State v. Parks

437 P.2d 642, 37 A.L.R. 3d 605, 1968 Alas. LEXIS 153
Alaska Supreme Court·Decided February 21, 1968·No. 858·Published·Cited by 42 cases

Opinions

OPINION

DIMOND, Justice.

Appellee was indicted for the crime of burglary. One witness had testified before [643] 'the grand jury — officer Bivens, an investigator for the Alaska State Police. While officer Bivens was testifying at the trial during the presentation of the state’s case in chief, appellee moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that it was based solely on hearsay testimony, a fact that was conceded by the state. The trial court dismissed the indictment, stating that it did so “under the authority of the minority rule and the indications of the Supreme Court in the Merrill case and in the Shelton case * * The state has appealed, claiming that the indictment was sufficient and that its dismissal was error.1

In State v. Shelton2 we considered the question of whether an indictment was sufficient to require a defendant to stand trial where one of five witnesses who testified before the grand jury testified at the trial somewhat at variance with the testimony the witness gave when before the grand jury. Since art. I, section 8 of the Alaska Constitution3 is identical with a like provision of the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, we had occasion in Shelton to refer to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Costello v. United States 4. There the court was considering the question of whether under the Fifth Amendment a defendant should be required to stand trial and a conviction be sustained where only hearsay evidence was presented to the grand jury which indicted him.5 The Supreme Court said:

[N] either the Fifth Amendment nor any other constitutional provision prescribes the kind of evidence upon which grand juries must act. * * *
An indictment returned by a legally constituted and unbiased grand jury, like an information drawn by the prosecutor, if valid on its face, is enough to call for trial of the charge on the merits. The Fifth Amendment requires nothing more.6

As to Costello, we said in Shelton:

[Tjhe broad declaration made in that case, not considered in relation to the factual situation there presented, would appear to preclude the dismissal of an indictment even where it appeared that “no evidence had been offered that rationally established the facts”, or that the indictment was returned “substantially upon evidence which was untrustworthy”. We would have serious misgivings about concurring in such a result; for in the extreme and yet conceivable situation it could mean that a defendant would be obliged to stand the expense and humiliation of a public trial where the grand jury had acted either on no evidence at all or solely on the basis of evidence that would not support a guilty verdict after trial. This would rob the constitutional right of much of its protective value, and would not be in accord with what we have stated to be a vital function of the grand jury — the protection of the innocent against oppression and unjust prosecution. [Footnotes omitted]7

In Merrill v. State8 we considered the question of whether an indictment was sufficient when based on the uncorroborated [644] testimony of an accomplice. We mentioned the fact that

In Shelton we left open the question whether an indictment based solely on hearsay is subject to dismissal.9

That question is now before us in this case.

We intimated in Shelton10 that we would hold an indictment to be insufficient and subject to dismissal if it appeared that no evidence was presented to the grand jury that rationally established the facts. This is a rule suggested by Judge Learned Hand in the Costello case when it was before the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.11 We now adopt that rule for this jurisdiction.

Under such a rule, the question is one of sufficiency of the evidence — whether it is adequate to persuade reasonable minded persons that if unexplained or uncontradict-ed it would warrant a conviction of the person charged with an offense by the judge or jury trying the offense.12 Sufficiency of the evidence is the test prescribed by statute.13 It is not required that the evidence be the kind that would not fall within one of the exclusionary rules of evidence and therefore would be admissible at the trial even though objected to by a defendant.

Hearsay is involved when one attempts to get into evidence a statement made by one who is not testifying.14 Under the exclusionary rules of evidence, hearsay is inadmissible unless it falls within one of the numerous exceptions to the hearsay rule. But it is inadmissible only if objected to by the party against whom it is offered. If there is no objection, then the hearsay may properly be considered by the trier of fact in making factual determinations, and it may be given its logical probative effect as if it were admissible.15 The hearsay rule involves “no assertion that hearsay statements are without probative force or that they furnish no logical basis for conclusions of fact.” 16 In fact, the courts by multiplying exceptions to the hearsay rule “reveal their conviction that relevant hearsay evidence normally has real probative value, and is capable of valuation by a jury * * 17 As Judge Hand said in the Costello case:

Indeed, we conduct our most serious affairs upon the strength of it [hearsay] 1 it would be impossible to carry on a day’s business without it.18

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State v. Parks, 437 P.2d 642, 37 A.L.R. 3d 605, 1968 Alas. LEXIS 153 (Ala. 1968).

437 P.2d 642 (State v. Parks) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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