WILLIAM G. CALLOW, J.
This is a review of an unpublished per curiam decision of the court of appeals affirming a judgment of conviction for burglary entered by the circuit court for Eau Claire county, Judge William D. O’Brien. We reverse the court of appeals.
The issue presented for review is whether this case was properly submitted to the jury on the burglary charge.
The defendant, Wallace R. O’Neill, was the supervisor of police officers at the University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire, Department of Safety and Security (Department). He had been employed by the Department since 1970. On September 27, 1981, the Department received a report from several university students that stereo components and some clothing had been taken from their dormitory rooms.
On October 5, 1981, O’Neill was contacted by Allen Sanders, an Eau Claire resident, with whom O’Neill had previous contacts on campus. Sanders informed O’Neill that he believed one of his roommates, James Ward, had brought a stolen stereo into the house they shared at 720 Chippewa Street, Eau Claire. Sanders’ [302]*302description of the stereo appeared to match the equipment which the students had reported missing on September 27. Sanders told O’Neill that he wanted the stereo out of the house because he was afraid he would get into trouble if it remained on the premises. Sanders stated that he would admit O’Neill or any other officer into the house for the purpose of removing the stereo.
Sanders refused to accompany O’Neill to the district attorney’s office to sign a complaint and requested that his name not be divulged. O’Neill telephoned Eau Claire Assistant District Attorney Daniel Enright and asked him to obtain a search warrant on the basis of Sanders’ tip. Enright stated that, before a search warrant could be obtained on the basis of an anonymous tip, it would be necessary to show that the informant was reliable. O’Neill then identified Sanders as the informant. En-right stated that he did not feel a search warrant could be obtained unless Sanders would allow his name to be disclosed. Enright and O’Neill then discussed alternative ways in which a warrant could be obtained. En-right suggested that perhaps the house could be searched with consent of one of the occupants, or that if the property was in plain view, a search could be authorized.
O’Neill sent Robert Shugarts, a parttime patrolman who was a student at the university, and the students whose property had been stolen to the house at 720 Chippewa Street to see if they could identify the stereo. Scott Sieg, the student who owned the missing stereo, looked through a window of the house and saw on a dresser three stereo components which he believed to be his. Shugarts then contacted Assistant District Attorney Enright with this additional information. En-right stated that, because Sieg could not identify any distinguishing marks or serial numbers on the components, he did not believe there was probable cause to obtain a search warrant.
O’Neill then suggested that Shugarts and the students stake out the house. Sieg knocked on the door of the [303]*303house, and when James Ward answered the knock, Sieg told him he had reason to believe his stereo was in the house and he wanted to come in and look at it. He was refused entry. Shugarts and the students then continued to observe the house from their car. They saw a vehicle come and go from the house on several occasions. One of the students, who was stationed behind the house, signaled to Shugarts that he saw several people running from the house to the car. The students did not see anything being removed from the premises. Shugarts pursued the car for several minutes and then returned to the house. Sieg again looked in the window where he had previously seen the stereo, and it was gone. Shugarts radioed this information to O’Neill.
Believing that his assistance was needed, O’Neill drove to the house. O’Neill testified that he knocked on the door and it swung open. He stepped inside and called out to see if anyone was home. Receiving no response, he told the students to go in and look for their things. The students searched the house. The stereo was not found, but they located their clothing in closet drawers and in a duffel bag. The missing stereo was later returned anonymously to O’Neill’s office.
On the basis of the above activity, O’Neill was subsequently charged with burglary1 and two counts of misconduct in public office.2 At trial O’Neill testified that [304]*304he believed his actions had been authorized because Sanders had given him permission to enter the house.3 At the close of the testimony, the court submitted only the burglary charge to the jury but identified misconduct in public office as the felony which O’Neill had allegedly intended to commit when he entered the house. The jury found O’Neill guilty of burglary. The defendant’s postverdict motions were denied. A judgment of conviction was entered and O’Neill was fined $1,000.
O’Neill appealed the judgment of conviction and the order denying his postconviction motions to the court of appeals, alleging that the trial court erred in numerous evidentiary rulings, in submitting the case on the burglary charge, and in instructing the jury. The court of appeals concluded “that the trial court’s rulings and instructions were either proper or were not prejudicial to O’Neill” and affirmed the conviction. O’Neill petitioned this court for review, and we granted the petition on the issue of whether the case was properly submitted to the jury on the burglary charge and on any other issues to the extent they may relate to that issue.
The issue presented is whether a law enforcement officer may properly be charged with burglary where the underlying felony in the burglary charge does not [305]*305involve a crime against person or property. The crime of burglary consists of three essential elements: (1) an intentional entry of a dwelling; (2) without the consent of the person in lawful possession; (3) with intent to steal or commit a felony. Sec. 943.10(1), Stats.; State v. Bowden, 93 Wis. 2d 574, 582, 288 N.W. 2d 139 (1980). This was not a typical burglary case in that the state did not contend that O’Neill entered the premises at 720 Chippewa Street, Eau Claire, with the intent to steal anything. Rather, O’Neill was charged with entering the premises without consent with the intent to commit a felony. The felony was identified in the criminal complaint as misconduct in public office as proscribed by sec. 946.12 (2), Stats.
The defendant contends that the burglary charge was not appropriate and that he should have only been charged with misconduct in public office. While the third element of burglary may be satisfied by proof that the defendant intended to commit a felony, we must decide whether misconduct in public office was contemplated by the legislature when sec. 943.10(1), Stats., was enacted and, therefore, whether misconduct in public office may serve as the underlying offense in a burglary charge.
Although the present statute does not specify which felonies will satisfy the third element of burglary, an earlier version of the statute enumerated some types of felonies which could form the basis of such a charge as “murder, rape, robbery, larceny or other felony.”4
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WILLIAM G. CALLOW, J.
This is a review of an unpublished per curiam decision of the court of appeals affirming a judgment of conviction for burglary entered by the circuit court for Eau Claire county, Judge William D. O’Brien. We reverse the court of appeals.
The issue presented for review is whether this case was properly submitted to the jury on the burglary charge.
The defendant, Wallace R. O’Neill, was the supervisor of police officers at the University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire, Department of Safety and Security (Department). He had been employed by the Department since 1970. On September 27, 1981, the Department received a report from several university students that stereo components and some clothing had been taken from their dormitory rooms.
On October 5, 1981, O’Neill was contacted by Allen Sanders, an Eau Claire resident, with whom O’Neill had previous contacts on campus. Sanders informed O’Neill that he believed one of his roommates, James Ward, had brought a stolen stereo into the house they shared at 720 Chippewa Street, Eau Claire. Sanders’ [302]*302description of the stereo appeared to match the equipment which the students had reported missing on September 27. Sanders told O’Neill that he wanted the stereo out of the house because he was afraid he would get into trouble if it remained on the premises. Sanders stated that he would admit O’Neill or any other officer into the house for the purpose of removing the stereo.
Sanders refused to accompany O’Neill to the district attorney’s office to sign a complaint and requested that his name not be divulged. O’Neill telephoned Eau Claire Assistant District Attorney Daniel Enright and asked him to obtain a search warrant on the basis of Sanders’ tip. Enright stated that, before a search warrant could be obtained on the basis of an anonymous tip, it would be necessary to show that the informant was reliable. O’Neill then identified Sanders as the informant. En-right stated that he did not feel a search warrant could be obtained unless Sanders would allow his name to be disclosed. Enright and O’Neill then discussed alternative ways in which a warrant could be obtained. En-right suggested that perhaps the house could be searched with consent of one of the occupants, or that if the property was in plain view, a search could be authorized.
O’Neill sent Robert Shugarts, a parttime patrolman who was a student at the university, and the students whose property had been stolen to the house at 720 Chippewa Street to see if they could identify the stereo. Scott Sieg, the student who owned the missing stereo, looked through a window of the house and saw on a dresser three stereo components which he believed to be his. Shugarts then contacted Assistant District Attorney Enright with this additional information. En-right stated that, because Sieg could not identify any distinguishing marks or serial numbers on the components, he did not believe there was probable cause to obtain a search warrant.
O’Neill then suggested that Shugarts and the students stake out the house. Sieg knocked on the door of the [303]*303house, and when James Ward answered the knock, Sieg told him he had reason to believe his stereo was in the house and he wanted to come in and look at it. He was refused entry. Shugarts and the students then continued to observe the house from their car. They saw a vehicle come and go from the house on several occasions. One of the students, who was stationed behind the house, signaled to Shugarts that he saw several people running from the house to the car. The students did not see anything being removed from the premises. Shugarts pursued the car for several minutes and then returned to the house. Sieg again looked in the window where he had previously seen the stereo, and it was gone. Shugarts radioed this information to O’Neill.
Believing that his assistance was needed, O’Neill drove to the house. O’Neill testified that he knocked on the door and it swung open. He stepped inside and called out to see if anyone was home. Receiving no response, he told the students to go in and look for their things. The students searched the house. The stereo was not found, but they located their clothing in closet drawers and in a duffel bag. The missing stereo was later returned anonymously to O’Neill’s office.
On the basis of the above activity, O’Neill was subsequently charged with burglary1 and two counts of misconduct in public office.2 At trial O’Neill testified that [304]*304he believed his actions had been authorized because Sanders had given him permission to enter the house.3 At the close of the testimony, the court submitted only the burglary charge to the jury but identified misconduct in public office as the felony which O’Neill had allegedly intended to commit when he entered the house. The jury found O’Neill guilty of burglary. The defendant’s postverdict motions were denied. A judgment of conviction was entered and O’Neill was fined $1,000.
O’Neill appealed the judgment of conviction and the order denying his postconviction motions to the court of appeals, alleging that the trial court erred in numerous evidentiary rulings, in submitting the case on the burglary charge, and in instructing the jury. The court of appeals concluded “that the trial court’s rulings and instructions were either proper or were not prejudicial to O’Neill” and affirmed the conviction. O’Neill petitioned this court for review, and we granted the petition on the issue of whether the case was properly submitted to the jury on the burglary charge and on any other issues to the extent they may relate to that issue.
The issue presented is whether a law enforcement officer may properly be charged with burglary where the underlying felony in the burglary charge does not [305]*305involve a crime against person or property. The crime of burglary consists of three essential elements: (1) an intentional entry of a dwelling; (2) without the consent of the person in lawful possession; (3) with intent to steal or commit a felony. Sec. 943.10(1), Stats.; State v. Bowden, 93 Wis. 2d 574, 582, 288 N.W. 2d 139 (1980). This was not a typical burglary case in that the state did not contend that O’Neill entered the premises at 720 Chippewa Street, Eau Claire, with the intent to steal anything. Rather, O’Neill was charged with entering the premises without consent with the intent to commit a felony. The felony was identified in the criminal complaint as misconduct in public office as proscribed by sec. 946.12 (2), Stats.
The defendant contends that the burglary charge was not appropriate and that he should have only been charged with misconduct in public office. While the third element of burglary may be satisfied by proof that the defendant intended to commit a felony, we must decide whether misconduct in public office was contemplated by the legislature when sec. 943.10(1), Stats., was enacted and, therefore, whether misconduct in public office may serve as the underlying offense in a burglary charge.
Although the present statute does not specify which felonies will satisfy the third element of burglary, an earlier version of the statute enumerated some types of felonies which could form the basis of such a charge as “murder, rape, robbery, larceny or other felony.”4 Although that version of the statute allowed other felonies than those specified to form the basis of a burglary charge, the felonies enumerated were all crimes against persons or property. In State ex rel. Wagner v. Lee, 220 Wis. 150, 156, 264 N.W. 484 (1936), the defendant had argued that the statute contemplated only [306]*306forcible crimes. We stated that the statutory language was “broad enough to include other felonies, such as kidnapping, sodomy, or adultery,” even though force was not involved. We did not declare that all felonies were included. The other felonies which we enumerated in Lee were also crimes against persons or property. The Lee decision is the only case in which this court has considered the types of felonies which may form the basis of the third element of a burglary charge. In a more recent decision of this court where an intended felony rather than intent to steal formed the third element of a burglary charge, the felony was a crime against property.5 Courts in other states with similar statutes have likewise found that the intended felonies contemplated by the statutes are crimes against persons or property.6 The acts alleged to constitute the underlying felony charged here were not crimes against persons or property. The acts which precipitated the misconduct charge in this case were the alleged impermissible entry and search of the premises.
The availability of a charge of burglary is not necessary to deter officers from conducting overzealous entries and searches of premises. In addition to the charge of misconduct in public office, other types of discipline are available. The exclusionary rule, which makes il[307]*307legally seized evidence inadmissible in court, has been recognized as a principal means of discouraging unlawful police conduct. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968). Civil actions for damages may be brought against officers who conduct unreasonable entries or searches. Officers conducting unreasonable searches may be subject to suits brought under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 (1982). See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Terry v. Kolski, 78 Wis. 2d 475, 254 N.W.2d 704 (1977). Officers who exceed the scope of their authority may also be subject to administrative disciplinary action. If a police review board concludes that an officer exceeded his authority in conducting a search, the officer could be suspended or dismissed, subjected to a monetary penalty, or have an entry of misconduct noted in his personnel record. See A. Boker and C. Corrigan, Making the Constable Culpable: A Proposal to Improve the Exclusionary Rule, 27 Hastings L.J. 1291, 1299-1300 (1976); H. Wingo, Growing Disillusionment With the Exclusionary Rule, 25 Sw. L.J. 573, 580-81 (1971); D. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 665, 674 (1970).
We conclude that the legislature intended to include only offenses against persons and property within the felonies which could form the basis of a burglary charge when sec. 943.10(1) (a), Stats., was enacted. This conclusion is supported by previous statements of this court regarding sec. 943.10(1) (a) and also by statements of other courts interpreting similar statutes. It would be a substantial deviation from past interpretations of the burglary statutes by this court and interpretations by foreign courts of similar statutes for us to find that misconduct in public office was the type of felony which could form the basis of a burglary charge.
[308]*308We conclude that misconduct in public office is not the type of felony contemplated by sec. 943.10(1), Stats. For this reason, the burglary charge against O’Neill was improper, and we thus reverse the decision of the court of appeals which sustained the conviction. Because we decide this case on the scope of the statute, we are not obliged to review the other issues raised by the parties.
By the Court. — The decision of the court of appeals is reversed.