OPINION
HENRY, Justice.
This case presents the issue of whether the trial judge erred in failing to make a conclusive determination of the voluntariness and admissibility of a criminal defendant’s confession, prior to its submission to the jury. The Court of Criminal Appeals unanimously concluded that the procedure employed by the trial judge in determining the admissibility to the defendant’s confession was improper. We affirm.
I.
Defendant’s conviction for first degree murder was based, in substantial part, upon [950]*950his confession. Prior to the trial of this case, the defendant moved to suppress his confession, contending that it had been obtained through coercion. A pre-trial admissibility hearing was conducted for the purpose of determining voluntariness of the confession, and numerous witnesses were called to testify. At the conclusion of this hearing, the trial judge stated: “I’m going to overrule your motion at the present time.” The trial then proceeded, with some duplication of proof as to the voluntariness of the defendant’s confession. Finally, in his instructions to the jury, and after stating the general rules for the admissibility of confessions, the trial judge charged:
Ordinarily, the question as to whether a confession is voluntary or not is one mixed law and fact (sic), to be decided by the Court, but, in this case, under all the facts and circumstances the Court submits to you for your determination from all the evidence, whether, first, was there, in fact, a confession as I have defined it herein; and second, whether if made, it was free and voluntary. .
Implicit in the fact that the trial judge overruled the defendant’s motion to suppress his confession is the conclusion that he considered it to have been voluntarily obtained. Nonetheless, thé instructions quoted supra, indicate that he was in doubt as to the voluntariness of the confession at the close of the proof, since the jury was also allowed to pass upon this question.
We granted certiorari to consider the correctness of the trial judge’s actions, and to clarify what we perceive to be a source of some confusion as to the proper procedure concerning the admissibility of confessions in this state.
II.
The clear weight of authority in Tennessee requires that in determining the admissibility of a criminal defendant’s confession, the initial decision as to its volun-tariness is to be made by the trial judge alone. Wynn v. State, 181 Tenn. 325, 181 S.W.2d 332 (1944). Quoting from an early opinion in Self v. State, 65 Tenn. 244 (1873), Chief Justice Grafton Green, in Wynn, supra, approved the following language:
When confessions are offered as evidence, their competency becomes a preliminary question, to be determined by the court. This imposes upon the presiding judge the duty of deciding the fact whether the party making the confession was influenced by hope or fear. This rule is so well established, that if the judge allowed the jury to determine the preliminary fact, it is error, for which the judgment will be reversed, (citation omitted). 181 Tenn. at 328, 181 S.W.2d at 333.
Thus, when objection to the admissibility of a confession is raised, the proper procedure is to conduct a hearing outside the presence of the jury, at the conclusion of which the trial judge determines the question of admissibility with “unmistakable clarity.” See Sims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 538, 87 S.Ct. 639, 17 L.Ed.2d 593 (1967). This procedure, sometimes referred to as the “orthodox” rule, has long been accepted by courts in Tennessee as the proper method of determining the admissibility of a criminal defendant’s confession. See Wynn v. State, 181 Tenn. 325, 181 S.W.2d 332 (1944); Self v. State, 65 Tenn. 244 (1873); Boyd v. State, 21 Tenn. 39 (1840).
Under the “orthodox” rule, the admissibility of a confession is not a proper matter for submission to the jury, however, once admitted, the weight to be given a confession does become a matter for the jury’s consideration. As stated by the Court in Wynn, supra, the jury’s purpose
is to determine whether defendant made the confession and whether the statements contained in it are true. To aid them in resolving these questions the jury may hear evidence of the circumstances under which the confession was procured. 181 Tenn. at 329, 181 S.W.2d at 333.
A substantial number of jurisdictions apply what is known as the “Massachusetts” [951]*951rule in determining the admissibility of a criminal defendant’s confession. Under this rule, after the trial judge has initially determined the admissibility of a confession, the jury is allowed to reconsider its admissibility by independently assessing the evidence of its voluntariness. The jury, if it finds the confession to have been freely and voluntarily given, may then consider the truthfulness of the confession. The distinctions between these two rules as well as the procedures adopted by the various jurisdictions which apply them, are the subject of an annotation entitled, “voluntariness of confession admitted by court as question for jury,” in 85 A.L.R. 870 (1933), and supplemented in 170 A.L.R. 567 (1947). See also Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964), Appendix A.
Both the “orthodox” and the “Massachusetts” rules have been upheld as against due process challenges under the Federal Constitution. See Jackson v. Denno, supra. Unquestionably, as pointed out supra, Tennessee adheres to the “orthodox” rule. However, use of the “Massachusetts” rule, by inadvertence or otherwise, has not previously been considered as constituting reversible error in Tennessee. See, e. g. Beaver v. State, 220 Tenn. 133, 414 S.W.2d 841 (1967); Shafer v. State, 214 Tenn. 416, 381 S.W.2d 254 (1964).
III.
The trial judge, in the instant case, instructed the jury that it was to determine both the admissibility and credibility of the defendant’s confession, despite the fact that he had previously made his own independent, final determination as to admissibility. Although such a procedure does contravene Tennessee’s “orthodox” rule, the State insists that it merely constitutes harmless error under the circumstances of this case. The State’s argument is based upon the rationale that since the trial court initially determined at the suppression hearing that the confession was voluntary, re-submission of the admissibility issue to the jury merely converted the “orthodox” procedure into the “Massachusetts” rule, a mistake which previous Tennessee courts have refused to consider as constituting reversible error.
Reliance is placed upon Shafer v. State, 214 Tenn. 416, 381 S.W.2d 254 (1964), a case which involved a search and seizure suppression hearing. The Court, equating such procedures to those involved in the determination of admissibility of confessions reasoned that:
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OPINION
HENRY, Justice.
This case presents the issue of whether the trial judge erred in failing to make a conclusive determination of the voluntariness and admissibility of a criminal defendant’s confession, prior to its submission to the jury. The Court of Criminal Appeals unanimously concluded that the procedure employed by the trial judge in determining the admissibility to the defendant’s confession was improper. We affirm.
I.
Defendant’s conviction for first degree murder was based, in substantial part, upon [950]*950his confession. Prior to the trial of this case, the defendant moved to suppress his confession, contending that it had been obtained through coercion. A pre-trial admissibility hearing was conducted for the purpose of determining voluntariness of the confession, and numerous witnesses were called to testify. At the conclusion of this hearing, the trial judge stated: “I’m going to overrule your motion at the present time.” The trial then proceeded, with some duplication of proof as to the voluntariness of the defendant’s confession. Finally, in his instructions to the jury, and after stating the general rules for the admissibility of confessions, the trial judge charged:
Ordinarily, the question as to whether a confession is voluntary or not is one mixed law and fact (sic), to be decided by the Court, but, in this case, under all the facts and circumstances the Court submits to you for your determination from all the evidence, whether, first, was there, in fact, a confession as I have defined it herein; and second, whether if made, it was free and voluntary. .
Implicit in the fact that the trial judge overruled the defendant’s motion to suppress his confession is the conclusion that he considered it to have been voluntarily obtained. Nonetheless, thé instructions quoted supra, indicate that he was in doubt as to the voluntariness of the confession at the close of the proof, since the jury was also allowed to pass upon this question.
We granted certiorari to consider the correctness of the trial judge’s actions, and to clarify what we perceive to be a source of some confusion as to the proper procedure concerning the admissibility of confessions in this state.
II.
The clear weight of authority in Tennessee requires that in determining the admissibility of a criminal defendant’s confession, the initial decision as to its volun-tariness is to be made by the trial judge alone. Wynn v. State, 181 Tenn. 325, 181 S.W.2d 332 (1944). Quoting from an early opinion in Self v. State, 65 Tenn. 244 (1873), Chief Justice Grafton Green, in Wynn, supra, approved the following language:
When confessions are offered as evidence, their competency becomes a preliminary question, to be determined by the court. This imposes upon the presiding judge the duty of deciding the fact whether the party making the confession was influenced by hope or fear. This rule is so well established, that if the judge allowed the jury to determine the preliminary fact, it is error, for which the judgment will be reversed, (citation omitted). 181 Tenn. at 328, 181 S.W.2d at 333.
Thus, when objection to the admissibility of a confession is raised, the proper procedure is to conduct a hearing outside the presence of the jury, at the conclusion of which the trial judge determines the question of admissibility with “unmistakable clarity.” See Sims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 538, 87 S.Ct. 639, 17 L.Ed.2d 593 (1967). This procedure, sometimes referred to as the “orthodox” rule, has long been accepted by courts in Tennessee as the proper method of determining the admissibility of a criminal defendant’s confession. See Wynn v. State, 181 Tenn. 325, 181 S.W.2d 332 (1944); Self v. State, 65 Tenn. 244 (1873); Boyd v. State, 21 Tenn. 39 (1840).
Under the “orthodox” rule, the admissibility of a confession is not a proper matter for submission to the jury, however, once admitted, the weight to be given a confession does become a matter for the jury’s consideration. As stated by the Court in Wynn, supra, the jury’s purpose
is to determine whether defendant made the confession and whether the statements contained in it are true. To aid them in resolving these questions the jury may hear evidence of the circumstances under which the confession was procured. 181 Tenn. at 329, 181 S.W.2d at 333.
A substantial number of jurisdictions apply what is known as the “Massachusetts” [951]*951rule in determining the admissibility of a criminal defendant’s confession. Under this rule, after the trial judge has initially determined the admissibility of a confession, the jury is allowed to reconsider its admissibility by independently assessing the evidence of its voluntariness. The jury, if it finds the confession to have been freely and voluntarily given, may then consider the truthfulness of the confession. The distinctions between these two rules as well as the procedures adopted by the various jurisdictions which apply them, are the subject of an annotation entitled, “voluntariness of confession admitted by court as question for jury,” in 85 A.L.R. 870 (1933), and supplemented in 170 A.L.R. 567 (1947). See also Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964), Appendix A.
Both the “orthodox” and the “Massachusetts” rules have been upheld as against due process challenges under the Federal Constitution. See Jackson v. Denno, supra. Unquestionably, as pointed out supra, Tennessee adheres to the “orthodox” rule. However, use of the “Massachusetts” rule, by inadvertence or otherwise, has not previously been considered as constituting reversible error in Tennessee. See, e. g. Beaver v. State, 220 Tenn. 133, 414 S.W.2d 841 (1967); Shafer v. State, 214 Tenn. 416, 381 S.W.2d 254 (1964).
III.
The trial judge, in the instant case, instructed the jury that it was to determine both the admissibility and credibility of the defendant’s confession, despite the fact that he had previously made his own independent, final determination as to admissibility. Although such a procedure does contravene Tennessee’s “orthodox” rule, the State insists that it merely constitutes harmless error under the circumstances of this case. The State’s argument is based upon the rationale that since the trial court initially determined at the suppression hearing that the confession was voluntary, re-submission of the admissibility issue to the jury merely converted the “orthodox” procedure into the “Massachusetts” rule, a mistake which previous Tennessee courts have refused to consider as constituting reversible error.
Reliance is placed upon Shafer v. State, 214 Tenn. 416, 381 S.W.2d 254 (1964), a case which involved a search and seizure suppression hearing. The Court, equating such procedures to those involved in the determination of admissibility of confessions reasoned that:
[i]f the Trial Judge went further in this case and applied what is termed as the “Massachusetts or Humane Rule” referred to in Jackson v. Denno, that would not be a denial of due process under the ruling of the United States Supreme Court in that case, nor would it be reversible error. ...
The defendants could not possible be harmed by having the jury in addition to the Trial Judge pass upon the legality of the search in this case. (Emphasis supplied). 214 Tenn. at 431, 381 S.W.2d at 261.
Subsequently, in Beaver v. State, 220 Tenn. 133, 414 S.W.2d 841 (1967), the Court again considered the effect of such an instruction.
We in Shafer v. State, 214 Tenn. 416, 381 S.W.2d 254, discuss this procedure of the court and the jury both passing upon the legality of searches and confessions and determine that it certainly wasn’t error and no harm was done the defendant. As a matter of fact he was getting the best of the situation. (Emphasis supplied). 220 Tenn. at 147, 414 S.W.2d at 848.
After carefully reviewing the procedures employed by the trial judge in the instant case, we are unable to concur with the State’s reliance upon Beaver v. State, supra, and Shafer v. State, supra, to the effect that any error was harmless. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774,12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964), requires that the determination of voluntariness of a confession must be resolved separately from the issue of its reliability or weight, and that such a determination cannot be made solely by the convicting jury.
[952]*952Although the “Massachusetts” rule itself was specifically approved in Jackson v. Demo, supra, the use of such a rule, as previously discussed, assumes that the trial judge has already made his own independent and final determination as to voluntar-iness. In the present case, after denying the defendant’s motion to suppress the confession “at the present time," the trial judge subsequently instructed the jury that “[ojrdinarily, the question as to whether a confession is voluntary or not is . to be decided by the Court, but, in this case, under all the facts and circumstances the Court submits to you for your determination from all the evidence” whether the confession was voluntarily given. The unmistakable conclusion to be drawn from such a charge is that the trial judge was abdicating his responsibility of making a final determination and, as suggested by the Court of Criminal Appeals, was in doubt as to the voluntariness of the confession. Under these circumstances, the trial judge did not, with “unmistakable clarity,” make his own independent determination as to the voluntariness of the defendant’s confession.
In holding that the trial judge erred by submitting the questions of voluntariness and reliability of the defendant’s confession to the jury for its sole determination, we also expressly reaffirm the use of the “orthodox” rule. Specifically, we herein adopt that version of the rule as stated in Wynn v. State, 181 Tenn. at 328,181 S.W.2d 332, as the proper procedure to be employed in this state with regard to the admission of a criminal defendant’s confession. To the extent that Beaver v. State, supra, and Shafer v. State, supra, have applied a standard which differs from this “orthodox” rule, we hereby disapprove the use of such procedures in all future cases. In so doing, we note that the “Massachusetts” rule and other similar procedures, even if considered not to be prejudicial to a criminal defendant, are nonetheless prejudicial to the State, which in our adversary system of criminal justice, is also entitled to receive a fair trial, free from undue prejudice. Cf. Corlew v. State, 181 Tenn. 220, 180 S.W.2d 900 (1944).
The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is hereby
Affirmed.
COOPER, C. J., and BROCK, J., concur.
FONES and HARBISON, JJ., dissent.