State v. Pullom

2025 Ohio 1701

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: May 12, 2025
• Docket: 13-24-29
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Pullom, 2025-Ohio-1701.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT SENECA COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 13-24-29 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

V.

ANDRE M. PULLOM, OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Appeal from Seneca County Common Pleas Court Trial Court No. 24 CR 0004

Judgment Affirmed

Date of Decision: May 12, 2025

APPEARANCES:

John C. Filkins, III for Appellant

Stephanie J. Kiser for Appellee Case No. 13-24-29

MILLER, J.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Andre M. Pullom (“Pullom”), appeals the July 5,

2024 judgment of conviction and sentence of the Seneca County Common Pleas

Court. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

{¶2} On January 10, 2024, the Seneca County Grand Jury indicted Pullom

with a single count of possession of cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A),

(C)(4)(b), a fourth-degree felony. At an arraignment on January 19, 2024, Pullom

entered a not-guilty plea to the charge in the indictment.

{¶3} On February 22, 2024, Pullom filed a motion to suppress arguing that

the traffic stop and arrest were unconstitutional because the State Highway Patrol

trooper lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion to effectuate the traffic stop and

lacked probable cause to arrest Pullom. The State filed its brief in opposition on

March 26, 2024. The parties appeared for a hearing on Pullom’s motion to suppress

on May 2, 2024. On May 31, 2024, the trial court filed a judgment entry overruling

Pullom’s motion to suppress.

{¶4} At a change-of-plea hearing on July 3, 2024, Pullom withdrew his not-

guilty plea and entered a no-contest plea to the charge in the indictment. The trial

court accepted Pullom’s no contest plea and found him guilty as charged. The trial

court proceeded directly to sentencing and imposed the jointly-recommended

sentence of five years of community control with various conditions of supervision.

The trial court filed its judgment entry of conviction and sentence on July 5, 2024.

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{¶5} On July 29, 2024, Pullom filed his notice of appeal. He raises a single

assignment of error for our review.

Assignment of Error

The trial court erred when it denied Appellant’s motion to suppress evidence.

{¶6} In his assignment of error, Pullom argues that the trial court erred by

denying his motion to suppress evidence. Pullom contends the initial traffic stop

was an unconstitutional seizure because Trooper Weaver lacked reasonable,

articulable suspicion to initiate a stop of Pullom’s vehicle.

Hearing Testimony

{¶7} At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Trooper Weaver testified that

on September 14, 2023 he initiated a traffic stop of a blue Chevy. (May 3, 2024 Tr.

at 4-6). On direct examination, Trooper Weaver testified that while patrolling North

Street in the City of Fostoria, he observed a blue Chevy pull out of the alley beside

the Smokehouse Bar and drive past him. (Id. at 6). Trooper Weaver testified that

he continued to observe the vehicle in his rearview mirror and noticed that the rear

license plate light appeared to be burned out and not working, prompting him to turn

his patrol vehicle around to catch up to the vehicle. (Id.). According to Trooper

Weaver, as he turned his vehicle around, he observed the Chevy “accelerate

quickly” from the stop sign with an estimated speed “above the 25-mile-an-hour

posted speed limit.” (Id. at 6). According to Trooper Weaver, he verified the

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Chevy’s speed by putting his radar in stationary mode while his patrol vehicle was

stopped, which indicated the Chevy was traveling 35 miles per hour. (Id. at 6-7).

{¶8} Trooper Weaver initiated a traffic stop, and at the hearing, identified

Pullom as the driver of the vehicle. (Id. at 6-8). Trooper Weaver testified that he

observed Pullom’s eyes were “red and glassy” with constricted pupils and Trooper

Weaver detected the odor of an alcoholic beverage emanating from the Chevy. (Id.

7-8). Pullom admitted he had been drinking at the Smokehouse Bar and consented

to field sobriety tests. (Id. at 8). Pullom also consented to a preliminary breath test

which yielded a result in excess of the legal limit. (Id. at 9-10). Trooper Weaver

testified that, as a result of the field sobriety tests and his observations, he placed

Pullom under arrest on suspicion of OVI. (Id. at 10). When Trooper Weaver

searched Pullom incident to arrest, he located suspected contraband on his person,

which the lab subsequently determined was 5.1 grams of cocaine. (Id. at 11).

{¶9} On cross examination, Trooper Weaver testified that he recalled

observing the Chevy at two stop signs. (May 3, 2024 Tr. at 14-15). Trooper Weaver

stated that after stopping at the second stop sign, the vehicle accelerated quickly

which Trooper Weaver estimated as going “well over the posted 25-mile-per-hour

speed limit[.]” (Id. at 16). Trooper Weaver recalled that he brought his patrol

vehicle to a complete stop at one of the stop signs and turned his radar into stationary

mode just long enough to get a reading. (Id. at 16-18).

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{¶10} However, after being presented with the body-worn camera and

dashboard footage of the traffic stop, Trooper Weaver recognized that some of the

details of his previous testimony were incorrect. Notably, Trooper Weaver

acknowledged that he only observed Pullom stop at one stop sign, rather than two.

(Id. at 25). Additionally, after reviewing the recordings, Trooper Weaver admitted

that his patrol vehicle made a “rolling stop” rather than a full stop and, accordingly,

could not accurately activate the stationary radar. (Id. at 25-26). Trooper Weaver

maintained that when he initiated the traffic stop he suspected that that Pullom’s

license plate was not illuminated. (Id. at 30).

{¶11} On redirect examination, Trooper Weaver reiterated that he initiated

the stop of the vehicle on suspicion of: (1) the vehicle’s license plate being burned

out and (2) excessive speed. (Id. at 33-34). With respect to the speed, Trooper

Weaver testified that he first visually estimated the speed to be around 34 or 35

miles an hour. (Id. at 34). Trooper Weaver stated that, at the time, he believed that

he had put his radar into stationary mode as he was stopping, but after reviewing the

video footage, he did not believe that his vehicle was stopped long enough for him

to be certain that that the 35 miles-per-hour reading from his radar was complete

and accurate. (Id.). He stated that not making a complete stop of his patrol vehicle

would “affect the mathematics inside [the radar]” and may “throw . . . off [the

reading] a little bit.” (Id. at 35).

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{¶12} Trooper Weaver testified that he has specific training on visually

estimating speed. (May 3, 2024 Tr. at 37-38). Further Trooper Weaver testified

that he has issued hundreds, if not thousands of speeding citations and made initial

speed estimations on “every single one of them.” (Id. at 38). However, Trooper

Weaver clarified that although he always uses visual estimations of speed, he

“always confirms them with the radar” but conceded that he did not “properly”

confirm his visual estimation in this instance. (Id. at 39).

{¶13} James Wyans (“Wyans”) testified that he owned a 2008 blue Chevy

Impala on September 14, 2023. (Id. at 41-42). According to Wyans, on September

13, 2023, he and Pullom met to discuss the possibility of Pullom purchasing the

vehicle and, as part of the process, he allowed Pullom to borrow the vehicle. (Id. at

42-43). Wyans testified that he delivered the keys to the Chevy to Pullom around

dusk and that, prior to leaving, he performed a check on the vehicle and observed

that all of the lights worked on the vehicle. (Id. at 44). Wyans specifically recalled

observing the license plate light illuminate. (Id.). Several hours later, he received

a call from the Ohio State Highway Patrol requesting that he pick up the vehicle.

(Id. at 45). The following day, Wyans again observed that the license plate light

was functional. (Id.).

Standard of Review

{¶14} “Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question

of law and fact.” State v. Burnside, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. At a suppression hearing,

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the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and, as such, is in the best position to

evaluate the evidence and the credibility of witnesses. Id. See also State v. Carter,

72 Ohio St.3d 545, 552 (1995). When reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress,

deference is given to the trial court’s findings of fact so long as they are supported

by competent, credible evidence. Burnside at ¶ 8, citing State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio

St.3d 19 (1982). With respect to the trial court’s conclusions of law, however, our

standard of review is de novo; therefore, we must decide whether the facts satisfy

the applicable legal standard. Id., citing State v. McNamara, 124 Ohio App.3d 706,

710 (4th Dist. 1997).

Applicable Law

{¶15} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees

“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,

against unreasonable searches and seizures . . .” “‘The primary purpose of the

Fourth Amendment is to impose a standard of reasonableness upon the exercise of

discretion by law enforcement officers in order to “safeguard the privacy and

security of individuals against arbitrary [governmental] invasions.”’” State v. Kerr,

2017-Ohio-8516, ¶ 12 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Carlson, 102 Ohio App.3d 585,

592 (9th Dist. 1995), quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391

(1979). “‘The Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all state-initiated searches and

seizures; it merely proscribes those which are unreasonable.’” Id., quoting Florida

v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250, 111 S.Ct. 1801 (1991), citing Illinois v. Rodriguez,

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497 U.S. 177, 110 S.Ct. 2793 (1990). “Thus, ‘[t]he touchstone of the Fourth

Amendment is reasonableness.’” Id., quoting Jimeno at 250.

{¶16} “Temporary detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile

by police, even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a

‘seizure’ of ‘persons’ within the meaning” of the Fourth Amendment. Whren v.

United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-810, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (1996), citing Prouse at 653,

United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556, 96 S.Ct. 3074 (1976), and

United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878, 95 S.Ct. 2574 (1975).

Accordingly, “[a]n automobile stop is . . . subject to the constitutional imperative

that it not be ‘unreasonable’ under the circumstances.” Id. at 810. To effect a

constitutionally reasonable traffic stop, a law enforcement officer usually must have

at least “‘a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a motorist has committed, is

committing, or is about to commit a crime,’ including a traffic violation.” State v.

Moiduddin, 2019-Ohio-3544, ¶ 11 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Mays, 2008-Ohio-

4539, ¶ 7.

{¶17} “The level of suspicion required to meet the reasonable-suspicion

standard ‘is obviously less demanding than that for probable cause’ and ‘is

considerably less than proof . . . by a preponderance of the evidence’ but is

‘something more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch.’”’”

State v. Hawkins, 2019-Ohio-4210, ¶ 20, quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S.

1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581 (1989), quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868

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(1968). To justify a seizure on the basis of reasonable suspicion, the law

enforcement officer involved “‘must be able to point to specific and articulable facts

which, when taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably

warrant that intrusion.’” State v. Bobo, 37 Ohio St.3d 177 (1988), quoting Terry at

21.

Analysis

{¶18} In his assignment of error, Pullom alleges that Trooper Weaver did not

have reasonable, articulable suspicion to make the traffic stop. Specifically, Pullom

challenges Trooper Weaver’s credibility, particularly in light of the inconsistencies

between his testimony on direct examination and his testimony when cross-

examined in concert with the video recording of the traffic stop. Pullom suggests

the inconsistencies render his entire testimony unreliable. Accordingly, Pullom

reasons that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress as it relied upon

Trooper Weaver’s testimony that he visually estimated the vehicle’s speed. We

disagree.

{¶19} In its judgment entry denying Pullom’s motion to suppress, the trial

court did not rely on testimony that was contradicted by the video evidence or the

defense witness but, gave credence to Trooper Weaver’s training and experience in

support of his testimony regarding his visual speed estimation. The trial court stated

as follows:

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[Trooper Weaver] testified that on September 14, 2023, he was on road patrol and observed a blue Chevy Impala driven by Defendant Andre M. Pullom rapidly accelerate. Trooper Weaver estimated the Defendant’s speed to be in excess of the 25 mile per hour posted speed limit, a traffic violation. [Trooper Weaver] testified as to his training and experience with the Ohio State Highway Patrol in visually estimating vehicle speeds. [Trooper Weaver] proceeded to initiate the traffic stop of the Defendant, Andre M. Pullom’s vehicle for that traffic violation. Trooper Weaver does not need to have a radar reading of the Defendant’s speed, his visual observation is sufficient.

(Doc. No. 33).

{¶20} “[T]he trial court as the trier of fact is in the best position to evaluate

the credibility of the witnesses because it observes the demeanor, voice inflection,

and gestures of the witnesses.” State v. Jarosz, 2013-Ohio-5839, ¶ 20 (11th Dist.).

We give deference to the trial court in its role as the trier of fact and are bound to

interpret the evidence consistently with the trial court’s ruling. Id. Thus, the trial

court was in the best position to assess the credibility of Trooper Weaver’s

testimony, and we will not disrupt the trial court’s determination. Id.

{¶21} Furthermore, “[a] visual estimation of a vehicle’s speed can constitute

reasonable and articulable suspicion.” State v. Mundy, 2021-Ohio-605, ¶ 18 (2d

Dist.). “‘“Visual observation has long been held a valid means of determining the

speed of a moving vehicle as long as the witness has a reliable opportunity to view

the vehicle.”’” Id., quoting Barberton v. Jenney, 2010-Ohio-2420, ¶ 15, quoting

State v. Harkins, 1987 WL 15492, *3 (4th Dist.).

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{¶22} Trooper Weaver testified to his visual estimation of the vehicle’s

speed, traveling approximately 10 miles per hour over the posted speed limit in a

25-mile-per-hour zone. He also testified that he had been a highway patrol officer

for seven years and has issued “hundreds, if not…thousands” of speeding citations

and that he used speed estimation “on every single one of them” and detailed the

training he has completed with respect to visual estimation of vehicle speed. (May

3, 2024 Tr. at 38). Thus, although Trooper Weaver’s testimony, in some respects,

conflicted with the video evidence, we nonetheless find that, under the totality of

the circumstances, the trial court did not err by finding that the stop of the vehicle

for the speed violation was based on reasonable, articulable suspicion. See Mundy

at ¶ 19; Barberton at ¶ 15 (“In so holding, many of these courts have considered the

testifying officer’s training and experience visually estimating vehicle speed.”).

{¶23} Pullom’s assignment of error is overruled.

Conclusion

{¶24} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the

particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the Seneca County Court

of Common Pleas.

WALDICK, P.J. and WILLAMOWSKI, J., concur.

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JUDGMENT ENTRY

For the reasons stated in the opinion of this Court, the assignment of error is

overruled and it is the judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the trial

court is affirmed with costs assessed to Appellant for which judgment is hereby

rendered. The cause is hereby remanded to the trial court for execution of the

judgment for costs.

It is further ordered that the Clerk of this Court certify a copy of this Court’s

judgment entry and opinion to the trial court as the mandate prescribed by App.R.

27; and serve a copy of this Court’s judgment entry and opinion on each party to the

proceedings and note the date of service in the docket. See App.R. 30.

Mark C. Miller, Judge

Juergen A. Waldick, Judge

John R. Willamowski, Judge

DATED: /jlm

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