[Cite as State v. Pritchard, 2026-Ohio-2733.]
IN THE OHIO COURT OF APPEALS FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, Case No. CT2025-0122 CT2025-0140 Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion And Judgment Entry -vs- Appeal from the Muskingum County Court of THOMAS PRITCHARD, Common Pleas, Case Nos. CR2023-0347, CR2023-0213 Defendant - Appellant Judgment: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry: July 16, 2026
BEFORE: William B. Hoffman; Craig R. Baldwin; David M. Gormley, Judges
APPEARANCES: JOSEPH PALMER, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff- Appellee; BRIAN W. BENBOW, for Defendant-Appellant.
Baldwin, J.
{¶1} The appellant, Thomas Pritchard, appeals his convictions and sentences
following his guilty pleas in the Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas. The appellee
is the State of Ohio.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND THE CASE
{¶2} On March 29, 2023, the Muskingum County Grand Jury indicted the appellant
on four counts of Kidnapping in violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(2) and R.C. 2905.01(B)(1), one
count of Grand Theft of a Motor Vehicle in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(1) and one count of
Escape in violation of R.C. 2921.34(A)(1) in Case No. CR2023-0213. {¶3} On May 31, 2023, the Muskingum County Grand Jury returned a second
indictment charging the appellant with one count of Receiving Stolen Property in violation
of R.C. 2913.51(A) and one count of OVI in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) in Case No.
CR2023-0347.
{¶4} On November 18, 2024, the appellant, through counsel, notified the trial court
of his intent to raise the issue of his competence to stand trial.
{¶5} The appellant was evaluated by Dr. Dreyer in January of 2025. Dr. Dreyer
reported that the appellant was not capable of rationally understanding the legal proceedings
and was not capable of adequately assisting counsel in his defense. The trial court
subsequently found the appellant incompetent to stand trial and ordered treatment for
restoration to competency at Appalachian Behavioral Healthcare.
{¶6} In August of 2025, once appellant had received mental-health treatment for
several months, psychologist Amanda Conn evaluated whether he had been restored to
competency and prepared a report documenting her findings. Dr. Conn concluded that the
appellant was capable of understanding the nature and objectives of the proceedings against
him and was capable of assisting counsel in his defense.
{¶7} On September 2, 2025, the trial court conducted a competency-restoration
proceeding. The parties stipulated to the August 2025 restoration report. Neither party
presented additional evidence or requested the testimony of the evaluator. Defense counsel
did not request a second competency evaluation. Based upon the stipulated report, the trial
court found that the appellant had been restored to competency.
{¶8} On September 22, 2025, the appellant appeared with counsel and entered
negotiated pleas of guilty. In Case No. CR2023-0213, the appellant pleaded guilty to two counts of kidnapping and one count of grand theft of a motor vehicle. In Case No. CR2023-
0347, the appellant pleaded guilty to receiving stolen property and OVI.
{¶9} During the plea colloquy, the trial court reviewed the nature of the charges, the
potential penalties, the constitutional rights the appellant would waive, postrelease control,
and the consequences of the pleas. The appellant responded to the trial court’s questions,
asked questions concerning the financial sanctions and other consequences of his pleas, stated
he understood the proceedings, and expressed satisfaction with counsel. The trial court
accepted the appellant’s pleas and found him guilty.
{¶10} The trial court conducted a sentencing hearing on October 27, 2025. The
appellant addressed the trial court and offered his version of the underlying events. The trial
court imposed an aggregate indefinite prison term of twenty-one to twenty-six years in Case
No. CR2023-0213. The trial court imposed an aggregate twelve-month prison term in Case
No. CR2023-0347, to be served consecutively to the sentence imposed in Case No. CR2023-
0213.
{¶11} The appellant filed a timely appeal and raised the following two assignments of
error:
{¶12} “I. TRIAL COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL BY FAILING TO CHALLENGE THE RESTORATION-TO-
COMPETENCY EVALUATION, FAILING TO REQUEST A SECOND
EVALUATION, AND ALLOWING THE PROCEEDINGS TO CONTINUE WITHOUT
A MEANINGFUL DETERMINATION OF THE APPELLANT’S COMPETENCY.”
{¶13} “II. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY
ACCEPTING THE DEFENDANT’S PLEA WITHOUT CONDUCTING THE COMPETENCY HEARING REQUIRED BY R.C. 2945.37(B), AFTER THE
DEFENDANT’S COMPETENCY WAS RAISED BEFORE TRIAL.”
I.
{¶14} In his first assignment of error, the appellant argues that he was denied effective
assistance of counsel in violation of his rights under both the United States Constitution and
the Ohio Constitution. We disagree.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
{¶15} The standard of review for ineffective assistance of counsel was set forth in the
seminal case of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984),
and was discussed by this Court in Mansfield v. Studer, 2012-Ohio-4840 (5th Dist.):
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires a two-prong
analysis. The first inquiry is whether counsel’s performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonable representation involving a substantial
violation of any of defense counsel’s essential duties to appellant. The second
prong is whether the appellant was prejudiced by counsel’s ineffectiveness.
Lockhart v. Fretwell (1993), 506 U.S. 364, 113 S.Ct. 838, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993);
Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674
(1984); State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989).
In order to warrant a finding that trial counsel was ineffective, the
petitioner must meet both the deficient performance and prejudice prongs of
Strickland and Bradley. Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 129 S.Ct. 1411,
1419, 173 L.Ed.2d 251 (2009). To show deficient performance, appellant must establish that “counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. This requires showing that
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel”
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. Counsel also has a duty to bring to bear such skill
and knowledge as will render the trial a reliable adversarial process. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (sic) at 2065.
Thus, a court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the
reasonableness of counsel’s challenged conduct on the facts of the particular
case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct. A convicted defendant
making a claim of ineffective assistance must identify the acts or omissions
of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable
professional judgment. The court must then determine whether, in light of
all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide
range of professionally competent assistance. In making that determination,
the court should keep in mind that counsel’s function, as elaborated in
prevailing professional norms, is to make the adversarial testing process
work in the particular case. At the same time, the court should recognize
that counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and
made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional
judgment.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 at 689 (sic), 104 S.Ct. at 2064. In light of “the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel [and]
the range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal
defendant,” the performance inquiry necessarily turns on “whether counsel’s
assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances.” Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. At all points, “[j]udicial
scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.” Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2064.
Studer, supra, at ¶¶58-61. Thus, in order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel
argument, the appellant must satisfy two prongs: first, that his trial counsel’s performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonable representation involving a substantial violation of
an essential duty to the appellant; and second, that the appellant was prejudiced by the alleged
ineffectiveness.
ANALYSIS
{¶16} The appellant contends trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by
stipulating to the restoration report, failing to challenge the adequacy of that report, and
failing to request an additional competency evaluation.
{¶17} A criminal defendant is competent to stand trial when the defendant has
sufficient present ability to consult with counsel with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding and possesses both a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings.
State v. Jefferson, 2022-Ohio-3448, ¶39 (5th Dist.), citing Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402,
80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960). {¶18} Following treatment, Dr. Conn concluded that the appellant was capable of
understanding the nature and objectives of the proceedings and capable of assisting counsel.
The parties stipulated to the report during the September 2, 2025, proceeding. R.C.
2945.37(E) expressly permits the prosecutor and defense counsel to submit evidence
concerning competency and permits a written evaluation report to be admitted by stipulation.
{¶19} Where the State and defense counsel stipulate to a competency report, the
stipulated report constitutes reliable and credible evidence of the defendant’s competency, and
the trial court may determine competency based upon that report. State v. Triplett-Fazzone,
2024-Ohio-4589, ¶¶9, 13 (10th Dist.), citing State v. Lanier, 2021-Ohio-4194, ¶8 (10th Dist.).
{¶20} The record fails to establish that counsel lacked a reasonable basis for accepting
Dr. Conn’s opinion. Counsel had the opportunity to communicate with the appellant and was
in a position to evaluate the appellant’s ability to understand the proceedings and assist in the
defense. Counsel did not advise the trial court that he remained unable to communicate with
the appellant, that the appellant was incapable of assisting in his defense, or that the
appellant’s condition had deteriorated following the restoration evaluation.
{¶21} The appellant argues that the August 2025 restoration report was deficient
because it was completed by an evaluator different from the evaluator who prepared the
January 2025 report, because the appellant had reported hallucinations during his treatment,
and because the restoration evaluator allegedly did not adequately consider the appellant’s
psychiatric history and intellectual functioning.
{¶22} These matters do not establish that counsel performed deficiently. A prior
finding of incompetency does not establish that a defendant remains incompetent indefinitely.
Ohio law expressly contemplates that a defendant initially found incompetent may be restored
to competency through treatment. See R.C. 2945.38. In State v. Fisher, 2025-Ohio-1648, ¶¶29- 35 (7th Dist.), the Seventh District Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s decision to
proceed after the defendant underwent restoration treatment, the parties stipulated to a report
finding him competent, and neither counsel nor the trial court identified circumstances
requiring an additional evaluation.
{¶23} In the case sub judice, the restoration report was prepared by a qualified mental-
health professional after the appellant had undergone treatment. The report acknowledged
the appellant’s mental-health condition and treatment and nevertheless concluded that he had
been restored to competency. No contrary opinion of restoration appears in the record. Nor
does the record contain evidence that counsel possessed information materially undermining
the evaluator’s conclusion but unreasonably failed to bring that information to the trial court’s
attention.
{¶24} Counsel’s decision to rely upon the unopposed restoration report instead of
seeking an additional evaluation falls within the realm of professional judgment. The mere
fact that appellate counsel would have pursued a different course does not demonstrate
constitutionally deficient performance. See Strickland at 689.
{¶25} The appellant’s questions during the plea colloquy do not demonstrate
incompetence. To the contrary, his questions concerning fines and other consequences
indicate he was listening to and attempting to understand the trial court’s explanation. The
trial court clarified the matters about which the appellant inquired, and the appellant indicated
he understood the trial court’s responses.
{¶26} The appellant further relies upon his allocution at sentencing. Although
portions of the appellant’s statement were lengthy and required clarification, his remarks
reflected a recollection of the events, an effort to explain his conduct, and an attempt to
mitigate his culpability. The appellant’s account may have been self-serving or difficult to follow in places, but it did not demonstrate that he lacked a rational or factual understanding
of the proceedings or was incapable of consulting with counsel.
{¶27} The appellant has also failed to establish prejudice. Following the restoration
finding, the trial court personally addressed the appellant during an extensive plea colloquy.
The appellant gave responsive answers, acknowledged his understanding of the charges and
potential penalties, asked relevant questions, and affirmed he understood the rights he was
relinquishing. The appellant also stated he was satisfied with counsel.
{¶28} The totality of the record does not establish a reasonable probability that an
additional evaluation or an objection to the restoration report would have resulted in a finding
that the appellant was incompetent.
{¶29} Accordingly, the appellant has failed to establish either deficient performance
or resulting prejudice under Strickland and Bradley.
{¶30} The appellant’s first assignment of error is overruled.
II.
{¶31} In his second assignment of error, the appellant argues that the trial court erred
in failing to conduct a competency hearing. We disagree.
{¶32} Fundamental principles of due process prohibit a criminal defendant from
being tried or convicted while legally incompetent. State v. Berry, 72 Ohio St.3d 354, 359
(1995). A defendant is presumed competent to stand trial. The defendant shall be found
incompetent only when the trial court determines, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
because of the defendant’s present mental condition, the defendant is incapable of understanding the nature and objective of the proceedings or of assisting in the defense. R.C.
2945.37(G).
{¶33} When the issue of a defendant’s competency is raised prior to trial, the trial
court is required to conduct a competency hearing. State v. Peters, 2016-Ohio-7773, ¶13 (5th
Dist.), citing State v. Bock, 28 Ohio St.3d 108, 109 (1986). The failure to conduct the required
hearing does not require reversal, however, when the record fails to disclose sufficient indicia
of incompetency. Id., citing Bock at 110.
{¶34} In determining whether sufficient indicia of incompetency appear in the record,
an appellate court must examine the record as a whole and determine whether the evidence
raised a reasonable question concerning the defendant’s competency. State v. Mills, 2023-
Ohio-4716, ¶18. The inquiry is made on a case-by-case basis and requires consideration of the
totality of the evidence, including evidence tending to support competency as well as evidence
tending to suggest incompetency. Mills at ¶21.
{¶35} Accordingly, when competency was raised before trial but the defendant
contends the trial court failed to conduct the hearing required by R.C. 2945.37(B), we
determine whether the omission occurred and, if so, whether the entire record contains
sufficient indicia of incompetency to require reversal.
{¶36} The appellant’s second assignment of error is premised upon his assertion that
the trial court accepted his pleas without first conducting a competency hearing. The record
reflects, however, that the trial court conducted a competency-restoration proceeding on
September 2, 2025. At that proceeding, the parties stipulated to the August 2025 restoration
report. Based upon the stipulated evidence, the trial court found that the appellant had been restored to competency. We first determine whether the September 2 proceeding satisfied
R.C. 2945.37. If it did not, we must determine whether the deficiency requires reversal. We
conclude the proceeding was adequate; even if it were not, any error was harmless.
{¶37} The appellant also argues that the September 2 proceeding did not qualify as a
hearing because the evaluator did not testify, no witnesses were cross-examined, and defense
counsel did not present competing evidence. We disagree.
{¶38} R.C. 2945.37 does not require live testimony at every competency hearing. The
parties may submit evidence concerning competency, and a written competency report may
be admitted by stipulation. R.C. 2945.37(E). When the trial court conducts a competency
hearing and the parties submit the issue on a stipulated report containing reliable and credible
evidence, the court may determine competency from that report. State v. Dickerson, 2021-Ohio-
3257, ¶¶20-21 (5th Dist.).
{¶39} Accordingly, the absence of live testimony or cross-examination did not render
the competency proceeding inadequate. The trial court convened a hearing, accepted the
parties’ stipulation to the restoration report, and determined the appellant’s competency from
the evidence submitted.
{¶40} The appellant relies upon State v. Flanagan, 2017-Ohio-955 (8th Dist.), in
support of his argument that the trial court could not accept his guilty pleas without first
conducting a competency hearing. In Flanagan, the issue of competency was raised before the
defendant entered his guilty plea, but the trial court did not conduct a hearing, the parties did
not stipulate to the competency report, and the trial court did not make a formal competency
finding before accepting the plea. Id. at ¶¶12-17.
{¶41} The case sub judice is distinguishable from Flanagan. The trial court did not
allow the competency issue to remain unresolved. The appellant underwent restoration treatment and was reevaluated. The trial court thereafter convened a proceeding devoted to
competency, accepted the parties’ stipulation to the restoration report, and expressly found
the appellant restored to competency before accepting his guilty pleas. The procedural
deficiencies identified in Flanagan are not present here.
{¶42} The appellant also relies upon State v. Were, 2002-Ohio-481, and argues that he
could not create a record rebutting the restoration report without the evidentiary hearing
contemplated by R.C. 2945.37 and R.C. 2945.371. In Were, defense counsel raised the
defendant’s competency on several occasions, through a pretrial motion, after opening
arguments, during trial, and before the mitigation phase, and repeatedly represented that the
defendant was incompetent, citing his refusal to cooperate and paranoid, irrational conduct
directed at defense counsel. Id. at ¶¶9-12. Despite these repeated requests, the trial court never
afforded the defendant an evidentiary competency hearing. Id. at ¶9.
{¶43} The circularity concern identified in Were and later discussed in Flanagan does
not arise under the circumstances presented here. The appellant was not deprived of an
opportunity to contest the restoration report. The trial court convened a competency
proceeding at which the appellant was represented by counsel. Counsel could have declined
to stipulate to the report, requested the evaluator’s testimony, presented additional evidence,
or requested further evaluation. Instead, the parties agreed to submit the issue on the
stipulated report. Any resulting limitation in the record arose from the manner in which the
parties chose to present the issue, not from the trial court’s failure to provide a forum in which
competency could be litigated.
{¶44} The appellant’s reliance on Hough is similarly misplaced. In Hough, the trial
court failed to address a pending pretrial motion for a competency evaluation and proceeded to trial without conducting an evaluation or competency hearing. Hough at ¶5. The record
also contained significant unresolved evidence bearing upon the defendant’s competency.
Hough at ¶¶29-37.
{¶45} Unlike Hough, the trial court in the case sub judice did not ignore a pending
competency request. The appellant was evaluated, found incompetent, received restoration
treatment, reevaluated, and determined by a mental-health professional to have been restored
to competency. The trial court then held a proceeding at which counsel stipulated to the
restoration report and the trial court made a competency determination before accepting the
appellant’s pleas. We discuss Were and Hough further below in weighing whether the record
otherwise contains sufficient indicia of incompetency.
{¶46} Nevertheless, because the appellant argues that the restoration proceeding did
not satisfy R.C. 2945.37(B), we also consider whether the record, viewed as a whole, contains
sufficient indicia of incompetency to render any asserted procedural deficiency prejudicial. In
doing so, we consider the prior medical opinions concerning competency, counsel’s conduct
and expressed concerns, evidence of irrational behavior or continuing psychiatric symptoms,
and the appellant’s demeanor and participation in the proceedings. See Hough at ¶¶29-37; State
v. Mills, 2023-Ohio-4716, ¶¶18, 36.
{¶47} First, we recognize that the appellant had previously been found incompetent
and had a documented history of mental illness. Those facts are relevant, but they are not
dispositive. The prior incompetency finding was followed by restoration treatment and a
subsequent professional opinion that the appellant had regained the ability to understand the
proceedings and assist counsel.
{¶48} The prior finding, however, was not the final competency evidence before the
trial court. Following court-ordered restoration treatment, the appellant underwent a second evaluation directed to his then-present competency. The restoration evaluator concluded that
the appellant was capable of understanding the nature and objectives of the proceedings and
assisting counsel in his defense. Ohio law expressly contemplates that a defendant initially
found incompetent may later be restored to competency through treatment. See R.C. 2945.38.
{¶49} Second, defense counsel did not express continuing doubts about the
appellant’s competency after completion of restoration treatment. Counsel stipulated to the
restoration report and did not advise the trial court that the appellant remained unable to
communicate, understand the proceedings, or assist in preparing the defense.
{¶50} Counsel in Were and Hough repeatedly informed the trial court that the
defendants could not understand the proceedings or assist in his own defenses. Counsel here
said nothing of the kind at any point after the restoration finding.
{¶51} Third, the appellant emphasizes that he reported auditory hallucinations during
June and July 2025 and that his psychiatric medication was increased shortly before the
August restoration evaluation. Those facts are relevant to the competency inquiry and must
be considered together with the remainder of the evidence. A history of mental illness or
psychotic symptoms, however, does not necessarily establish legal incompetency. A
defendant may experience mental illness and nevertheless possess the present ability to
understand the proceedings and assist counsel. State v. Bock, 28 Ohio St.3d 108, 110 (1986);
Mills at ¶15.
{¶52} The reported hallucinations and medication adjustment occurred before the
restoration evaluator rendered her opinion. The evaluator completed the assessment after
those events and nevertheless concluded that the appellant satisfied the statutory competency
criteria. The record reflects no comparable hallucinations, delusional statements, or inability
to communicate during the subsequent competency proceeding or plea hearing. {¶53} The appellant further challenges the restoration evaluation because it was
prepared by an evaluator different from the psychologist who conducted the earlier evaluation
and because, in his view, the report did not sufficiently account for his intellectual limitations.
{¶54} These arguments concern the weight of the restoration opinion; they do not
establish that the opinion was inadmissible or unreliable. The competency inquiry focuses on
the defendant’s present mental condition and present ability to understand the proceedings
and assist in the defense. R.C. 2945.37(G). The restoration evaluator examined the appellant
after treatment and addressed the applicable competency criteria. The parties stipulated to the
report, and the appellant presented no competing post-restoration opinion concluding that he
remained incompetent.
{¶55} Nor does the use of a different evaluator establish that the restoration opinion
was unreliable. Nothing in R.C. 2945.37 or R.C. 2945.371 requires the professional
conducting a restoration evaluation to be the same professional who performed the initial
competency evaluation.
{¶56} Fourth, the appellant argues that his demeanor at the plea and sentencing
hearings demonstrated continuing incompetency. During the plea hearing, however, the
appellant understood that he was resolving two separate criminal cases, responded to the trial
court’s questions, discussed the possible sanctions, acknowledged the constitutional rights he
was waiving, and entered pleas consistent with the negotiated agreement.
{¶57} The appellant’s questions during the plea colloquy do not demonstrate
incompetence. His questions concerning fines and other consequences show that he was
listening to the trial court and seeking clarification regarding the effects of his pleas. After the
trial court responded, the appellant indicated that he understood. {¶58} The appellant also relies upon his allocution at sentencing. Although portions
of his statement were lengthy and required clarification, his remarks reflected a recollection
of the underlying events, an attempt to explain his conduct, and an effort to mitigate his
culpability. His statement may have been imperfect, nonlinear, or self-serving, but it did not
demonstrate that he lacked a rational or factual understanding of the proceedings or was
incapable of communicating with counsel.
{¶59} The fact that the appellant occasionally responded briefly or that the trial court
asked follow-up questions does not establish incompetency. The relevant inquiry is not
whether the appellant communicated with precision, but whether the record raises a
reasonable question about his ability to understand the proceedings and assist in the defense.
See Mills at ¶18.
{¶60} Finally, the appellant cites State v. Chapin, 67 Ohio St.2d 437, 439 (1981), and
Bishop v. United States, 350 U.S. 961, 76 S.Ct. 440, 100 L.Ed. 835 (1956), for the proposition
that convicting a legally incompetent defendant violates due process. We do not dispute that
proposition. That principle is implicated here only if the trial court failed to determine the
appellant’s competency or if the record raises a reasonable question whether the appellant
remained incompetent when he entered his pleas. Neither circumstance is present here. The
trial court did determine his competency, through the September 2 proceeding, and the record
does not raise a reasonable question about whether that determination was correct.
{¶61} Because the September 2 proceeding satisfied R.C. 2945.37, no error occurred.
Even assuming the proceeding was procedurally deficient, the record—including the initial
and restoration evaluations, the timing of the appellant’s reported symptoms relative to the
restoration evaluation, counsel’s failure to express continuing concerns after the restoration
finding, and the appellant’s participation at the plea and sentencing hearings—does not contain sufficient indicia of incompetency to render any procedural deficiency prejudicial.
The trial court did not err in accepting the appellant’s pleas.
{¶62} The appellant’s second assignment of error is overruled.
CONCLUSION
{¶63} Based upon the foregoing, the judgments of the Muskingum County Court of
Common Pleas are affirmed.
{¶64} Costs to the appellant.
By: Baldwin, J.
Hoffman, P.J. and
Gormley, J. concur.