State v. Perkins

• Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina
• Decided: December 3, 2025
• Docket: 25-26
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA25-26

Filed 3 December 2025

Watauga County, Nos. 24CR000162-940, 24CR219407-940

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

JOSHUA PIERRE PERKINS

Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 30 May 2024 by Judge Todd

Pomeroy in Watauga County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 28

August 2025.

Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Assistant Attorney General Mia B. Bass, for the State-Appellee.

Center for Death Penalty Litigation, by Sydney J. Calas, for Defendant- Appellant.

COLLINS, Judge.

Defendant Joshua Pierre Perkins appeals from the trial court’s judgment

entered upon his convictions for possession of a stolen motor vehicle and attaining

habitual felon status. Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his

motion to dismiss the charge of possession of a stolen motor vehicle because the State STATE V. PERKINS

Opinion of the Court

failed to present sufficient evidence to support a finding that he knew or had reason

to believe the car was stolen. We find no error.

I. Background

Defendant was indicted for larceny of a motor vehicle, possession of a stolen

motor vehicle, and attaining habitual felon status. The matter came on for trial on

28 May 2024. The evidence presented at trial tends to show the following: Robert

Rodriguez wrecked his 2009 black Honda CRV during a snowstorm on 19 January

2024. Robert’s father, Mr. Robbins, arrived at the scene, moved the car with the

assistance of a Highway Patrol officer, and left it parked on the roadside. Several

days later, Mr. Robbins moved the car to a paved portion of the road and left the keys

above the visor. By 25 January 2024, the car was gone. After verifying that the car

had not been towed, Robert’s mother, Mrs. Robbins, reported the car as stolen to the

Watauga County Sheriff’s Office. Deputy Gracie Brown received the report and

verified that no towing record existed.

On 26 January 2024, Mrs. Robbins saw the car travelling in the opposite

direction from which she was driving. She turned around and pursued the car.

Although the speed limit was forty-five miles per hour, she had to accelerate to

approximately seventy miles per hour to keep pace. The car eventually pulled into a

driveway, where two individuals “jumped out of the car and ran into the house.” Mrs.

Robbins saw Defendant get out of the driver’s seat and saw a woman get out of the

passenger’s seat. Mrs. Robbins recognized the woman as Hannah Greer, whom she

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knew because Greer’s sister was her son’s friend. Mrs. Robbins approached the pair

and told them the car belonged to her. Greer responded, “this is my friend’s car,

ma’am[,]” to which Mrs. Robbins responded “no . . . it’s not, it’s my car.” The pair

then repeatedly went back and forth between the house and the car, removing bags

and clothing from the car, before fleeing on foot across a nearby field.

Law enforcement arrived and confirmed the car belonged to the Robbins. The

car had sustained new damage that was not present on 19 or 23 January 2024,

including a missing bumper, additional body damage, and makeshift cords tied across

the front of the car. The interior contained trash, clothing, and tools consistent with

forced entry, including a crowbar, screwdrivers, and a window-suction device.

On 28 January 2024, deputies located a white Ford Ranger abandoned on a

logging road. Defendant was seated inside and arrested on outstanding warrants.

The jury acquitted Defendant of larceny of a motor vehicle but convicted him

of possession of a stolen motor vehicle. Defendant then pled guilty to attaining

habitual felon status. The trial court imposed a sentence of 70 to 96 months’

imprisonment. That same day, Defendant filed a written notice of appeal.

On 3 February 2025, Defendant filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with this

Court, acknowledging that his written notice of appeal was defective.

II. Discussion

Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss

the charge of possession of a stolen motor vehicle because the State failed to present

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sufficient evidence to support that Defendant knew or had reason to believe the car

was stolen.

A. Appellate Jurisdiction

As a preliminary matter, we address our jurisdiction to hear this appeal.

“Notice of appeal shall be given within the time, in the manner and with the

effect provided in the rules of appellate procedure.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1448(b)

(2024). An appeal in a criminal case may be taken by either “giving oral notice of

appeal at trial” or by “filing [written] notice of appeal with the clerk of superior court

and serving copies thereof upon all adverse parties within fourteen days after entry

of the judgment or order . . . .” N.C. R. App. P. 4(a). A written notice shall specify the

party taking the appeal, “designate the judgment or order from which appeal is taken

and the court to which appeal is taken,” and be signed by the appealing party’s

counsel of record or the party, if proceeding pro se. N.C. R. App. P. 4(b).

Here, immediately following sentencing on 30 May 2024, Defendant’s counsel

filed a written Notice of Appeal from Defendant’s convictions and included a request

for court-appointed appellate counsel. Defendant’s notice of appeal specifies he is the

party taking the appeal; designates he is appealing from his convictions for

possession of a stolen motor vehicle and attaining the status of a habitual felon, and

includes the case file numbers; and is signed by Defendant’s counsel and Defendant.

“[W]hile the notice of appeal fails to designate the court to which his appeal is taken,

as required by Rule 4(b), ‘[D]efendant’s intent to appeal is plain[.]’” State v. Rouse,

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234 N.C. App. 92, 94 (2014) (quoting State v. Ragland, 226 N.C. App. 547, 553, disc.

review denied, 367 N.C. 220 (2013)). By Appellate Entries signed by the trial court

the same day as Defendant’s Notice of Appeal was filed, the trial court found that

“[D]efendant has given Notice of Appeal to the N.C. Court of Appeals[.]” “[A]nd since

this Court is the only court with jurisdiction to hear [D]efendant’s appeal, it can be

fairly inferred [D]efendant intended to appeal to this Court.” Id.; see N.C. Gen. Stat.

§§ 7A-27(b)(1) (2024) and 15A-1444(a1) (2024). “Having examined [D]efendant’s

notice of appeal, we find its contents sufficient to satisfy the jurisdictional

requirements of N.C. R. App. P. 4(b).” Id.

While the record on appeal does not contain a “proof of service” showing the

Notice of Appeal was served on the District Attorney’s Office within fourteen days of

its filing,1 “[i]t is the filing of the notice of appeal that confers jurisdiction upon this

Court, not the service of the notice of appeal.” State v. Golder, 257 N.C. App. 803, 804

(2018), aff’d as modified by 374 N.C. 238 (2020) (citation omitted). “The State has

1 The record on appeal is replete with proof that the District Attorney’s office had timely and

repeated notice of Defendant’s appeal. The Appellate Entries contain the assistant clerk of superior court’s certification that a copy of the Appellate Entries – finding that “[D]efendant has given Notice of Appeal to the N.C. Court of Appeals” – was served on counsel for all parties and the Appellate Defender’s Office on 3 June 2024, within four days of the Notice of Appeal’s filing. Furthermore, the Appointment of Appellate Counsel by the Appellate Defender indicates it was served on the District Attorney’s Office. The Certificate of Transcript Delivery indicates that the hearing transcripts “Ordered/Requested by Defendant” were delivered to the District Attorney’s Office. The Certificate of Proposed Record indicates the proposed record on appeal was served on the District Attorney’s Office, and the Certificate of Record Settlement indicates the record was settled by operation of law pursuant to Rule 11. See N.C. R. App. P. 11(b) (“If all appellees within the times allowed them either serve notices of approval or fail to serve either notices of approval or objections, amendments, or proposed alternative records on appeal, appellant’s proposed record on appeal thereupon constitutes the record on appeal.”).

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entered no objection to any lack of service and has participated in this appeal, thereby

waiving service of Defendant’s notice of appeal.” Id.

For these reasons, we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal, and we dismiss as

moot Defendant’s conditional petition for writ of certiorari.

B. Standard of Review

“This Court reviews the trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss de novo.”

State v. Smith, 186 N.C. App. 57, 62 (2007) (italics and citation omitted). Under de

novo review, this Court “considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own

judgment for that of the lower tribunal.” State v. Williams, 362 N.C. 628, 632-33

(2008) (quotation marks and citations omitted). “In ruling on a motion to dismiss,

the trial court is required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State,

making all reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the State.” State v.

Kemmerlin, 356 N.C. 446, 473 (2002) (citation omitted). “[T]he trial court must

determine whether there is substantial evidence of each essential element of the

crime.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Substantial evidence is that

amount of relevant evidence necessary to persuade a rational juror to accept a

conclusion.” State v. Mann, 355 N.C. 294, 301 (2002) (citation omitted). If substantial

evidence exists that the charged offense was committed and that the defendant was

the perpetrator of said offense, “the case is for the jury [to decide] and the motion to

dismiss should be denied.” State v. Locklear, 322 N.C. 349, 358 (1988) (citation

omitted).

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C. Possession of a stolen motor vehicle

A person is guilty of possession of a stolen motor vehicle in violation of N.C.

Gen. Stat. § 20-106 if he (1) possesses, (2) a stolen motor vehicle, and (3) knew or

reason to believe that the vehicle has been stolen. State v. Bailey, 157 N.C. App. 80,

83-84 (2003). Here, Defendant concedes that the evidence is sufficient to support a

finding that he possessed the stolen car, but he argues that the evidence is insufficient

to show that he knew or had reason to believe that the car was stolen. We disagree.

The State may rely on the doctrine of recent possession to show that a

defendant knew or had reason to believe that property was stolen. State v. McQueen,

165 N.C. App. 454, 459 (2004). Under the doctrine of recent possession, a

presumption arises that “a person in possession of recently stolen property is guilty

of its wrongful taking . . . .” Id. (citations omitted). The presumption is not conclusive

but is treated as an evidentiary fact that the jury may consider along with all other

evidence to determine whether the State has proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

See State v. Barnes, 345 N.C. 184, 241 (1997); State v. Washington, 277 N.C. App.

576, 583 (2021). For the doctrine of recent possession to apply, the State must show:

“(1) the property was stolen, (2) defendant had possession of the property, subject to

his control and disposition to the exclusion of others, and (3) the possession was

sufficiently recent after the property was stolen, as mere possession of stolen property

is insufficient to raise a presumption of guilt.” McQueen, 165 N.C. App. at 459

(citations omitted).

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Furthermore, the element of knowledge may be established through other

circumstantial evidence. Bailey, 157 N.C. App. at 84. Circumstances permitting a

reasonable inference that the possessor knew, or had reason to believe, that the

property was stolen include flight, inconsistent statements, and alterations to the

property. State v. Bracey, 297 N.C. App. 136, 140-41 (2024). An accused’s high-speed

flight from police officers, including driving recklessly, may be used as evidence of

consciousness of guilt and support the inference that the defendant knew or had

reason to believe the car was stolen. State v. Parker, 316 N.C. 295, 304 (1986).

Inconsistent statements to law enforcement upon apprehension may support an

inference that the defendant knew or had reason to believe that the property was

stolen. Bracey, 297 N.C. App. at 140-41. Finally, alterations to the car, such as visible

damage or tampering, can further reinforce the inference that the defendant

possessed knowledge of the property’s stolen nature. Id. at 141.

In Bracey, the defendant engaged in reckless driving, reaching speeds of more

than ninety-five miles per hour in a sixty mile-per-hour zone. Id. at 137. After

abandoning the car, the defendant fled the scene on foot and was later apprehended

by law enforcement. Id. Upon questioning, he provided inconsistent statements

regarding his possession and knowledge of the car, and further investigation revealed

that the car was damaged. Id. at 138. This Court held that these circumstances,

including flight, inconsistent statements, and the condition of the car, supported a

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reasonable inference that the defendant knew or had reasonable grounds to believe

that the car was stolen. Id. at 141-42.

Here, the State’s evidence tends to show that Mr. Robbins moved the car on 23

January 2024, and it was reported stolen two days later. The key, which Mr. Robbins

had left above the car’s visor, was no longer there. On 26 January 2024, while driving,

Mrs. Robbins recognized their car traveling in the opposite direction. She began to

follow the car, at which point the driver attempted to evade apprehension by

accelerating to approximately seventy miles per hour in a forty-five mile-per-hour

zone. The car was eventually driven to a residence, where Mrs. Robbins saw

Defendant get out of the driver’s seat and help Greer remove clothing and other items

from the car. Shortly thereafter, Defendant and Greer left the residence on foot, and

Defendant was later apprehended by law enforcement.

This evidence satisfies the doctrine of recent possession by showing that the

Robbins’ stolen car was in Defendant’s possession twenty-four hours after the

Robbins reported the theft. See Barnes, 345 N.C. at 240; McQueen, 165 N.C. App. at

459. Furthermore, other evidence supports the inference that Defendant knew, or

had reason to believe, that the car had been stolen. See State v. Vaughn, 130 N.C.

App. 456, 458 (1998). Like the defendant in Bracey, Defendant engaged in erratic

driving behavior while being pursued by Mrs. Robbins, accelerating to nearly thirty

miles per hour above the speed limit. Defendant’s manner of driving supports the

inference that he knew the car was stolen. See Bracey, 297 N.C. App. at 140.

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Further similar to Bracey, Defendant subsequently abandoned the car and fled

on foot when confronted. This conduct is “evidence of consciousness of guilt . . . .”

Parker, 316 N.C. at 304. Additionally, the car’s interior contained burglary tools,

including suction devices, screwdrivers, and a crowbar; all items a thief may use to

break into a car. State v. Glaze, 24 N.C. App. 60, 64 (1974) (finding that incriminating

circumstances, including possession of burglary tools within a vehicle, can support an

inference of knowledge). When viewed in combination, the evidence of Defendant’s

immediate possession of the stolen car, his efforts to evade detection, the missing car

key, and the presence of burglary tools support that Defendant knew the car had been

stolen. Parker, 316 N.C. at 304; Bracey, 297 N.C. App. at 140; Glaze, 24 N.C. App. at

64.

III. Conclusion

Because the State presented substantial evidence that Defendant knew or had

reason to believe the car was stolen, the trial court did not err in denying the motion

to dismiss.

NO ERROR.

Judges ARROWOOD and FREEMAN concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).

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