A flashlight containing baggies of
suspected methamphetamine and fentanyl stuffed inside was also recovered from this
room. T. at 116-117; 122; State’s Exhibits 3-V; 3-X; 5; 6. Items removed from the room
associated with Ridenbaugh include a syringe, smoking bong and snorting straw. T. at Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00087 21
115-116; State’s Exhibits 3-E; 3-P; and 3-R. Scales were also recovered from the room.
T. at 116; State’s Exhibit 3-T. A pizza box with Ridenbaugh’s name was located inside
the room. T. at 118; State’s Exhibit 3-Y. A very small amount of additional
methamphetamine, (.22 grams) which the police suspected was fentanyl, was also found
on the bedside table T. at 123; 142; 148; State's Exhibits 9; 10; and 12. Ridenbaugh’s
shoes, watch, and backpack were recovered by the police at Ridenbaugh’s request from
his bedroom. Id. at 162- 163; 171; State’s Exhibit’s 3-E; 3-K; 3-C.
{¶57} Ridenbaugh does not dispute that drugs were found inside the second
bedroom. He also does not dispute that he asked the police officers to retrieve his
personal belongings from that room. Therefore, the only dispute concerns whether
Ridenbaugh “knowingly possessed” the drugs.
Knowingly
{¶58} R.C. 2901.22(B) sets forth the definition of how and when a person acts
knowingly,
A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is
aware that the person’s conduct will probably cause a certain result or will
probably be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances
when the person is aware that such circumstances probably exist. When
knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense,
such knowledge is established if a person subjectively believes that there is
a high probability of its existence and fails to make inquiry or acts with a
conscious purpose to avoid learning the fact. Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00087 22
{¶59} Whether a person acts knowingly can only be determined, absent a
defendant’s admission, from all the surrounding facts and circumstances, including the
doing of the act itself. State v. Johnson, 56 Ohio St.3d 35, 38 (1978) citing State v.
Huffman, 131 Ohio St. 27(1936): State v. Rojas, 64 Ohio St.3d 131, 139 (1992); State v.
Huff, 145 Ohio App.3d 555, 563 (1st Dist. 2001). (Footnote omitted.) Thus, “[t]he tests
for whether a defendant acted knowingly is a subjective one, but it is decided on objective
criteria.” Id. citing State v. Adams, 1995 WL 360247(4th Dist. June 8, 1995) and State v.
Paidousis, 2001 WL 436079 (10th Dist. May 1, 2001). See also, State v. Butler, 2012–
Ohio–5030, ¶ 25 (5th Dist.).
Possession
{¶60} R.C. 2925.01(K) defines possession as follows: “‘Possess’ or ‘possession’
means having control over a thing or substance, but may not be inferred solely from mere
access to the thing or substance through ownership or occupation of the premises upon
which the thing or substance is found.” R.C. 2901.21 provides the requirements for
criminal liability and provides that possession is a “voluntary act if the possessor
knowingly procured or received the thing possessed, or was aware of the possessor’s
control of the thing possessed for sufficient time to have ended possession.” R.C.
2901.21(D)(1).
{¶61} Possession may be actual or constructive. State v. Butler, 42 Ohio St.3d
174, 176 (1989); State v. Haynes, 25 Ohio St.2d 264, 267(1971); State v. Hankerson, 70
Ohio St.2d 87(1982), syllabus. To establish constructive possession, the evidence must
prove that the defendant was able to exercise dominion and control over the contraband.
State v. Wolery, 46 Ohio St.2d 316, 332(1976). Dominion and control may be proven by Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00087 23
circumstantial evidence alone. State v. Trembly, 137 Ohio App.3d 134 (8th Dist. 2000).
Circumstantial evidence that the defendant was located in very close proximity to the
contraband may show constructive possession. State v. Butler, supra; State v. Barr, 86
Ohio App.3d 227, 235 (8th Dist. 1993); State v. Morales, 2005-Ohio-4714, ¶ 50 (5th Dist.);
State v. Moses, 2004-Ohio-4943, ¶ 9 (5th Dist.). Ownership of the contraband need not
be established in order to find constructive possession. State v. Smith, 2002-Ohio-3034,
¶13 (9th Dist.), citing State v. Mann, 93 Ohio App.3d 301, 308 (8th Dist. 1993).
Furthermore, possession may be individual or joint. Wolery, 46 Ohio St.2d at 332. Multiple
individuals may constructively possess a particular item simultaneously. State v. Pitts,
2000-Ohio-1986 (4th Dist.). The Supreme Court has held that knowledge of illegal goods
on one’s property is sufficient to show constructive possession. State v. Hankerson, 70
Ohio St.2d 87, 91 (1982), certiorari denied, 459 U.S. 870 (1982). It would follow, therefore,
that knowledge of drugs and drug paraphernalia in plain view in one’s bedroom would be
circumstantial evidence of possession.
{¶62} In Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979), the United States
Supreme Court upheld a statute which provided that the presence in an automobile,
other than a public one, of a firearm “is presumptive evidence of its possession by all
persons occupying such automobile at the time except (a) where the firearm is found
upon the person of an occupant, (b) where the automobile is being operated for hire
by a licensed operator or (c) if the weapon is a handgun and one of the occupants,
not present under duress, has a license to have a handgun.” Id. at 442 U.S. 142-143.
The Court noted that the presumption was not mandatory; rather it was a permissive
inference available only in certain circumstances. Further, the jury could ignore the Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00087 24
presumption even if there was no affirmative proof offered in rebuttal by the accused.
Id. at 160-162. Finally, the trial judge in Allen explained, “that possession could be
actual or constructive, but that constructive possession could not exist without the
intent and ability to exercise control or dominion over the weapons.” Id. at 161.
{¶63} In the case at bar, a pizza box with Ridenbaugh’s name on it was
recovered from the second bedroom where the drugs were found. T. at 118; State’s
Exhibit 3-Y. The jury was shown photographs of the room associated with Quick and the
room associated with Ridenbaugh as they existed on the day the search warrant was
executed. Scales, a syringe, smoking bong and snorting straw are in plain view. T. at 115-
116; State’s Exhibits 3-E; 3-P; and 3-R; 3-T. Ridenbaugh admitted to the police that he
periodically uses both methamphetamine and fentanyl throughout the day. Id. at 161-
162. Ridenbaugh told the officer that the gun found on the bed in the room is a BB gun.
T. at 161. Ridenbaugh’s shoes, watch, and backpack were recovered by the police at
Ridenbaugh’s request from his bedroom. Id. at 162- 163; 171; State’s Exhibit’s 3-E; 3-K;
3-C.
{¶64} Circumstantial evidence is defined as “‘testimony not based on actual
personal knowledge or observation of the facts in controversy, but of other facts from
which deductions are drawn, showing indirectly the facts sought to be proved.’” State
v. Nicely, 39 Ohio St.3d 147,150 (1988), quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (5th Ed.
1979). “Circumstantial evidence and direct evidence inherently possess the same
probative value.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph one of the
syllabus, superseded by State constitutional amendment on other grounds as stated
in State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 102 at n.4 (1997). “‘[C]ircumstantial evidence is Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00087 25
sufficient to sustain a conviction if that evidence would convince the average mind of
the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v. McKnight, 2005-Ohio-
6046, ¶ 75, quoting State v. Heinish, 50 Ohio St.3d 231, 238(1990).
{¶65} The facts strongly suggest that Ridenbaugh was not the only person able
to exercise dominion over the drugs. The jury could find that Ridenbaugh jointly
possessed the drugs with Quick. In the case at bar, ample circumstantial evidence existed
that would allow the trier of fact to conclude that Ridenbaugh constructively possessed
the drugs found in the second bedroom associated with him. As long as there is
substantial evidence going to all the essential elements of the case the case will not be
reversed by a reviewing court as being against the manifest weight of the evidence. State
v. Getsy, 84 Ohio St.3d 180, 193-194 (1998); State v. Nicholson, 2024-Ohio-604, ¶71.
{¶66} Upon review of the entire record, weighing the evidence and all reasonable
inferences as a thirteenth juror, including considering the credibility of witnesses, we
cannot reach the conclusion that the jury lost their way and created a manifest miscarriage
of justice. We do not find the jury erred when they found Ridenbaugh guilty. Taken as a
whole, the testimony and record contain ample evidence of Ridenbaugh’s responsibility
for the alleged offenses. The fact that the jury chose to believe the testimony of the state’s
witnesses does not, in and of itself, render his conviction against the manifest weight of
the evidence. While Ridenbaugh is certainly free to argue that he did not know there were
drugs inside the wooden box or the flashlight, on a full review of the record we cannot say
that the jury clearly lost their way or created a manifest injustice by choosing not to believe
his argument and explanations. The jury was able to observe the testimony subject to Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00087 26
cross-examination, see photographs taken when the search warrant was executed, as
well as hear Ridenbaugh’s explanation and arguments.
{¶67} Finally, upon careful consideration of the record in its entirety, we find that
there is substantial evidence presented which if believed, proves all the elements of the
offenses for which Ridenbaugh was convicted. We do not find that the jury disregarded
or overlooked compelling evidence that weighed against conviction.
{¶68} Ridenbaugh’s Fourth Assignment of Error is overruled.
{¶69} The judgment of the Licking County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
By Gwin, P.J.,
Hoffman, J., and
Baldwin, J., concur [Cite as State v. Ridenbaugh, 2024-Ohio-3072.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR LICKING COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO : : Plaintiff-Appellee : : : -vs- : JUDGMENT ENTRY : TEDDY E. RIDENBAUGH, JR. : : : Defendant-Appellant : CASE NO. 2023 CA 00087
For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion, the judgment of
the Licking County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Costs to appellant.
_________________________________ HON. W. SCOTT GWIN
_________________________________ HON. WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN
_________________________________ HON. CRAIG R. BALDWIN