IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE FILED FEBRUARY 1998 SESSION March 18, 1998
Cecil W. Crowson STATE OF TENNESSEE, * Appellate Court Clerk C.C.A. # 01C01-9705-CC-00199
Appellee, * FRANKLIN COUNTY
VS. * Hon. Buddy D. Perry, Judge
RICHARD D. SAWYER, * (DUI, Third Offense and Driving on a
Appellant. * Revoked License, Second Offense)
For Appellant: For Appellee:
Robert S. Peters John Knox Walkup Swafford, Peters & Priest Attorney General and Reporter 100 First Avenue, Southwest Winchester, TN 37398 Ruth Anne Thompson (at trial and on appeal) Counsel for the State 425 Fifth Avenue North Timothy Priest Cordell Hull Building, Second Floor Swafford, Peters & Priest Nashville, TN 37243-0493 100 First Avenue, Southwest Winchester, TN 37398 Stephen M. Blount (at sentencing) Assistant District Attorney General 324 Dinah Shore Boulevard Winchester, TN 37398
OPINION FILED:__________________________
AFFIRMED
GARY R. WADE, JUDGE OPINION
The defendant, Richard D. Sawyer, was convicted of driving under the
influence, third offense, and driving on a revoked license, second offense. The trial
court imposed concurrent sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days for
driving under the influence and ninety days for driving on a revoked license. See
Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 55-10-401(a) and 55-50-504(a)(1). The defendant was fined
$1,050.00.
In this appeal of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence and argues that the sentence was excessive. We affirm the judgment of
the trial court.
At 1:16 A.M. on April 4, 1995, Cowan Assistant Police Chief Tony
Bean observed a brown Ford LTD veer several times outside of its line of traffic.
Officer Bean, accompanied by Officer Chris Fann, stopped the vehicle and
determined that the defendant, the only occupant, was the driver. When the
defendant stepped out of the car, Officer Bean smelled alcohol and could see vomit
on the defendant's pants and shirt. The defendant explained that he had been
playing pool at the Pit Stop when he became ill and decided to go home. When
asked whether he needed an ambulance, the defendant declined. Officer Bean then
administered four field sobriety tests, all of which, in the officer's opinion, the
defendant failed.
Later, Officer Bean learned that the defendant's driver's license had
been revoked and that he had been issued a restricted license. When asked about
this, the defendant admitted that he was not allowed to be driving after 1:00 A.M.
The restricted license was for transportation to and from work only.
2 The defendant declined a blood alcohol test. At trial, Officer Bean
recalled that the defendant explained that he had not taken his medicine and that he
had a physical ailment that made it difficult for him to stand. There was a medicine
bottle found in the front seat of the car. Officer Bean remembered that both the
vomit and the breath of the defendant smelled of alcohol.
Officer Fann recalled seeing the defendant's car weave back and forth
across the yellow and white line before Officer Bean turned on the blue lights and
siren. He testified that he observed each of the field sobriety tests. Officer Fann
also came to the conclusion that the defendant was too intoxicated to be driving.
The defendant, a security guard at Shaw Industry, testified that he had
a restricted driver's license at the time of his arrest which allowed him to drive to and
from work. He claimed that his hours varied at his place of employment and that he
was under the care of a physician for both depression and epileptic seizures. He
explained that he had been prescribed Perphenazine which he was required to take
each day for his epilepsy.
The defendant insisted that he had not consumed any alcohol prior to
his arrest and had stopped at the Pit Stop only to play pool and drink Coca-Cola.
The defendant testified that he became ill and that a patron from Chicago, who was
quite intoxicated, tried to assist him but threw up on him and spilled whiskey on him.
The defendant stated that he was on his way to his place of employment to find his
medicine when he was stopped by the police. He claimed that his seizure had
passed before he began to operate his car and that his driving might have appeared
erratic because the officers were following too closely behind. He claimed that he
began to have another seizure at the time Officer Bean began to administer the field
3 sobriety test.
Defense witness Bill Williams, who arrived at the Pit Stop between
7:00 and 8:00 P.M. prior to the arrest, testified that he did not see the defendant
drink alcohol on the night in question. When W illiams offered the defendant a drink,
the defendant responded, "I can't, Bill, I'm on medication." Williams, who left
between 10:30 and 11:00 P.M., recalled that there was a man from Chicago at the
Pit Stop who was intoxicated. He testified that the defendant was not under the
influence of alcohol when last seen.
After the jury found the defendant guilty of driving under the influence
and driving on a revoked license, the state presented documents establishing his
prior convictions on each of the offenses. In consequence, the trial judge concluded
that the defendant was guilty of driving under the influence, third offense, and
driving on a revoked license, second offense.
In this appeal, the defendant complains that driving from a
"recreational establishment to his place of employment for the purpose of procuring
needed medicine," was "within the scope of his restricted [driver's] license." He
insists that there was insufficient evidence of any consumption of alcohol on his
part. He claims that the corroborated "story about the man from Illinois who was
drunk, irrational, and possessed with a propensity to propel vomit on the helpful and
unwary" was an adequate explanation of the incriminating circumstances.
On appeal, however, the state is entitled to the strongest legitimate
view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences which might be drawn therefrom.
State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978). The credibility of the
4 witnesses, the weight to be given their testimony, and the reconciliation of conflicts
in the evidence are matters entrusted exclusively to the jury as the triers of fact.
Byrge v. State, 575 S.W.2d 292, 295 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978). A guilty verdict,
approved by the trial judge, accredits the testimony of the state's witnesses and
resolves all conflicts in the evidence favorable to the theory of the state. State v.
Hatchett, 560 S.W.2d 627, 630 (Tenn. 1978).
Two law enforcement officers were of the opinion that the defendant
was intoxicated. Clearly, the defendant was driving his automobile on a revoked
license and after the time authorized by his restricted use. The jury chose the
accredit the testimony of the prosecution witnesses and reject that of the defense.
That was their prerogative. In our view, a rational trier of fact could have found the
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IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE FILED FEBRUARY 1998 SESSION March 18, 1998
Cecil W. Crowson STATE OF TENNESSEE, * Appellate Court Clerk C.C.A. # 01C01-9705-CC-00199
Appellee, * FRANKLIN COUNTY
VS. * Hon. Buddy D. Perry, Judge
RICHARD D. SAWYER, * (DUI, Third Offense and Driving on a
Appellant. * Revoked License, Second Offense)
For Appellant: For Appellee:
Robert S. Peters John Knox Walkup Swafford, Peters & Priest Attorney General and Reporter 100 First Avenue, Southwest Winchester, TN 37398 Ruth Anne Thompson (at trial and on appeal) Counsel for the State 425 Fifth Avenue North Timothy Priest Cordell Hull Building, Second Floor Swafford, Peters & Priest Nashville, TN 37243-0493 100 First Avenue, Southwest Winchester, TN 37398 Stephen M. Blount (at sentencing) Assistant District Attorney General 324 Dinah Shore Boulevard Winchester, TN 37398
OPINION FILED:__________________________
AFFIRMED
GARY R. WADE, JUDGE OPINION
The defendant, Richard D. Sawyer, was convicted of driving under the
influence, third offense, and driving on a revoked license, second offense. The trial
court imposed concurrent sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days for
driving under the influence and ninety days for driving on a revoked license. See
Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 55-10-401(a) and 55-50-504(a)(1). The defendant was fined
$1,050.00.
In this appeal of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence and argues that the sentence was excessive. We affirm the judgment of
the trial court.
At 1:16 A.M. on April 4, 1995, Cowan Assistant Police Chief Tony
Bean observed a brown Ford LTD veer several times outside of its line of traffic.
Officer Bean, accompanied by Officer Chris Fann, stopped the vehicle and
determined that the defendant, the only occupant, was the driver. When the
defendant stepped out of the car, Officer Bean smelled alcohol and could see vomit
on the defendant's pants and shirt. The defendant explained that he had been
playing pool at the Pit Stop when he became ill and decided to go home. When
asked whether he needed an ambulance, the defendant declined. Officer Bean then
administered four field sobriety tests, all of which, in the officer's opinion, the
defendant failed.
Later, Officer Bean learned that the defendant's driver's license had
been revoked and that he had been issued a restricted license. When asked about
this, the defendant admitted that he was not allowed to be driving after 1:00 A.M.
The restricted license was for transportation to and from work only.
2 The defendant declined a blood alcohol test. At trial, Officer Bean
recalled that the defendant explained that he had not taken his medicine and that he
had a physical ailment that made it difficult for him to stand. There was a medicine
bottle found in the front seat of the car. Officer Bean remembered that both the
vomit and the breath of the defendant smelled of alcohol.
Officer Fann recalled seeing the defendant's car weave back and forth
across the yellow and white line before Officer Bean turned on the blue lights and
siren. He testified that he observed each of the field sobriety tests. Officer Fann
also came to the conclusion that the defendant was too intoxicated to be driving.
The defendant, a security guard at Shaw Industry, testified that he had
a restricted driver's license at the time of his arrest which allowed him to drive to and
from work. He claimed that his hours varied at his place of employment and that he
was under the care of a physician for both depression and epileptic seizures. He
explained that he had been prescribed Perphenazine which he was required to take
each day for his epilepsy.
The defendant insisted that he had not consumed any alcohol prior to
his arrest and had stopped at the Pit Stop only to play pool and drink Coca-Cola.
The defendant testified that he became ill and that a patron from Chicago, who was
quite intoxicated, tried to assist him but threw up on him and spilled whiskey on him.
The defendant stated that he was on his way to his place of employment to find his
medicine when he was stopped by the police. He claimed that his seizure had
passed before he began to operate his car and that his driving might have appeared
erratic because the officers were following too closely behind. He claimed that he
began to have another seizure at the time Officer Bean began to administer the field
3 sobriety test.
Defense witness Bill Williams, who arrived at the Pit Stop between
7:00 and 8:00 P.M. prior to the arrest, testified that he did not see the defendant
drink alcohol on the night in question. When W illiams offered the defendant a drink,
the defendant responded, "I can't, Bill, I'm on medication." Williams, who left
between 10:30 and 11:00 P.M., recalled that there was a man from Chicago at the
Pit Stop who was intoxicated. He testified that the defendant was not under the
influence of alcohol when last seen.
After the jury found the defendant guilty of driving under the influence
and driving on a revoked license, the state presented documents establishing his
prior convictions on each of the offenses. In consequence, the trial judge concluded
that the defendant was guilty of driving under the influence, third offense, and
driving on a revoked license, second offense.
In this appeal, the defendant complains that driving from a
"recreational establishment to his place of employment for the purpose of procuring
needed medicine," was "within the scope of his restricted [driver's] license." He
insists that there was insufficient evidence of any consumption of alcohol on his
part. He claims that the corroborated "story about the man from Illinois who was
drunk, irrational, and possessed with a propensity to propel vomit on the helpful and
unwary" was an adequate explanation of the incriminating circumstances.
On appeal, however, the state is entitled to the strongest legitimate
view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences which might be drawn therefrom.
State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978). The credibility of the
4 witnesses, the weight to be given their testimony, and the reconciliation of conflicts
in the evidence are matters entrusted exclusively to the jury as the triers of fact.
Byrge v. State, 575 S.W.2d 292, 295 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978). A guilty verdict,
approved by the trial judge, accredits the testimony of the state's witnesses and
resolves all conflicts in the evidence favorable to the theory of the state. State v.
Hatchett, 560 S.W.2d 627, 630 (Tenn. 1978).
Two law enforcement officers were of the opinion that the defendant
was intoxicated. Clearly, the defendant was driving his automobile on a revoked
license and after the time authorized by his restricted use. The jury chose the
accredit the testimony of the prosecution witnesses and reject that of the defense.
That was their prerogative. In our view, a rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of each of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. Tenn. R. App.
P. 13(e). The evidence of the defendant's guilt more than satisfied the prescribed
standard. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781 (1979).
The defendant also complains that the sentence was excessive. He
argues that the trial court should have imposed the minimum penalty of one hundred
twenty days as prescribed by the legislature. We disagree.
In misdemeanor sentencing, a separate sentencing hearing is not
mandatory but the court is required to provide the defendant with a reasonable
opportunity to be heard as to the length and manner of the sentence. Tenn. Code
Ann. § 40-35-302(a). Misdemeanor sentences must be specific and in accordance
with the principles, purposes, and goals of the Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of
1989. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-104, -117, and -302; State v. Palmer, 902
S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tenn. 1995). The misdemeanor offender must be sentenced to
5 an authorized determinant sentence with a percentage of that sentence designated
for eligibility for rehabilitative programs. Generally, a percentage of not greater than
75% of the sentence should be fixed for a misdemeanor offender; however, a DUI
offender may be required to serve the full 100% of his sentence. Id. at 393-94. In
determining the percentage of the sentence, the court must consider enhancement
and mitigating factors as well as the legislative purposes and principles related to
sentencing. Id.
Upon service of that percentage, the administrative agency governing
the rehabilitative programs determines which among the lawful programs available is
appropriate. The trial court retains the authority to place the defendant on probation
either immediately or after a term of periodic or continuous confinement. Tenn.
Code Ann. § 40-35-302(e). The legislature has encouraged courts to consider
public or private agencies for probation supervision prior to directing supervision by
the Department of Correction. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-302(f). The governing
statute is designed to provide the trial court with continuing jurisdiction in
misdemeanor cases and a wide latitude of flexibility. "The misdemeanant, unlike the
felon, is not entitled to the presumption of a minimum sentence." State v. Creasy,
885 S.W.2d 829, 832 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).
The state established a significant criminal history on the part of the
defendant. His violation of the terms of his restricted license indicates an
unwillingness to comply with conditions of release. While one of the convictions
here was for driving under the influence, third offense, this is actually his fourth such
offense over a thirteen-year period. Apprised that the defendant and his wife had
medical problems, the trial court imposed the maximum sentence for driving under
the influence but ordered the sentence for driving on a revoked license to be
6 concurrently served. The primary basis for the imposition of a sentence above the
minimum for driving under the influence was the defendant's lengthy history of
drinking and driving.
In our view, the trial court addressed the appropriate factors in
considering the sentence to impose. The defendant has failed to rebut the
presumption of the correctness of the sentence.
The judgment is, therefore, affirmed.
________________________________ Gary R. Wade, Judge
CONCUR:
_____________________________ William M. Barker, Judge
_____________________________ Curwood Witt, Judge