State v. Reams

648 P.2d 1185, 98 N.M. 372
CourtNew Mexico Court of Appeals
DecidedDecember 31, 1981
Docket5272, 5273
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 648 P.2d 1185 (State v. Reams) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Mexico Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Reams, 648 P.2d 1185, 98 N.M. 372 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981).

Opinions

OPINION

DONNELLY, Judge.

The State appeals from two orders entered by the District Court of Lea County in separate criminal proceedings, dismissing (1) one count of a criminal information charging defendant Jesse Fore with the unlawful distribution of a controlled substance (quaalude) contrary to the Controlled Substances Act, § 30-31-22 N.M.S.A.1978 (Repl.1980); and (2) two counts of a criminal information charging the defendant James Reams with conspiring to distribute controlled substances (quaalude) contrary to § 30-28-2 N.M.S.A.1978 (Supp.1981), and the Controlled Substances Act. The appeals in the two cases have been consolidated before this court and involve the same basic facts and legal issues. •

Two different statutory enactments purport to declare the possession or sale of quaalude a criminal offense. Although neither act specifically mentions quaalude or its generic derivative, methaqualone, both acts invest the State Board of Pharmacy with the authority to designate additional drugs or controlled substances which are covered under such acts. The Controlled Substances Act, § 30-31-22, declares that intentional distribution or possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance enumerated in Schedule II of the act is, for the first offense, a third degree felony. Similarly, the New Mexico Drug and Cosmetic Act, as amended, § 26-1-16 A, N.M. S.A.1978 (Supp.1980), prohibits sale, disposal of or possession of any dangerous drugs, as defined by the act, by any person unless licensed by the State Board of Pharmacy. Under the latter act violation constitutes a petty misdemeanor for the first offense. Section 26-l-26(B), N.M.S.A.1978. The prosecution and defense have stipulated that quaalude is a “dangerous drug” as defined by the Drug and Cosmetic Act, § 26-1-2 F, N.M.S.A.1978, and that methaqualone (the generic name for quaalude) is a controlled substance listed in Schedule II of the Controlled Substances Act. Quaalude is not a narcotic drug within the definition of § 30-31-2 (P) of the Controlled Substances Act.

Since both the Controlled Substances Act and the Drug and Cosmetic Act condemn the same offense, the principle issues in this appeal are whether defendants were properly charged under the Controlled Substances Act or whether the Drug and Cosmetic Act covers the unauthorized distribution of quaalude.

The State argues that distribution of quaalude falls within the Controlled Substances Act, § 30-31-22, because it is a non-narcotic drug listed in Schedule II of that act.

Defendants rely upon State v. Allen, 71 N.M. 433, 423 P.2d 867 (1967) which held that violations of administrative agricultural regulations could not be punished as criminal offenses absent an express provision making such violations a crime under the penalty provisions of the parent legislative enactment. Because the Controlled Substances Act, §§ 30-31-1 to -40, does not expressly provide that violations regarding substances added to such schedules by administrative regulations are criminal offenses, defendants argue that they have not committed punishable offenses under that act and can only be properly charged under the Drug and Cosmetic Act.

In the Controlled Substances Act, the legislature has specifically listed certain controlled substances in Schedules I through V, inclusive and at § 30-31-3 has empowered the State Board of Pharmacy to “add by regulation substances to the list of substances enumerated in Schedules I through IV pursuant to the Uniform Licensing Act.” The penalty provisions of the act do not specify that intentional distribution or possession with intent to distribute substances scheduled by regulation constitute criminal offenses. Section 30-31-22, (Repl.1980), provides in applicable part:

A. Except as authorized by the Controlled Substances Act * * *, it is unlawful for any person to intentionally distribute or possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance except a substance enumerated in Schedules I or II which is a narcotic drug. Any person who violates this subsection with respect to:
(2) any other controlled substance enumerated in Schedules I, II, III, or IV except a substance enumerated in Schedule I or II which is a narcotic drug, is:
(a) for the first offense, guilty of a third degree felony and shall be sentenced pursuant to the provisions of Section 31-18-15 N.M.S.A., 1978; * * *.

In Montoya v. O’Toole, 94 N.M. 303, 610 P.2d 190 (1980), the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the provisions in the Controlled Substances Act that authorize the State Board of Pharmacy to add by regulation to the list of scheduled substances in the act. In O’Toole, plaintiff contended that to allow the board to add to the scheduled drugs enumerated by the legislature amounted to an unlawful delegation of legislative authority, contrary to the New Mexico Constitution, and in violation of due process notice requirements of the New Mexico and United States Constitutions. By upholding the validity of the act, O’Toole implicitly disposes of defendants’ contention that express legislative authority is required to make the penalty provisions of the Controlled Substances Act applicable to drugs scheduled by administrative regulation.

Defendants further argue that they cannot be charged under the Controlled Substances Act because the Drug and Cosmetic Act more specifically and properly applies to the defenses alleged in this case. The courts in New Mexico have long adhered to the rule that where both a general and a specific statute condemn the same offense, the State must prosecute under the specific statute. State v. Cuevas, 94 N.M. 792, 617 P.2d 1307 (1980); State v. Padilla, 92 N.M. 19, 582 P.2d 396 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 92 N.M. 180, 585 P.2d 324 (1978); State v. Thoreen, 91 N.M. 624, 578 P.2d 325 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 91 N.M. 610, 577 P.2d 1256 (1978); State v. Riley, 82 N.M. 235, 478 P.2d 563 (Ct.App.1970).

Comparison of the Controlled Substances Act and the Drug and Cosmetic Act indicates that the Drug and Cosmetic Act treats regulation of dangerous drugs, including quaalude, and the category of persons subject thereto, in greater detail than does the Controlled Substances Act. Since neither legislative enactment specifically refers to quaalude, we must look to the specific provisions of the two acts to determine which legislative enactment deals more specifically with the category of substances which include the drug in question.

Section 26-1-18 of the Dangerous Drug Act empowers the Board of Pharmacy to declare by regulation a substance a “dangerous drug.” As defined in the act at § 26-1-2 F, “dangerous drug” means:

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State v. Reams
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Bluebook (online)
648 P.2d 1185, 98 N.M. 372, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-reams-nmctapp-1981.