State v. Pearson

637 N.W.2d 845, 2002 Minn. LEXIS 5, 2002 WL 59032

• Court: Supreme Court of Minnesota
• Decided: January 17, 2002
• Docket: C9-99-2021
• Status: Published

Opinions

OPINION

BLATZ, Chief Justice.

A sentencing circle, addressing the proper sanction for an offender pursuant to a plea agreement, recommended that the district court stay adjudication of a felony theft count for wrongfully obtaining public assistance. The district court stayed adjudication, and the court of appeals reversed, holding that the reasons cited by the district court did not constitute special circumstances warranting a stay of adjudication. We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a stay of adjudication when the state agreed to send this matter to the sentencing circle, which recommended a stay, and reverse the decision of the court of appeals.

Pearson received approximately $2,430 in food stamps and approximately $4,080 in Aid to Families with Dependent Children (“AFDC”) benefits from Washington County Community Services (“County”) during a period including most of 1995 and the first part of 1996. In her application for these benefits, Pearson indicated that she was earning no income. In fact, from May 1995 to February 1996, Pearson worked 40 hours a week at a chiropractic clinic and was therefore ineligible to receive food stamps or AFDC. Pearson did not disclose this employment or income to the County.

The state charged Pearson with two felony theft counts: one count of wrongfully obtaining public assistance in violation of MinmStat. § 256.98, subd. 1 (1994), and one count of wrongfully obtaining food stamps in violation of Minn.Stat. § 393.07, subd. 10(c)(1) (1994). Appellant and the state negotiated a plea agreement, under which the case would be referred to a sentencing circle prior to sentencing by the court. The parties did not condition the agreement on any understanding regarding what the circle would recommend or on the court’s ultimate disposition of the case.

At the plea hearing, Pearson pleaded guilty to the wrongfully obtaining public assistance charge in return for dismissal of the wrongfully obtaining food stamps charge. The district court accepted Pearson’s guilty plea and, pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement and Minn. Stat. § 611A.775 (2000), assigned her case to a sentencing circle to determine what her sentence would involve. The district court noted that Pearson would return to court for the imposition of sentence. Before the plea hearing ended, the prosecutor sought to. clarify his expectation that restitution would be awarded on both charged counts, and the court told the prosecutor that the state’s interests were represented in the circle process. The prosecutor stated, “Right. I understand that.”

The sentencing circle was conducted by the Hastings Restorative Justice Council and met five times. The County, as the victim of the offenses, was notified of the meetings but declined to attend. The Washington County Attorney’s Office did not receive specific notice as to when the meetings were going to take place and did not attend. The district court judge assigned to Pearson’s case attended the final meeting.

After 14 hours of meetings, the sentencing circle recommended that Pearson receive a stay of adjudication, pay restitution, obtain credit counseling, perform community service, participate in support/follow up circles, have no same or similar offenses, remain law abiding, and appear in court for sentencing. The sentencing circle’s rationale supporting the stay of adjudication was that Pearson was not a risk to public safety by not having a felony record, she had no pattern of breaking the law, a felony record would impede her ability to obtain future employment, a traumatic family event was a contributing factor in the offense, and Pearson’s case would likely have been diverted from felony prosecution had she been able to pay down the amount of restitution owed.

At the sentencing hearing, the state objected to the stay of adjudication, arguing that State v. Krotzer, 548 N.W.2d 252 (Minn.1996), prohibited a stay. The state also complained that it was unable to participate in the sentencing circle because it did not receive notice of the circle’s meetings. Over the state’s objection, the district court adopted the sentencing circle’s recommendation in its entirety, vacated Pearson’s plea, and sentenced her according to the circle’s recommendation. The court relied on the same reasons the sentencing circle used to support its recommendation of a stay of adjudication.

On appeal, the court of appeals concluded that section 611A.775 does not authorize a restorative justice program to “assign a sanction that would be an improper sentence if imposed by the district court.” State v. Pearson, 609 N.W.2d 630, 633 (Minn.App.2000). Noting that Krotzer and State v. Foss, 556 N.W.2d 540 (Minn.1996), allow a district court to stay adjudication only if special circumstances exist, the court of appeals concluded that no special circumstances were present in this case and reversed and remanded for adjudication and sentencing. Pearson, 609 N.W.2d at 633-34.

The issue presented by this appeal is whether the district court had the authority under Minn.Stat. § 611A.775 to stay adjudication of Pearson’s guilt based on the sentencing circle’s recommendation after the state agreed to send the case to the circle. A district court’s sentencing decision will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Schmit, 601 N.W.2d 896, 896 (Minn.1999).

Minnesota Statutes § 611A.775 provides:

A community-based organization, in collaboration with a local governmental unit, may establish a restorative justice program. A restorative justice program is a program that provides forums where certain individuals charged with or petitioned for having committed an offense meet with the victim, if appropriate; the victim’s family members or other supportive persons, if appropriate; the offender’s family members or other supportive persons, if appropriate; a law enforcement official or prosecutor when appropriate; other criminal justice system professionals when appropriate; and members of the community, in order to:

(1) discuss the impact of the offense on the victim and the community;

(2) provide support to the victim and methods for reintegrating the victim into community life;

(3) assign an appropriate sanction to the offender; and

(4) provide methods for reintegrating the offender into community life.

(Emphasis added).¹

On its face, section 611A.775 reflects a broad healing purpose to restorative justice programs, both for victims and offenders. Bringing victims and offenders together provides an opportunity for offenders to better understand the impact of their conduct, and gives victims a clear voice in the resolution of the offense. On a more concrete level, the statute explicitly gives restorative justice programs the authority to assign appropriate sanctions to an offender. However, the statute fails to address how the restorative justice pro-grain’s assigned sanction operates in light of the judiciary’s role in adjudicating and sentencing. While the statute fails to provide any guidance as to what constitutes an “appropriate sanction” or who makes the determination as to whether the sanction assigned in a given case is “appropriate,” there is also no indication in the statute that the legislature intended that courts abdicate their sentencing authority.

However, we need not attempt in this case to answer the questions left open by the legislature in the restorative justice statute. The parties in this case each agreed, pursuant to the terms of a plea agreement, to refer the case to a sentencing circle prior to sentencing by the court. The state did not qualify its consent to send the matter to the circle. Specifically, the state did not condition its consent on the understanding that the circle would recommend adjudication of the offense, or that the court would ultimately adjudicate the offense. In fact, when the prosecutor sought to clarify, after his consent to refer the matter to a sentencing circle, his expectation that restitution would be awarded on both charged counts, the court told the prosecutor that the state’s interests were represented in the circle process. The prosecutor stated, “Right. I understand that.” Thus, without further objection or discussion, the state agreed that there were no up-front limitations on the authority of the sentencing circle and that to protect its interest in the sentencing result the state needed to work through the sentencing circle.

While we note that there were no up-front limitations imposed on the sentencing circle in this case, we need not decide whether a court would be bound by any conditions imposed on the restorative justice program by the parties. Because the parties apparently did not agree to any limitations on the sentencing circle’s authority in this case, we can leave for another day whether a party can impose limitations on the operation of a restorative justice program. It is enough, for purposes of this case, to recognize that the state agreed to refer the case to a sentencing circle and acknowledged that its after-the-fact attempt to limit the discretion of the circle on restitution was improper in light of the agreement reached.²

Specifically with respect to the disposition in this case and notwithstanding Krot-zer and Foss, Minn.Stat. § 609.095(b) (2000) allows a stay of adjudication when the parties agree to it. In a typical case, that agreement might arise as part of the plea negotiations or before the court imposes a sentence. A case referred to a sentencing circle is not a typical case, however. While the restorative justice statute is written broadly to encompass a wide range of processes, it specifically allows a restorative justice program to “assign an appropriate sanction to the offender.” Minn.Stat. § 611A.775. Each sentencing circle involves the participation of community members who voluntarily come together to reach a consensus on how a case can best be resolved with the goal of supporting the victim and reintegrating the victim and offender into community life. The work of a circle is often arduous, emotional and time-consuming. Necessarily, then, any limitation on the agreement to send a case to a restorative justice program, if allowable at all, must be made up front, before the laborious process of reconciliation and resolution takes place. To allow an after-the-fact objection to the authority of the sentencing circle would eviscerate the purposes of the restorative justice program.

On this record, the court did not abuse its discretion in staying adjudication of the offense. Questions remain regarding the scope of the authority of restorative justice programs, and the respective roles of the program and the court in sentencing. However, the legislature has an opportunity, perhaps in light of the ruling in this case, to clarify those roles. We reverse the holding of the court of appeals and reinstate the disposition imposed by the district court.

Reversed.

PAGE and PAUL H. ANDERSON, JJ., concurring Specially.

1 . The parties do not dispute that the sentencing circle used in this case is a restorative justice program under the statute.

2 . In addition, we reject the state’s argument that because it lacked notice of the sentencing circle meetings, the state should not be bound by its result. The lack of participation by the County and the prosecutor is troubling to the extent that the district court judge participated in a process in which only one of two parties before the court was present. However, the County received notice of the meetings, and apparently chose not to attend and not to ask the prosecutor to attend. Moreover, the statute does not make attendance by the prosecutor mandatory, as it provides for participation by the prosecutor "when appropriate.” Minn.Stat. § 611A.775. Given that the prosecutor in this case had clear notice that if he wanted a particular result at sentencing he was to participate in the circle, and given the absence of a clear requirement in the statute that the prosecutor participate in the process, we cannot conclude on this record that the state's lack of participation negates the sentencing circle recommendation.