[736]*736Brachtenbagh, J.
Virginia Sue LaVanway was charged with and convicted of grand larceny. Her codefendant, Milton V. LaVanway, whom she married after they were charged with these crimes, was charged with and convicted of aiding and abetting grand larceny. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions and we granted review.
The defendant wife had been employed by a restaurant but had been discharged from that employment. In the early evening of June 24, 1970, the defendants visited the restaurant to obtain her final paycheck. The. defendants went to the rest rooms in the rear of the restaurant and then returned to the front where defendant wife used the telephone which was located next to the cash register. Defendant husband stood near the restaurant door where he paced back and forth, looked about and kept moving around, according to the witnesses. The restaurant employee who' was the only one operating the cash register that evening heard the register bell, indicating the register was being opened, and.went toward the cash register. He saw defendant wife facing the cash register, then the defendants left the restaurant. A witness reported to the employee that his son had seen a young woman at the register with a stack of money bills in her hand. An immediate tally of the register disclosed a shortage, of approximately $250.
The first issue arises from the following testimony elicited by the prosecutor:
Q. Mrs. LaVanway, is it true that in June of this year you were addicted to or were using a narcotic drug? A. Yes. Q. Mrs. LaVanway, is it true that on July 14th, you went onto a methadone program to cure a narcotic addiction or use? A. Yes.
It appears that the question of admissibility of this testimony was discussed in chambers before the trial started. Apparently, although.it is not clear from the record, the court indicated that testimony as to drug addiction would be inadmissible in the state’s case. Only after defendant wife took the stand and testified as to her character, as described later, did the court allow this testimony. Admissi[737]*737bility of evidence of prior drug addiction can be considered on at least two distinctly different grounds. First, that it relates to the witness’ credibility and second, that it is an unrelated act of misconduct, admissible to contradict character evidence. It is obvious that there is an immense difference between the practical effect of the two theories of admissibility. If it is admissible to attack credibility, it will come in whenever a defendant testifies while, if it is restricted to countering character evidence, it will only be used against that defendant who chooses to put his or her character into evidence. As to admissibility relating to credibility, there is a division of authority. See 3A J. Wigmore, Evidence § 934 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1970); 52 A.L.R.2d 848 (1957).
We note that we are not confronted with a situation where it is contended that the witness was under the influence of drugs at the time of the events to which he testifies as in Doe v. State, 487 P.2d 47 (Alas. 1971), or that the witness is under the influence at the time of testifying such as in State v. Reyes, 99 Ariz. 257, 408 P.2d 400 (1965).
The Court of Appeals recognized the division in the authorities but felt bound by our decision in Lankford v. Tombari, 35 Wn.2d 412, 213 P.2d 627, 19 A.L.R.2d 462 (1950), wherein a terse holding concluded that drug use or addiction is relevant to veracity. In view of society’s deep concern today with drug usage and its consequent condemnation by many if not most, evidence of drug addiction is necessarily prejudicial in the minds of the average juror. Additionally there is no proof before the court connecting addiction to a lack of veracity. If such medical or scientific proof were made, it might well be admissible as relevant to credibility. Absent such proof its relevance on credibility or veracity is an unknown factor while its prejudice is within common knowledge. The Lankford v. Tombari decision is limited accordingly by our view herein.
However, the alternate and more restrictive ground of character impeachment dictates admissibility here. The [738]*738defendant wife voluntarily put her character before the jury. She testified to her work experience, that she had attended college, that she had been a candidate in the Miss Yakima pageant, that she had párticipated in a glee club, drill team, pep club and was the treasurer of a science club. Implicit in such testimony is the painting of a picture of a person most unlikely to commit grand larceny. While the character of defendant husband was not so clearly put into evidence, it was introduced sufficiently to subject the defendant husbánd to the same questions as recited above which were asked of the wife. There was testimony as to his occupation as a professional photographer, as to his physical dress on the day in question, as to his somewhat lengthy engagement and subsequent marriage to the • defendant wife whose character had been so vividly pictured, as to his working in his garden at home and as to the planned attendance at a family barbecue on the day of the alleged crime. The state was entitled to complete the tapestry with his admitted drug addiction.
This court has consistently followed the rule stated in State v. Emmanuel, 42 Wn.2d 1, 14, 253 P.2d 386 (1953), that:
[I]f a defendant puts his prior conduct into issue by testifying as to his own past good behavior, he may be cross-examined as to specific acts of misconduct unrelated to the crime charged. State v. Armstrong, 29 Wash. 57, 69 Pac. 392; State v. Melvern, 32 Wash. 7, 72 Pac. 489; State v. Hollister, 157 Wash. 4, 288 Pac. 249; State v. Johnson, 180 Wash. 401, 40 P. (2d) 159; State v. Kelly, 187 Wash. 301, 60 P. (2d) 50.
The court instructed the jury that evidence of prior misconduct was to be considered only as bearing on credibility and on the weight to be given to the witness’ testimony. That instruction was proposed by the defendants. The record discloses that the defendants felt the instruction was necessary to lessen the impact of the evidence. Defendants had a choice to propose no instruction, to propose one [739]*739relating to credibility or one relating to character. The choice was made and cannot now be urged as error.
Defendant husband assigns error to the court’s instruction on aiding and abetting which was as follows:
You are instructed that every person concerned in the commission of grand larceny, whether he directly or indirectly commits the acts constituting the offense or aids or abets in the commission, is guilty of grand larceny.
Thus, the act of one individual among several who are present at the scene and participate in grand larceny, would be the acts of each and all, as a principal, whether each of them took, stole, or carried away the property or not. For a person to be an aider or abettor by his presence, he must be ready to assist, ready to render assistance should it become necessary, or must assist the perpetrator of the crime by his presence.
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[736]*736Brachtenbagh, J.
Virginia Sue LaVanway was charged with and convicted of grand larceny. Her codefendant, Milton V. LaVanway, whom she married after they were charged with these crimes, was charged with and convicted of aiding and abetting grand larceny. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions and we granted review.
The defendant wife had been employed by a restaurant but had been discharged from that employment. In the early evening of June 24, 1970, the defendants visited the restaurant to obtain her final paycheck. The. defendants went to the rest rooms in the rear of the restaurant and then returned to the front where defendant wife used the telephone which was located next to the cash register. Defendant husband stood near the restaurant door where he paced back and forth, looked about and kept moving around, according to the witnesses. The restaurant employee who' was the only one operating the cash register that evening heard the register bell, indicating the register was being opened, and.went toward the cash register. He saw defendant wife facing the cash register, then the defendants left the restaurant. A witness reported to the employee that his son had seen a young woman at the register with a stack of money bills in her hand. An immediate tally of the register disclosed a shortage, of approximately $250.
The first issue arises from the following testimony elicited by the prosecutor:
Q. Mrs. LaVanway, is it true that in June of this year you were addicted to or were using a narcotic drug? A. Yes. Q. Mrs. LaVanway, is it true that on July 14th, you went onto a methadone program to cure a narcotic addiction or use? A. Yes.
It appears that the question of admissibility of this testimony was discussed in chambers before the trial started. Apparently, although.it is not clear from the record, the court indicated that testimony as to drug addiction would be inadmissible in the state’s case. Only after defendant wife took the stand and testified as to her character, as described later, did the court allow this testimony. Admissi[737]*737bility of evidence of prior drug addiction can be considered on at least two distinctly different grounds. First, that it relates to the witness’ credibility and second, that it is an unrelated act of misconduct, admissible to contradict character evidence. It is obvious that there is an immense difference between the practical effect of the two theories of admissibility. If it is admissible to attack credibility, it will come in whenever a defendant testifies while, if it is restricted to countering character evidence, it will only be used against that defendant who chooses to put his or her character into evidence. As to admissibility relating to credibility, there is a division of authority. See 3A J. Wigmore, Evidence § 934 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1970); 52 A.L.R.2d 848 (1957).
We note that we are not confronted with a situation where it is contended that the witness was under the influence of drugs at the time of the events to which he testifies as in Doe v. State, 487 P.2d 47 (Alas. 1971), or that the witness is under the influence at the time of testifying such as in State v. Reyes, 99 Ariz. 257, 408 P.2d 400 (1965).
The Court of Appeals recognized the division in the authorities but felt bound by our decision in Lankford v. Tombari, 35 Wn.2d 412, 213 P.2d 627, 19 A.L.R.2d 462 (1950), wherein a terse holding concluded that drug use or addiction is relevant to veracity. In view of society’s deep concern today with drug usage and its consequent condemnation by many if not most, evidence of drug addiction is necessarily prejudicial in the minds of the average juror. Additionally there is no proof before the court connecting addiction to a lack of veracity. If such medical or scientific proof were made, it might well be admissible as relevant to credibility. Absent such proof its relevance on credibility or veracity is an unknown factor while its prejudice is within common knowledge. The Lankford v. Tombari decision is limited accordingly by our view herein.
However, the alternate and more restrictive ground of character impeachment dictates admissibility here. The [738]*738defendant wife voluntarily put her character before the jury. She testified to her work experience, that she had attended college, that she had been a candidate in the Miss Yakima pageant, that she had párticipated in a glee club, drill team, pep club and was the treasurer of a science club. Implicit in such testimony is the painting of a picture of a person most unlikely to commit grand larceny. While the character of defendant husband was not so clearly put into evidence, it was introduced sufficiently to subject the defendant husbánd to the same questions as recited above which were asked of the wife. There was testimony as to his occupation as a professional photographer, as to his physical dress on the day in question, as to his somewhat lengthy engagement and subsequent marriage to the • defendant wife whose character had been so vividly pictured, as to his working in his garden at home and as to the planned attendance at a family barbecue on the day of the alleged crime. The state was entitled to complete the tapestry with his admitted drug addiction.
This court has consistently followed the rule stated in State v. Emmanuel, 42 Wn.2d 1, 14, 253 P.2d 386 (1953), that:
[I]f a defendant puts his prior conduct into issue by testifying as to his own past good behavior, he may be cross-examined as to specific acts of misconduct unrelated to the crime charged. State v. Armstrong, 29 Wash. 57, 69 Pac. 392; State v. Melvern, 32 Wash. 7, 72 Pac. 489; State v. Hollister, 157 Wash. 4, 288 Pac. 249; State v. Johnson, 180 Wash. 401, 40 P. (2d) 159; State v. Kelly, 187 Wash. 301, 60 P. (2d) 50.
The court instructed the jury that evidence of prior misconduct was to be considered only as bearing on credibility and on the weight to be given to the witness’ testimony. That instruction was proposed by the defendants. The record discloses that the defendants felt the instruction was necessary to lessen the impact of the evidence. Defendants had a choice to propose no instruction, to propose one [739]*739relating to credibility or one relating to character. The choice was made and cannot now be urged as error.
Defendant husband assigns error to the court’s instruction on aiding and abetting which was as follows:
You are instructed that every person concerned in the commission of grand larceny, whether he directly or indirectly commits the acts constituting the offense or aids or abets in the commission, is guilty of grand larceny.
Thus, the act of one individual among several who are present at the scene and participate in grand larceny, would be the acts of each and all, as a principal, whether each of them took, stole, or carried away the property or not. For a person to be an aider or abettor by his presence, he must be ready to assist, ready to render assistance should it become necessary, or must assist the perpetrator of the crime by his presence.
You are further instructed that to aid and abet may consist of words spoken, or acts done, for the purpose of assisting in the commission of a crime or of counseling, encouraging, commanding or inducing its commission. To constitute an aider or abettor, it is essential that the aider or abettor should share the criminal intent of the person or party who committed the offense.
The defendant proposed an instruction which included this language: “There must be some overt act, the doing or saying of something, directly or indirectly contributing to a criminal act, and mere assent to a criminal act is insufficient.”
Defendant relies on State v. Peasley, 80 Wash. 99, 141 P. 316 (1914), which held erroneous an instruction which said that assent alone would constitute aiding and abetting. It is true that assent to the crime alone is not aiding and abetting, but the instruction correctly required a specific criminal intent, not merely passive assent, and the state of being ready to assist or actually assisting by his presence. The correct rule is set out in State v. Redden, 71 Wn.2d 147, 150, 426 P.2d 854 (1967):
[T]he jury was properly instructed that the defendant might be considered a principal if it found that he directly or indirectly aided and abetted in the commission [740]*740of the crime. A separate instruction, requiring the finding of an overt act, was unnecessary; since the instruction, as given, details what acts constitute aiding and abetting under the statute; which acts themselves signify some form of overt act in the doing or saying of something that either directly or indirectly contributes to the criminal offense.
Accord, State v. Palmer, 1 Wn. App. 152, 459 P.2d 812 (1969). State v. Catterall, 5 Wn. App. 373, 486 P.2d 1167 (1971), also cited by defendant, is not inconsistent with our holding. It merely confirms that physical presence and assent alone are not sufficient to constitute aiding and abetting. The remaining assignments of error dealing largely with matters within the discretion of the trial court are without merit.
Judgments of conviction are affirmed.
Hale, C.J., and Hunter, Hamilton, Stafford, and Wright, JJ., concur.