State v. Quarels

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: June 24, 2026
• Docket: C-250470, C-250471
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Quarels, 2026-Ohio-2394.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NOS. C-250470 C-250471 Plaintiff-Appellee, : TRIAL NOS. C/23/CRB/18200 24/CRB/3435 vs. :

DARRELL QUARLES, :

Defendant-Appellant. : JUDGMENT ENTRY

This cause was heard upon the appeals, the record, and the briefs. For the reasons set forth in the Opinion filed this date, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. Further, the court holds that there were reasonable grounds for these appeals, allows no penalty, and orders that costs be taxed under App.R. 24. The court further orders that (1) a copy of this Judgment with a copy of the Opinion attached constitutes the mandate, and (2) the mandate be sent to the trial court for execution under App.R. 27.

To the clerk: Enter upon the journal of the court on 6/24/2026 per order of the court.

By:_______________________ Administrative Judge [Cite as State v. Quarels, 2026-Ohio-2394.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NOS. C-250470 C-250471 Plaintiff-Appellee, : TRIAL NOS. C/23/CRB/18200 24/CRB/3435 vs. :

Defendant-Appellant. : OPINION

Criminal Appeals From: Hamilton County Municipal Court

Judgments Appealed From Are: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: June 24, 2026

Emily Smart Woerner, City Solicitor, and Susan M. Zurface, Chief Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,

Roger W. Kirk, for Defendant-Appellant. [Cite as State v. Quarels, 2026-Ohio-2394.]

KINSLEY, Presiding Judge.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Darrell Quarles was convicted by the Hamilton

County Municipal Court of two counts of engaging in the business of security services

without a license. He challenges his convictions on appeal, arguing that the trial

court’s judgments were against the manifest weight of the evidence and that the State

failed to present sufficient evidence of the offenses at trial. Quarles also argues that

R.C. 4749.13—the statute which requires individuals who engage in the business of

security services to be specially licensed—unconstitutionally infringes on his due

process and equal protection rights. We disagree on all fronts. As explained in this

opinion, we reject Quarles’s constitutional and evidentiary arguments and affirm the

judgments of the trial court.

Background

{¶2} Following an investigation by the Ohio Department of Homeland

Security (“Homeland Security department”) and the Cincinnati Police Department

(“CPD”), Quarles was charged in two separate cases with engaging in the business of

security services without a license, first-degree misdemeanors. See R.C. 4749.13(A)

and 4749.99(A). The charge in the case numbered C/23/CRB/18200 was alleged to

have occurred at Clutch OTR bar on October 19, 2023.1 The charge in the case

numbered 24/CRB/3435 was alleged to have occurred at the Aura Room bar on

February 29, 2024.2

{¶3} Quarles filed motions to dismiss the charges in both cases, asserting that

R.C. 4749.13 is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him. In particular,

1 Quarles appealed his conviction in the case numbered C/23/CRB/18200 in the appeal numbered

C-250470. 2 Quarles appealed his conviction in the case numbered 24/CRB/3435 in the appeal numbered C-

250471. OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

Quarles alleged that the statute classified employees and business owners who provide

security services into different categories and then treated them differently without a

rational basis for doing so. In his written motions, Quarles also alleged that R.C.

4749.13 is unconstitutionally arbitrary, capricious, and overbroad, although he offered

little explanation for what he meant by these terms.

{¶4} The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on Quarles’s motions

to dismiss, at which Quarles called four witnesses to testify. The first witness was

Investigator Nick Gescheider, an enforcement investigator with Ohio’s Homeland

Security department. Gescheider began his testimony by addressing the purpose and

mechanics of the security services licensing requirement. To that end, Gescheider

testified that individuals who provide security services are required by law to have a

“guard card,” which he described as a special license issued by the Homeland Security

department. Gescheider indicated that “bouncers” and other staff who verify the

identification of guests outside of bars and nightclubs provide security services and

therefore fall within the “guard card” requirement. However, according to Gescheider,

the “guard card” law contains an exception. Where a business employs a person to

provide security services for the company, and the employee receives a W2 tax form

from the employer, the employee is not required to obtain a “guard card.” In other

words, as Gescheider explained, individuals working as corporate security are exempt

from the licensing requirement, but those who perform contract security services are

not.

{¶5} Gescheider further testified that the purpose of the security services

licensing requirement is to protect public safety. In particular, requiring licenses of

security personnel ensures that security guards are distinguishable from police officers

and are adept at managing public danger. He also explained that those interests may

4 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

not apply with the same force against private employers, who have incentives to set

their own standards for their employees who provide security.

{¶6} After addressing the licensing requirement, Gescheider explained his

investigation of Quarles’s conduct. Gescheider first came into contact with Quarles

when police responded to a shooting at a bar called Brandy’s Lounge. The police

suspected that the bar’s security guards were unlicensed and were not employed by

Brandy’s, so they alerted Gescheider.3 Gescheider then searched Quarles’s name in a

state database and found no record for him. But Gescheider spoke with Quarles, who

admitted that he operated his own private security company. Later, Gescheider was

again alerted by CPD that Quarles was serving as an unlicensed security guard, this

time at an establishment called Aura.

{¶7} Quarles’s next witness was CPD Officer Dennis Barnette. Barnette

testified that he arrived on scene at Brandy’s in response to a shooting, where he

recognized Quarles. At the time, Quarles was dressed in tactical gear and a vest that

said “fugitive response team” on the front. Barnette did not request a “guard card”

from Quarles at the time.

{¶8} Quarles next called CPD Officer Doug Horton. Horton identified

Quarles at the front of the Clutch bar, where he was working security.

{¶9} Quarles’s final witness in support of his motions to dismiss was CPD

Officer Brent Eve. Eve testified that he was aware of Quarles from his time policing

various bars in the central business district, including a time when he responded to a

fire alarm at Aura Room. Eve also testified that he had been instructed by the vice

3 Quarles was charged with a third count of engaging in the business of security services without a

license arising from the incident at Brandy’s Lounge, but the trial court found him not guilty of this offense.

5 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

squad to request “guard cards” from security guards.

{¶10} The trial court denied Quarles’s motions to dismiss and continued the

cases for trial.

{¶11} On October 3, 2024, Quarles tried the two charges against him to the

bench. The State presented four witnesses: (1) Eve, (2) Barnette, (3) CPD Officer

Curtis Latham, and (4) Gescheider.

{¶12} Eve testified to events that occurred when he responded to a fire alarm

at Aura Room. When Eve arrived on the scene, Quarles stood at the door of the bar.

Quarles wore a bullet-proof vest and other attire that resembled a security guard.

Quarles also had a firearm. According to Eve, the bar was in operation, as he could see

people inside the building who were smoking and mingling.

{¶13} Eve was wearing a body-worn camera (“BWC”) at the time, and its

footage was admitted into evidence and played for the trial court. Eve’s BWC footage

depicted Eve asking Quarles for his “guard card.” Quarles responded that he left his

wallet at home.

{¶14} Barnette testified he observed Quarles in the parking lot of Brandy’s

Lounge when he arrived at the bar in response to a reported shooting. Quarles was

dressed in a tactical vest that said “Lieutenant Quarles.” Quarles told Barnette that he

was not working that evening.

{¶15} Latham responded to the Clutch bar on September 30, 2023 in response

to a report from undercover officers who had been conducting an operation at the

establishment related to underage drinking. When Latham arrived, he encountered

Quarles, who was wearing a vest that said “security.” Quarles also carried a firearm.

Quarles declined to provide his social security number or license information to

Latham.

6 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

{¶16} Like Eve, Latham wore a BWC, and his BWC footage was admitted into

evidence. Latham’s BWC footage showed Quarles managing a parking problem in

Clutch’s parking lot.

{¶17} Gescheider testified that he interviewed Quarles at his home following

the incident at Brandy’s Lounge. The interview was recorded, and the recording was

played in court. During the interview, Quarles denied working as a security guard the

night of the shooting at Brandy’s. But he acknowledged that he owns a private security

company called P&Q Security and Fugitive Recovery (“P&Q”), that he is aware of the

“guard card” requirement, and that P&Q is unlicensed. Quarles also told Gescheider

that he does not maintain contracts with the businesses that he works for but normally

gets paid $40 to $50 in cash.

{¶18} After interviewing Quarles, Gescheider searched for Quarles in a state

database for licensed security services. He was unable to find Quarles.

{¶19} The trial court found Quarles guilty of the offenses arising from Clutch

and Aura Room. Quarles moved the trial court to reconsider its verdicts, arguing that

the State had not disproven that Quarles was an employee of either Clutch or Aura

Room and was therefore exempt from the licensing requirement. The trial court

denied the motion. In both cases, it sentenced Quarles to 180 days in jail, 179 of which

were suspended. He was given credit for one day and placed on one year of community

control. The trial court remitted Quarles’s fines and court costs and stayed Quarles’s

sentences pending appeal.

Analysis

{¶20} Quarles raises three assignments of error on appeal. The first relates to

the trial court’s denial of his motions to dismiss. The second and third challenge the

weight and sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial. None of Quarles’s

7 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

assignments of error have merit.

Constitutional Challenges

{¶21} In his first assignment of error, Quarles contends that the trial court

erred as a matter of law by denying his motions to dismiss, because R.C. 4749.13

violates his equal protection and due process rights.

{¶22} As an initial matter, our review of Quarles’s argument is frustrated by

the lack of completeness in his briefing. Quarles’s constitutional challenge comprises

a mere four paragraphs in his appellate brief, in which he fails to cite a single authority.

As Quarles has barely developed a constitutional argument, we could overrule his

assignment of error on this basis alone. See, e.g., Hall v. Waselski, 2025-Ohio-2552,

¶ 19 (9th Dist.) (“where the appellant failed to develop an argument . . . this court may

disregard those assignments of error”). But, for the sake of completeness, we address

Quarles’s claims as best we understand them. In doing so, we apply a de novo standard

of review. See State v. Hammock, 2022-Ohio-3570, ¶ 10 (1st Dist.) (holding that the

constitutionality of a statute is a legal question subject to de novo review on appeal).

{¶23} Quarles’s first allegation is that R.C. 4749.13 deprives him of equal

protection by treating private security guards differently from the employees of

businesses who provide security services for their employers. “Equal protection does

not forbid the legislature from making classifications but simply prohibits ‘treating

differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike.’” State v. Duncan, 2025-

Ohio-1153, ¶ 30 (1st Dist.), citing State v. Klembus, 2016-Ohio-1092, ¶ 8. Thus, where

a statute classifies individuals on the basis of a nonsuspect classification, the law will

be upheld if it bears a rational relationship to a legitimate government interest. Id. at

¶ 34. Under this rational basis standard, the government has no obligation to produce

evidence supporting either its interest or the relationship between its interest and the

8 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

challenged law. Pickaway Cty. Skilled Gaming, L.L.C. v. Cordray, 2010-Ohio-4908,

¶ 19. Rather, “[t]he party challenging the constitutionality of a statute bears the

burden to negate every conceivable basis that might support the legislation.” (Cleaned

up.) Id.

{¶24} Ohio’s security services licensing statutes create two groups—those that

require a license and those that do not. The dividing line between the groups is

employment status. Pursuant to R.C. 4749.01(H)(6), an employee of a business who

secures the employer’s property and is subjected to tax withholding by the employer

is exempt from the R.C. 4749.13 licensing requirement Quarles was convicted of

violating. Because this is a nonsuspect classification, the statutory scheme need only

be rationally related to a legitimate government interest.4 And Quarles bears the

burden of showing it is not in order to prevail.

{¶25} Quarles has made no such showing. To the contrary, at the evidentiary

hearing on Quarles’s motions to dismiss, Gescheider testified that the security services

licensing requirement is supported by the state’s interest in promoting public safety.

He explained that licenses are needed to ensure that security guards are not confused

with police officers and to promote security guards’ ability to manage public danger.

These interests are plainly legitimate. See, e.g., State v. Green, 2013-Ohio-1197, ¶ 9.

{¶26} As to whether the licensing scheme is rationally related to public safety,

Gescheider testified that the government’s concern about security guard preparedness

is less strong with respect to private employers, who have reasons to develop their own

safety standards for their employees. This explains why the license requirement

4 A suspect classification involves race, national origin, or a fundamental right, categories that are

plainly not at issue here. See Adamsky v. Buckeye Local School Dist., 73 Ohio St.3d 360, 362 (1995).

9 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

applies only to those who work for or supply external security services. Quarles

presented no evidence to undercut this assertion. He therefore failed to carry his

burden under the rational basis test, and we reject his equal protection challenge to

R.C. 4749.13.

{¶27} In addition, Quarles contends that he has a due process right to pursue

his chosen profession, which is compromised by the State’s security services licensing

requirement. We disagree. As the Ohio Supreme Court has held, “[T]he state may set

standards and regulate professions with the aim of protecting the public . . . .”

(Cleaned up.) In re Jones, 2018-Ohio-4182, ¶ 40. That is exactly what the State did

here.

{¶28} Finally, in passing, Quarles suggests that R.C. 4749.13 is

unconstitutionally vague. However, Quarles failed to develop this argument below and

has therefore waived it. See State v. Smith, 2019-Ohio-5350, ¶ 15 (1st Dist.).

{¶29} For these reasons, we overrule Quarles’s first assignment of error.

Weight and Sufficiency of the Evidence

{¶30} In his second and third assignments of error, Quarles argues that his

convictions are supported by insufficient evidence and are against the manifest weight

of the evidence. We consider these assignments of error together.

{¶31} To determine whether a conviction is supported by sufficient evidence,

we inquire “whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the

crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991),

paragraph two of the syllabus. See State v. Curry, 2020-Ohio-1230, ¶ 11 (1st Dist.).

{¶32} When reviewing whether Quarles’s convictions are against the manifest

weight of the evidence, we sit as the “thirteenth juror.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio

10 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

St.3d 380, 387 (1997). “A verdict can be against the manifest weight of the evidence

even though legally sufficient evidence supports it.” State v. Myers, 2018-Ohio-1903,

¶ 140. To evaluate a manifest weight challenge, the appellate court reviews the entire

record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, and considers the credibility

of all witnesses. State v. McKelton, 2016-Ohio-5735, ¶ 328. The panel questions

whether the trier of fact clearly lost its way in resolving evidentiary conflicts and

rendered a verdict that embodies a manifest miscarriage of justice. State v. Wilks,

2018-Ohio-1562, ¶ 52.

{¶33} To obtain a conviction for engaging in the business of security services

without a license under R.C. 4749.13(A), the State was required to prove that Quarles

did not have a security services license and that he “[f]urnish[ed], for hire . . . guards .

. . whose primary duties are to protect persons or property.” R.C. 4749.01(D)(1)

(defining the term “business of security services” as used in R.C. 4749.13(A)). Quarles

does not dispute that he was unlicensed. Therefore, the only question is whether

Quarles furnished security services for hire at Clutch and Aura Room on the dates in

question.

{¶34} Ample evidence presented at trial proved that he did. On both

occasions, officers observed Quarles outside the bars dressed in clothing that

identified him as a security guard. At Clutch, Latham observed Quarles wearing a vest

labeled “security.” At Aura Room, Eve saw Quarles dressed in a bullet-proof vest and

other security-type attire. Quarles had a firearm on his person both times as well.

Latham’s BWC captured Quarles performing security guard functions in Clutch’s

parking lot.

{¶35} Quarles also made statements that were consistent with his

performance as a security guard. For example, when Eve asked for his “guard card,”

11 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

he did not deny serving as a security guard. Instead, he said his wallet was at home.

Quarles also admitted to Gescheider that he owns a security company, P&Q.

{¶36} As for the “for hire” element of R.C. 4749.01(D)(1), the evidence is also

substantial that Quarles performed security services at the bars for a financial benefit.

When interviewed by Gescheider, Quarles indicated that he was typically paid $40 or

$50 in cash for his services. In Latham’s BWC footage, Quarles also admitted that he

was “hired” to secure the parking area.

{¶37} Thus, sufficient evidence provided to the trial court supports the trial

court’s conclusion that Quarles was hired to furnish security services to Clutch and

Aura Room without a license. This is not the exceptional case where the trial court’s

verdicts were against the manifest weight of the evidence.

{¶38} We overrule Quarles’s second and third assignments of error.

Conclusion

{¶39} Having overruled Quarles’s three assignments of error, we affirm the

Judgments affirmed.

BOCK and NESTOR, JJ., concur.