State v. Partridge

531 P.3d 69, 153 Haw. 246

• Court: Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals
• Decided: June 27, 2023
• Docket: CAAP-21-0000706
• Status: Published

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

Electronically Filed Intermediate Court of Appeals CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX 27-JUN-2023 08:11 AM Dkt. 41 SO

NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I

STATE OF HAWAI#I, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOSHUA PARTRIDGE, Defendant-Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT WAILUKU DIVISION (CASE NO. 2DTC-21-601509)

SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER (By: Leonard, Presiding Judge, Nakasone and McCullen, JJ.)

Defendant-Appellant Joshua Partridge (Partridge)

appeals from the Judgment and Notice of Entry of Judgment entered

on October 29, 2021 (Judgment), in the District Court of the

Second Circuit, Wailuku Division (District Court).1 After a

bench trial, Partridge was convicted of Excessive Speeding in

violation of Hawai#i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 291C-105(a)(1) or

1/ The Honorable Christopher M. Dunn presided. NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

(2) (2020)2 and sentenced in accordance with HRS § 291C-105(c)(2)

(2020).3

Partridge raises two points of error on appeal,

contending that: (1) the District Court erred in denying his

oral motion to dismiss the June 18, 2021 Amended Complaint where

the charge failed to give him notice of the nature and cause of

the accusation against him; and (2) his sentence for Excessive

Speeding as a second conviction within five years under HRS

§ 291C-105(c)(2) must be vacated where there was no admissible

evidence of a prior conviction.

Upon careful review of the record and the briefs

submitted by the parties, and having given due consideration to

the arguments advanced and the issues raised by the parties, we

resolve Partridge's points of error as follows:

(1) Partridge contends the Excessive Speeding charge

violated his constitutional rights to due process under the Sixth

Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and article I,

§ 5 of the Constitution of the State of Hawai#i because the

Amended Complaint failed to define the term "applicable state or

county speed limit," which is separately defined in HRS § 291C-

2/ HRS § 291C-105(a) states: § 291C-105 Excessive speeding. (a) No person shall drive a motor vehicle at a speed exceeding: (1) The applicable state or county speed limit by thirty miles per hour or more; or

(2) Eighty miles per hour or more irrespective of the applicable state or county speed limit. 3/ HRS § 291C-105(c)(2) provides enhanced sentencing instructions for "an offense that occurs within five years of a prior conviction for an offense under th[e same] section."

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105(b),4 and is an attendant circumstance of the offense.

Partridge submits that by omitting the definition, Plaintiff-

Appellee State of Hawai#i (the State) failed to provide Partridge

with fair notice of which state or county speed limit he was

accused of exceeding.5

"Whether a charge sets forth all the essential elements

of a charged offense is a question of law, which we review under

the de novo, or right/wrong, standard." State v. Mita, 124

Hawai#i 385, 389, 245 P.3d 458, 462 (2010) (citation omitted;

format altered). Here, the language in the Amended Complaint

tracked the language of HRS § 291C-105(a)(1) and (c)(2), alleged

that Partridge committed the offense of Excessive Speeding — as a

second offense in five years — when he drove 77 miles-per-hour in

a 45 mile-per-hour zone, and did so within five years of a prior

conviction for the same offense. See State v. Garcia, 152

4/ Specifically, HRS § 291C-105(b) provides:

(b) For the purposes of this section, "the applicable state or county speed limit" means:

(1) The maximum speed limit established by county ordinance; (2) The maximum speed limit established by official signs placed by the director of transportation on highways under the director's jurisdiction; or (3) The maximum speed limit established pursuant to section 291C-104 by the director of transportation or the counties for school zones and construction areas in their respective jurisdictions. 5/ Although Partridge arguably waived his argument concerning a defect in the charge by not raising it in a pre-trial motion, see Hawai#i Rules of Penal Procedure Rule 12(b)(2), (f), the District Court impliedly granted relief from the waiver by considering the argument on the merits, without comment on its timeliness. See State v. Przeradski, 5 Haw. App. 29, 31-32, 677 P.2d 471, 474-75 (1984).

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Hawai#i 3, 8, 518 P.3d 1153, 1158 (2022) ("Generally if a

charging document tracks an offense's statutory language, then

the State doesn't need to load it with definitions of words

defined elsewhere."). The statutory definition of "applicable

state or county speed limit" is consistent with its commonly

understood meaning, i.e., the maximum speed permitted by law on a

particular roadway. Moreover, the definition does not create an

additional element of the offense, but merely describes three

different ways the speed limit may be established. See Mita, 124

Hawai#i at 392, 245 P.3d at 465 ("[T]he State need only allege

the statutory definition of a term when it creates an additional

essential element of the offense, and the term itself does not

provide a person of common understanding with fair notice of that

element."). Thus, we conclude that the charge did not deprive

Partridge of due process.

(2) Partridge contends that the District Court erred in

admitting a driver's traffic abstract and a prior judgment for

the same offense (both documents named Joshua Partridge and

contained certain other identifying information), because the

State failed to prove that Partridge was the same person named in

those documents. On appeal, Partridge concedes that, in the

District Court proceedings, he did not argue that the State

failed to prove that Partridge was the person named in the

documents. At no point in the proceedings below did Partridge

contest that he was the person referenced in the State's

exhibits.

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We conclude that Partridge waived a challenge to the

admissibility of the State's exhibits on the basis that they had

not established that he was the same person named in those

documents. See State v. Moses, 102 Hawai#i 449, 456, 77 P.3d

940, 947 (2003) (arguments not raised at trial are waived on

appeal); State v. Long, 98 Hawai#i 348, 353, 48 P.3d 595, 600

(2002) ("[A] 'lack of foundation' objection generally is

insufficient to preserve foundational issues for appeal because

such an objection does not advise the trial court of the problems

with the foundation.").

For these reasons, the District Court's October 29,

2021 Judgment is affirmed.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai#i, June 27, 2023.

On the briefs: /s/ Katherine G. Leonard Presiding Judge Marshall K.P. Pautsch, Deputy Public Defender, /s/ Karen T. Nakasone for Defendant-Appellant. Associate Judge

Renee Ishikawa Delizo, /s/ Sonja M.P. McCullen Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Associate Judge for Plaintiff-Appellee.