State v. Peacock

Court of Appeals of Georgia

State v. Peacock

342 S.E.2d 364, 178 Ga. App. 96, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2487

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedMarch 4, 1986

Docket71583

StatusPublished

Cited by7 cases

This text of 342 S.E.2d 364 (State v. Peacock) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

State v. Peacock, 342 S.E.2d 364, 178 Ga. App. 96, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2487 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986).

Pincite

Opinions

Carley, Judge.

In this D.U.I. case, the State appeals from the trial court’s grant of a motion to suppress the evidence of the results of the blood test performed on defendant. The basis of the motion was that the evidence did not show the required reasonable and articulable suspicion necessary to authorize the stopping of defendant. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648 (99 SC 1391, 59 LE2d 660, 663) (1979); Thomason v. State, 153 Ga. App. 345, 346, 347 (265 SE2d 312) (1980).

The testimony of the officer was to the effect that he had observed defendant bring his vehicle to a stop at least three car lengths from three different traffic lights. The officer also testified that as defendant left the second traffic light, he did so at a high rate of speed. During the hearing on the motion to suppress, defendant took the stand and denied that he had conducted himself in the manner testified to by the officer.

At the conclusion of the hearing on the motion to suppress, the trial court stated as follows: “The Court realizes that the standard is reasonable, articulable suspicion rather than probable cause, but applying all of that to the facts of this case and taking the State’s testimony on Officer McCain at his best, all he observed was a man stopped three car lengths from a red light, and, of course, that’s disputed by the Defendant, but taken as Officer McCain says, that three car lengths — he’s in a Corvette which would put it some forty to fifty feet — three times — I guess a Corvette’s what, ten, fifteen feet long if that, and at 11:30 at night this Court just doesn’t see how this is articulable to stop a car just because he’s stopped three car lengths from a red light. He hadn’t done anything else. Everything else was fine. So, the Court’s going to grant your Motion to Suppress as to Count One.” (Emphasis supplied.)

The actual written order granting the motion to suppress, from which this appeal is taken, states as follows: “the court having heard evidence from the state and the defendant, the court holds that even in holding the evidence in a light most favorable to the state, such [97]*97conduct on the part of the defendant was insufficient to justify the traffic stop executed by Officer McCain, Clayton County Police Department. The Motion is GRANTED.”

“[WJhere there is a conflict in the evidence on the motion to suppress, the ruling of the trial court will be upheld where there is any evidence to authorize a finding in support of his order.” State v. Swift, 232 Ga. 535 (2) (207 SE2d 459) (1974). Although, in this case, the evidence was definitely conflicting, a review of the transcript statement of the trial court and of the written order itself reveals clearly that the trial court did not really resolve the disputed issues of fact. The trial court simply held that even if the evidence presented by the State were true, it still would not show sufficient articulable suspicion to authorize a stop. Furthermore, a review of the bench ruling and the order also indicates that the trial court did not consider the officer’s testimony that defendant left one traffic light at a high rate of speed.

In this connection, we recognize that there is no requirement that a trial judge make specific findings of fact after a hearing on a motion to suppress. Shirley v. State, 166 Ga. App. 456, 458 (304 SE2d 468) (1983). Thus, if, on this record containing conflicting testimony, the trial court had simply granted the motion to suppress, we would affirm. Woodruff v. State, 233 Ga. 840 (3) (213 SE2d 689) (1975). In this case, however, the record shows that the trial court did not really make any findings of fact, articulated or not. The record further shows that “taking the State’s testimony on Officer McCain at his best,” in order to conclude as a matter of law that there was no articulable suspicion, the trial court did not consider the additional testimony concerning the high rate of speed departure from one of the stop lights. Accordingly, this case must be remanded to the trial court for redetermination of the relevant issues after consideration of all of the evidence. Cf. State v. Waters, 170 Ga. App. 505 (2) (317 SE2d 614) (1984). See also Brown v. State, 167 Ga. App. 473 (306 SE2d 728) (1983).

Judgment reversed and case remanded with direction.

Banke, C. J., Deen, P. J., McMurray, P. J., and Pope, J., concur. Birdsong, P. J., Sognier, Benham and Beasley, JJ., dissent.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Carley, Judge.

In this D.U.I. case, the State appeals from the trial court’s grant of a motion to suppress the evidence of the results of the blood test performed on defendant. The basis of the motion was that the evidence did not show the required reasonable and articulable suspicion necessary to authorize the stopping of defendant. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648 (99 SC 1391, 59 LE2d 660, 663) (1979); Thomason v. State, 153 Ga. App. 345, 346, 347 (265 SE2d 312) (1980).

The testimony of the officer was to the effect that he had observed defendant bring his vehicle to a stop at least three car lengths from three different traffic lights. The officer also testified that as defendant left the second traffic light, he did so at a high rate of speed. During the hearing on the motion to suppress, defendant took the stand and denied that he had conducted himself in the manner testified to by the officer.

At the conclusion of the hearing on the motion to suppress, the trial court stated as follows: “The Court realizes that the standard is reasonable, articulable suspicion rather than probable cause, but applying all of that to the facts of this case and taking the State’s testimony on Officer McCain at his best, all he observed was a man stopped three car lengths from a red light, and, of course, that’s disputed by the Defendant, but taken as Officer McCain says, that three car lengths — he’s in a Corvette which would put it some forty to fifty feet — three times — I guess a Corvette’s what, ten, fifteen feet long if that, and at 11:30 at night this Court just doesn’t see how this is articulable to stop a car just because he’s stopped three car lengths from a red light. He hadn’t done anything else. Everything else was fine. So, the Court’s going to grant your Motion to Suppress as to Count One.” (Emphasis supplied.)

The actual written order granting the motion to suppress, from which this appeal is taken, states as follows: “the court having heard evidence from the state and the defendant, the court holds that even in holding the evidence in a light most favorable to the state, such [97]*97conduct on the part of the defendant was insufficient to justify the traffic stop executed by Officer McCain, Clayton County Police Department. The Motion is GRANTED.”

“[WJhere there is a conflict in the evidence on the motion to suppress, the ruling of the trial court will be upheld where there is any evidence to authorize a finding in support of his order.” State v. Swift, 232 Ga. 535 (2) (207 SE2d 459) (1974). Although, in this case, the evidence was definitely conflicting, a review of the transcript statement of the trial court and of the written order itself reveals clearly that the trial court did not really resolve the disputed issues of fact. The trial court simply held that even if the evidence presented by the State were true, it still would not show sufficient articulable suspicion to authorize a stop. Furthermore, a review of the bench ruling and the order also indicates that the trial court did not consider the officer’s testimony that defendant left one traffic light at a high rate of speed.

In this connection, we recognize that there is no requirement that a trial judge make specific findings of fact after a hearing on a motion to suppress. Shirley v. State, 166 Ga. App. 456, 458 (304 SE2d 468) (1983). Thus, if, on this record containing conflicting testimony, the trial court had simply granted the motion to suppress, we would affirm. Woodruff v. State, 233 Ga. 840 (3) (213 SE2d 689) (1975). In this case, however, the record shows that the trial court did not really make any findings of fact, articulated or not. The record further shows that “taking the State’s testimony on Officer McCain at his best,” in order to conclude as a matter of law that there was no articulable suspicion, the trial court did not consider the additional testimony concerning the high rate of speed departure from one of the stop lights. Accordingly, this case must be remanded to the trial court for redetermination of the relevant issues after consideration of all of the evidence. Cf. State v. Waters, 170 Ga. App. 505 (2) (317 SE2d 614) (1984). See also Brown v. State, 167 Ga. App. 473 (306 SE2d 728) (1983).

Judgment reversed and case remanded with direction.

Banke, C. J., Deen, P. J., McMurray, P. J., and Pope, J., concur. Birdsong, P. J., Sognier, Benham and Beasley, JJ., dissent.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

342 S.E.2d 364, 178 Ga. App. 96, 1986 Ga. App. LEXIS 2487, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-peacock-gactapp-1986.

Opinions

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack