Hicks, J.
Petitioners challenge a decision of the Court of Appeals, Division Three, holding that the constitutional validity of underlying traffic convictions may not be collaterally attacked in a habitual traffic offender action in superior court. State v. Ponce, 21 Wn. App. 277, 584 P.2d 482 (1978). We granted the petition for review and we affirm the Court of Appeals as to Ponce; we reverse as to Ozuna.
The consolidated cases of petitioners Ponce and Ozuna are before this court upon an agreed set of facts. In early 1977, the Walla Walla County Prosecutor served Ozuna and Ponce with complaints alleging that each was a habitual traffic offender based upon past driving convictions. Such actions are governed by RCW 46.65, the Washington Habitual Traffic Offenders Act. RCW 46.65.020 defines a habitual traffic offender as an individual who has "[t]hree or more convictions, singularly or in combination," of certain specified traffic offenses committed within a 5-year period.1 Each specified offense carries a possible jail sentence.2
In each case, under RCW 46.65.050, the prosecutor moved for an order to show cause why the petitioner should [536]*536not be found to be a habitual traffic offender. Each petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint against him, arguing that the convictions underlying his complaint were constitutionally invalid. As to the prior convictions, the trial court found the following facts: (1) neither petitioner was advised that he had a right to counsel and that if indigent the court would appoint counsel; (2) each petitioner was indigent and without means to secure counsel for at least one of the three traffic convictions in district or municipal court; (3) neither petitioner was represented by counsel in any of these proceedings; and (4) the petitioners pleaded guilty in each case without advice of counsel. Nevertheless, the trial court concluded that constitutional or statutory defects in the underlying convictions did not invalidate those convictions for the purposes of a habitual traffic offender action. The court entered judgment that each petitioner was a habitual traffic offender and suspended the right of each to drive for a period of 5 years. RCW 46.65.060.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, holding that a habitual traffic offender proceeding under RCW 46.65 is "separate from the original driving convictions and may not be collaterally attacked" therein. State v. Ponce, supra at 279. Each petitioner asserts that he should be able to collaterally attack the validity of his original traffic offense convictions at a habitual traffic offender proceeding because the underlying convictions were obtained without the constitutionally guaranteed representation of counsel.
Right to Counsel
A threshold determination may be dispositive of. the issue on appeal: whether defendants had a constitutional right to counsel in the underlying proceedings. Both defendants were tried for offenses for which imprisonment was authorized punishment. The record before this court indicates that the jail sentence was actually imposed on only one occasion — Ozuna was sentenced to jail following an Oregon conviction for driving while intoxicated. The [537]*537prosecutor, the trial court, and the Court of Appeals proceeded on the assumption that each defendant had a constitutional right to counsel at the trial of his underlying traffic convictions ostensibly under Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 32 L. Ed. 2d 530, 92 S. Ct. 2006 (1972), and its progeny.
In McInturf v. Horton, 85 Wn.2d 704, 538 P.2d 499 (1975), this court construed JCrR 2.11(a), adopted to comply with Argersinger, as affording a right to counsel in misdemeanor cases wherein conviction may result in loss of liberty. JCrR 2.11(a)(1) provides:
The right to counsel shall extend to all criminal proceedings for offenses punishable by loss of liberty regardless of their denomination as felonies, misdemeanors, or otherwise.
(Italics ours.) Emphasizing the italicized language, the Mclnturf court held that the right to counsel extends to all criminal proceedings for offenses punishable by loss of liberty "whether or not they are so punished,” Mclnturf, at 705. The court specifically rejected the idea of conditioning the right to counsel upon the trial court's pretrial determination that punishment would be imposed.
In the recent decision of Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 59 L. Ed. 2d 383, 99 S. Ct. 1158 (1979), however, the United States Supreme Court adopted a more restrictive interpretation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in misdemeanor cases. The majority rejected the "authorized imprisonment” rule, and held that the constitutional right to counsel attaches only when "actual imprisonment" results:
Even were the matter res nova, we believe that the central premise of Argersinger — that actual imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from fines or the mere threat of imprisonment — is eminently sound and warrants adoption of actual imprisonment as the line defining the constitutional right to appointment of counsel.
Scott, at 373.
[538]*538As actual imprisonment was not imposed for any of the traffic convictions sustained by Ponce, there was no constitutional violation under Scott. As discussed above, under our court rule, JCrR 2.11(a), the right to counsel extends to any case "punishable" by loss of liberty. Nevertheless, we have said that a final judgment may be vacated during a collateral proceeding only by demonstrating that it is void. Bresolin v. Morris, 86 Wn.2d 241, 245, 543 P.2d 325 (1975). Violation of a court rule that does not reach constitutional magnitude provides an insufficient basis to collaterally attack Ponce's convictions for underlying traffic offenses.
In one instance, however, Ozuna was not informed of his right to counsel in a case resulting in a jail sentence, thus he was denied his constitutional right under Scott.3 Therefore, we reach the issue of whether this constitutional defect in an underlying traffic conviction renders the judgment void and subject to collateral attack in a habitual traffic offender proceeding.
Collateral Attack
The Court of Appeals relied upon State v. Petersen, 16 Wn. App. 77, 553 P.2d 1110
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Hicks, J.
Petitioners challenge a decision of the Court of Appeals, Division Three, holding that the constitutional validity of underlying traffic convictions may not be collaterally attacked in a habitual traffic offender action in superior court. State v. Ponce, 21 Wn. App. 277, 584 P.2d 482 (1978). We granted the petition for review and we affirm the Court of Appeals as to Ponce; we reverse as to Ozuna.
The consolidated cases of petitioners Ponce and Ozuna are before this court upon an agreed set of facts. In early 1977, the Walla Walla County Prosecutor served Ozuna and Ponce with complaints alleging that each was a habitual traffic offender based upon past driving convictions. Such actions are governed by RCW 46.65, the Washington Habitual Traffic Offenders Act. RCW 46.65.020 defines a habitual traffic offender as an individual who has "[t]hree or more convictions, singularly or in combination," of certain specified traffic offenses committed within a 5-year period.1 Each specified offense carries a possible jail sentence.2
In each case, under RCW 46.65.050, the prosecutor moved for an order to show cause why the petitioner should [536]*536not be found to be a habitual traffic offender. Each petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint against him, arguing that the convictions underlying his complaint were constitutionally invalid. As to the prior convictions, the trial court found the following facts: (1) neither petitioner was advised that he had a right to counsel and that if indigent the court would appoint counsel; (2) each petitioner was indigent and without means to secure counsel for at least one of the three traffic convictions in district or municipal court; (3) neither petitioner was represented by counsel in any of these proceedings; and (4) the petitioners pleaded guilty in each case without advice of counsel. Nevertheless, the trial court concluded that constitutional or statutory defects in the underlying convictions did not invalidate those convictions for the purposes of a habitual traffic offender action. The court entered judgment that each petitioner was a habitual traffic offender and suspended the right of each to drive for a period of 5 years. RCW 46.65.060.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, holding that a habitual traffic offender proceeding under RCW 46.65 is "separate from the original driving convictions and may not be collaterally attacked" therein. State v. Ponce, supra at 279. Each petitioner asserts that he should be able to collaterally attack the validity of his original traffic offense convictions at a habitual traffic offender proceeding because the underlying convictions were obtained without the constitutionally guaranteed representation of counsel.
Right to Counsel
A threshold determination may be dispositive of. the issue on appeal: whether defendants had a constitutional right to counsel in the underlying proceedings. Both defendants were tried for offenses for which imprisonment was authorized punishment. The record before this court indicates that the jail sentence was actually imposed on only one occasion — Ozuna was sentenced to jail following an Oregon conviction for driving while intoxicated. The [537]*537prosecutor, the trial court, and the Court of Appeals proceeded on the assumption that each defendant had a constitutional right to counsel at the trial of his underlying traffic convictions ostensibly under Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 32 L. Ed. 2d 530, 92 S. Ct. 2006 (1972), and its progeny.
In McInturf v. Horton, 85 Wn.2d 704, 538 P.2d 499 (1975), this court construed JCrR 2.11(a), adopted to comply with Argersinger, as affording a right to counsel in misdemeanor cases wherein conviction may result in loss of liberty. JCrR 2.11(a)(1) provides:
The right to counsel shall extend to all criminal proceedings for offenses punishable by loss of liberty regardless of their denomination as felonies, misdemeanors, or otherwise.
(Italics ours.) Emphasizing the italicized language, the Mclnturf court held that the right to counsel extends to all criminal proceedings for offenses punishable by loss of liberty "whether or not they are so punished,” Mclnturf, at 705. The court specifically rejected the idea of conditioning the right to counsel upon the trial court's pretrial determination that punishment would be imposed.
In the recent decision of Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 59 L. Ed. 2d 383, 99 S. Ct. 1158 (1979), however, the United States Supreme Court adopted a more restrictive interpretation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in misdemeanor cases. The majority rejected the "authorized imprisonment” rule, and held that the constitutional right to counsel attaches only when "actual imprisonment" results:
Even were the matter res nova, we believe that the central premise of Argersinger — that actual imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from fines or the mere threat of imprisonment — is eminently sound and warrants adoption of actual imprisonment as the line defining the constitutional right to appointment of counsel.
Scott, at 373.
[538]*538As actual imprisonment was not imposed for any of the traffic convictions sustained by Ponce, there was no constitutional violation under Scott. As discussed above, under our court rule, JCrR 2.11(a), the right to counsel extends to any case "punishable" by loss of liberty. Nevertheless, we have said that a final judgment may be vacated during a collateral proceeding only by demonstrating that it is void. Bresolin v. Morris, 86 Wn.2d 241, 245, 543 P.2d 325 (1975). Violation of a court rule that does not reach constitutional magnitude provides an insufficient basis to collaterally attack Ponce's convictions for underlying traffic offenses.
In one instance, however, Ozuna was not informed of his right to counsel in a case resulting in a jail sentence, thus he was denied his constitutional right under Scott.3 Therefore, we reach the issue of whether this constitutional defect in an underlying traffic conviction renders the judgment void and subject to collateral attack in a habitual traffic offender proceeding.
Collateral Attack
The Court of Appeals relied upon State v. Petersen, 16 Wn. App. 77, 553 P.2d 1110 (1976), for the proposition that original traffic convictions are not subject to collateral attack in the independent habitual traffic offender proceeding. In Petersen, licenses had been summarily suspended by the Department of Motor Vehicles. Subsequently, each defendant accumulated several convictions for driving while his license was suspended. The State filed habitual traffic offender actions. The Court of Appeals held defendants could not attack the impropriety of the summary license [539]*539suspensions, assertedly in violation of due process guaranties under Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 29 L. Ed. 2d 90, 91 S. Ct. 1586 (1971):
The traffic charges could perhaps have been defended on that ground at trial or challenged on direct appeal, but are not subject to collateral attack in a separate habitual offender proceeding.
Petersen, at 80.
At issue in the instant case is whether uncounseled post-Argersinger traffic convictions can be considered in habitual traffic offender proceedings. In State v. Francis, 85 Wn.2d 894, 540 P.2d 421 (1975), this court addressed the issue of whether uncounseled pre-Argersinger convictions for traffic offenses could be considered in license revocation proceedings under RCW 46.65. The court held at page 896 that Argersinger did not bar use of such convictions:
[A]ny uncounseled conviction in any appellant's driving history is too far removed to invalidate the habitual traffic offender proceeding. . . .
. . . Further, such proceedings, even if termed a collateral consequence of accumulated driving convictions, must be viewed as a consequence that is indirect and removed, both in time and in purpose, from the original driving convictions of the offender.
The Francis court reiterated that revocation proceedings are civil, not criminal, with a purpose other than punishment. See State v. Scheffel, 82 Wn.2d 872, 514 P.2d 1052 (1973); Flory v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 84 Wn.2d 568, 527 P.2d 1318 (1974).
Neither Petersen nor Francis is dispositive of the issue presently before the court. Because the instant convictions do not involve the retroactive application of Argersinger, Francis is inapplicable. In Petersen, the defendants did not collaterally attack the proceedings in which underlying traffic convictions were rendered. Rather, defendants' collateral attack was against the prior administrative suspension procedure, not a criminal proceeding. Here, the constitutional violation involves the failure to advise a [540]*540criminal defendant of the right to counsel. The constitutional right to counsel is a categorical requirement necessary to give substance to other constitutional procedural protections afforded criminal defendants. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799, 83 S. Ct. 792, 93 A.L.R.2d 733 (1963).
We are cognizant that other jurisdictions have held that underlying traffic convictions are not susceptible to collateral attack in habitual traffic offender proceedings under similar statutes.4 We find the reasoning of such cases unpersuasive when the constitutional right to counsel has been denied. We further recognize that a habitual traffic offender proceeding is a civil action with the laudable purpose of barring from the highways drivers who are deemed to represent a peril and hazard to the motoring public. State v. Francis, supra at 896-97. The fact that a habitual traffic offender proceeding is civil, however, neither excuses the failure of the court to advise a defendant of the constitutional right to have counsel at the earlier criminal proceeding nor does it validate the underlying conviction following therefrom.
We hold that a traffic conviction constitutionally invalid under Argersinger, as refined by Scott, may not be considered in a subsequent habitual traffic offender proceeding. Such a conviction is void and subject to collateral attack. Cf. Haislip v. Morris, 84 Wn.2d 106, 524 P.2d 405 (1974) (habitual criminal conviction). Thus, as to Ozuna, the habitual traffic offender decree lacked sufficient supporting convictions. See State v. Robinson, 117 N.H. 496, 374 A.2d 953 (1977).
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed as to Ponce and reversed as to Ozuna.
Utter, C.J., and Horowitz and Dolliver, JJ., concur.