Petrich, J.
William Alan Regan has appealed his convictions for first degree rape, first degree assault and first degree kidnapping. Defense counsel initially moved to withdraw on the basis that the appeal presented no arguable issues, and the State had moved to dismiss the appeal. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967); State v. Theobald, 78 Wn.2d 184, 470 P.2d 188 (1970). After briefs were filed by the parties, the Washington Supreme Court rendered its decision in State v. Johnson, 92 Wn.2d 671, 600 P.2d 1249 (1979). Defense counsel then filed a supplemental brief arguing that defendant's convictions for kidnapping and assault merge into the first degree rape conviction under the rule of [682]*682Johnson. Counsel pursued this issue forcefully during oral argument but still renewed his motion to withdraw. Since the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson raises an issue of possible merit, we deny defense counsel's motion to withdraw as well as the State's motion to dismiss the appeal and have made an independent review of the record. We conclude that under the rule of Johnson, defendant's convictions for first degree kidnapping and first degree assault merge into the first degree rape conviction. Therefore, we affirm defendant's conviction for first degree rape but order the dismissal of the assault and kidnapping convictions.
On the morning of June 19, 1978, the victim was driving north on Interstate 5 when she had a flat tire near the Bay Street exit north of downtown Tacoma. After waiting nearly 40 minutes in her car, a man she later identified as defendant stopped at approximately 8:50 a.m. and asked if she needed assistance. The victim said that she did and asked to be driven to a service station. After the victim got into his car, the defendant held a sharp object which appeared to be a knife or long screwdriver to her throat and tied her hands. He drove the victim some distance to the southeast in the direction of Puyallup by back roads to a secluded area near the intersection of 72nd Street and Waller Road. He forced the victim out of the car by threatening to use his weapon, and then threw it to the ground as he made her walk to a wooded area a short distance from the car where he raped her. Following the rape, defendant made the victim return to the car. In the process, he picked up the weapon and placed it on the front seat of the car. He then drove west in the direction of Tacoma through the McKinley Hill district back toward the victim's car. As he approached Bay Street, defendant stopped his car. At this point the victim struggled to get out of the car, but before she could escape defendant started to choke her. After a witness heard the victim's screams and started to come to her aid, defendant drove off and the victim escaped.
The victim reported the attack immediately to witnesses [683]*683who called police. An officer arrived at approximately 10:30 a.m. and interviewed the victim. She described the physical appearance of defendant and of his car and reported the vehicle's license number. Police were able to apprehend defendant shortly after noon in Puyallup. Defendant denied that he abducted or raped the victim and contended that he was at a Puyallup restaurant at the critical times. A witness from the restaurant testified, however, that defendant did not arrive at the restaurant until after 10 a.m. Additionally, the State's criminalist testified that seminal stains found on the clothing of the defendant and on other pertinent evidence matched blood groupings belonging to the defendant and the victim.
At the conclusion of the evidence the trial court gave instructions defining the elements of first degree rape, first degree kidnapping and first degree assault. It also gave instructions defining a deadly weapon. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on all three charges and made deadly weapon findings with regard to the assault and kidnapping charges. However, the jury found by special verdict that the defendant was not armed with a deadly weapon when he committed the rape.
In Johnson, our Supreme Court noted that by enacting RCW Title 9A the legislature clearly set forth the different degrees of seriousness for crimes by defining specific types of conduct that call for more severe penalties. By removing the need to pyramid the elements of various crimes in order to provide sufficient punishment for more serious crimes, the legislature intended that "punishment for first-degree rape should suffice as punishment for crimes proven in aid of the conviction, which are incidental to and elements of the central crime." State v. Johnson, supra at 678. The court observed that the distinct elements contained in the first degree rape statute which was in effect at the time of this offense all involve the commission of an act defined elsewhere in the criminal code as a [684]*684felony.1 Under the holding of Johnson, the State may not obtain a conviction for another felony in addition to a conviction for first degree rape unless it involves some injury to the victim which is separate and distinct from, and not merely incidental to, the crime of first degree rape. State v. Johnson, supra at 680. If the defendant could not be convicted for the additional felony without the proof of the rape, the convictions for the additional felony must merge into the conviction for first degree rape. State v. Johnson, supra at 681.
The State argues that the rule of Johnson does not require a merger in the present case because, unlike Johnson, the time and distance factors in the present case clearly show that three separate crimes were perpetrated upon the victim. In view of the manner that the defendant was charged and the way that the jury instructions were phrased, we cannot agree.
The trial court's instructions defining the elements of first degree rape paraphrased relevant sections of RCW 9.79.170(1), the first degree rape statute in effect at the time of trial. These instructions informed the jury that it could convict defendant of first degree rape if it found that he had sexual intercourse with the victim by forcible compulsion and that he threatened to use a deadly weapon or kidnapped the victim.2 The instructions setting forth the elements of first degree kidnapping and first degree assault also contain overlapping references to the first degree rape [685]*685charge. The kidnapping instructions state that the jury could find defendant guilty of first degree kidnapping if it found that he intentionally abducted the victim with the intent to facilitate the commission of rape or to inflict bodily injury.* *3 Similarly, the elements of first degree rape overlap in the first degree assault instructions which state that the jury may find defendant guilty of first degree assault if it found that he assaulted the victim with a firearm, deadly weapon or force likely to produce death with the intent to [686]*686commit rape.4
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Petrich, J.
William Alan Regan has appealed his convictions for first degree rape, first degree assault and first degree kidnapping. Defense counsel initially moved to withdraw on the basis that the appeal presented no arguable issues, and the State had moved to dismiss the appeal. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967); State v. Theobald, 78 Wn.2d 184, 470 P.2d 188 (1970). After briefs were filed by the parties, the Washington Supreme Court rendered its decision in State v. Johnson, 92 Wn.2d 671, 600 P.2d 1249 (1979). Defense counsel then filed a supplemental brief arguing that defendant's convictions for kidnapping and assault merge into the first degree rape conviction under the rule of [682]*682Johnson. Counsel pursued this issue forcefully during oral argument but still renewed his motion to withdraw. Since the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson raises an issue of possible merit, we deny defense counsel's motion to withdraw as well as the State's motion to dismiss the appeal and have made an independent review of the record. We conclude that under the rule of Johnson, defendant's convictions for first degree kidnapping and first degree assault merge into the first degree rape conviction. Therefore, we affirm defendant's conviction for first degree rape but order the dismissal of the assault and kidnapping convictions.
On the morning of June 19, 1978, the victim was driving north on Interstate 5 when she had a flat tire near the Bay Street exit north of downtown Tacoma. After waiting nearly 40 minutes in her car, a man she later identified as defendant stopped at approximately 8:50 a.m. and asked if she needed assistance. The victim said that she did and asked to be driven to a service station. After the victim got into his car, the defendant held a sharp object which appeared to be a knife or long screwdriver to her throat and tied her hands. He drove the victim some distance to the southeast in the direction of Puyallup by back roads to a secluded area near the intersection of 72nd Street and Waller Road. He forced the victim out of the car by threatening to use his weapon, and then threw it to the ground as he made her walk to a wooded area a short distance from the car where he raped her. Following the rape, defendant made the victim return to the car. In the process, he picked up the weapon and placed it on the front seat of the car. He then drove west in the direction of Tacoma through the McKinley Hill district back toward the victim's car. As he approached Bay Street, defendant stopped his car. At this point the victim struggled to get out of the car, but before she could escape defendant started to choke her. After a witness heard the victim's screams and started to come to her aid, defendant drove off and the victim escaped.
The victim reported the attack immediately to witnesses [683]*683who called police. An officer arrived at approximately 10:30 a.m. and interviewed the victim. She described the physical appearance of defendant and of his car and reported the vehicle's license number. Police were able to apprehend defendant shortly after noon in Puyallup. Defendant denied that he abducted or raped the victim and contended that he was at a Puyallup restaurant at the critical times. A witness from the restaurant testified, however, that defendant did not arrive at the restaurant until after 10 a.m. Additionally, the State's criminalist testified that seminal stains found on the clothing of the defendant and on other pertinent evidence matched blood groupings belonging to the defendant and the victim.
At the conclusion of the evidence the trial court gave instructions defining the elements of first degree rape, first degree kidnapping and first degree assault. It also gave instructions defining a deadly weapon. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on all three charges and made deadly weapon findings with regard to the assault and kidnapping charges. However, the jury found by special verdict that the defendant was not armed with a deadly weapon when he committed the rape.
In Johnson, our Supreme Court noted that by enacting RCW Title 9A the legislature clearly set forth the different degrees of seriousness for crimes by defining specific types of conduct that call for more severe penalties. By removing the need to pyramid the elements of various crimes in order to provide sufficient punishment for more serious crimes, the legislature intended that "punishment for first-degree rape should suffice as punishment for crimes proven in aid of the conviction, which are incidental to and elements of the central crime." State v. Johnson, supra at 678. The court observed that the distinct elements contained in the first degree rape statute which was in effect at the time of this offense all involve the commission of an act defined elsewhere in the criminal code as a [684]*684felony.1 Under the holding of Johnson, the State may not obtain a conviction for another felony in addition to a conviction for first degree rape unless it involves some injury to the victim which is separate and distinct from, and not merely incidental to, the crime of first degree rape. State v. Johnson, supra at 680. If the defendant could not be convicted for the additional felony without the proof of the rape, the convictions for the additional felony must merge into the conviction for first degree rape. State v. Johnson, supra at 681.
The State argues that the rule of Johnson does not require a merger in the present case because, unlike Johnson, the time and distance factors in the present case clearly show that three separate crimes were perpetrated upon the victim. In view of the manner that the defendant was charged and the way that the jury instructions were phrased, we cannot agree.
The trial court's instructions defining the elements of first degree rape paraphrased relevant sections of RCW 9.79.170(1), the first degree rape statute in effect at the time of trial. These instructions informed the jury that it could convict defendant of first degree rape if it found that he had sexual intercourse with the victim by forcible compulsion and that he threatened to use a deadly weapon or kidnapped the victim.2 The instructions setting forth the elements of first degree kidnapping and first degree assault also contain overlapping references to the first degree rape [685]*685charge. The kidnapping instructions state that the jury could find defendant guilty of first degree kidnapping if it found that he intentionally abducted the victim with the intent to facilitate the commission of rape or to inflict bodily injury.* *3 Similarly, the elements of first degree rape overlap in the first degree assault instructions which state that the jury may find defendant guilty of first degree assault if it found that he assaulted the victim with a firearm, deadly weapon or force likely to produce death with the intent to [686]*686commit rape.4
In view of the wording of these instructions we find that it is impossible to determine whether the jury could have found defendant guilty of the additional felonies of first degree kidnapping and first degree assault without proof of the first degree rape charge. Under the instructions given, the jury was asked to find defendant guilty of two additional felonies which were incidental to and intricately tied to the commission of the first degree rape. Therefore, under the rule of State v. Johnson, 92 Wn.2d 671, 600 P.2d 1249 (1979), we hold that the first degree kidnapping and first degree assault convictions merge into defendant's conviction for first degree rape. State v. Ingham, 26 Wn. App. 45, 612 P.2d 801 (1980).
We also hold that the merger of the kidnapping and assault convictions requires the vacation of the deadly weapon findings entered pursuant to RCW 9.95.015 in regard to the kidnapping and assault charges. In view of the result reached, preservation of the deadly weapon findings would clearly go against the specific finding of the jury that defendant was not armed with a deadly weapon when he committed the rape.
Defendant has raised 4 other issues in his brief concerning the admission of evidence and statements made during [687]*687the course of the trial by the trial court and by the prosecuting attorney. We have considered these assignments of error and conclude that they have no merit. Defendant's pro se brief raises 10 other issues which are either discussed above or are totally without merit.
Defense counsel's motion to withdraw and the State's motion to dismiss the appeal are each denied. We affirm defendant's conviction for first degree rape and remand the cause with directions to strike the convictions for kidnapping and assault and to strike the deadly weapon findings.
Pearson, J., concurs.