Opinion of the Court by
RAMIL, J.
The defendant-appellant Frank Pauline, Jr. appeals from the third circuit court’s judgment of conviction1 of murder in the second degree, in violation of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 707-701.5 (1993), kidnapping, in violation of HRS § 707-720(l)(c) (1993), and sexual assault in the first degree, in violation of HRS § 707-730(l)(a) (1993), and the subsequent sentence. On appeal, Pauline contends that the trial court erred in: (1) denying Pauline’s motion to transfer the case to another circuit; (2) failing to review the videotape of Pauline’s expert witness pri- or to ruling on its admissibility; (3) excluding the videotape of Pauline’s expert witness as evidence; (4) allowing the jury’s trunk hood “experiment” during the jury view and, thereby, violating Pauline’s rights of due process, confrontation, and effective assistance of counsel; (5) excluding Pauline from the jury views of the car and, thereby, violating Pauline’s right to be present at all stages of the proceeding; (6) failing to engage in an on-the-record colloquy with Pauline concerning included offense instructions; and (7) denying Pauline’s motion for a new trial.
For the reasons set forth below, we hold that: (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Pauline’s motion to transfer; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to review the videotape of Pauline’s expert witness prior to ruling on its admissibility; (3) the trial court did not err in excluding the videotape of Pauline’s expert witness as evidence; (4) the jury’s trunk hood “experiment” did not violate Pauline’s rights to due process, confrontation, and effective assistance of counsel; (5) although the exclusion of Pauline from the jury views violated his right of presence, such error was harmless; (6) the failure of the trial court to engage in an on-the-record colloquy with Pauline concerning included offense instructions was not plain error affecting Pauline’s substantial rights; and (7) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Pauline’s motion for a new trial. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment of conviction and sentence.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
In December of 1991, Dana Ireland visited her sister in Puna on the island of Hawai'i. [361] In the early afternoon of December 24, 1991, Ireland borrowed her sister’s bicycle and rode over to her friend’s house to invite him to a family Christmas dinner.
At about 4:45 p.m., in Waa Waa, Ida Smith, a local resident, heard crying near her house. When' Smith investigated the noise, she found Ireland bloodied and her clothes torn off. Since Smith had no access to a phone, she had to hail ears from a nearby street to call for help.
At 5:36 p.m., -Sergeant Robert F. Wagner of the Hawai'i County Police Department arrived at Kapoho Kai Drive and observed a black mountain bike on the right hand shoulder, with debris on the roadway. Wagner testified that he noticed “what appeared to be a gouge mark in the roadway area and what appeared to be acceleration marks on the roadway area leading up to where the bicycle was at.” He also found a shoe, a clump of blond hair, and a wristwatch on the scene.
At 6:20 p.m., Officer Harold Pinnow of the Hawai'i County Police Department arrived at the Waa Waa scene. He observed several people attempting to comfort Ireland, who was “incoherent” and “seriously injured.”
About half an hour later, Hawai'i County Fire Department paramedic, Johnson K. Kahili, arrived at the Waa Waa scene and observed that Ireland had numerous abrasions on her face, was suffering from shock, and “had a very large laceration ... to the right side of her head ... [through which her] skull was visible.” Kahili further noted that he was unable to measure her blood pressure, which indicated that “her blood pressure was very low.”
Later that night, the paramedics brought Ireland into the Hilo Medical Center emergency room, where she was treated by Dr. Nigel Palmer. Emergency room nurse, Reggie Agliam, observed that Ireland had “lost a lot of blood” and had sustained “a large laceration to her scalp” and “multiple contusions.” Following emergency surgery, Ireland died. Dr. Charles Reinhold, pathologist at the medical center, performed an autopsy of Ireland and determined that she “died from massive blood loss due to multiple traumatic injuries throughout her body.”
Dr. Kanthi Von Guenthner, forensic pathologist and first deputy medical examiner for the City and County of Honolulu, reviewed the medical records, including autopsy photographs, Dr. Reinhold’s autopsy report, and X-ray reports. Dr. Von Guenthner observed that Ireland had numerous injuries, including damage to her brain and to the outer part of her head; extensive bleeding of her head; scrapes to her back, legs, and arms; bruising of her lips; tears with bleeding in her mouth; a bite mark to her left breast; fingernail scratch marks to her right breast; fingernail scratch marks on her left hip; extensive bruising to her neck, vagina, and scalp; and a broken pelvis and clavicle.
B. Pauline’s Confession
On June 18, 1994, Detective Steven Guillermo of the Hawai'i County Police Department met with Pauline at the Attorney General’s Office on the island of O'ahu. After being advised of his constitutional rights, Pauline recounted what occurred on December 24, 1991. At trial, Guillermo testified as to Pauline’s confession.
Pauline stated that Ian and Shawn Schweitzer stopped by his house during the early afternoon hours and asked him if he “wanted to go out and party.” Pauline “understood that to mean if he wanted to go and join them to have some cocaine and probably go cruising.” Pauline agreed and got into Ian’s purple Volkswagen, with Ian driving and Shawn in the front passenger seat. They headed towards Pohoiki and made several stops to smoke cocaine.
As they neared Kapoho, they spotted Ireland standing on the roadside. Pauline explained, “At that time, Ian made some type of a comment to her, which is similar to the word ho or something like that.” Ian immediately turned around and headed back in the direction towards Ireland. Pauline observed that the car was traveling at about 40 miles per hour when it struck Ireland. After driving over Ireland, Ian reversed over her again and then stopped the car. The Schweitzer brothers got out, picked Ireland up, and loaded her into the ear’s front trunk. They next [362] drove towards the Waa Waa area on Beach Road. They stopped once along the way to smoke crack and Ian also checked the car’s trunk.
Pauline told Guillermo that when they reached the Waa Waa area, they stopped the car on a dirt roadway. Pauline then helped Ian remove Ireland from the trunk compartment. They placed her on the ground and Ian had sexual intercourse with her. Pauline later stated that he helped Ian in pulling Ireland’s pants down. Ian then invited Pauline to also have sex with her, but Pauline refused. Ian told Pauline that they must kill her, or else she would be able to identify them. In response, Pauline walked back to the car and retrieved a toe iron from the back portion of the car. “At that point, he approached the victim, looked at her, and swung the tire iron at her head.” Pauline acknowledged that “he did hit her but ... wasn’t sure exactly where.” Pauline later signed a formal statement, admitted in evidence, which stated that his intention in hitting Ireland with the tire iron was “to make sure [he] killed her.” He also noted that Ian may have later struck Ireland. Pauline told Guillermo that when they left the scene, he did not realize that they had left Ireland behind until they arrived at the Schweitzer’s home and were washing the car.
Guillermo testified that following the confession, the Hawaii County Police escorted Pauline to the island of Hawaii to conduct a “reconstruction” of Pauline’s statements. At the Schweitzer residence, Pauline pointed out a Volkswagen that was now painted yellow and had no fenders, and identified this car as the vehicle involved in the incident. The car was later shown to the jury and the jury was instructed to treat the car like “any other evidence.”
At trial, Pauline disavowed his confession and testified that he had lied to the police in order to get out of prison, where he faced death threats.
C. Pretrial Proceedings
1. Indictment and Arraignment
On July 30, 1997, Pauline was indicted for murder in the second degree, kidnapping, and sexual assault in the first degree. On July 31, 1997, Pauline was arraigned and entered pleas of not guilty.
2. Motion to Transfer Case
On January 21, 1999, Pauline filed a motion to transfer the ease, “on grounds that there [was] so great a prejudice against the defendant in the Third Circuit that he cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial in the Thud Circuit.” On February 16, 1999, Pauline filed a memorandum in support of his motion to transfer the ease, attaching over 875 pages of newspaper articles concerning either Pauline or the murder of Ireland. In denying the motion on February 18, 1999, the trial court explained that it was capable of ensuring a fail' trial through precautionary actions, such as jury questionnaires, extensive voir dire, cautionary instructions, and appropriate jury instructions.
D. Trial Proceedings
R Reconstruction Videotape
At trial, Pauline sought to introduce not only the testimony of an accident reconstruction engineer, James Campbell, but also Campbell’s report and videotape of a computer-generated simulation of the automobile incident. The videotape “show[ed] the accident event in real time” based upon the prosecution’s theory, while the report summarized the results of the videotape:
The simulation clearly shows that the accident described by certain people could not likely have happen[ed]. The simulationfs] speeds were run at 20 MPH for the VW, and 5 MPH for Ms. Ireland. Simulation reveals her trajectory as she is struck by the VW. She is thrown into the ah' and comes back to earth and is again struck by the VW. This whole event lasts only 1.8 seconds in real time. Increasing the speed of the VW only causes more damage to Ms. Ireland. It is a reasonable engineering probability that Ms. Ireland was not struck by this VW vehicle. This simulated event obviously did not take place. It was only produced to show that this type of low sloping vehicle could not have caused Ms. Ireland’s injuries. Her injuries were, [363] more likely than not, caused by a vehicle with a flatter upright radiator with a conventional hood on it. The VW sedan does not have a conventional radiator.
In response, the prosecution moved to strike Campbell’s videotape, report, and testimony as it related to the computer simulation. The prosecution contended that the computerized reconstruction was unreliable given the numerous assumptions made. In opposition to the prosecution’s motion, Pauline called Campbell, who testified, outside the presence of the jury, to his credentials and the validity of the reconstruction program. Campbell then explained that the data used by the computer program were derived from police reports, inspections of the bicycle and car, Pauline’s statements to the police, and a reenactment of the accident.
The trial court agreed with the prosecution’s argument and granted its motion to strike. As a result, the court prohibited Pauline from presenting Campbell’s reconstruction videotape and report, as well as any testimony by Campbell regarding the videotape or his use of the computer reconstruction program.
2. Jury Views and Trunk Hood “Experiment”
On August 23, 1999, the jury was allowed to view the car and car parts, which had been identified by Pauline as being involved in the incident. Immediately before the view, the trial court explained to the jury that it would be viewing the ear in the basement of the courthouse due to its large size. Nevertheless, the trial court instructed the jury to “consider the Volkswagen the same way that [it would] consider all of the other evidence in this case.” The trial court further directed the jury to “not talk about or discuss anything while [it was] doing the viewing.”
Prior to giving these jury instructions, the trial court had discussed the logistics of the viewing with counsel. The trial court decided, without objection from Pauline’s counsel, that there would be no counsel present. The trial court also determined that there would “be no speaking at all, not even with the Court and the Jurors at all.” Thus, the viewing was not conducted on the record, and counsel and Pauline were not present.
The following morning, Pauline’s counsel brought to the trial court’s attention the fact that the front page of the Haivai'i Tribune Herald displayed a photograph of the car, which was taken immediately prior to the jury viewing.2 The photograph depicted the car trunk compartment with the gas tank missing. Pauline complained that such “egregious tampering with the evidence [was] a direct attempt by the police and the prosecution to mislead the Jury by portraying this Volkswagen as having this big open front compartment.” Pauline then orally moved that he be allowed, in the jury’s presence, to take the testimony of the police and prosecution personnel in order to expose the prosecution’s attempt to mislead the jury.3 The trial court denied the motion, and instead decided that a re-viewing of the car, with the gas tank in the front trunk, would constitute appropriate “curative steps.”
The trial court then instructed the jury with respect to the second viewing of the ear. As with the first viewing, the second one was unrecorded and conducted without the presence of counsel or Pauline.
Following the second view, the trial court informed both parties of the jury’s trunk hood “experiment”:
I want to inform Counsels [sic] that during the viewing the Jury asked the Law Clerks to have the trunk cover put back on the car. And the Law Clerk asked me whether we were going to allow that or not, and I did. So the-whoever the detectives are or people downstairs put the trunk lid back on the car. And although the Jurors didn’t say anything, I guess some communicated by motion that they wanted to see the hood opened and closed. And so the detectives did that as well.
The affidavit of one of the law clerks states that the hood was opened and closed about [364] two or three times. The trial court then asked whether there were any objections. Neither party objected.'4
3. Prosecution’s Withdrawal of Included Offenses Without On-The-Record Colloquy
After the jury was excused for the second viewing, the trial court judge began to settle the jury instructions, including those concerning murder in the second degree, kidnapping, and sexual assault in the first degree. The prosecution offered instructions relating to manslaughter and assault in the first degree, as included offenses of murder in the second degree. Pauline’s counsel, however, argued against such instructions because they were inconsistent with Pauline’s defense. Later, the prosecution informed the trial court that it was requesting that the included offense instructions be withdrawn, given that the included offenses were barred by the statute of limitations. Pauline’s counsel did not object to the withdrawal, and after discussion with counsel regarding the statute of limitations, the tidal court withdrew the included offense instructions.
4. Motion for a Neio Trial
On August 27, 1999, about fifteen minutes after the jury found Pauline guilty as charged, one of the alternate jurors, Marveen Teresa Miller, approached Pauline’s investigator, Dan Boe. According to Boe’s affidavit, Miller stated that she wanted to speak with Pauline’s counsel, Clifford Hunt. Miller then made four statements to Hunt and Boe regarding the trial:
(1) “We believed no one would confess to a murder that they did not commit”;
(2) “We believed [Irelandj’s body would fit in the Volkswagen’s trunk”;
(3) “We believed the Volkswagen was involved”; and
(4) “We believed Ken Baker.”
On September 10, 1999, Pauline filed a motion for a new trial claiming, inter alia, that “certain irregularities may have occurred concerning the jury.”
On October 20, 1999, Boe and William Perreira, the prosecution’s investigator, held a telephone interview with Miller. The interview was summarized in separate memoran-da -written by Boe and Perrera, respectively. Miller clarified that when she had said “we,” she actually meant “I.”
At a hearing on October 25, 1999, Pauline argued that Miller’s statements raised the issue of whether she discussed the evidence with the jurors prior to the commencement of formal deliberations, thereby violating Pauline’s right to a far trial by an impartial jury. Pauline further insisted that Miller’s subsequent clarification only applied to one, rather than all, of the four statements made by her. Nonetheless, the trial court rejected Pauline’s request to examine Miller by stating that the “loose reference” was insufficient to support further inquiry. After hearing argument on other issues, the trial court denied the motion for a new trial.
II. Standards of Review
A. Trial Court’s Denial of Pauline’s Motion to Transfer
A trial court’s denial of a motion for change of venue due to pretrial publicity is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See State v. Hashimoto, 46 Haw. 183, 186, 377 P.2d 728, 732 (1962); see also State v. Okumura, 78 Hawai'i 383, 394, 894 P.2d 80, 91 (1995) (citing State v. Williamson, 72 Haw. 97, 102, 807 P.2d 593, 596 (1991) (citation and quotation marks omitted)); State v. Moyd, 1 Haw.App. 439, 441, 619 P.2d 1107, 1109 (1980).
B. Reconstruction Videotape
“Whether expert testimony should be admitted at trial rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned unless there is a clear abuse of discretion.” State v. Fukusaku, 85 Hawai'i 462, 472, 946 P.2d 32, 42 (1997) (quoting State v. Maelega, 80 Hawai'i 172, 180, 907 P.2d 758, 766 (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Torres, 60 Haw. 271, [365]*365277, 589 P.2d 83, 87 (1978); State v. Smith, 59 Haw. 565, 569, 583 P.2d 347, 350 (1978), overruled on other grounds by State v. Kelekolio, 74 Haw. 479, 849 P.2d 58 (1993). Generally, the trial court abuses its discretion when it “clearly exceeds the bounds of reason or disregards rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of a party litigant.” State v. Klinge, 92 Hawai‘i 577, 584, 994 P.2d 509, 516 (2000) (quoting State v. Ganal, 81 Hawai'i 358, 373, 917 P.2d 370, 385 (1996) (citation omitted)).
C. Trunk Hood “Experiment” During Jury Vieiu
With regard to the issue of whether outside influence rises to the level of substantial prejudice, the reviewing court, “giving due deference to the trial court’s discretion, is to make an independent examination of the totality of the circumstances to determine if there are any indications that the defendant’s trial was not fundamentally fair.” Okumura, 78 Hawai'i at 394, 894 P.2d at 91 (citing State v. Keliiholokai, 58 Haw. 356, 360, 569 P.2d 891, 895 (1977)) (internal citation marks omitted); see also State v. Somonte, 83 Hawai'i 507, 527, 928 P.2d 1, 21 (1996).
D. Pauline’s Right to Be Present at Jury Views of the Car
We review questions of constitutional law de novo under the “right/wrong” standard. Accordingly, this court “exer-eis[es][its] own independent judgment[,] based on the facts of the case.” State v. Jenkins, 93 Hawai'i 87, 100, 997 P.2d 13, 26 (2000) (citations omitted).
E. Prosecution’s Withdrawal of Included Offense Instructions Without On-The-Record Colloquy
The issue of whether the trial court was required to engage in an on-the-record colloquy with Pauline presents a question of law. We review questions of law de novo under the right/wrong standard of review. See State v. Friedman, 93 Hawai'i 63, 68, 996 P.2d 268, 273 (2000) (citing Francis v. Lee Enterprises, Inc., 89 Hawai'i 234, 236, 971 P.2d 707, 709 (1999) (citations omitted)).
F.Trial Court’s Denial of Pauline’s Motion for a New Trial
“As a general matter, the granting or denial of a motion for new trial is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion.” Samonte, 83 Hawai'i at 527, 928 P.2d at 21 (quoting State v. Furutani, 76 Hawai'i 172, 178-79, 873 P.2d 51, 57-58 (1994) (citations omitted)). More specifically, we observed that “[t]he same principle is applied on [sic] the context of a motion for new trial premised on an impartial jury.” Id. (citing Furutani, 76 Hawai'i at 179, 873 P.2d at 58).
III. Disctission
A. Tnal Court’s Denial of Pauline’s Motion to Transfer
Pauline contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to transfer the case to another circuit. Ha-wai'i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 21(a) provides for a change of venue in certain cases:
The court upon motion of the defendant shall transfer the proceeding as to him to another circuit ... if the court is satisfied that there exists in the circuit where the prosecution is pending so great a prejudice against the defendant that he cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial in the circuit.
Pauline claims that, in this case, the court should have presumed there was “so great a prejudice” to his right to a fair and impartial trial under the state and federal constitutions.
In Ainsworth v. Calderon, 138 F.3d 787, 795 (9th Cir.1998), the Ninth Circuit described two types of prejudice—presumed and actual:
A defendant need only demonstrate one of two different types of prejudice in support of a motion to transfer venue: presumed or actual. Prejudice is presumed when the record demonstrates that the community where the trial was held was saturated with prejudicial and inflammatory media publicity about the crime. Prejudice is rarely presumed because “saturation” de[366] fines conditions found only in extreme situations. To establish actual prejudice, the defendant must demonstrate that the jurors exhibited actual partiality or hostility that could not be laid aside.