State v. Ramos
This text of 407 A.2d 952 (State v. Ramos) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Connecticut primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
On December 17,1975, the defendant entered pleas of not guilty to an information charg *276 ing him with the crimes of rape in the first degree, sexual contact in the first degree and injury or risk of injury to a child, alleged to have been committed on or about April 15,1975, and elected a trial by the court. Prior to the commencement of the trial on December 22, 1976, the state requested, and over objection was granted, permission to file a substitute information alleging that the above offenses were committed on May 22,1975. The change in the date was the only significant difference between the original and the substitute informations. Following the withdrawal of the defendant’s prior pleas and elections, he again entered pleas of not guilty to the substitute information and elected to be tried by the court, which found him guilty as charged. From the judgment rendered, the defendant has appealed to this court, claiming error in the trial court’s decision to allow the filing of the substitute information.
The substitute information was, in effect, simply an amendment of the original information as to the date of the alleged offense. The order of the trial court allowing the filing of such an amendment to conform to the evidence is generally within its sound discretion; Practice Book, 1963, §525; 1 see State v. Rafanello, 151 Conn. 453, 457, 199 A.2d 13; and thus subject to review only upon circumstances indicating an abuse of that discretion. Cf. Corcoran v. Jacovino, 161 Conn. 462, 471, 290 A.2d 225; 41 Am. Jur. 2d, Indictments and Informations § 201.
It is a well-established rule in this state that “it is not essential in a criminal prosecution that the crime be proved to have been committed on the pre *277 cise date alleged, it being competent ordinarily for the prosecution to prove the commission of the crime charged at any time prior to the date of the complaint and within the period fixed by the Statute of Limitations.” State v. Lorusso, 151 Conn. 189, 191, 195 A.2d 429; State v. Bitting, 162 Conn. 1, 8, 291 A.2d 240; see also Stenz v. Sandstrom, 143 Conn. 72, 75, 118 A.2d 900; State v. Horton, 132 Conn. 276, 277, 43 A.2d 744; State v. Ferris, 81 Conn. 97, 99, 70 A. 587. Thus, it is entirely proper for a court to permit an amendment or a substitute information merely to amplify or to correct the time of the commission of the offense when time is not a material ingredient of the crime charged. See State v. Horton, supra; 41 Am. Jur. 2d, Indictments and Informations § 204. In the present case, since the date of the alleged offenses was neither an essential element of the crimes with which the defendant was charged; see State v. Horton, supra; State v. Ferris, supra; nor an otherwise material factor in the defendant’s case, 2 the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the state to file the substitute information.
The defendant argues that, under the circumstances of this case, the late filing of the substitute information deprived him of the opportunity to prepare his defense and thus constituted a denial of due process. We disagree. If the information *278 apprises the accused of the charges against him with such particularity and certainty to enable him to prepare his defense and avoid prejudicial surprise, and to enable him to plead his conviction or acquittal in bar of any future prosecution for’ the same offense, it is constitutionally sufficient. United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 377-78, 74 S. Ct. 113, 98 L. Ed. 92; State v. Coleman, 167 Conn. 260, 275, 355 A.2d 11 (Bogdanski, J., concurring); State v. Beaulieu, 164 Conn. 620, 625, 325 A.2d 263; State v. Costello, 62 Conn. 128, 130, 25 A. 477.
Both the arrest warrant affidavit and the original information filed on October 27, 1975, in the Court of Common Pleas, from which the case was bound over to the Superior Court, alleged that the offenses committed by the defendant took place in May of 1975. Thereafter, the original information filed in November of 1975 in the Superior Court gave April 15 as the date of the offenses. In April of 1976, the state prepared the substitute information changing the date of the alleged offense to May, 1975, 3 but, through inadvertence, it failed to inform *279 the defendant of this intended modification until December 21, 1976, the day before it was actually filed. 4 In the absence of any request by the defendant for a continuance, the trial began on December 22, 1976.
In spite of the previously filed documents in the Court of Common Pleas indicating that the state would seek to prove that the offenses were committed in May, the defendant may have been somewhat surprised by the subsequent change in the date. Nevertheless, under the circumstances, he was not denied due process. See United States ex rel. Gordon v. Reincke, 415 F.2d 1126, 1128 (2d Cir.). Since the defendant informed the court that he had no alibi defense to the April 15 allegations, 5 he was not prejudiced in making his defense on the basis of the amended date. State v. Horton, 132 Conn. 276, 277, 43 A.2d 744. The defendant failed to pursue a “Motion for Bill of Particulars” filed with the court on December 17, 1976, asking for, inter alia, “the date and time of the alleged offense.” Moreover, it is important to note that the defendant did not request a continuance for additional investigation regarding the new date. Practice Book, 1963, § 526; 6 see State v. Lorusso, 151 Conn. 189, 191, 195 A.2d 429
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
407 A.2d 952, 176 Conn. 275, 1978 Conn. LEXIS 1090, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-ramos-conn-1978.