State v. Raia

Ohio Court of Appeals

State v. Raia

2014 Ohio 2707

CourtOhio Court of Appeals

DecidedJune 23, 2014

Docket2013-P-0020

StatusPublished

Cited by51 cases

This text of 2014 Ohio 2707 (State v. Raia) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

State v. Raia, 2014 Ohio 2707 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014).

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Opinion

[Cite as State v. Raia, 2014-Ohio-2707.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

PORTAGE COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO, : OPINION

Plaintiff-Appellee, : CASE NO. 2013-P-0020 - vs - :

PAUL RAIA a.k.a. PETER PAUL RAIA, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

Criminal Appeal from the Portage County Municipal Court, Case No. 12 CRB 636.

Judgment: Reversed and remanded.

Victor V. Vigluicci, Portage County Prosecutor, and Pamela J. Holder, Assistant Prosecutor, 241 South Chestnut Street, Ravenna, OH 44266 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).

Frank J. Cimino, 250 South Chestnut Street, Suite #18, Ravenna, OH 44266 (For Defendant-Appellant).

THOMAS R. WRIGHT, J.

{¶1} This appeal is from the Portage County Municipal Court. Appellant Paul

Raia was found guilty of exposing his private parts in violation of R.C. 2907.09(A)(1), a

fourth degree misdemeanor. The jury also found that Raia had two prior convictions of

public indecency, elevating his current conviction to a second degree misdemeanor.

On appeal, Raia alleges that the single judgment entry containing both of his prior

convictions was improperly admitted because it did not set forth the trial judge’s

signature. He also alleges that the trial court’s various limitations on his cross- examination of the state’s witnesses violated his right to confrontation. For the

following reasons, we reverse and remand.

{¶2} On the afternoon of March 21, 2012, Danielle Keller and Stacey Parsons

went to a Burger King in Kent, Ohio for lunch. Parsons ordered a salad and sat at a

table where she saw Raia sitting at another table with his legs apart and his private

parts exposed. Parsons went to Keller, who was still ordering lunch, and told her what

she saw. The two decided to sit at the table where Parsons originally sat. Keller

glanced at Raia and saw that his testicles were exposed through the bottom of his

shorts and told Parsons “the mouse is back out of the house.”

{¶3} Parsons turned around and saw Raia smiling with his legs spread apart

and his testicles exposed. As a result, Parsons became distressed and went to the

restroom to call the police. However, because her cell phone battery was low, she

went to Gary Trump, a manager at the Burger King, to complain about the situation.

Trump testified that he went over to Raia to investigate. Upon walking over to the table

where Raia was sitting, Trump saw that Raia’s penis and testicles were exposed

through the bottom of his shorts. He informed Raia that his genitals were exposed and

told him to cover himself up. Raia complied.

{¶4} Shortly thereafter, Keller informed Parsons that Raia’s private parts were

exposed again. Keller and Parsons left the restaurant. After apologizing to Keller and

Parsons for the incident, Trump told Raia that he had to leave the restaurant. Upon

leaving, Keller and Parsons called the police who apprehended Raia shortly thereafter.

{¶5} At trial, Raia’s defense consisted solely of his own testimony. According

to Raia, he was the victim of various malicious lies directed at him. He claimed that

Keller and Parsons were lying because they were cross-dressers, and that because

2 cross-dressers have an intrinsic bias against men, they sought to make false

accusations against him. Raia also claimed the police officer wrongfully arrested him

because the officer is rewarded for each arrest he makes. Additionally, Raia claimed

that he could not have wrongfully exposed himself because he was wearing tight

underpants.

{¶6} As his first assignment of error, Raia alleges that:

{¶7} “The trial court committed prejudicial error in overruling the Defendant-

Appellant’s Motion to Exclude the conviction of Case No. K98 CVB 1221S filed in the

Portage County Municipal Court, in Kent Division, on December 2, 1998, in that the

judgment entry did not contain the signature of the presiding judge, Donald. H. Martell.”

{¶8} Within this assignment of error, Raia makes two arguments. He first

alleges that the trial court’s admission of the judgment entry of Raia’s two previous

convictions for public indecency was improper because the judgment entry did not

comply with R.C. 2945.75(B)(1) or Crim.R. 32(C). He also alleges that the judgment

entry was not properly authenticated. The State does not defend the propriety of the

trial court’s admission; rather, the state contends it is harmless error.

{¶9} We first address the issue of compliance with Crim.R. 32(C) and R.C.

2945.75(B)(1). A trial court has broad discretion in determining the admissibility of

evidence. State v. Hymore, 9 Ohio St.2d 122, 128 (1967). Unless an abuse of

discretion is apparent from a review of the record, appellate courts will not disturb

evidentiary rulings. Id. An “abuse of discretion” is one of art, connoting judgment

exercised by a court, which does not comport with reason or the record. State v.

Underwood, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2008-L-113, 2009-Ohio-2089, ¶30, citing State v.

Ferranto, 112 Ohio St. 667, 676-678 (1925). The Second Appellate District also

3 recently adopted a similar definition of the abuse-of-discretion standard: an abuse of

discretion is the trial court's “‘failure to exercise sound, reasonable, and legal decision-

making.’” State v. Beechler, 2d Dist. Clark No. 09-CA-54, 2010-Ohio-1900, ¶62,

quoting Black's Law Dictionary (8 Ed.Rev.2004). When an appellate court is reviewing

a pure issue of law, “the mere fact that the reviewing court would decide the issue

differently is enough to find error[.] * * * By contrast, where the issue on review has

been confined to the discretion of the trial court, the mere fact that the reviewing court

would have reached a different result is not enough, without more, to find error.” Id.

¶67.

{¶10} In regard to proving a past conviction, the state may prove the past

conviction pursuant to R.C. 2945.75(B)(1). R.C. 2945.75(B)(1) provides: “Whenever in

any case it is necessary to prove a prior conviction, a certified copy of the entry of

judgment in such prior conviction together with evidence sufficient to identify the

defendant named in the entry as the offender in the case at bar, is sufficient to prove

such prior conviction.” When proving a past conviction pursuant to R.C. 2945.75(B)(1),

the judgment entry must comply with Crim.R. 32(C). State v. Gwen, 134 Ohio St.3d

284, 2012-Ohio-5046, ¶23. To comply with Crim.R. 32(C), “the judgment entry must set

forth (1) the fact of a conviction, (2) the sentence, (3) the judge's signature, and (4) the

time stamp indicating the entry upon the journal by the clerk.” Id.

{¶11} The judgment entry admitted does not contain a signature of the trial judge

and therefore did not comply with Crim.R. 32(C). Consequently, the admission of the

judgment entry was improper. However, in Gwen, the Ohio Supreme Court made clear

that R.C. 2945.75(B)(1) is not the only way to prove a previous conviction. Id., ¶22. In

Gwen the court held that the defendant may admit or stipulate that the defendant has a

4 previous conviction. Id., ¶12, 14. Raia admitted on the stand that he had two previous

convictions for public indecency. Because his testimony acted as an alternate means

of proving his prior convictions for public indecency, the admission of the judgment

entry to prove the two previous convictions, although improper, was harmless error.

Id., ¶12; Crim.R. 52(A).

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