[Cite as State v. Pettaway, 2025-Ohio-2260.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LUCAS COUNTY
State of Ohio/City of Toledo Court of Appeals No. {48}L-24-1154
Appellee Trial Court No. CRB2309247
v.
Edward E. Pettaway DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellant Decided: June 27, 2025
*****
Tyler Naud Jechura, Esq., for appellant.
Rebecca Facey, Esq., Prosecutor and Jimmie L. Jones, Esq., Assistant Prosecutor, for appellee.
MAYLE, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Edward Pettaway, appeals the May 24, 2024 judgment of the
Toledo Municipal Court sentencing him following his conviction of domestic violence
and assault. For the following reasons, we affirm. I. Background and Facts
{¶ 2} Pettaway was charged by complaint with one count each of domestic
violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A) and assault in violation of R.C. 2903.13(A),
both first-degree misdemeanors. The charges arose from allegations that Pettaway
slammed his wife, G.P., on the floor and ripped her glued-on wig from her head.
Pettaway’s case was tried to the court. At trial, the city presented the testimony of
G.P. Pettaway presented the testimony of Toledo Police Department officers Richard
Wrobel and Bradley Wittmann and testified in his own behalf.
{¶ 3} G.P. testified that she and Pettaway got into an argument on September 18,
2023. Before Pettaway started the argument, she was sitting on the couch doing nothing
to him. He came up to her while she was on the couch, began yelling at her, and told her
to get out of the house. After Pettaway approached her, G.P. recalled him “snatching”
her off the couch, “[k]ind of throwing [her] around on the floor[,]” and putting his knee in
her back and “snatch[ing]” her wig, which was glued on, off of her head. She elaborated
that he was “grabbing [her] by [her] t-shirt and yanking [her] to get off the couch.” When
Pettaway pulled her off the couch, she yelled at him to stop and tried to get him to let go
of her by “[p]ushing him back off.” She was also “swinging” at him but was unsure if
she hit him. She fell to the floor as she tried to push him. Once she was on the floor,
Pettaway “constantly just kind of drug [her] back and forth.” As a result, G.P.’s shirt and
bra were torn, she had bruising on her left arm, hair around her hairline was missing, and
her shoulder and knee hurt. Pettaway pulling off her wig was painful.
2. {¶ 4} During these events, G.P. called 911. The city played the call at trial. G.P.
was unable to speak when she called, but the call picked up some background noise. G.P.
said that the noises on the call were Pettaway “throwing [her] around[,]” a dog barking,
and her and Pettaway yelling. Most of the call is unintelligible. At one point, G.P. asks
if she can get some of her things and leave, which leads to her and Pettaway fighting
about who should actually leave the house.
{¶ 5} After this encounter, G.P. went down the stairs to get away from Pettaway
and asked him if she could get their son and some things and leave. Pettaway let her go
upstairs to get their son. While she was upstairs, she put on a headscarf and texted her
father. When she came back down, Pettaway said that he would leave the house, but he
changed his mind shortly after. When G.P. again said that she was leaving, Pettaway told
her that she could not and “slammed” the front door. She tried to run out a back door, but
Pettaway also “slammed it shut when [she] opened it.” After that, Pettaway began
yelling again. He pushed G.P. while she was holding their child, so G.P. went back to the
couch to prevent him from hurting the baby while trying to hurt her. Once she was
sitting, Pettaway “snatched” her watch off of her wrist and took her phone. He then went
downstairs to the gun safe, took out some guns, put them on the stairs, “lifted [one] in the
air[,]” told G.P. “this is all your fault” and said, “I’m sorry son.” When he said that, G.P.
ran out of the house through the back door, ran through neighbors’ yards, and hid by the
side of a neighbor’s house until she saw the police coming.
3. {¶ 6} When she saw the police arrive, G.P. walked back to her house. Officers
were talking to her father, and when she approached, they talked to her. The officers did
not take any photographs of G.P.’s injuries. However, G.P. took several pictures later
that day, including two that she took while she was at the emergency room. The pictures
show a tear in the collar of her shirt, redness or bruising on her shoulder, redness on her
cheek, and her holding a handful of hair.
{¶ 7} On cross-examination, G.P. testified that the officers who responded to her
house did not arrest Pettaway or charge him with any crimes. She told one of the
responding officers that the bruises on her arm were “new” and that Pettaway had “ripped
[her] hair off[,]” but did not point out any other injuries, say that she was in pain, or tell
the officers that Pettaway had lifted her off of the couch or “slammed [her] repeatedly[.]”
G.P. went to the emergency room that day.
{¶ 8} While Pettaway was pulling on her and she was on the floor, she was
“kicking and flailing [her] arm to have him let [her] go[,]” but claimed that she only
touched Pettaway “[i]n self-defense.” She did not know what happened to her wig.
{¶ 9} On September 21, 2023, three days after the incident, G.P. went to the
police station to get a copy of the report from September 18. When the officer on duty
could not find a report, someone from internal affairs told G.P. to file a report herself.
She reported the events from September 18 to the duty officer, who decided to file
charges against Pettaway. She claimed that she told the duty officer “the full story.
Because the [responding] officer, on the scene, cut [her] off” and she did not “get to tell
4. him the full story.” She did not tell the duty officer about or give him the pictures she
took. She admitted that the pictures did not have timestamps.
{¶ 10} G.P. denied that (1) she had “planned this situation, between [her] and Mr.
Pettaway, in a[n] attempt to convict him of a crime”; (2) she wanted Pettaway to be
convicted of domestic violence because of their relationship issues; (3) she told the duty
officer at the police department a different story than she told the officers at her house;
(4) her wig was on under the headscarf she was wearing in the body cam video; (5) she
damaged the house’s front door by hitting it with a brick; (6) she was ever aggressive
with or hit Pettaway before this incident; or (7) she hit Pettaway when their son was
present.
{¶ 11} During G.P.’s testimony, the city played the body camera video of Wrobel,
one of the responding officers. In the video, Pettaway explains that he needed someone
to come get him because he had gone through too much with G.P. After listening to
Pettaway’s complaints—which did not address the specifics of his and G.P.’s fight that
day—Wrobel concludes that “there’s not a whole lot for [the officers] to do here. You
guys are just arguing, and she left.” He advises Pettaway to stay somewhere else for a
night or two if G.P. returns to the house and is argumentative. As G.P. is walking back
toward the house, Pettaway tells the officer about her torn shirt and that he and G.P. “got
into a shoving match” but he “didn’t hit her.”
{¶ 12} G.P. is crying and standing on the street with her father and son when
Wrobel approaches her. Her father asks her about calling 911, and she says that she
5. called but was not able to talk and Pettaway took her watch and phone. She explains that
Pettaway picked the fight and “grabbed [her] and ripped [her] hair off . . . .” When she
told Pettaway that she was going to leave, he responded by saying that he was going to
leave and going upstairs to pack. When he came back downstairs, he said that he was not
leaving and “started pushing [G.P.] while [she] had the baby . . . .” She also tells Wrobel
that Pettaway ripped her shirt.
{¶ 13} Wrobel tells both Pettaway and G.P. that he is going to file a report, and
they can take the report to the prosecutor’s office if they want to press charges.
{¶ 14} The city also played Pettaway’s 911 call during G.P.’s testimony. In it,
Pettaway tells the operator that they need to “come get [him]” because he got into a fight
with his wife and is “not feeling well.” His father was coming to take his firearms, which
were unloaded and “sitting [t]here.” When the operator asks if there was “anything
physical with [his] wife . . . ,” Pettaway replies, “[y]eah, I mean, I didn’t hit her or
nothing, but she’s got some—.” Pettaway cuts off his comment to tell the operator that
the police are there.
{¶ 15} The state rested after G.P.’s testimony.
{¶ 16} For his case, Pettaway first presented Wrobel’s testimony. Wrobel testified
that Pettaway said that he and G.P. had been arguing all day, “the two of them had
pushed each other a little bit, . . .” he did not know where G.P. was, and he did not want
to press charges. When Wrobel talked to G.P., she told him that she and Pettaway had
been arguing all day, Pettaway had pushed her, Pettaway had pulled off her wig while
6. they were “scuffling,” and she was going to leave the house with the children. She did
not tell him about Pettaway taking his guns out of the safe or preventing her from leaving
the house, or her breaking free from Pettaway to run out the door. Based on the
information Pettaway and G.P. provided, Wrobel concluded that “it just seemed like they
were arguing. It got heated. There was maybe some pushing and shoving going on. And
then she left.” Wrobel stayed at the house until G.P.’s father arrived, she gathered some
things, and she and her father left.
{¶ 17} Wrobel did not see any physical injuries on G.P. and did not recall G.P.
telling him about any injuries. He told both Pettaway and G.P. that he was going to file a
report, and they could press charges against each other if they wanted to. Wrobel could
not determine the “initial aggressor,” which “gives you who the victim is . . . .”
{¶ 18} Defense counsel asked Wrobel to compare his report from September 18 to
the police report G.P. filed on September 21. He said that “there is definitely accusations
of acts of violence . . .” in the September 21 report, while his report was “just more of
argument.” G.P. did not tell him about the violent acts that she alleged in the September
21 report.
{¶ 19} On cross, Wrobel said that he spent most of his time at the scene talking to
Pettaway because G.P. was not there when he arrived. When he approached G.P., he
noticed that her shirt was a little torn.
{¶ 20} Next, Wittmann testified that he was the officer on duty when G.P. came to
the police station on September 21. He confirmed that this was three days after the
7. alleged domestic violence incident. She told him that officers had been out to their house
on a domestic violence call, but he was not able to find a record of the call in the call
logs, and neither he nor the records department could find a report.
{¶ 21} After taking a report from G.P., Wittmann filed the complaints against
Pettaway. He decided to do so based on the information G.P. gave him and the injuries
he saw on her, and without talking to Pettaway.
{¶ 22} When he compared his report to Wrobel’s, Wittmann noted that Wrobel did
not determine a primary aggressor; issue any charges; or mention firearms, Pettaway
blocking the door so G.P. could not exit, Pettaway taking her phone and watch, or
Pettaway slamming her to the floor. After seeing Wrobel’s report, Wittmann would not
have charged Pettaway with domestic violence because he “would have came to the same
conclusion as the other officer. There was not enough there to charge either party.”
{¶ 23} On cross, Wittmann said that G.P. was missing patches of hair from her
head when she came in. He confirmed that G.P. came to the police department on
September 21 to get the report from the incident on September 18; she did not come in
intending to file a new report.
{¶ 24} Finally, Pettaway testified. He said that he and G.P. were in the middle of a
divorce. They had separated previously, but G.P. “begged [him] to come home.” A
week before this incident, when Pettaway asked her for a separation, G.P. punched him in
the face and stood in front of his car as he tried to leave with their child. They were
having problems because any time he tried to “enforce some rules, the police got threated
8. to get called on [him].” G.P. and her mother had threatened to call the police on
Pettaway four other times.
{¶ 25} On September 18, the argument between him and G.P. began because he
asked her to leave, as he had been doing for several days. When he “calmly” approached
her about it, “she went crazy.” He elaborated that he approached her while she was
sitting on the couch watching TV to ask her questions about whether they were separating
and where she planned to live, but the “more [he] asked, the more irate she got . . . .” He
went outside to get away from G.P., but she followed him, “cussing at” him. As they
approached the driveway, Pettaway spun around, went back into the house, and locked
the door. G.P. responded by picking up a paver and “beat[ing] on the door handle.” He
admitted to grabbing G.P.’s shirt but said he only did so “[a]fter she tried to bash the door
in with a brick” because he “knew, at that point, [he] was in danger.”
{¶ 26} After G.P. came back into the house, he blocked the door to keep her from
leaving with their child.
{¶ 27} He denied lifting G.P. off the couch, ripping her wig off, slamming her on
the floor, or taking her watch and phone. G.P. pushed him when he started talking about
getting a divorce. She was “highly upset” and “irate,” and Pettaway could not calm her
down. He did not push her back, but they both fell to the floor.
{¶ 28} After they fell, Pettaway moved away from G.P. She went upstairs to use
the bathroom. When she came out, she was “yelling and cussing and stuff” and told
Pettaway that “[he] was going to die, and she hoped that it happened real soon.”
9. {¶ 29} Pettaway said that G.P. did not call 911, but “showed [him] that she was
going to call . . . .” He was unaware that the call had gone through and recorded the
background noise. The noises on the call were him and G.P. yelling at each other at the
beginning of their fight; none of the “physical stuff”—i.e., G.P. hitting the door with a
brick and her shirt ripping—happened until after G.P.’s 911 call.
{¶ 30} Pettaway also called 911 as part of his “care plan” for his posttraumatic
stress disorder. When he feels unsafe, afraid, or suicidal, he is supposed to contact law
enforcement and tell them that he is a disabled veteran under treatment and has firearms.
He called 911 that day because he thought that he might lose his son if G.P. left with the
child.
{¶ 31} The officers did not charge Pettaway with anything before they left his
house. He learned about the charges a few days later from G.P.’s father. He denied
threatening G.P. with a gun and thought that G.P.’s size and stature would make it
difficult for him to pick her up and slam her on the floor multiple times.
{¶ 32} Pettaway said that G.P. was “[a]bsolutely” lying in court. Specifically, she
lied about him getting guns out of the safe, ripping her wig off (because he did not take it
completely off), starting the argument over housework, and locking the back door.
{¶ 33} On cross-examination, Pettaway confirmed that he had guns in the house on
September 18. Although he told the 911 operator about the guns, he did not tell the
responding officers. The door G.P. hit with the paver was a security door that would not
10. break. He agreed with the prosecutor that he was “safely inside” with G.P. locked
outside, but he chose to unlock and open the door anyway.
{¶ 34} On redirect, Pettaway clarified that he opened the locked door and let G.P.
back into the house because he wanted her to stop hitting the door and to assess the
damage she had done. He thought that G.P. was going to hit him with the paver when
she first picked it up. G.P. pushed him as soon as he opened the front door. He grabbed
her shirt after she pushed him. After grabbing her, he “backed up” and “just let her go.”
{¶ 35} After Pettaway testified, he rested.
{¶ 36} The court found Pettaway guilty of both charges. When it announced its
verdict, the court specifically said that it found G.P.’s testimony credible. It
acknowledged the discrepancies in the police reports but found that G.P.’s claim that
Pettaway pulled her from the couch and dragged her around was “somewhat synonymous
with” her being slammed to the ground. It also pointed out that G.P. consistently said
that Pettaway pulled off her wig; Wittmann found her claims, combined with the visible
injury he saw, sufficient to charge Pettaway; and it was not unusual for a domestic
violence victim to inquire about a police report. Additionally, the court found that the
facts did not support a self-defense claim because Pettaway did not tell the 911 operator
or the responding officers that G.P. tried to damage the house or sufficiently explain why
he unlocked the door to let G.P. back in the house.
{¶ 37} At the sentencing hearing, the court sentenced Pettaway to 180 days in jail,
all suspended, and placed him on probation.
11. {¶ 38} Pettaway now appeals, raising one assignment of error:
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DESCRETION [sic] WHEN IT CONVICTED MR. PETTAWAY. THE CONVICTION WAS CLEARLY AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE INTORDUCED [sic]. FURTHER, THE EVIDENCE THAT INTRODUCED [sic] WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPORT [sic] THE CONVICTION OR MEET THE CITY’S BURDEN OF PROOF.
II. Law and Analysis
{¶ 39} In his sole assignment of error, Pettaway argues that his convictions are not
supported by sufficient evidence and are against the manifest weight of the evidence. He
contends that “it is clear the City failed to meet its burden of proof in this case” because
of G.P. “giving two different stories to TPD and the concurring opinion of two TPD
officers that no one should have been charged . . . .” He also argues that his convictions
are not supported by the manifest weight of the evidence, essentially because G.P.’s
testimony was not credible. The city responds that the trial court “weighed the credibility
of the witnesses and determined that there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction
beyond a reasonable doubt” and there is no miscarriage of justice in this case because the
trial court heard both sides of the story and decided that G.P.’s testimony was more
credible. We address each argument in turn.
A. Pettaway’s convictions are supported by sufficient evidence.
{¶ 40} First, we find that the evidence sufficiently supports Pettaway’s
convictions. In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the
evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether “any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a
12. reasonable doubt.” State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 113 (1997). We do not weigh the
evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. State v. Were, 2008-Ohio-2762, ¶ 132.
“Rather, we decide whether, if believed, the evidence can sustain the verdict as a matter
of law.” State v. Richardson, 2016-Ohio-8448, ¶ 13. Naturally, this requires “a review
of the elements of the charged offense and a review of the state’s evidence.” Id.
Whether there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction is a question of law. State v.
Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997).
{¶ 41} To convict Pettaway of domestic violence, the city was required to prove
that he knowingly caused or attempted to cause physical harm to a family or household
member. R.C. 2919.25(A). To convict Pettaway of assault, the city was required to
prove that he knowingly caused or attempted to cause physical harm to another. R.C.
2903.13(A). A person acts “knowingly” when, regardless of his purpose, he is aware that
his conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature.
R.C. 2901.22(B). “Physical harm” includes “any injury, illness, or other physiological
impairment, regardless of its gravity or duration.” R.C. 2901.01(A)(3). A spouse who is
residing with a defendant is a “family or household member.” R.C. 2919.25(F)(1)(a)(i).
{¶ 42} The prosecution is not required to show that the defendant intended the end
result to prove that he acted “knowingly.” State v. Turner, 2024-Ohio-684, ¶ 90 (2d
Dist.); R.C. 2901.22(B). Instead, the prosecution must show that the defendant acted
with awareness that the conduct will probably cause such harm. State v. Chambers,
2024-Ohio-3341, ¶ 181 (6th Dist.). In other words, “it is only necessary that the result is
13. within the natural and logical scope of risk created by the conduct[.]” Turner at ¶ 90,
citing State v. Pierce, 2023-Ohio-528, ¶ 24 (8th Dist.).
{¶ 43} Further, the slightest injury is enough to prove physical harm, and the
injury does not have to be visible. State v. Williams, 2023-Ohio-4456, ¶ 15 (6th Dist.). A
defendant can be convicted under R.C. 2903.13(A) and 2919.25(A) even if the victim is
not injured at all because the statutes criminalize causing or attempting to cause physical
harm. City of Oregon v. Snyder, 2008-Ohio-6537, ¶ 15 (6th Dist.); Turner at ¶ 89.
Pushing a person or pulling their hair can be evidence that the defendant caused or
attempted to cause physical harm. State v. Rohm, 2010-Ohio-1240, ¶ 13 (2d Dist.);
Turner at ¶ 89; In re Mark M., 2000 WL 125800, *2 (6th Dist. Feb. 4, 2000). Bruising is
also evidence that the defendant caused physical harm. State v. Elkins, 2024-Ohio-1314,
¶ 28 (12th Dist.).
{¶ 44} In this case, the trial court had before it evidence from G.P., Pettaway’s
wife, that Pettaway picked a fight with her, which ultimately led to him pulling her off of
the couch, “drag[ging]” her on the floor, tearing her shirt and bra, ripping out her hair by
“snatch[ing]” off the wig that was glued to her head, pushing her while she was holding
their child, bruising her arm, and displaying his guns. Pettaway’s actions caused G.P.
pain and resulted in bald patches on her head. There is also some evidence that G.P.
sought treatment at a hospital following this incident.
{¶ 45} From Pettaway, the court had evidence that G.P. started the fight after
Pettaway asked her about a separation; two different officers took reports on two
14. different days and reported versions of G.P.’s story that differed in several significant
respects; G.P. hit their door with a brick; he was concerned that G.P. might hit him with
the brick; G.P. pushed him, he did not push her back, and they both somehow fell to the
floor; and G.P. had punched him when he asked her for a separation about a week before
this incident.
{¶ 46} Based on this evidence, a rational trier of fact could have determined that
Pettaway knowingly caused or attempted to cause physical harm to G.P. G.P. testified
that Pettaway pulled her glued-on wig off her head, which caused her pain, pushed her
into a door, and caused bruising on her arm, which meets the physical harm elements of
assault and domestic violence. Her testimony also showed that Pettaway pulled her hair
with enough force to detach her glued-on wig, threw her on the floor, and pushed her into
a door, causing pain and bruising and leaving bald spots on her head. These
consequences are within the natural and logical scope of risk created by forcefully pulling
someone’s hair, throwing them to the floor, and pushing them, which meets the
knowingly elements of assault and domestic violence. Therefore, G.P.’s testimony, if
believed, was sufficient to show that Pettaway knowingly caused pain and bruising by
throwing her to the floor and pulling off her wig—i.e., that he knowingly caused her
physical harm. See State v. Sherman, 2024-Ohio-5354, ¶ 172 (6th Dist.), citing State v.
Thompson, 2017-Ohio-8375, ¶ 5 (10th Dist.) (the testimony of one witness, if believed, is
enough to support a conviction).
15. {¶ 47} At its core, Pettaway’s argument relates to credibility. That is, he
essentially claims that G.P.’s testimony was not credible because of the discrepancies in
the police reports, and the officers’ testimony about their charging decisions was more
credible than G.P.’s testimony. However, this does not affect the outcome of our
sufficiency analysis because we do not consider the credibility of witnesses when
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence. Were, 2008-Ohio-2762, at ¶ 132. Thus, we
conclude that Pettaway’s convictions are supported by sufficient evidence.
B. Pettaway’s convictions are not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶ 48} We also find that Pettaway’s convictions are not against the weight of the
evidence. When we review a claim that a verdict is against the manifest weight of the
evidence, we weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of
the witnesses, and determine whether the jury clearly lost its way in resolving evidentiary
conflicts so as to create such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be
reversed, and a new trial ordered. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387. We do not view the
evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution. “Instead, we sit as a ‘thirteenth
juror’ and scrutinize ‘the factfinder’s resolution of the conflicting testimony.’” State v.
Robinson, 2012-Ohio-6068, ¶ 15 (6th Dist.), citing Thompkins at 387. Reversal on
manifest weight grounds is reserved for “‘the exceptional case in which the evidence
weighs heavily against the conviction.’” Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20
Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983).
16. {¶ 49} Although we consider the credibility of witnesses under a manifest-weight
standard, we must, nonetheless, extend special deference to the trial court’s credibility
determinations, given that it is the court that has the benefit of seeing the witnesses testify,
observing their facial expressions and body language, hearing their voice inflections, and
discerning qualities such as hesitancy, equivocation, and candor. State v. Fell, 2012-Ohio-
616, ¶ 14 (6th Dist.). The trial court, as the finder of fact and the sole judge of the weight of
the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, may believe or disbelieve all, part, or none of a
witness’s testimony. State v. Caudill, 2008-Ohio-1557, ¶ 62 (6th Dist.), citing State v. Antill,
176 Ohio St. 61, 67 (1964).
{¶ 50} After carefully reviewing the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses
and weighing the testimony, we are not convinced that this is an exceptional case in
which the evidence weighs heavily against a conviction. Pettaway primarily relies on the
discrepancies between Wrobel’s and Wittmann’s police reports to attempt to discredit
G.P.’s testimony. It is true that Wittmann’s report—but not Wrobel’s—indicates that
G.P. told him about Pettaway taking her phone and watch, blocking her from leaving the
house, and pulling out his guns during their argument. However, Wrobel’s body camera
shows that G.P. told him that Pettaway took her phone and watch, “grabbed [her] and
ripped [her] hair off . . . [,]” and pushed her while she was holding their child. Although
Wrobel opted to not include some of those things in his report, we cannot discredit G.P.’s
testimony simply because the responding officer did not find those details relevant
enough to include in his report. Nor can we entirely discount her testimony because of
17. her failure to give Wrobel some of the details that she gave Wittmann. And we note that
Wittmann reported seeing bald spots on G.P.’s head when she went to the police station
on September 21, which corroborates her testimony about Pettaway pulling off her wig.
{¶ 51} On the whole, given the evidence before it, the trial court did not clearly
lose its way by finding Pettaway guilty. Accordingly, Pettaway’s convictions are not
against the manifest weight of the evidence, and his assignment of error is not well-taken.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 52} Based on the foregoing, the May 24, 2024 judgment of the Toledo
Municipal Court is affirmed. Pettaway is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal under
App.R. 24.
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See, also, 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Christine E. Mayle, J. [[Applied Signature]] JUDGE
Gene A. Zmuda, J. [[Applied Signature 2]] JUDGE
Myron C. Duhart, J. [[Applied Signature 3]] CONCUR. JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
18.