BEASLEY, Judge.
Megan Sue Otto (Defendant) appeals from a judgment imposing a suspended sentence based on her conviction for driving while impaired. On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress on the grounds that the arresting officer lacked the required reasonable suspicion immediately prior to the stop that she was driving while impaired. For the following reasons, we reverse.
On 29 February 2008, Trooper Ashley Brent Smith of the North Carolina Highway Patrol noticed that Defendant was weaving from the center line to the fog line. Defendant’s vehicle did not leave the roadway or cross the center line, nor did Defendant commit any additional traffic violations, but Trooper Smith activated his blue lights after following her “for approximately three-quarters of a mile.” When Trooper Smith initially observed Defendant, she was approximately one-half mile from a private club known as the Rock Springs Equestrian Club (Rock Springs) and was coming from the direction of that facility. Trooper Smith was aware that a Ducks Unlimited banquet was being held at Rock Springs that evening. Despite the fact that Trooper Smith did not know if alcohol would be served at Rock Springs that evening, he had previously heard others indicate that functions at which alcohol was served were held at Rock Springs on occasion. Trooper Smith issued Defendant a citation for driving while subject to an impairing substance.
On 2 December 2008, Defendant filed a motion to suppress any evidence obtained as a result of her initial detention on the grounds that the evidence in question had been obtained as the result of a “substantial violation” of her rights under North Carolina statutes and the state and federal constitutions. A hearing on Defendant’s motion [81]*81was conducted before Judge Charles M. Vincent in Pitt County District Court, after which Judge Vincent stated that he intended to grant Defendant’s motion. The State sought review of Judge Vincent’s decision in the Pitt County Superior Court.
On 22 May 2009, a hearing on Defendant’s suppression motion was held before the Pitt County Superior Court. On 23 August 2009, the superior court entered an order reversing Judge Vincent and remanding this case to the Pitt County District Court for further proceedings. On remand, Defendant was convicted of driving while impaired in the Pitt County District Court and appealed the resulting judgment to the Pitt County Superior Court.
On 3 December 2009, Defendant filed a motion seeking suppression of the evidence obtained as a result of her arrest which was heard on 30 September 2010. The superior court entered a written order denying Defendant’s suppression motion on 13 January 2011. After the denial of her suppression motion, Defendant entered a plea of guilty to driving while impaired while reserving her right to seek appellate review of the order denying her suppression motion. In light of Defendant’s plea, the superior court found that Defendant was subject to Level V punishment and sentenced her to sixty days imprisonment, which was suspended on the condition that Defendant successfully complete a twenty-four month period of supervised probation. Defendant noted an appeal to this Court from the superior court’s judgment.
I.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in finding that Trooper Smith “knew” that Rock Springs serves alcohol. We agree.
In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court’s findings of fact “are conclusive and binding on the appellate courts when supported by competent evidence.” State v. Brooks, 337 N.C. 132, 140-41, 446 S.E.2d 579, 585 (1994).
In its order, the trial court found, in pertinent part, that:
1. On 29 February 2008, at approximately 10:59 p.m., Trooper A.B. Smith . . . was traveling north on Highway 43 in Pitt County when he received a phone call . . . [and] pulled off of Highway 43[.]
2. As Trooper Smith was ending the telephone conversation . . . he observed a burgundy Ford Explorer traveling down High[82]*82way 43 coming from the direction of the Rock Springs Equestrian Center.
3. By chance, Trooper Smith pulled back onto Highway 43 . . . behind the burgundy Ford Explorer. There were no other vehicles between [his] patrol car and the Ford Explorer.
4. Trooper Smith remained behind the Ford Explorer for approximately three-quarters of a mile, during which time [he] observed the vehicle weaving constantly and continuously within the width of the travel lane ....
5. Trooper Smith knew that there was a Ducks Unlimited Banquet being held at the Rock Springs Equestrian Center that evening, which was approximately four-tenths to five-tenths of a mile away from where he initially observed the vehicle, and Trooper Smith knew that Rock Springs Equestrian Center serves alcohol.
6. As a result of his observations, Trooper Smith activated his blue lights and emergency equipment.
The trial court’s Finding of Fact number 5 which state that Trooper Smith “knew” that Rock Springs serves alcohol is not supported by the evidence. While Trooper Smith testified that he had heard from others that alcohol was sometimes served at Rock Springs, he had never been inside the facility or personally observed alcohol being consumed there. Further, unlike an establishment which regularly serves alcohol such as a bar or restaurant, there was no basis upon which Trooper Smith could presume that alcohol was served that evening at an equestrian club. State v. Jacobs, 162 N.C. App. 251, 255, 590 S.E.2d 437, 441 (2004). As a result, the trial court’s finding that Trooper Smith “knew” that alcohol was served at Rock Springs lacks competent evidentiary support to the extent that the trial court determined that Trooper Smith had actual knowledge or reasonably could have known that alcohol consumption occurred at Rock Springs on that evening.
II.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in concluding that Trooper Smith had a reasonable, articulable suspicion for stopping her vehicle. We agree.
While a trial court’s factual findings are binding on appeal if supported by competent evidence, the conclusions of law “are binding [83]*83upon us on appeal [only] if they are supported by the trial court’s findings.” Brooks, 337 N.C. at 141, 446 S.E.2d at 585. The prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure is guaranteed. U.S. Const., amend. IV. Temporary detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the police, even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a “seizure” of a “person” within the meaning of this provision. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660, 667 (1979); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89, 95 (1996). “[Reasonable suspicion is the necessary standard for traffic stops[.]” State v. Styles, 362 N.C. 412, 415, 665 S.E.2d 438, 440 (2008). In State v. Fields,
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BEASLEY, Judge.
Megan Sue Otto (Defendant) appeals from a judgment imposing a suspended sentence based on her conviction for driving while impaired. On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress on the grounds that the arresting officer lacked the required reasonable suspicion immediately prior to the stop that she was driving while impaired. For the following reasons, we reverse.
On 29 February 2008, Trooper Ashley Brent Smith of the North Carolina Highway Patrol noticed that Defendant was weaving from the center line to the fog line. Defendant’s vehicle did not leave the roadway or cross the center line, nor did Defendant commit any additional traffic violations, but Trooper Smith activated his blue lights after following her “for approximately three-quarters of a mile.” When Trooper Smith initially observed Defendant, she was approximately one-half mile from a private club known as the Rock Springs Equestrian Club (Rock Springs) and was coming from the direction of that facility. Trooper Smith was aware that a Ducks Unlimited banquet was being held at Rock Springs that evening. Despite the fact that Trooper Smith did not know if alcohol would be served at Rock Springs that evening, he had previously heard others indicate that functions at which alcohol was served were held at Rock Springs on occasion. Trooper Smith issued Defendant a citation for driving while subject to an impairing substance.
On 2 December 2008, Defendant filed a motion to suppress any evidence obtained as a result of her initial detention on the grounds that the evidence in question had been obtained as the result of a “substantial violation” of her rights under North Carolina statutes and the state and federal constitutions. A hearing on Defendant’s motion [81]*81was conducted before Judge Charles M. Vincent in Pitt County District Court, after which Judge Vincent stated that he intended to grant Defendant’s motion. The State sought review of Judge Vincent’s decision in the Pitt County Superior Court.
On 22 May 2009, a hearing on Defendant’s suppression motion was held before the Pitt County Superior Court. On 23 August 2009, the superior court entered an order reversing Judge Vincent and remanding this case to the Pitt County District Court for further proceedings. On remand, Defendant was convicted of driving while impaired in the Pitt County District Court and appealed the resulting judgment to the Pitt County Superior Court.
On 3 December 2009, Defendant filed a motion seeking suppression of the evidence obtained as a result of her arrest which was heard on 30 September 2010. The superior court entered a written order denying Defendant’s suppression motion on 13 January 2011. After the denial of her suppression motion, Defendant entered a plea of guilty to driving while impaired while reserving her right to seek appellate review of the order denying her suppression motion. In light of Defendant’s plea, the superior court found that Defendant was subject to Level V punishment and sentenced her to sixty days imprisonment, which was suspended on the condition that Defendant successfully complete a twenty-four month period of supervised probation. Defendant noted an appeal to this Court from the superior court’s judgment.
I.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in finding that Trooper Smith “knew” that Rock Springs serves alcohol. We agree.
In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court’s findings of fact “are conclusive and binding on the appellate courts when supported by competent evidence.” State v. Brooks, 337 N.C. 132, 140-41, 446 S.E.2d 579, 585 (1994).
In its order, the trial court found, in pertinent part, that:
1. On 29 February 2008, at approximately 10:59 p.m., Trooper A.B. Smith . . . was traveling north on Highway 43 in Pitt County when he received a phone call . . . [and] pulled off of Highway 43[.]
2. As Trooper Smith was ending the telephone conversation . . . he observed a burgundy Ford Explorer traveling down High[82]*82way 43 coming from the direction of the Rock Springs Equestrian Center.
3. By chance, Trooper Smith pulled back onto Highway 43 . . . behind the burgundy Ford Explorer. There were no other vehicles between [his] patrol car and the Ford Explorer.
4. Trooper Smith remained behind the Ford Explorer for approximately three-quarters of a mile, during which time [he] observed the vehicle weaving constantly and continuously within the width of the travel lane ....
5. Trooper Smith knew that there was a Ducks Unlimited Banquet being held at the Rock Springs Equestrian Center that evening, which was approximately four-tenths to five-tenths of a mile away from where he initially observed the vehicle, and Trooper Smith knew that Rock Springs Equestrian Center serves alcohol.
6. As a result of his observations, Trooper Smith activated his blue lights and emergency equipment.
The trial court’s Finding of Fact number 5 which state that Trooper Smith “knew” that Rock Springs serves alcohol is not supported by the evidence. While Trooper Smith testified that he had heard from others that alcohol was sometimes served at Rock Springs, he had never been inside the facility or personally observed alcohol being consumed there. Further, unlike an establishment which regularly serves alcohol such as a bar or restaurant, there was no basis upon which Trooper Smith could presume that alcohol was served that evening at an equestrian club. State v. Jacobs, 162 N.C. App. 251, 255, 590 S.E.2d 437, 441 (2004). As a result, the trial court’s finding that Trooper Smith “knew” that alcohol was served at Rock Springs lacks competent evidentiary support to the extent that the trial court determined that Trooper Smith had actual knowledge or reasonably could have known that alcohol consumption occurred at Rock Springs on that evening.
II.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in concluding that Trooper Smith had a reasonable, articulable suspicion for stopping her vehicle. We agree.
While a trial court’s factual findings are binding on appeal if supported by competent evidence, the conclusions of law “are binding [83]*83upon us on appeal [only] if they are supported by the trial court’s findings.” Brooks, 337 N.C. at 141, 446 S.E.2d at 585. The prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure is guaranteed. U.S. Const., amend. IV. Temporary detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the police, even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a “seizure” of a “person” within the meaning of this provision. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660, 667 (1979); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89, 95 (1996). “[Reasonable suspicion is the necessary standard for traffic stops[.]” State v. Styles, 362 N.C. 412, 415, 665 S.E.2d 438, 440 (2008). In State v. Fields, we held that there was no reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop a vehicle where defendant was stopped at 4:00 p.m. after an officer observed him weaving in his lane. 195 N.C. App. 740, 746, 673 S.E.2d 765, 768 (2009). Without any additional circumstances giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot, stopping a vehicle for weaving is unreasonable.
[Wjeaving can contribute to a reasonable suspicion of driving while impaired. However, in each instance, the defendant’s weaving was coupled with additional specific articulable facts, which also indicated that the defendant was driving while impaired. See, e.g., State v. Aubin, 100 N.C. App. 628, 397 S.E.2d 653 (1990) (weaving within lane, plus driving only forty-five miles per hour on the interstate), appeal dismissed, disc. review denied, 328 N.C. 334, 402 S.E.2d 433 (1991); State v. Jones, 96 N.C. App. 389, 386 S.E.2d 217 (1989) (weaving towards both sides of the lane, plus driving twenty miles per hour below the speed limit), appeal dismissed, disc. review denied, 326 N.C. 366, 389 S.E.2d 809 (1990); State v. Adkerson, 90 N.C. App. 333, 368 S.E.2d 434 (1988) (weaving within lane five to six times, plus driving off the road); State v. Thompson, 154 N.C. App. 194, 571 S.E.2d 673 (2002) (weaving within lane, plus exceeding the speed limit).
Id. at 744, 673 S.E.2d at 768. When determining if reasonable suspicion exists under the totality of the circumstances, a police officer may also evaluate factors such as traveling at an unusual hour or driving in an area with drinking establishments. In Jacobs, 162 N.C. App. at 255, 590 S.E.2d at 441, the defendant was weaving within his lane and touching the designated lane markers on each side of the road. We concluded that the defendant’s weaving combined with the fact that he was driving at 1:43 a.m., which we deemed an “unusual hour,” in an area near bars was sufficient to establish a reasonable suspicion of driving while impaired. Id. Similarly, we found that the facts in [84]*84State v. Watson, 122 N.C. App. 596, 599-600, 472 S.E.2d 28, 30 (1996), established a reasonable suspicion, due to the fact that the defendant was weaving within his lane and driving on the center line of the highway at 2:30 a.m. on a road near a nightclub.
Based on the totality of the circumstances here, we find that Trooper Smith did not form a reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop Defendant; consequently the stop occurred in violation of Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. In reviewing the trial court’s pertinent findings of fact, Trooper Smith stopped Defendant after he observed her weaving within only her lane of travel at 11:00 p.m. (which is not an “unusual hour”) near a facility that he “had heard” might be serving alcohol, but had no direct knowledge of alcohol service occurring on any occasion, let alone on the evening in question. Moreover, Trooper Smith did not observe Defendant commit any traffic violations other than weaving within her own lane. We therefore conclude that Trooper Smith did not have a reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop Defendant.
Reversed.
Judge STEPHENS concurs.
Judge ERVIN dissents.