[Cite as Fien v. Galloway-Fien, 2024-Ohio-5762.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT GEAUGA COUNTY
WILLIAM G. FIEN, JR., CASE NO. 2023-G-0048
Plaintiff-Appellee, Civil Appeal from the - vs - Court of Common Pleas
SHERRY L. GALLOWAY-FIEN, Trial Court No. 2012 DC 000898 Defendant-Appellant.
OPINION
Decided: December 9, 2024 Judgment: Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Patrick DiChiro, 6300 Rockside Road, Suite 302, Independence, OH 44131 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
Sherry L. Galloway-Fien, pro se, 15863 Thompson Road, Thompson, OH 44086 (Defendant-Appellant).
JOHN J. EKLUND, J.
{¶1} Appellant, Sherry Galloway-Fien, and Appellee, William Fien, were divorced
in 2015. Six years later, the parties each filed post-decree motions asking the court to
order the other to show cause why the other should not be held in contempt for failing to
comply with the Divorce Decree’s property division terms.
{¶2} Appellee’s post-decree motion alleged Appellant had failed to pay him his
agreed upon share of equity ($17,130.50) in their W. 157th Street residence. Appellant
first filed a Motion to Modify Child Support and then a Motion to Show Cause, which asserted that Appellee had failed to make mortgage payments on the Thompson Road
residence.
{¶3} After holding a hearing, a magistrate issued a decision. The trial court
adopted the magistrate’s decision, over Appellant’s objections. For the reasons stated
below, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in part, reverse in part, and remand.
Substantive and Procedural History
{¶4} Appellant and Appellee were married March 20, 2005, and had two children.
{¶5} On September 6, 2012, Appellee filed a Complaint for Divorce.
{¶6} On May 11, 2015, the trial court entered a Judgment of Divorce. That
judgment addressed (among other things) the division of two properties: a Thompson
Road marital residence and a W. 157th Street residence.
The Divorce Decree:
{¶7} As to the Thompson Road residence, the Divorce Decree stated:
[Appellee] shall be entitled to retain exclusive possession of the Thompson Road property unless the property is sold or [Appellant] removes [Appellee] from liability on the residence as set forth herein. [Appellee] shall be responsible for the first and second mortgages on said property and all other obligations associated with said residence and shall indemnify and hold [Appellant] harmless thereon.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that [Appellee] shall be granted one year from the date of this final Judgment Entry of Divorce to refinance or otherwise remove [Appellant’s] name from the liabilities on the first and second mortgages associated with the Thompson Road property. If after one year [Appellee] is unable to refinance or otherwise remove [Appellant’s] name from the first and second mortgages at the Thompson Road property, then [Appellant] shall have 90 days to refinance or otherwise remove [Appellees’] name from the liabilities on the first and second mortgages associated with the Thompson road property. . . . If after both periods of time for the parties to refinance or otherwise remove the other from liability on the Thompson Road property have expired and neither party has refinanced the residence or otherwise removed the pother party from liability, then the residence shall be immediately listed for sale with a licensed real estate agent and sold. 2
Case No. 2023-G-0048 {¶8} As to the W. 157th Street residence, the Divorce Decree stated:
[Appellant], at her option, shall be permitted to retain exclusive possession of the W. 157th Street property until the occurrence of one of the events set forth below. [Appellant] shall indemnify and hold [Appellee] harmless as to all obligations regarding said real property including but not limited to the mortgage, taxes, homeowner’s insurance, maintenance and utilities.
[Appellant], at her option, shall have up to one year to either pay [Appellee] for his share of the equity in the W. 157th St. property or list the property on the market for sale. In the event [Appellant] elects to sell the property, then within one year of this final Judgment Entry of Divorce, said property shall be listed with a licensed real estate agent selected by mutual agreement of the parties and sold. In the event the parties are unable to agree, the parties shall follow the advice of the real estate agent regarding listing price, acceptance of offers, and counteroffers. Upon sale, after payment of the customary costs of sale, the proceeds shall be equally divided between the parties.
In the event [Appellant] elects to purchase [Appellee’s] interest in said real property, she shall, within one year of this final Judgment Entry of Divorce, be ordered to pay [Appellee] $17,130.50 for his share of the equity.
{¶9} Thus, under the Divorce Decree, Appellee assumed responsibility for the
mortgages on Thompson Road residence and agreed to indemnify and hold Appellant
harmless on the mortgages and other obligations for the property.
{¶10} As to the W. 157th Street residence, Appellant agreed to indemnify and hold
Appellee harmless for the mortgage payments. Appellant had the option to pay Appellee
$17,130.50 for his share of the equity in the property or to list and sell the property with
mutual participation of the parties and to divide the proceeds of the sale.
{¶11} Appellant took exclusive possession of the W. 157th Street residence;
Appellee took exclusive possession of the Thompson Road residence.
Case No. 2023-G-0048 Temporary Agreement:
{¶12} A mere four and one-half months later, on September 28, 2015, the parties
entered a Temporary Agreement to switch residences. Although the parties assumed
responsibility for the utilities and other expenses along with the switch in residence, the
parties remained responsible for their original mortgage expenses on the properties as
set forth in the Divorce Decree until March 1, 2016.
Post-Decree Motions:
{¶13} Appellee filed his post-decree Motion to Show Cause on April 14, 2021.
{¶14} Appellant filed a Motion to Modify Child Support on November 4, 2021.
{¶15} Appellant filed her Motion to Show Cause on December 7, 2021. Appellant
said that Appellee’s failure to make the Thompson Road mortgage payments as required
resulted in her taking out a loan to stop a foreclosure on the residence and that she
incurred late fees and finance charges.
Hearing on the Motions:
{¶16} On August 26, 2022, the trial court held a hearing through a magistrate on
the pending motions.
{¶17} At the start of the hearing, Appellee withdrew the portion of his show cause
motion pertaining to refinancing the Thompson Road residence because Appellant had
since refinanced the loan. Second, the parties stipulated to the child support computation
worksheet figures, which were entered into evidence as Court’s Exhibit I. The parties
agreed that “two of the four issues” raised had been resolved.
Case No. 2023-G-0048 Testimony relating to W. 157th Street residence:
{¶18} Appellee testified that the parties owned two houses at the time of their
divorce. Appellant did not list the W. 157th Street residence by May 11, 2016. Instead,
Appellant sold the residence in December 2017. However, she did not pay Appellee
$17,130.50 as required by the Divorce Decree.
{¶19} Appellee said he did not pursue court action on this issue sooner because
there was still an ongoing dispute about the refinance of the Thompson Road residence.
According to Appellee, Appellant told him repeatedly he would have to take her back to
court to get her to refinance the Thompson Road residence.
{¶20} The proceeds from the sale of the W. 157th Street residence were
$26,763.14. However, Appellee maintained that he was entitled to the full $17,130.50, not
merely one-half of the proceeds of the sale, because Appellant did not sell the house
within one year, as contemplated in the Divorce Decree.
{¶21} Appellant testified that she sold the W. 157th Street residence in 2017.
According to her understanding of the Divorce Decree, she was obligated to pay Appellee
one-half of the proceeds. However, she acknowledged that she had not done so. She
acknowledged she did not consult with Appellee about the sale of the property but said
she sold the property for the highest price she could.
Testimony relating to Thompson Road Residence:
{¶22} Appellant testified that after the Divorce Decree, the parties entered into an
agreement to switch residences but that each party was to continue to make mortgage
payments for their original residence until March 1, 2016. In September 2015, Appellant
moved out of the W. 157th Street residence and into the Thompson Road residence.
Case No. 2023-G-0048 {¶23} Appellant said that Appellee did not make the mortgage payments on the
Thompson Road residence. When she began to make the payments in March 2016, the
bank had initiated a foreclosure and refused to accept her monthly payments until she
made a lump sum payment to catch up on the arrears. Appellant talked to Appellee about
this issue, and he said that it was Appellant’s “problem now.”
{¶24} Appellant explained that the Thompson Road residence had an 80/20
mortgage with two outstanding balances. According to the bank statements, introduced
as exhibits I and L, as of March 1, 2016, the total arrearage for both balances was
$12,640.11.
{¶25} She testified that due to fees and the late payments, the bank was owed
$19,809.66. Further, in order to make this lump sum payment, Appellant took a loan from
her retirement account. She said that she needed to borrow double the amount she
wanted to account for taxes and expenses associated with taking the loan. She claimed
damages of approximately $28,862.00.
{¶26} Appellee testified that he was not able to pay the mortgage on the
Thompson Road residence. He explained his inability to pay was the reason the parties
switched houses in September 2015. However, he testified that he paid between $900.00
and $1,100 in “rent” to Appellant for the W. 157th Street residence from September
through December 2015.
Post-hearing filings:
{¶27} After the hearing, Appellant filed a Motion for Partial Withdrawal of
Stipulation. Court’s Exhibit I set forth Appellee’s out of pocket expenses for health
insurance of $3,246.00. Appellant’s motion questioned whether this amount was accurate
Case No. 2023-G-0048 and submitted a request for production of documents to Appellee. Appellant’s motion
requested that the $3,246.00 figure be stricken if Appellee did not substantiate it.
{¶28} On November 4, 2022, Appellant filed a Notice of Dismissal, dismissing her
Motion for Partial Withdrawal of Stipulation.
{¶29} Despite Appellant’s Notice of Dismissal of her motion, on November 11,
2022, the magistrate issued an order requiring Appellee to produce “documentation to
substantiate the $3246 actual out-of-pocket health insurance costs on the proposed
stipulations” within seven days. Failure to do so would result in Court’s Exhibit I being
stricken.
{¶30} On February 9, 2023, the magistrate ruled on Appellant’s Motion for Partial
Withdrawal of Stipulation, and the magistrate struck the amount from the proposed
stipulation.
{¶31} On February 10, 2023, Appellee filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
magistrate’s February 9 ruling, arguing that Appellant’s November filing of a Notice of
Dismissal of her Motion warranted reversing the ruling. However, the magistrate did not
directly rule on the Motion for Reconsideration.
Magistrate’s Decision and Objections:
{¶32} On October 11, 2023, the magistrate issued a decision. The decision stated
that it was ruling on the two motions to show cause. The magistrate found that the parties
had “stipulated to the figures and calculations for child support purposes and the
[Appellant’s] Motion to Modify Child Support was resolved thereby.”
{¶33} As to the W. 157th Street residence, the magistrate found that Appellant
owed Appellee $17,130.50 rather than one-half of the net proceeds of the sale for three
Case No. 2023-G-0048 reasons: (1) Appellant did not sell the W. 157th Street residence until December 22, 2017;
(2) Appellee did not have any say in the price, the realtor, the negotiation, or any part of
the sale of the residence despite the Divorce Decree providing for Appellee’s
participation; and (3) the parties switched houses to accommodate the children and
because Appellee could not afford the Thompson Road house.
{¶34} As to the Thompson Road residence, the magistrate found that Appellee
had “failed to duly pay the mortgages for the Thompson Road property” and that because
of this, Appellant “was caused damages in the approximate amount of $28,862.00 plus
other costs, expenses and fees.”
{¶35} The magistrate said that although Appellant established damages for
Appellee’s failure to timely pay the mortgage, Appellant also failed to timely refinance or
sell the Thompson Road property as contemplated in the Divorce Decree. Because of
this failure, Appellant was not solely at fault for the non-payment of the mortgage. Next,
the magistrate determined that some of these damages might have been avoided had
Appellant timely sold the W. 157th Street residence. Finally, the magistrate observed that
Appellee had been making payments to Appellant but that he did not have any
documentation to support his testimony.
{¶36} Therefore, the magistrate determined that “[u]nder these circumstances, the
[Appellee] should not be 100% responsible for the expenses the [Appellant] incurred to
rescue the Thompson property from foreclosure. [Appellant’s] own conduct and decision
arguably contributed to [Appellee’s] default. . . . [N]either party has clean hands.” Thus,
the magistrate declined to find either party in contempt of court. Both parties were ordered
to bear their own attorney fees, and Appellant was ordered to pay Appellee $17,130.50
Case No. 2023-G-0048 for his share of the equity of the W. 157th Street residence, less one-half of the amount
Appellee was behind on the mortgages as of March 1, 2016, pursuant to Exhibits I and L.
{¶37} On October 24, 2023, Appellant filed Objections to the Magistrate’s
Decision. Appellee did not file a response to the objections.
{¶38} On December 15, 2023, the trial court issued a judgment entry adopting the
Magistrate’s Decision.
{¶39} Appellant timely appealed, raising three assignments of error. 1
Assignments of Error and Analysis
{¶40} Each of Appellant’s assignments of error relates to the trial court adopting
the magistrate’s decision. “When reviewing an appeal from a trial court’s adoption of a
magistrate’s decision, an appellate court must determine whether the trial court abused
its discretion in adopting the decision.” Huntington Natl. Bank v. Betteley, 2015-Ohio-
5067, ¶ 17 (11th Dist.). “Further, any claimed error on appeal must be based on the trial
court’s actions, and not on the magistrate’s decision.” Id.
{¶41} “The term ‘abuse of discretion’ . . . is one of art, connoting judgment
exercised by a court which neither comports with reason, nor the record.” State v.
Underwood, 2009-Ohio-2089, ¶ 30 (11th Dist.). An abuse of discretion is “the trial court’s
‘failure to exercise sound, reasonable, and legal decision-making.’” State v. Beechler,
2010-Ohio-1900, ¶ 62 (2d Dist.), quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (8th Ed. 2004); State v.
Raia, 2014-Ohio-2707, ¶ 9 (11th Dist.). “When an appellate court is reviewing a pure issue
of law, ‘the mere fact that the reviewing court would decide the issue differently is enough
1. Appellant was represented by R. Russell Kubyn, in this appeal. However, after briefing closed but before oral arguments, Attorney Kubyn passed away. Appellant proceeded pro se during oral arguments. 9
Case No. 2023-G-0048 to find error[.] . . . By contrast, where the issue on review has been confined to the
discretion of the trial court, the mere fact that the reviewing court would have reached a
different result is not enough, without more, to find error.’” Raia at ¶ 9, quoting Beechler
at ¶ 67.
{¶42} “In construing a divorce decree, a court must give common words their
ordinary meaning unless some other meaning is clearly suggested from the face of the
decree or its overall contents.” Allen v. Allen, 2022-Ohio-3198, ¶ 65 (11th Dist.).
“Language is ambiguous if it is susceptible to two or more conflicting, yet reasonable,
interpretations.” Id. It is an issue of law whether language is ambiguous. Id. However, it
is an issue of fact as to the parties’ intent if the language is capable of two reasonable but
conflicting interpretations. Id.
{¶43} Appellant’s first assignment of error is: “The trial court erred and committed
an abuse of discretion, including adopting the Magistrate’s Decision, finding that Appellant
owed $17,130.50 to the Appellee from the sale of the Cleveland Property. (T.d. 303, 306,
311).”
{¶44} Pursuant to the terms of the Divorce Decree, Appellant had two options: the
first was to list and sell the W. 157th Street residence and split the net proceeds evenly
with Appellee. In relation to this option, the Divorce Decree provided that Appellant “had
up to one year . . . to list the property on the market for sale” and further provided: “In the
event [Appellant] elects to sell the property, then within one year of this final Judgment
Entry of Divorce, said property shall be listed with a licensed real estate agent selected
by mutual agreement of the parties and sold.” The second was to pay Appellee
$17,130.50 for his share of the equity in the property. Although Appellant was required to
Case No. 2023-G-0048 exercise either option within one year, she failed to do so. A review of the facts indicates
that she did not list the property within one year but that it was listed in 2017.
Nevertheless, she did ultimately sell the property in December 2017, at which time she
received $26,763.14 in net proceeds. So, Appellant exercised the first option as detailed
in the Divorce Decree (albeit tardily). Therefore, Appellant owed Appellee one-half of the
net proceeds of the sale.
{¶45} The trial court abused its discretion in ordering Appellant to pay Appellee
$17,130.50 for his share of the equity in the property when the actual sale of the property
yielded only $26,763.14 in net proceeds. Appellant testified that she sold the property for
the highest price she could obtain, and Appellee is entitled to one-half of the proceeds:
$13,381.57.
{¶46} Accordingly, Appellant’s first assignment of error has merit.
{¶47} Appellant’s second assignment of error is: “The trial court erred and
committed an abuse of discretion, including adopting the Magistrate’s Decision, finding
the Appellee was not in contempt of court, contrary to the clear and convincing evidence
to the contrary. (T.d. 303, 306, 311).”
{¶48} “‘Contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience to, the orders or commands
of judicial authority. Indirect contempt may include the disobedience of, or resistance to,
a lawful order, judgment, or command of a court officer.’” (Internal citations and footnote
omitted.) Miller v. Miller, 2020-Ohio-6914, ¶ 8 (11th Dist.), quoting Dozer v. Dozer, 88
Ohio App.3d 296, 302 (4th Dist. 1993). “Where the contempt allegation is based on
violation of a court order, the order must be clear and definite with respect to the precise
Case No. 2023-G-0048 conduct constituting disobedience.” Lanza v. Lanza, 2023-Ohio-3531, ¶ 7 (11th Dist.);
see Cain v. Cain, 2019-Ohio-184, ¶ 21 (11th Dist.).
{¶49} The burden of proof for finding civil contempt is clear and convincing
evidence. Kolenic v. Kolenic, 2018-Ohio-1106, ¶ 18 (11th Dist.). “Clear and convincing
evidence is . . . evidence sufficient to produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief
or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.” In re Janson, 2005-Ohio-6712, ¶
33 (11th Dist.). “A reviewing court ‘will not reverse the decision of the court below in a
contempt proceeding in the absence of a showing of an abuse of discretion.’” Kolleda v.
Kolleda, 2014-Ohio-2013, ¶ 42 (11th Dist.), quoting State ex rel. Ventrone v. Birkel, 65
Ohio St.2d 10, 11 (1981).
{¶50} A person charged with contempt of court for violating a court order may
defend the charge by proving it was not in the person’s power to obey the order. Stychno
v. Stychno, 2009-Ohio-6858, ¶ 38 (11th Dist.). “Once a person seeking contempt has
demonstrated a defendant’s failure” to comply with the court order, “the burden of proof
shifts to the defendant to prove” the impossibility of compliance. Smith v. Smith, 2013-
Ohio-4101, ¶ 41 (11th Dist.) (addressing the inability to pay child support).
{¶51} In declining to hold Appellee in contempt, the magistrate’s decision found
that Appellee did not have the ability to pay the mortgage on the Thompson Road
residence. Appellee testified the reason the parties switched houses in September 2015
was because he did not have the ability to continue to make the mortgage payments.
However, the terms of the temporary agreement required that he continue to pay the
Thompson Road mortgage payments until March 1, 2016. Thus, the trial court did not
Case No. 2023-G-0048 abuse its discretion by declining to hold Appellee in contempt because the court
concluded that Appellee did not have the ability to obey the Divorce Decree.
{¶52} But, the trial court only ordered Appellee to pay one-half of the amount he
was behind on the mortgages as of March 1, 2016. This was an error. The Divorce Decree
required Appellee to indemnify and hold Appellant harmless on the Thompson Road
mortgages and other obligations for the property. While Appellee’s inability to pay the
mortgage from September 2015 through March 2016 may relieve him of a contempt
finding, it does not relieve him from his obligation to indemnify Appellant fully for that
expense.
{¶53} The magistrate decided it did because Appellant was partially responsible
for the default on the Thompson Road residence. The magistrate came to this conclusion
for two reasons. First, the magistrate reasoned that “if [Appellant] had timely refinanced
or sold the Thompson property as the order required, the [Appellee] would not likely have
been burdened with the continuing expense.” However, under the May 11, 2015 Divorce
Decree, Appellee had until May 10, 2016, to refinance or otherwise remove Appellant
from the Thompson Road mortgages. If Appellee failed to do so, then Appellant had 90
days to remove Appellee from the mortgages. When Appellant assumed the mortgage
payments in March 2016, Appellee’s one-year period to refinance or sell had not yet
expired, and Appellant’s 90-day window to do so had not yet begun.
{¶54} Second, the magistrate found that Appellant was partially responsible for
the Thompson Road default because Appellant did not timely pursue a sale of the W.
157th Street residence. Had she done so, the magistrate said that Appellee “might have
Case No. 2023-G-0048 received his proper share of the proceeds earlier which, in turn, may have enabled
[Appellee] to keep the Thompson property mortgage payments up to date.”
{¶55} Appellee had no right to Appellant’s noblesse when he fell behind on the
mortgage payments. The May 11, 2015 Divorce Decree contemplated that Appellant had
“up to one year to either pay [Appellee] for his share of the equity in the W. 157th St.
property or list the property on the market for sale.” When Appellant assumed the
payments for the Thompson Road mortgages in March 2016, her time to either sell the
W. 157th Street residence or pay Appellee his share of the equity had not expired.
{¶56} Perhaps more importantly, Appellant cannot be said to have assumed any
portion of those arrears when she paid them. After Appellant assumed the Thompson
Road mortgage payments, which were already in a state of foreclosure, Appellee told
Appellant that it was her “problem now.” In fact, the terms of the Divorce Decree and the
Temporary Agreement made clear that Appellee was to indemnify Appellant and hold her
harmless on the Thompson Road mortgage payments up to March 1, 2016. Although the
magistrate noted that Appellee had paid “monies” to Appellant during the relevant period,
the decision minimized the persuasiveness of this testimony and found that Appellee had
“failed to provide any specific testimony or any documents in support thereof.”
{¶57} Finally, the magistrate specifically found that Appellant had incurred costs
of approximately “$28,862.00 plus others costs, expenses and fees” in bringing the
Thompson Road residence mortgage out of foreclosure. Yet, apparently because the
magistrate found that Appellant did not have clean hands, the magistrate only ordered
Appellee to repay one-half of the Thompson Road mortgage arrearages to Appellant.
Case No. 2023-G-0048 {¶58} The trial court said that it “agrees with the analysis set forth in the Decision
and Conclusions of Law in the Magistrate’s decision” and ordered that Appellant pay
$17,130.50, less one-half of the amount Appellee was behind on the mortgages as of
March 1, 2016.
{¶59} We find that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that the
magistrate’s analysis was correct.
{¶60} The magistrate plainly misinterpreted the Divorce Decree and negatively
applied provisions not yet in effect against Appellant in finding that Appellant’s “own
conduct and decisions arguably contributed to [Appellee’s] default.” Further, there is no
question that Appellee was 100 percent responsible for the Thompson Road mortgages
from September 2015 to March 1, 2016, as the decree provided that Appellee was to
indemnify and hold Appellant harmless for the mortgage until March 1, 2016.
{¶61} Yet, the trial court only held Appellee responsible for paying one-half of that
amount. This ruling failed to give the ordinary meaning to the plain language of the
Divorce Decree and subsequent Temporary Agreement, which required Appellee to pay
100 percent of the Thompson Road mortgage payments until March 1, 2016. The trial
court did not exercise sound and reasonable decision-making in this regard. Appellant
should not be responsible for any portion of the arrearages or the damages Appellant
suffered as a direct result of Appellee’s failure to pay.
{¶62} Accordingly, Appellant’s second assignment of error has merit.
{¶63} Appellant’s third assignment of error is: “The trial court erred and committed
an abuse of discretion, including adopting the Magistrate’s Decision, ignoring the issue of
Case No. 2023-G-0048 child support based upon an incorrect and/or withdrawn alleged stipulation. (T.d. 212,
281, 303, 306, 311).”
{¶64} It is true that the magistrate granted Appellant’s Motion for Partial
Withdrawal of Stipulation. However, by the time the magistrate had done so, Appellant
had already filed a Notice of Dismissal, dismissing her Motion for Partial Withdrawal of
Stipulation. Appellant has not addressed on appeal the dismissal of her motion and
makes no effort to explain why the trial court should have ruled on an issue that she raised
and dismissed. The trial court did not err when it did not address Appellant’s Motion to
Modify Child Support as Appellant had dismissed her Motion for Partial Withdrawal of
{¶65} Accordingly, Appellant’s third assignment of error is without merit.
{¶66} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Geauga County Court of
Common Pleas is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. On remand, Appellant
shall be responsible to pay one-half of the net proceeds of the sale of the W. 157th Street
residence to Appellee. Appellee shall be responsible to pay Appellant’s damages that
resulted from Appellee’s failure to pay the Thompson Road mortgages, found by the trial
court to be “the approximate amount of $28,862.00 plus other costs, expenses and fees.”
EUGENE A. LUCCI, P.J.,
MATT LYNCH, J.,
concur.
Case No. 2023-G-0048