318 Ga. 79 FINAL COPY
S23A1118. THE STATE v. RANDALL.
BETHEL, Justice.
This criminal appeal — brought by the State1 from the grant of
Antonio Rodrick Randall’s motion to suppress evidence of his refusal
to submit to a blood test after his arrest for driving under the
influence — is the second appearance of this case before this Court.
In State v. Randall, 315 Ga. 198 (880 SE2d 134) (2022) (“Randall
I”), this Court vacated the trial court’s order suppressing the same
evidence at issue in this case based on our conclusion that the court
unnecessarily resolved Randall’s constitutional challenge to the
admissibility of blood test refusal evidence and to OCGA § 40-5-67.1
(b). 315 Ga. at 200-202 (1), (2). On remand, the trial court again
suppressed evidence of Randall’s refusal to consent to a blood test
on constitutional grounds, a ruling that the State again disputes.
However, we need not determine the correctness of that ruling,
1 See OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (5). at least at this point in the case, because the trial court first should
have evaluated Randall’s argument that exclusion of the evidence
was warranted under OCGA § 24-4-403 (“Rule 403”) before reaching
his constitutional claims. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s
order on Randall’s motion to suppress and remand the case for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
1. Case history.
We recounted the material facts of this case in Randall I:
On April 6, 2021, an Athens-Clarke County police officer initiated a traffic stop after observing Randall’s vehicle failing to maintain its lane while traveling on College Station Road. During the traffic stop, the officer smelled the odor of alcohol when Randall spoke to him and observed that Randall had glassy eyes and difficulty with balance when he exited the vehicle. The officer arrested Randall for DUI, read Randall the statutory implied consent notice for drivers aged 21 years and over, and requested that Randall submit to a blood test. Randall refused to submit to a blood test, and no test was performed.
(Citation omitted.) 315 Ga. at 198.
Randall moved to suppress evidence of his refusal to consent to
the blood test, arguing that the admission of evidence of his
2 exercising his constitutional right to refuse a blood test violated his
due process rights under the federal and state Constitutions.
Randall further argued that, to the extent OCGA §§ 40-5-67.1 (b)
and 40-6-392 (d), the implied consent statutes, allow the
introduction of such evidence, they also violate due process. The trial
court agreed and ordered suppressed evidence of Randall’s refusal
to consent to a blood test. But the trial court did not confine its
analysis to the arguments actually raised by Randall and went on to
conclude that the implied consent statutes have a chilling effect on
a defendant’s exercise of his constitutional right to refuse a
warrantless search, impermissibly and unduly burden a defendant’s
exercise of his right to refuse warrantless blood testing, and violate
a defendant’s due process rights under the United States and
Georgia Constitutions. See 315 Ga. at 199.
The State appealed, and in Randall I, this Court vacated the
trial court’s order. Because the parties had agreed that evidence of
Randall’s refusal to take the blood test was admissible for the
limited purpose of explaining the absence of blood test results, we
3 held that “the constitutional ruling by the trial court on the
admissibility of blood test refusal evidence [was] unnecessary.” 315
Ga. at 200-201 (1). We also held that, because Randall did not
challenge the constitutionality of OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b) on the basis
that it chilled his right to refuse a warrantless search, the trial court
erred by expanding the scope of its review to the constitutionality of
the statute. Id. at 201-202 (2).
After the case returned to the trial court, Randall filed an
amended motion to suppress, again arguing that admission of
evidence that he exercised his constitutional right to refuse the
state-administered blood test violates due process, that the implied
consent statutes also violate due process to the extent they permit
the introduction of such evidence, and that the implied consent
statutes impermissibly burdened and chilled his constitutional
rights. Randall also argued that evidence of his refusal was more
prejudicial than probative. While his argument did not expressly
invoke OCGA § 24-4-403, it did necessarily implicate those statutory
principles. See Rule 403 (“Relevant evidence may be excluded if its
4 probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice . . . .”). Following a hearing, the trial court granted
Randall’s amended motion. As an initial matter, in ruling on
Randall’s amended motion, the trial court found that the parties did
not agree that evidence of Randall’s refusal of the blood test was
admissible to explain the absence of a test result as we determined
they had with respect to the prior motion to suppress in Randall I.
Then, employing the same reasoning verbatim as in its first
suppression order, see Randall I, 315 Ga. at 199, the trial court held:
To the extent that OCGA § 40-5-67.1 informs a person that refusing to submit to blood testing may be offered as evidence against them at trial, it needlessly and unnecessarily chills a defendant’s exercise of the constitutional right to refuse a warrantless search. To the extent that OCGA § 40-6-392 (d) allows that evidence to be admitted at trial, it impermissibly and unduly burdens a defendant’s exercise of the right to refuse warrantless blood testing. Therefore, to that extent, OCGA § 40-5-67.1 and [OCGA] § 40-6-392 (d) violate a defendant’s due process rights guaranteed by both the United States and Georgia Constitutions.
The trial court expressly noted that, in light of its ruling on the
constitutional issues, it would not address Randall’s argument made
5 pursuant to Rule 403 that evidence of his refusal to consent was
more prejudicial than probative. The State now appeals.
2. Analysis.
As they did in the trial court, the parties focus their arguments
on the thorny and unresolved issues of constitutional law raised in
Randall’s amended motion to suppress and the trial court’s ruling
on that motion.2 But, as we discuss below, it is not necessary for us
to reach those issues.
Generally speaking, this Court will not reach novel
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
318 Ga. 79 FINAL COPY
S23A1118. THE STATE v. RANDALL.
BETHEL, Justice.
This criminal appeal — brought by the State1 from the grant of
Antonio Rodrick Randall’s motion to suppress evidence of his refusal
to submit to a blood test after his arrest for driving under the
influence — is the second appearance of this case before this Court.
In State v. Randall, 315 Ga. 198 (880 SE2d 134) (2022) (“Randall
I”), this Court vacated the trial court’s order suppressing the same
evidence at issue in this case based on our conclusion that the court
unnecessarily resolved Randall’s constitutional challenge to the
admissibility of blood test refusal evidence and to OCGA § 40-5-67.1
(b). 315 Ga. at 200-202 (1), (2). On remand, the trial court again
suppressed evidence of Randall’s refusal to consent to a blood test
on constitutional grounds, a ruling that the State again disputes.
However, we need not determine the correctness of that ruling,
1 See OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (5). at least at this point in the case, because the trial court first should
have evaluated Randall’s argument that exclusion of the evidence
was warranted under OCGA § 24-4-403 (“Rule 403”) before reaching
his constitutional claims. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s
order on Randall’s motion to suppress and remand the case for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
1. Case history.
We recounted the material facts of this case in Randall I:
On April 6, 2021, an Athens-Clarke County police officer initiated a traffic stop after observing Randall’s vehicle failing to maintain its lane while traveling on College Station Road. During the traffic stop, the officer smelled the odor of alcohol when Randall spoke to him and observed that Randall had glassy eyes and difficulty with balance when he exited the vehicle. The officer arrested Randall for DUI, read Randall the statutory implied consent notice for drivers aged 21 years and over, and requested that Randall submit to a blood test. Randall refused to submit to a blood test, and no test was performed.
(Citation omitted.) 315 Ga. at 198.
Randall moved to suppress evidence of his refusal to consent to
the blood test, arguing that the admission of evidence of his
2 exercising his constitutional right to refuse a blood test violated his
due process rights under the federal and state Constitutions.
Randall further argued that, to the extent OCGA §§ 40-5-67.1 (b)
and 40-6-392 (d), the implied consent statutes, allow the
introduction of such evidence, they also violate due process. The trial
court agreed and ordered suppressed evidence of Randall’s refusal
to consent to a blood test. But the trial court did not confine its
analysis to the arguments actually raised by Randall and went on to
conclude that the implied consent statutes have a chilling effect on
a defendant’s exercise of his constitutional right to refuse a
warrantless search, impermissibly and unduly burden a defendant’s
exercise of his right to refuse warrantless blood testing, and violate
a defendant’s due process rights under the United States and
Georgia Constitutions. See 315 Ga. at 199.
The State appealed, and in Randall I, this Court vacated the
trial court’s order. Because the parties had agreed that evidence of
Randall’s refusal to take the blood test was admissible for the
limited purpose of explaining the absence of blood test results, we
3 held that “the constitutional ruling by the trial court on the
admissibility of blood test refusal evidence [was] unnecessary.” 315
Ga. at 200-201 (1). We also held that, because Randall did not
challenge the constitutionality of OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b) on the basis
that it chilled his right to refuse a warrantless search, the trial court
erred by expanding the scope of its review to the constitutionality of
the statute. Id. at 201-202 (2).
After the case returned to the trial court, Randall filed an
amended motion to suppress, again arguing that admission of
evidence that he exercised his constitutional right to refuse the
state-administered blood test violates due process, that the implied
consent statutes also violate due process to the extent they permit
the introduction of such evidence, and that the implied consent
statutes impermissibly burdened and chilled his constitutional
rights. Randall also argued that evidence of his refusal was more
prejudicial than probative. While his argument did not expressly
invoke OCGA § 24-4-403, it did necessarily implicate those statutory
principles. See Rule 403 (“Relevant evidence may be excluded if its
4 probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice . . . .”). Following a hearing, the trial court granted
Randall’s amended motion. As an initial matter, in ruling on
Randall’s amended motion, the trial court found that the parties did
not agree that evidence of Randall’s refusal of the blood test was
admissible to explain the absence of a test result as we determined
they had with respect to the prior motion to suppress in Randall I.
Then, employing the same reasoning verbatim as in its first
suppression order, see Randall I, 315 Ga. at 199, the trial court held:
To the extent that OCGA § 40-5-67.1 informs a person that refusing to submit to blood testing may be offered as evidence against them at trial, it needlessly and unnecessarily chills a defendant’s exercise of the constitutional right to refuse a warrantless search. To the extent that OCGA § 40-6-392 (d) allows that evidence to be admitted at trial, it impermissibly and unduly burdens a defendant’s exercise of the right to refuse warrantless blood testing. Therefore, to that extent, OCGA § 40-5-67.1 and [OCGA] § 40-6-392 (d) violate a defendant’s due process rights guaranteed by both the United States and Georgia Constitutions.
The trial court expressly noted that, in light of its ruling on the
constitutional issues, it would not address Randall’s argument made
5 pursuant to Rule 403 that evidence of his refusal to consent was
more prejudicial than probative. The State now appeals.
2. Analysis.
As they did in the trial court, the parties focus their arguments
on the thorny and unresolved issues of constitutional law raised in
Randall’s amended motion to suppress and the trial court’s ruling
on that motion.2 But, as we discuss below, it is not necessary for us
to reach those issues.
Generally speaking, this Court will not reach novel
constitutional questions when a case can be resolved without
passing on such issues. See Randall I, 315 Ga. at 200 (1) (“Properly
enacted statutes carry a presumption of constitutional validity, and
inquiry into the constitutionality of a statute generally should not
be made by the trial courts if a decision on the merits can be reached
2 Randall also argues that the law of the case prohibits the State from
arguing that evidence of his refusal is admissible for the purpose of creating an inference of guilt, and that the State abandoned its argument that evidence of the refusal is admissible for the limited purpose of explaining the absence of a blood test. However, because of our holding here, we need not address these arguments. 6 without doing so.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). Indeed, it is
well settled that
[w]e do not unnecessarily decide the constitutionality of statutes. As early as 1884, we recognized that principles underlying the separation of powers should also limit occasions on which we determine whether statutes violate the Georgia Constitution to those where such a decision was truly necessary. Comity to a co-ordinate department of the government requires, according to many decisions of this and other courts, that causes shall not be disposed of upon constitutional grounds when it is possible to avoid such questions, without a sacrifice of the rights of parties. And it is especially so in cases where the constitutional merits are important, novel, and difficult.
In the Interest of C. C., 314 Ga. 446, 451-452 (2) (a) (877 SE2d 555)
(2022) (citations and punctuation omitted). So too in this case.
As discussed above, in his amended motion to suppress,
Randall not only presented constitutional arguments in support of
suppression but also asserted that suppression was warranted
because evidence of his refusal to consent to the blood test was more
prejudicial than probative. And although Randall’s amended motion
did not expressly invoke Rule 403, his argument necessarily
7 implicates those principles.3 The trial court, though, did not resolve
this evidentiary argument and instead proceeded to rule on
Randall’s constitutional claims. But Randall’s argument “presents a
threshold issue of constitutional avoidance” because if evidence of
his refusal to consent to the blood test is due to be excluded as more
prejudicial than probative, there will be “no occasion to reach the
merits of his constitutional claim.” State v. Mondor, 306 Ga. 338,
344-345 (2) (830 SE2d 206) (2019). Thus, rather than “jumping
straight to the constitutional question[,] [t]he trial court should have
resolved the statutory question first.” Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170,
171 (1) n.7 (751 SE2d 337) (2013).
Given the current posture of this case, we conclude that the
3 In his supplemental brief before this Court, Randall also argues that
evidence of his refusal is not relevant and therefore should not be subject to a Rule 403 balancing test. Of course, the trial court must address whether such evidence is relevant under OCGA § 24-4-401 before determining whether its probative value (of course, irrelevant evidence can have no probative value) is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice under Rule 403. See Wilson v. State, 315 Ga. 728, 738 (8) (883 SE2d 802) (2023) (noting that “relevant evidence is admissible even if it has only slight probative value,” but that “[r]elevant evidence may nevertheless be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” (citations and punctuation omitted)). And because that question is reserved at least in the first instance to the trial court, we express no opinion on the matter. 8 trial court’s order must be vacated and that remand is necessary.
Because “[t]he application of the Rule 403 test is a matter committed
principally to the discretion of the trial courts,” Olds v. State, 299
Ga. 65, 70 (2) (786 SE2d 633) (2016), we do not reach the merits of
that issue in the first instance. And because Randall’s Rule 403
argument presents a basis on which his motion to suppress may be
resolved without reaching his constitutional claims, we decline to
resolve those claims at this juncture.4 See In the Interest of C. C., 314
Ga. at 451-455 (2) (a) (declining to address constitutional challenge
to statute before lower court had “properly addressed [a]
preliminary question” relevant to petitioners’ standing to raise
constitutional challenge and remanding case for lower court to apply
correct standard to that “threshold inquiry”). Accordingly, we vacate
the order of the trial court and remand the case for the court to rule
on Randall’s statutory argument.
4 Of course, if the trial court determines that Rule 403 — or some other
statutory rule of evidence — does not require suppression of the evidence at issue, it then must proceed to consideration of Randall’s constitutional claims, to the extent they were properly preserved. 9 Judgment vacated and case remanded. All the Justices concur.
Decided January 17, 2024.
Implied consent; constitutional question. Clarke State Court.
Before Judge Auslander.
William W. Fleenor, Solicitor-General, Eric M. Whitmore,
Ethan M. Makin, Assistant Solicitors-General; Deborah Gonzales,
District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Beth A.
Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Clint C. Malcolm, Meghan H. Hill,
Senior Assistant Attorneys General, for appellant.
Daniels & Rothman, Jeffrey A. Rothman, Anna G. Bolden, for
appellee.
J. Ryan Brown Law, Hunter J. Rodgers; Willis Law Firm, Greg
A. Willis, Jessica Jones, Casey A. Cleaver, amici curiae.