State v. Reldan
This text of 400 A.2d 138 (State v. Reldan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF,
v.
ROBERT RELDAN, DEFENDANT.
Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division.
*563 Mr. Robert Leaman, Assistant County Prosecutor, for plaintiff (Mr. Roger W. Breslin, Prosecutor of Bergen County, attorney).
*564 Mr. Frank Wagner, Deputy Public Defender, for defendant.
LUCCHI, J.S.C.
Counsel for the defense has moved to dismiss the above-captioned indictment for lack of jurisdiction. The facts, as derived from counsel's briefs, grand jury testimony and oral argument, are as follows:
On October 6, 1975 Mrs. Susan Heynes was reported missing from her home in Haworth, New Jersey, under circumstances that led her husband to believe she had been the victim of foul play. Mrs. Heynes was last seen by a neighbor outside her home at about 3:30 P.M. on the day of her disappearance.
On October 27, 1975 the nude body of Susan Heynes was discovered partially hidden beneath some broken-off tree branches in a wooded area of Valley Cottage, New York. An autopsy performed by the Rockland County Chief Medical Examiner indicated the cause of death to be homicide by strangulation.
Vacuum sweepings subsequently taken from defendant's Opel station wagon revealed strands of hair exhibiting the same microscopic characteristics as head hair samples taken from Susan Heynes. In addition, sensitive tracking dogs employed by the State detected Mrs. Heynes scent in defendant's automobile.
On October 14, 1975 Susan Reeve disappeared from her home in Demarest, New Jersey. She was last seen by a witness who "noticed something was wrong" as he observed her standing with a man near a parked station wagon about a quarter of a mile from her home. The station wagon was later positively identified as belonging to defendant.
Susan Reeve's nude body was discovered on October 28, 1975 in Tallman State Park, New York. The body had been partially covered with broken-off swamp reeds. The Rockland County Chief Medical Examiner was again summoned and determined the cause of death to be homicide by strangulation. In addition, he opined that Ms. Reeve had been the victim of rape and her body moved to the site of *565 its discovery subsequent to her murder. Articulable similarities in the manner of disappearance and death of the two victims led the Chief Medical Examiner to conclude that they were murdered by the same person.
As in the case of Susan Heynes, the scent of Susan Reeve was subsequently detected by tracking dogs to be present inside defendant's automobile. Ms. Reeve's scent was also located in two areas at the house of defendant's aunt in Closter, New Jersey. In one such area, the garage, investigators discovered blood stains of the same type as Susan Reeve's blood. Finally, vacuum sweepings extracted from defendant's automobile revealed the presence of hair strands possessing the same microscopic characteristics as those belonging to Susan Reeve.
On January 20, 1977 a Bergen County grand jury returned a two-count indictment against defendant charging him with the murders of Susan Heynes and Susan Reeve, in violation of the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2A:113-1 and 2A:113-2. Defendant now moves pursuant to R. 3:10-4 for the dismissal of said indictment based upon lack of jurisdiction.
Both the State and defense counsel have noted, and this court is likewise cognizant of, the fundamental legal principle that "an essential element necessary to the invocation of jurisdiction in criminal cases is that the crime be committed in the state in which the case is tried." State v. McDowney, 49 N.J. 471, 474 (1967); see also, State v. Stow, 83 N.J.L. 14 (Sup. Ct. 1912); State v. Wyckoff, 31 N.J.L. 65 (Sup. Ct. 1864); and 4 Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure § 1501 (1957).
The opinion in McDowney, supra, recognized that a defendant moving pretrial to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is faced with a significant burden. The court noted that:
* * * a pretrial motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction * * * should be granted only after very careful consideration. The moving party must carry the burden by showing that no inference could reasonably be drawn placing the site of the crime within the State. *566 Such consideration should require more than the mere presentation of affidavits. [49 N.J. at 475]
McDowney involved a motion to dismiss a murder indictment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. In that case the body of the victim was found in New Jersey, as was the bloody automobile used to transport it into this State. Notwithstanding defendant's confession that he murdered the victim in Washington, D.C., the court in McDowney held, among other things, that the presence of the body in the State can alone be sufficient to allow the drawing of an inference that the crime was committed here. Defense counsel has urged this court to construe McDowney as standing for the proposition that the finding of a body in this State constitutes the sole justification for a trial court to exercise jurisdiction in the prosecution of a murder indictment. A full reading of the McDowney decision does not lend itself to so narrow an interpretation.
It is uncontroverted that the site of a crime need not be proved by direct evidence; it may be established by circumstantial evidence which permits the drawing of an inference that the crime was committed in this State. State v. Barr, 110 N.J. Super. 365 (App. Div. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 58 N.J. 72 (1970); State v. Brooks, 136 N.J.L. 577 (E. & A. 1948).
While the presence of a body in this State can certainly be said to constitute strong circumstantial evidence justifying such an inference, it is equally clear to this court that the absence of such proof does not preclude the introduction and consideration of other circumstantial evidence that may be extant in a particular case.
The indictment in the present matter has been so constructed as to allow the State to proceed on a theory of either felony murder or premeditated murder, or both. See State v. Mayberry, 52 N.J. 413 (1968). In furtherance of this theory the State has advanced the offense of kidnapping as the underlying felony necessary to sustain a prosecution under *567 the former theory.[1] In this regard the State has cited the well-established principle that a sovereign has jurisdiction to try an offense where only part of that offense has been committed within its boundaries. See e.g., Leonard v. United States, 500 F.2d 673 (5 Cir.1974), and cases cited therein; see also, Conrad v. State, 262 Ind. 446, 317 N.E.2d 789 (Sup. Ct. 1974), wherein evidence of an assault and abduction in the forum state was held to provide an adequate jurisdictional basis for defendant's murder conviction, even where it could be inferred that the murder was actually committed in another jurisdiction.
It is incumbent upon this court in this case to weigh the probative value of the circumstantial evidence thus far presented so as to determine, pursuant to the McDowney standard heretofore cited[2] whether a reasonable inference may be drawn placing New Jersey as the site of any criminal activity vis a vis the two murder victims.
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400 A.2d 138, 166 N.J. Super. 562, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-reldan-njsuperctappdiv-1979.