[Cite as State v. Randleman, 2019-Ohio-3221.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF LORAIN )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 17CA011179
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE DEVONTAE RANDLEMAN COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO Appellant CASE No. 17CR095509
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: August 12, 2019
CALLAHAN, Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Devonte Randleman, appeals from his convictions in the
Lorain County Court of Common Pleas. This Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} Someone shot S.D. four times after he came home in the middle of the night. The
police discovered his body lying in his driveway along with a pair of sunglasses and an iPhone.
Because his apartment had been ransacked, the police surmised that a burglary had been in
progress when S.D. unexpectedly returned home. An anonymous tip led them to Mr.
Randleman, and evidence found at the scene also pointed toward his involvement. Forensic
testing of the sunglasses and iPhone detected Mr. Randleman’s DNA on those items.
Additionally, his DNA was detected on a loaded firearm the police found lying on a dresser
inside S.D.’s apartment. The iPhone was registered to Mr. Randleman’s girlfriend and used by
Mr. Randleman. The police discovered that someone remotely wiped the phone and restored it 2
to its factory settings a little over two hours after the murder. They also discovered that, later
that same day, Mr. Randleman purchased a new cell phone.
{¶3} A grand jury indicted Mr. Randleman on one count of aggravated murder; one
count of murder; one count of felony murder; two counts of aggravated robbery, charged under
alternative subsections; two counts of aggravated burglary, charged under alternative
subsections; two counts of felonious assault, charged under alternative subsections; one count of
tampering with evidence; one count of having a weapon under disability; and numerous firearm
specifications. The matter proceeded to trial, and a jury found Mr. Randleman guilty on all
counts. The trial court then sentenced him to a total of 33 years to life in prison.
{¶4} Mr. Randleman now appeals from his convictions and raises three assignments of
error for review. For ease of analysis, this Court rearranges his assignments of error.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2
THE STATE OF OHIO VIOLATED THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, AND BATSON V. KENTUCKY, WHEN THE PROSECUTOR EXCUSED THE ONLY AFRICAN AMERICAN JUROR FOR BEING “DISHONEST” WHEN HE ONLY DISCLOSED A CRIMINAL CONVICTION THROUGH A JURY QUESTIONNAIRE AND NOT AFFIRMATIVELY DURING VOIR DIRE.
{¶5} In his second assignment of error, Mr. Randleman argues that his due process
rights were violated when the trial court allowed the State to strike Juror Number 5, the only
member of the jury pool who was an African American. Upon review, this Court rejects his
argument.
{¶6} “The Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution prohibits
deliberate discrimination based on race by a prosecutor in his exercise of peremptory
challenges.” State v. Campbell, 9th Dist. Summit No. 24668, 2010-Ohio-2573, ¶ 33, citing 3
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986). “‘A court adjudicates a Batson claim in three
steps.’” State v. Were, 118 Ohio St.3d 448, 2008-Ohio-2762, ¶ 61, quoting State v. Murphy, 91
Ohio St.3d 516, 528 (2001).
In the first step, a defendant must make a prima facie showing that the [S]tate has exercised a peremptory challenge on the basis of race. Once the prima facie showing has been made, the State must offer a basis for striking the prospective juror that is race-neutral. Finally, the trial court must consider the parties’ positions to determine whether the defendant has demonstrated purposeful discrimination.
(Internal citations omitted.) State v. Jackson, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27739, 2017-Ohio-278, ¶ 6.
The final step directs the court to examine the State’s race-neutral explanation “‘in context to
ensure [its] reason is not merely pretextual.’” State v. Pickens, 141 Ohio St.3d 462, 2014-Ohio-
5445, ¶ 63, quoting State v. Frazier, 115 Ohio St.3d 139, 2007-Ohio-5048, ¶ 65. The court
“must ‘assess the plausibility’ of the prosecutor’s reason for striking the juror ‘in light of all
evidence with a bearing on it.’” Pickens at ¶ 63, quoting Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 252
(2005). “The conclusion of the trial court that the [S]tate did not possess discriminatory intent in
the exercise of its peremptory challenges will not be reversed on appeal absent a determination
that it was clearly erroneous.” State v. Hernandez, 63 Ohio St.3d 577, 583 (1992).
{¶7} During voir dire, the prosecutor asked the prospective jurors whether any of them,
their family members, or their friends had ever been “accused or convicted of a crime.” Two
prospective jurors responded, and the prosecutor asked those jurors about their experiences and
whether those experiences would affect their impartiality. The prosecutor then asked the jury
pool: “Anyone else? Someone? Anyone else? Here? Anyone?” Because no one else
responded, the prosecutor changed topics. Later during voir dire, however, a third prospective
juror asked to return to the prosecutor’s question and discuss the matter in private. After she did
so, a fourth prospective juror likewise indicated that she wanted to discuss the matter in private. 4
Both prospective jurors were given the opportunity to answer the prosecutor’s question in
chambers.
{¶8} At the conclusion of voir dire, the prosecutor sought to excuse Juror Number 5.
Mr. Randleman objected on the basis that Juror Number 5 was the only prospective juror who
was African American. Because Juror Number 5 had not answered any questions in a manner
that might lead someone to question his impartiality, Mr. Randleman argued that the State’s
peremptory challenge was race-based. The prosecutor noted, however, that Juror Number 5 had
failed to disclose his criminal convictions during voir dire. The prosecutor knew that Juror
Number 5 had been convicted of “making false alarms and falsification” because he had included
that information on his jury questionnaire. Yet, Juror Number 5 had not responded when the
prosecutor asked whether anyone had ever been convicted of a crime. Nor had he come forward
when two other prospective jurors later indicated that they wished to discuss the prosecutor’s
question in chambers. The prosecutor stated that she was striking Juror Number 5 because she
felt he was not giving truthful answers. She noted that she was striking another juror for the
same reason, as that juror also had failed to disclose her prior conviction during voir dire. After
hearing from the prosecutor, the trial court overruled Mr. Randleman’s objection.
{¶9} Mr. Randleman concedes that the State provided a race-neutral reason for its
decision to strike Juror Number 5. See Jackson, 2017-Ohio-278, at ¶ 6. His argument is that the
State’s reason was a pretext for unlawful discrimination. He claims that the State misled the
court when it portrayed Juror Number 5 as dishonest. He notes that Juror Number 5 answered
his jury questionnaire honestly, and the prosecutor never directly inquired of him during voir
dire. Because the record supports the conclusion that the State engaged in purposeful
discrimination, Mr. Randleman argues, the court’s finding to the contrary is clearly erroneous. 5
{¶10} This Court cannot conclude that the trial court clearly erred when it found that the
prosecutor lacked a discriminatory intent. See Hernandez, 63 Ohio St.3d at 583. A prospective
juror’s past criminal history, standing alone, “‘“is a valid, race-neutral reason for raising a
peremptory challenge.”’” State v. Lewis, 9th Dist. Summit No. 28064, 2017-Ohio-2747, ¶ 11,
quoting State v. Lacey, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 10MA122, 2012-Ohio-1685, ¶ 127, quoting State
v. Santiago, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 02AP-1094, 2003-Ohio-2877, ¶ 10. Here, apart from the
mere fact of Juror Number 5’s prior conviction, the prosecutor explained that she struck him
because she felt he had failed to answer her questions truthfully. See State v. Moss, 9th Dist.
Summit No. 24511, 2009-Ohio-3866, ¶ 12 (“[A] peremptory challenge may be exercised for any
racially-neutral reason.”). Even if Juror Number 5 disclosed his prior conviction on his jury
questionnaire, he failed to respond when asked about prior convictions during voir dire. He did
not respond when the prosecutor first asked her question. He did not respond when two
prospective jurors disclosed their family members’ prior convictions. He did not respond when
the prosecutor followed up on her inquiry (i.e., “Anyone else? Someone? Anyone else? Here?
Anyone?”). Finally, he did not respond when two other prospective jurors later asked for an
opportunity to answer the prosecutor’s question in chambers. The prosecutor specifically cited
Juror Number 5’s failure to take advantage of any of the foregoing opportunities as a basis for
her conclusion that he was not being truthful. Moreover, she indicated that she had struck
another prospective juror for the same reason. Contrary to Mr. Randleman’s argument, “[t]here
is no indication in the record that the State possessed a discriminatory intent when it sought to
remove Juror Number [5] from the venire.” Lewis at ¶ 11. Accordingly, this Court cannot
conclude that the trial court clearly erred when it overruled Mr. Randleman’s Batson challenge.
See Hernandez at 583. 6
{¶11} Mr. Randleman’s brief also contains a singular assertion that the trial court erred
by rejecting his Batson challenge without first conducting “a proper Batson hearing under Hicks
v. Westinghouse [Materials Co.], [78 Ohio St.3d 95 (1997)].” The record reflects, however, that
Mr. Randleman failed to raise this argument in the lower court. See State v. Rice, 9th Dist.
Medina No. 08CA0054-M, 2009-Ohio-5419, ¶ 9 (“When reviewing arguments on appeal, this
Court cannot consider issues that are raised for the first time on appeal.”). The trial court
listened to the parties’ arguments and made its Batson ruling at sidebar. Mr. Randleman never
requested a more extensive hearing. Nor has he claimed that the trial court misapplied the
standard articulated in Batson. Compare Hicks at 98-99. Because Mr. Randleman has not
shown that the trial court erred by overruling his Batson challenge, this Court rejects his
arguments to the contrary. Mr. Randleman’s second assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 3
THE EVIDENCE IN THIS MATTER WAS INSUFFICIENT TO CONVICT [MR.] RANDLEMAN OF AGGRAVATED MURDER OR MURDER BY CAUSING THE “PURPOSEFUL” DEATH OF THE VICTIM WHILE COMMITTING A BURGLARY OR ROBBERY. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED WAS ONLY SUFFICIENT TO DEMONSTRATE THAT A MURDER OCCURRED. THE EVIDENCE FAILED TO SHOW A PURPOSEFUL KILLING, BUT ONLY A DEATH CAUSED AS THE PROXIMATE RESULT OF COMMITTING A BURGLARY.
{¶12} In his third assignment of error, Mr. Randleman argues that his aggravated murder
and murder convictions are based on insufficient evidence. Specifically, he argues that there was
no evidence he purposely caused S.D.’s death. This Court disagrees.
{¶13} “Whether a conviction is supported by sufficient evidence is a question of law
that this Court reviews de novo.” State v. Williams, 9th Dist. Summit No. 24731, 2009-Ohio-
6955, ¶ 18, citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997). The relevant inquiry is
whether the prosecution has met its burden of production by presenting sufficient evidence to 7
sustain a conviction. Thompkins at 390 (Cook, J., concurring). In reviewing the evidence, we do
not evaluate credibility, and we make all reasonable inferences in favor of the State. State v.
Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 273 (1991). The evidence is sufficient if it allows the trier of fact to
reasonably conclude that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id.
{¶14} A person commits murder if he “purposely cause[s] the death of another * * *.”
R.C. 2903.02(A). The crime constitutes aggravated murder if he purposely causes the other’s
death “while committing or attempting to commit, or while fleeing immediately after committing
or attempting to commit, * * * aggravated robbery * * * [or] aggravated burglary * * *.” R.C.
2903.01(B). “A person acts purposely when it is [his] specific intention to cause a certain result,
or, when the gist of the offense is a prohibition against conduct of a certain nature, regardless of
what the offender intends to accomplish thereby, it is [his] specific intention to engage in
conduct of that nature.” R.C. 2901.22(A).
{¶15} “A person need not be the principal offender to be convicted of a crime.” State v.
Davis, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26660, 2013-Ohio-5226, ¶ 11. R.C. 2923.03(A)(2) prohibits any
person, “acting with the kind of culpability required for the commission of an offense, [from] * *
* [a]id[ing] or abet[ting] another in committing the offense.” “To support a conviction for
complicity by aiding and abetting * * *, the evidence must show that the defendant supported,
assisted, encouraged, cooperated with, advised, or incited the principal in the commission of the
crime, and that the defendant shared the criminal intent of the principal.” State v. Johnson, 93
Ohio St.3d 240 (2001), syllabus. “‘[A] jury can infer an aider and abettor’s purpose to kill where
the facts show that the participants in a felony entered into a common design and either the aider
or abettor knew that an inherently dangerous instrumentality was to be employed to accomplish 8
the felony or the felony and the manner of its accomplishment would be reasonably likely to
produce death.’” State v. Lollis, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26607, 2014-Ohio-684, ¶ 21, quoting
State v. Scott, 61 Ohio St.2d 155, 165 (1980). “A person who violates R.C. 2923.03(A)(2) is
guilty of complicity and ‘shall be prosecuted and punished as if he were a principal offender.’”
Davis at ¶ 11, quoting R.C. 2923.03(F).
{¶16} The State set forth evidence that S.D. was shot and killed in his driveway around
4:00 a.m. on August 5, 2016. He was shot four times with a .40 caliber firearm, but that firearm
was never recovered. The police officers who responded to the scene found S.D.’s garage door
open and his apartment ransacked. Items had been strewn about, cabinet doors and dresser
drawers had been left open, and the toilet tank cover had been removed. Inside the apartment,
the police observed several items of interest, including (1) drug paraphernalia; (2) packaging
consistent with the type used to transport powdered drugs; and (3) a loaded firearm lying on top
of a dresser in the spare bedroom. Outside the apartment, they also found several items of
interest, including (1) a small blowtorch and hammer, both of which had been used to disable the
front door; (2) a pair of sunglasses; (3) an iPhone; and (4) a drawstring bag containing money,
several champagne canisters, and two firearms that were later traced to S.D. Both the sunglasses
and the iPhone were discovered lying on the driveway just outside S.D.’s garage.
{¶17} The police were able to trace three of the items they found at S.D.’s apartment to
Mr. Randleman. First, his DNA was detected on the loaded firearm they found lying on top of
the dresser in S.D.’s spare bedroom. Second, his DNA was detected on the sunglasses they found
lying on the driveway just outside the garage. Third, his DNA was detected on the iPhone they
found lying in the same area. 9
{¶18} Several witnesses testified about the iPhone. A records custodian from Sprint
linked the iPhone to a prepaid account registered to D.C., Mr. Randleman’s girlfriend. The
prepaid account reflected that D.C. had activated two devices over the course of her subscription.
Service for the first device was activated in June 2016 and remained active until August 5, 2016.
On that date, service was transferred to the second device. The State produced evidence that
D.C. and Mr. Randleman went to Best Buy on the afternoon of August 5th to purchase the
second device. Though neither phone was registered in Mr. Randleman’s name, the State
produced evidence that he was the user of both phones.
{¶19} The police were only able to obtain limited information from the iPhone. A
cybercrimes agent from the Bureau of Criminal Investigation inspected the phone and
determined that it had been restored to its factory settings as a result of being remotely wiped
through Apple. The only information he was able to retrieve from the phone was a file creation
date and a file termination date. The file creation date showed that the files on the phone had
been created in June 2016. The file termination date showed that the files had been terminated at
6:10 a.m. on August 5, 2016; a little over two hours after the murder. D.C. testified that she had
used Mr. Randleman’s Apple ID to remotely wipe the phone after she spoke with him at 5:50
a.m. on August 5th. She claimed that she did so because Mr. Randleman said he had lost the
phone and it contained potentially embarrassing pictures and videos of her.
{¶20} Both Mr. Randleman and D.C. told the police that Mr. Randleman was in
Sandusky at the time of the murder. D.C. initially claimed to have driven Mr. Randleman there
herself, but later recanted. The call history records that Sprint maintained for the iPhone
demonstrated that the phone was still in the Lorain area at 12:36 a.m. on August 5th. Thereafter,
no calls were made or received on the phone until 4:32 a.m. At that time, the phone began 10
receiving calls. It is undisputed that the police arrived at S.D.’s apartment shortly after 4:30
a.m., by which point in time the phone was already lying in his driveway.
{¶21} Special Agent Jonathan Lieber acted as the lead investigator in this matter. Given
that S.D. had been earning a significant amount of money as a drug dealer, Special Agent Lieber
believed that more than one person had broken into his apartment to steal his money and his
product. The special agent theorized that one of the intruders had brought sunglasses with him to
protect his eyes as he used a blowtorch to destroy the door lock on the apartment. He further
theorized that the burglary was still in progress when S.D. unexpectedly arrived home and
“spooked” the intruders, at which point an altercation took place in the driveway. Special Agent
Lieber speculated that one of the intruders dropped several of his items in the driveway and
either he or his accomplice also dropped a drawstring bag while running from the scene. He
noted that the drawstring bag was awkward and heavy because, apart from being loaded with two
firearms and several other items, it contained more than 17 pounds of loose change. Special
Agent Lieber theorized that the intruders panicked and ran quickly once they shot S.D. because
the gunshots would have been noteworthy at that time of night in a relatively quiet community.
{¶22} Mr. Randleman argues that his aggravated murder and murder convictions are
based on insufficient evidence because the State failed to prove that he burglarized S.D.’s home
with the intention of killing him. He argues that, at best, the evidence showed it was his
accomplice who shot S.D. Further, he argues that the evidence showed the killing was a
spontaneous event, not a planned occurrence. Because there was no evidence that he specifically
intended to kill S.D., Mr. Randleman argues, the State failed to prove mens rea on his aggravated
murder and murder charges. 11
{¶23} Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact
could have concluded that the State proved mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jenks, 61
Ohio St.3d at 273. The State set forth evidence that Mr. Randleman was present both before and
during S.D.’s murder, as his sunglasses, iPhone, and gun were found at the scene. See State v.
Smith, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25650, 2012-Ohio-794, ¶ 7, quoting In re T.K., 109 Ohio St.3d 512,
2006-Ohio-3056, ¶ 13 (“The criminal intent of [an] aider and abettor ‘can be inferred from the
presence, companionship, and conduct of the defendant before and after the offense is
committed.’”). Even if it was his accomplice who ultimately shot S.D. with a .40 caliber gun,
the record supports the conclusion that Mr. Randleman brought his own gun to the scene. S.D.
was a known drug dealer, so the jury reasonably could have inferred that Mr. Randleman
recognized the potential dangers involved in the burglary and armed himself accordingly.
Because he and his accomplice broke into S.D.’s apartment in the middle of the night, fully
armed, to commit a theft offense, the jury reasonably could have inferred that he “‘entered into a
common design’” knowing either that (1) “‘an inherently dangerous instrumentality was to be
employed to accomplish the felony’”; or (2) “‘the felony and the manner of its accomplishment
would be reasonably likely to produce death.’” Lollis, 2014-Ohio-684, at ¶ 21, quoting Scott, 61
Ohio St.2d at 165. Upon review, Mr. Randleman has not shown that his aggravated murder and
murder convictions are based on insufficient evidence. Accordingly, his third assignment of
error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1
THE COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR WHEN IT UTILIZED THE DEFINITION OF “CAUSE” AS AN ACT WHICH, IN A NATURAL AND CONTINUOUS SEQUENCE, DIRECTLY PRODUCES THE DEATH OF A PERSON. THIS IS AN INCORRECT STATEMENT OF LAW UNDER OHIO JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND THE OHIO STATE SUPREME COURT. 12
{¶24} In his first assignment of error, Mr. Randleman argues that the trial court
committed plain error when it instructed the jury on aggravated murder. Specifically, he argues
that he was prejudiced by the court’s instruction on the element of causation. Because Mr.
Randleman has not shown that the trial court committed plain error, this Court rejects his
{¶25} A defendant’s “[f]ailure to object to a jury instruction limits review of the alleged
error to the plain error standard.” State v. Fry, 9th Dist. Medina No. 16CA0057-M, 2017-Ohio-
9077, ¶ 20. Plain error exists only where there is a deviation from a legal rule, that is obvious,
and that affected the appellant’s substantial rights to the extent that it affected the outcome of the
trial. State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27 (2002). “Notice of plain error under Crim.R. 52(B)
is to be taken with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a
manifest miscarriage of justice.” State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91 (1978), paragraph three of the
syllabus. Further, “[w]hen reviewing jury instructions, the appellate court reviews the
instructions as a whole.” State v. Schell, 9th Dist. Summit No. 28255, 2017-Ohio-2641, ¶ 38.
“‘[M]isstatements and ambiguity in a portion of the instructions will not constitute reversible
error unless the instructions are so misleading that they prejudicially affect a substantial right of
the complaining party.’” State v. Horne, 9th Dist. Summit No. 24672, 2010-Ohio-350, ¶ 19,
quoting Wozniak v. Wozniak, 90 Ohio App.3d 400, 410 (9th Dist.1993).
{¶26} When instructing the jury on the elements of aggravated murder, the trial court
defined “cause” as follows:
“Cause” is an act which, in a natural and continuous sequence, directly produces the death of a person and without which the death could not have occurred.
The court used the same definition when instructing the jury on the elements of murder and
felony murder. Mr. Randleman argues that the court’s causation instruction was misleading as to 13
his aggravated murder charge because it included a foreseeability component. He avers that the
instruction’s “natural and continuous sequence” language allowed the jury to convict him of
aggravated murder in the absence of a finding of specific intent. Because the instruction relieved
the State of its burden to prove mens rea, Mr. Randleman argues, he was denied a fair trial.
{¶27} For purposes of criminal trials, the Ohio Jury Instructions offer a standard
causation instruction:
1. CAUSE. * * * Cause is an act or failure to act which in a natural and continuous sequence directly produces the [death of another], and without which it would not have occurred.
2. NATURAL CONSEQUENCES. The defendant’s responsibility is not limited to the immediate or most obvious result of the defendant’s act or failure to act. The defendant is also responsible for the natural and foreseeable [consequences] that follow, in the ordinary course of events, from the act or failure to act.
Ohio Jury Instructions, CR Section 417.23 (2019). For an aggravated murder charge, however,
the Ohio Jury Instructions offer a specific causation instruction:
4. CAUSATION. * * * Cause is an act which directly produces the [death of another], and without which it would not have occurred.
Ohio Jury Instructions, CR Section 503.01 (2019). Unlike the standard instruction, the
aggravated murder instruction omits any reference to the “natural and foreseeable consequences”
of one’s act. Compare Ohio Jury Instructions, CR Section 417.23 with Ohio Jury Instructions,
CR Section 503.01.
{¶28} The Ohio Supreme Court has repeatedly “expressed concern that the standard
foreseeability instruction may be confusing in aggravated murder cases.” State v. Williams, 99
Ohio St.3d 493, 2003-Ohio-4396, ¶ 105. Accord State v. Getsy, 84 Ohio St.3d 180, 196 (1998);
Causation Comment to Ohio Jury Instructions, CR 503.01. Yet, it also has recognized that
“[t]he use of that instruction * * * does not require reversal where the instructions as a whole
make clear that the jury must find purpose to kill in order to convict.” State v. Phillips, 74 Ohio 14
St.3d 72, 100 (1995). The question is whether the instructions adequately conveyed that “the
jury was required to find specific intent to kill and prior calculation and design before it could
convict [the defendant] of aggravated murder.” State v. Jalowiec, 91 Ohio St.3d 220, 231
(2001). Accord State v. Gross, 97 Ohio St.3d 121, 2002-Ohio-5524, ¶ 99.
{¶29} Upon review, Mr. Randleman has not shown that the trial court committed plain
error when it instructed the jury on his aggravated murder charge. The trial court instructed the
jury that it could find Mr. Randleman guilty of aggravated murder only if it found that he
purposely caused S.D.’s death during the commission or attempted commission of an aggravated
robbery or aggravated burglary. The court then “extensively instructed the jury on the
requirement of purpose and intent prior to the causation language.” State v. Goodwin, 84 Ohio
St.3d 331, 346 (1999). It instructed the jury (1) that it must have been Mr. Randleman’s
“specific intention to purposely cause the death of another”; (2) that he must have “act[ed] with a
conscious objective of producing a specific result”; and (3) that his actions must not have been
accidental. It also instructed the jury that “[p]urpose and intent mean the same thing” and that
purpose may be inferred from the fact that a victim’s wound is inflicted “with a deadly weapon
in a manner calculated to destroy life * * *.” Moreover, the court specifically instructed the jury
that “no person may be convicted of aggravated murder unless he or she specifically intended to
cause the death of another.” “[W]hen viewed in the requisite full context, the trial court’s
instructions adequately conveyed to the jury that it could not convict [Mr. Randleman] of
aggravated murder unless it found specific intent to kill.” Gross at ¶ 99. See Williams at ¶ 105;
Jalowiec at 231.
{¶30} In rejecting Mr. Randleman’s argument, this Court neither adopts, nor approves of
the trial court’s decision to use one causation instruction for all three of Mr. Randleman’s murder 15
charges. This Court would caution the trial court against including “natural and continuance
sequence” language in its causation instruction for aggravated murder. See Getsy at 196. In this
instance, however, this Court cannot conclude that the trial court’s inclusion of that language
resulted in plain error. That is because the instructions, as a whole, made it clear that the jury
could only convict Mr. Randleman of aggravated murder upon a finding of specific intent to kill.
See Williams at ¶ 105; Gross at ¶ 99; Jalowiec at 231. For that reason, Mr. Randleman’s first
assignment of error is overruled.
III.
{¶31} Mr. Randleman’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Lorain
County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of
this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 16
Costs taxed to Appellant.
LYNNE S. CALLAHAN FOR THE COURT
TEODOSIO, P. J. HENSAL, J. CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
JOHN D. TOTH, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
DENNIS P. WILL, Prosecuting Attorney, and LINDSEY C. POPROCKI, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.