[Cite as State v. Odums, 2012-Ohio-1724.]
COURT OF APPEALS RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
: JUDGES: STATE OF OHIO : Patricia A. Delaney, P.J. : Sheila G. Farmer, J. Plaintiff-Appellee : Julie A. Edwards, J. : -vs- : Case No. 2011-CA-0037 : : MAURICE ODUMS : OPINION
Defendant-Appellant
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal Appeal from Richland County Court of Common Pleas Case No. 2010-CR-853D and 2004-CR- 785D
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: April 17, 2012
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
JAMES J. MAYER, JR. RYAN HOOVLER Prosecuting Attorney 13 Park Avenue, West Richland County, Ohio Suite 300 Mansfield, Ohio 44902 BY: JILL M. COCHRAN Assistant Richland County Prosecutor 38 South Park Street Mansfield, Ohio 44902 [Cite as State v. Odums, 2012-Ohio-1724.]
Edwards, J.
{¶1} Appellant, Maurice Odums, appeals a judgment of the Richland County
Common Pleas Court convicting him of three counts of felonious assault (R.C.
2903.11(A)(2)), improper handling of a firearm while in a motor vehicle (R.C.
2923.16(B)), discharging a firearm on or near prohibited premises (R.C.
2923.162(A)(3)), and failure to appear (R.C. 2937.99), as well as a firearm specification
pursuant to R.C. 2941.145 and a motor vehicle firearm specification pursuant to R.C.
2941.146. Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate term of incarceration of ten years.
Appellee is the State of Ohio.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND CASE
{¶2} During the afternoon and evening of September 7, 2004, Andre “Dray”
Huffman, Adolf “Skeet” Briggs and Ida Figures were sitting on the porch of 17 Granite
Street in Mansfield, Ohio. At some point, Dray and Skeet went to the Quik Stop
convenience store to buy pink lemonade and alcohol. While in the store, appellant
came in and began speaking in a disrespectful manner to patrons of the store. Dray
recognized appellant, but knew him by a street name of P-Bone or Red. In the
checkout line, appellant cut in front of Dray and Skeet. They became involved in a
verbal altercation.
{¶3} After Dray and Skeet checked out, they met appellant in the parking lot
and more words were exchanged. Dray stated, “It was like a face-down words
exchange.” Tr. 141. The store clerk broke up the encounter and both parties left the
store. Dray and Skeet returned to Granite Street and resumed socializing with Ida
Figures on the front porch. Richland County App. Case No. 2011-CA-0037 3
{¶4} Appellant got into a white Dodge Dynasty with Eugenia Au. They were
followed in a red car by Jamie King and Ashley Smith, friends of Eugenia. Appellant
told Eugenia in the car about an argument he got into at the Quik Stop and how he
wanted to go back and fight the guy involved. Eugenia was driving the Dynasty and
appellant was in the passenger seat. Appellant directed Eugenia to Granite Street.
{¶5} As they drove down Granite Street, Eugenia saw appellant hanging out
the window and heard shots fired. She drove away and told appellant to get out of the
car because she believed he had fired a gun from her vehicle. Jamie King saw
appellant riding in the front passenger seat of Eugenia’s vehicle, and saw a gun go out
the window and fire from the front passenger seat. Ashley Smith also saw shots come
from the white car Eugenia was driving.
{¶6} Ida Figures noticed the car coming down the street with a man riding
partially outside of the vehicle, sitting on the window “like a Dukes of Hazzard thing.” Tr.
118. She said, “What the fuck is this mother-fucker riding down the street like this,” and
then heard four or five shots fired. The three occupants of the porch dropped to the
floor upon hearing the shots. Police officers who responded to the call that night found
five shell casings in the street.
{¶7} The next day, a resident of 22 Granite Street called police to report that
when he returned home from work at approximately 1 a.m., he discovered a shot fired
into his home. Police found a bullet hole in the wall and one in the window, with drywall
dust and glass on the inside of the home.
{¶8} Appellant was initially indicted in Case No. 04-CR-0785 on October 6,
2004, with improperly discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle and improperly Richland County App. Case No. 2011-CA-0037 4
handling a firearm in a motor vehicle. He was arrested on a municipal court charge of
Underage Consumption on October 22, 2004, and served with a warrant for a bond
violation on the instant case on October 23, 2004. The State of Michigan placed a
holder on appellant.
{¶9} Jury trial was scheduled in Case No. 04-CR-0785 for January 20, 2005.
However, appellant failed to appear because he had been extradited to Michigan on
December 13, 2004. He was convicted of possession of cocaine in Michigan and
sentenced to 35 days incarceration and two years probation.
{¶10} The trial court set a new trial date for May 19, 2005, and issued a bench
warrant. On May 3, 2005, the court upgraded the bench warrant from statewide to
nationwide. Appellant was not arrested on the warrant until November 9, 2006, at
which time he was incarcerated for an unrelated felony drug offense in Case. No. 05-
CR-523, on which he ultimately was convicted and sentenced to ten months
incarceration.
{¶11} The trial court set a new trial date for February 25, 2007. After several
continuances, a period of incarceration on Case. No. 05-CR-523, and a change in
counsel for appellant, trial was ultimately scheduled for October 11, 2007. Appellant
was returned to the Richland County jail on September 19, 2007, and released on a
personal recognizance bond in order to transport him to the Crossroads program to
begin serving a term of three years community control also imposed in Case No. 05-
CR-523. He failed to appear for his October 11, 2007, trial and absconded from the
Crossroads program. A bench warrant was issued. Richland County App. Case No. 2011-CA-0037 5
{¶12} Appellant was not arrested on the bench warrant until October 7, 2010,
after a domestic violence incident in Cincinnati led to his arrest. He was returned to
Mansfield and incarcerated for failing to appear in the instant case and for a probation
violation in Case No. 05-CR-523.
{¶13} Appellant was reindicted in Case No. 10-CR-583 on three counts of
felonious assault, discharging a firearm at or into an occupied structure, discharging a
firearm on or near a prohibited premises, failure to appear and improperly handling a
firearm in a motor vehicle, with accompanying firearm specifications and motor vehicle
firearm specifications. The case proceeded to jury trial on March 24, 2011. Appellant
was acquitted of improperly discharging a firearm at or into a habitation and convicted
on all other counts and the firearm specifications. He assigns the following errors on
appeal:
{¶14} “I. DEFENDANT/APPELLANT WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL BECAUSE
OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL.
{¶15} “II. THE JURY VERDICT IN COUNT, I, II, III, V AND VII, WAS AGAINST
THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE.
{¶16} “III. THE JURY VERDICT IN COUNT I, II, III, V AND VII, WAS AGAINST
THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
{¶17} “IV. THE JURY VERDICT IN BOTH GUN SPECIFICATIONS, WAS
AGAINST THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE.
{¶18} “V. THE JURY VERDICT IN BOTH GUN SPECIFICATIONS, WAS
AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.” Richland County App. Case No. 2011-CA-0037 6
I
{¶19} In his first assignment of error, appellant argues his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to file a motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds.
{¶20} A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires a two-prong analysis.
The first inquiry is whether counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonable representation involving a substantial violation of any of defense counsel's
essential duties to appellant. The second prong is whether the appellant was prejudiced
by counsel's ineffectiveness. Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct.
2052, State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373. In determining
whether counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,
judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. Bradley at 142,
538 N.E.2d 373. Because of the difficulties inherent in determining whether effective
assistance of counsel was rendered in any given case, a strong presumption exists that
counsel's conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable, professional assistance. Id.
In order to warrant a reversal, the appellant must additionally show he was prejudiced
by counsel's ineffectiveness. “Prejudice from defective representation sufficient to justify
reversal of a conviction exists only where the result of the trial was unreliable or the
proceeding fundamentally unfair because of the performance of trial counsel.” State v.
Carter, 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 558, 1995–Ohio–104, 651 N.E.2d 965, citing Lockhart v.
Fretwell (1993), 506 U.S. 364, 113 S.Ct. 838, 842–843, 122 L.Ed.2d 180.
{¶21} An accused is guaranteed the right to a speedy trial by the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 10, Article I of the Ohio
Constitution. To determine whether an accused's right to a speedy trial has been Richland County App. Case No. 2011-CA-0037 7
violated, the United States Supreme Court has devised a balancing test that requires
courts to balance and weigh the conduct of the prosecution and that of the accused by
examining four factors: the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, whether the
accused has asserted his speedy trial rights, and any resulting prejudice to the accused.
Barker v. Wingo (1972), 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101.
{¶22} In Ohio, the right to a speedy trial has been implemented by statutes that
impose a duty on the state to bring a defendant who has not waived his rights to a
speedy trial to trial within the time specified by the particular statute. R.C. 2945.71 et
seq. applies to defendants generally. R.C. 2945.71 provides:
{¶23} “(C) A person against whom a charge of felony is pending:
{¶24} “(2) Shall be brought to trial within two hundred seventy days after the
person's arrest.”
{¶25} If a person is held in jail in lieu of bond, then each day that the suspect is
in custody counts as three days. R.C. 2945.71(E). This “triple count” provision is applied
only when the defendant is being held in jail solely on the pending charge. State v.
MacDonald (1976), 48 Ohio St.2d 66, 357 N.E.2d 40, paragraph one of the syllabus.
The day of the arrest is not counted when computing speedy trial time. State v. Jenkins,
2011–Ohio–837 at ¶ 15, Cuyahoga App. No. 95006, citing State v. Masters, 172 Ohio
App.3d 666, 2007–Ohio–4229, 876 N.E.2d 1007.
{¶26} A speedy-trial claim involves a mixed question of law and fact. State v.
Larkin, Richland App. No. 2004–CA–103, 2005–Ohio–3122. As an appellate court, we
must accept as true any facts found by the trial court and supported by competent,
credible evidence. With regard to the legal issues, however, we apply a de novo Richland County App. Case No. 2011-CA-0037 8
standard of review and thus freely review the trial court's application of the law to the
facts. Id. When reviewing the legal issues presented in a speedy-trial claim, we must
strictly construe the relevant statutes against the state. In Brecksville v. Cook, 75 Ohio
St.3d 53, 57, 1996–Ohio–171, 661 N.E.2d 706, 709, the court reiterated its prior
admonition “to strictly construe the speedy trial statutes against the state.”
{¶27} “When reviewing a speedy-trial issue, an appellate court must calculate
the number of days chargeable to either party and determine whether the appellant was
properly brought to trial within the time limits set forth in R.C. 2945.71.” State v. Riley,
162 Ohio App.3d 730, 2005–Ohio–4337, 834 N.E.2d 887, ¶ 19. The time to bring a
defendant to trial can be extended for any of the reasons enumerated in R.C. 2945.72.
{¶28} Appellant was arrested on September 10, 2004, and bonded out on
October 1, 2004. The triple count provision applies for this time, for a total of sixty-three
days elapsed. Although he was re-arrested on October 22, 2004, triple-count time does
not apply because appellant was not being held solely on the pending charge. A holder
had been placed on appellant by the state of Michigan due to a drug charge pending in
Michigan.
{¶29} Appellant was extradited to Michigan on December 13, 2004, to face
criminal charges for which he was convicted and sentenced to thirty-five days
imprisonment. Pursuant to R.C. 2945.72(A), the period within which the accused must
be brought to trial is tolled for “any period during which the accused is unavailable for
hearing or trial, by reason of other criminal proceedings against him, within or outside
the state, by reason of his confinement in another state, or by reason of the pendency of
extradition proceedings.” The period of time between October 1, 2004, and December Richland County App. Case No. 2011-CA-0037 9
13, 2004, is 73 days, bringing the total number of days that had elapsed on the speedy
trial clock as of the day of his extradition to Michigan to 136.
{¶30} Jury trial was scheduled for January 21, 2005. The trial court continued
the trial due to appellant’s unavailability for trial based on his conviction and sentence in
Michigan. Jury trial was rescheduled for May 19, 2005. On January 26, 2005, the court
issued a bench warrant for appellant’s arrest for failure to appear. After a pretrial on
May 2, 2005, the trial court upgraded the bench warrant for failure to appear from a
statewide warrant to a nationwide warrant. The docket reflects that on May 18, 2005,
the court cancelled the trial scheduled for May 19, 2005. The bench warrant was not
served on appellant until November 9, 2006.
{¶31} The Ohio Supreme Court has held that a defendant who fails to appear at
a scheduled trial, and whose trial must therefore be rescheduled for a later date, waives
his right to assert the provisions of R.C. 2945.71 through 2945.73 for that period of time
that elapses from his original arrest date until he is subsequently rearrested. State v.
Bauer (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 83, 85, 399 N.E.2d 555. Thus, the failure to appear on a
trial date causes the speedy-trial time to begin running anew from the date of the
accused’s rearrest, and is not merely tolled during that time. State v. Meyer, First Dist.
C-090802, 2011-Ohio-1357, ¶10.
{¶32} Appellant failed to appear for his January 21, 2005, trial date, and
although there is no judgment entry specifically stating that he failed to appear for the
May 2, 2005, pretrial, it appears from the fact that the court upgraded the warrant to
nationwide and cancelled the May 19, 2005, jury trial that appellant’s whereabouts were
unknown at that time. Further, the bench warrant issued in January 2005, had not been Richland County App. Case No. 2011-CA-0037 10
executed. In fact, appellant was not arrested on the bench warrant until November 9,
2006, and due to extradition proceedings was not returned to Richland County until
November 22, 2006. As cited earlier, R.C. 2945.72(A) tolls the clock while extradition
proceedings are pending. Thus the clock began to run again on November 22, 2006, at
which point the State had a new 270 days to bring appellant to trial.
{¶33} At the time appellant was returned to the Richland County jail, he was also
being held on pending drug offense charges in Case No. 05-CR-523, as well as three
municipal court cases on which he had failed to appear. Thus, he was not being held in
jail solely on the pending charge and the triple-count provision did not apply.
{¶34} From the time of appellant’s extradition on November 22, 2006, until
February 23, 2007, 93 days elapsed. On February 23, 2007, his attorney filed a motion
to withdraw as counsel. The court granted the motion and appointed new counsel on
March 14, 2007. R.C. 2945.72(E) tolls the speedy trial time for any period of delay
necessitated by a motion filed by the accused. Thus, the speedy trial time was tolled
from February 23, 2007, until March 14, 2007.
{¶35} Between March 14, 2007 and March 26, 2007, twelve days elapsed,
bringing the total number of days charged against the state to 105 days. On March 26,
2007, appellant filed a motion for a bond hearing, again tolling the clock pursuant to
R.C. 2945.72(E). The motion was ruled on by the court on April 30, 2007.
{¶36} From April 30, 2007 until July 12, 2007, 73 days elapsed, bringing the total
to 178 days. On July 12, 2007, appellant began serving a prison sentence on Case No.
05-CR-523. Richland County App. Case No. 2011-CA-0037 11
{¶37} If a defendant is incarcerated, R.C. 2941.401 governs the time within
which the state must bring him or her to trial. State v. Fowler (Sept. 4, 1987),
Tuscarawas App. No. 87AP010009, 1987 WL 16874; State v. Butcher (Dec. 12, 1985),
Cuyahoga App. No. 49879, affirmed on other grounds (1986), 27 Ohio St.3d 28, 500
N.E.2d 1368. R.C. 2941.401 provides in pertinent part:
{¶38} “When a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a
correctional institution of this state, and when during the continuance of the term of
imprisonment there is pending in this state any untried indictment, information, or
complaint against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within one hundred eighty
days after he causes to be delivered to the prosecuting attorney and the appropriate
court in which the matter is pending, written notice of the place of his imprisonment and
a request for a final disposition to be made of the matter, except that for good cause
shown in open court, with the prisoner or his counsel present, the court may grant any
necessary or reasonable continuance. The request of the prisoner shall be
accompanied by a certificate of the warden or superintendent having custody of the
prisoner, stating the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the
time served and remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time
earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the adult parole
authority relating to the prisoner.”
{¶39} Once the defendant substantially complies with R.C. 2941.401, the state
must bring him or her to trial within one hundred eighty days. Id. When a defendant is
imprisoned, the speedy-trial deadline for pending offenses is tolled unless he makes a Richland County App. Case No. 2011-CA-0037 12
written request for final disposition. Cleveland v. Adkins, 156 Ohio App.3d 482, 484,
806 N.E.2d 1007, 1008, 2004-Ohio-1118.
{¶40} Appellant did not make a demand for trial pursuant to R.C. 2941.401, and
thus the speedy trial clock was tolled at 178 days from July 12, 2007, until he was
released on September 19, 2007. Trial was set for October 11, 2007, at which point in
time only 199 of the 270 days the State had to bring appellant to trial had elapsed.
{¶41} Appellant once again failed to appear for his October 11, 2007, trial.
Appellant was serving the community control portion of his sentence on Case No. 05-
CR-523 at Crossroads, a halfway house program. He signed himself out of Crossroads
on October 11, 2007, for trial, but never appeared for trial. A bench warrant was issued
for his arrest, and he was not arrested on the warrant until October 7, 2010. Pursuant
to Bauer, supra, as of October 7, 2010, the state had a new 270 days in which to bring
appellant to trial.
{¶42} When appellant was arrested, he was held not only on the instant case,
but also on a probation violation from Case No. 05-CR-523. Therefore the days were
not triple counted, as he was not held solely on the pending charges. McDonald, supra.
He was brought to trial on March 24, 2011, 168 days after his arrest.
{¶43} Appellant has not demonstrated prejudice from counsel’s failure to file a
motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds because appellant has not demonstrated that
had such motion been filed, his charges would have been dismissed.
{¶44} The first assignment of error is overruled. Richland County App. Case No. 2011-CA-0037 13
II, III
{¶45} In his second and third assignments of error, appellant argues that his
convictions on counts I, II, III, V, and VII were against the manifest weight and
sufficiency of the evidence.
{¶46} In determining whether a verdict is against the manifest weight of the
evidence, the appellate court acts as a thirteenth juror and “in reviewing the entire
record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of
witnesses, and determines whether in resolving conflicts in evidence the jury ‘clearly
lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must
be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678
N.E.2d 541, 1997-Ohio-52, quoting State v. Martin (1983), 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175,
485 N.E.2d 717.
{¶47} An appellate court's function when reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence is to determine whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259,
574 N.E.2d 492, paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶48} In Counts I, II, and III, appellant was convicted of three counts of felonious
assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2):
{¶49} “(A) No person shall knowingly do either of the following:
{¶50} “(2) Cause or attempt to cause physical harm to another or to another's
unborn by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance.” Richland County App. Case No. 2011-CA-0037 14
{¶51} Appellant was convicted in Count V of improper handling of a firearm while
in a motor vehicle as defined by R.C. 2923.16(B):
{¶52} “(B) No person shall knowingly transport or have a loaded firearm in a
motor vehicle in such a manner that the firearm is accessible to the operator or any
passenger without leaving the vehicle.”
{¶53} In Count VII, appellant was convicted of failure to appear in violation of
R.C. 2937.99(A):
{¶54} “(A) No person shall fail to appear as required, after having been released
pursuant to section 2937.29 of the Revised Code. Whoever violates this section is guilty
of failure to appear and shall be punished as set forth in division (B) or (C) of this
section.”
{¶55} Appellant argues that as to all counts, the State did not present evidence
that he had a gun, shot a gun out of a motor vehicle or had possession of a firearm.
{¶56} Count VII, failure to appear, does not require any proof that appellant had
a firearm or used a firearm. Appellant makes no argument that the State failed to prove
this charge, and the State did in fact present evidence that appellant failed to appear for
trial after being released on a personal recognizance bond.
{¶57} As to the other counts, while none of the witnesses testified directly that
they saw appellant shoot the firearm out of the passenger window, there was testimony
that he was seated on the passenger side of the vehicle and a gun was fired from the
window on that side of the vehicle.
{¶58} Andre Huffman and Adolf Briggs testified that they were involved in a
heated verbal altercation with appellant early the day of the shooting at the Quik Stop, Richland County App. Case No. 2011-CA-0037 15
and he left in a white or tan car. Eugenia Au testified that appellant was angry when he
got into her white car and wanted to fight with the men he had argued with in the Quik
Stop. He directed her to drive to Granite Street. Huffman and Briggs were sitting on the
porch of a home on Granite Street with Ida Figures. Au did not see the gun but heard
shots fired while appellant was hanging out of her passenger side window. She made
appellant get out of the car because she believed he had fired a gun from her car.
Ashley Smith testified that appellant was in the passenger seat of Au’s vehicle, and she
saw shots fired from that side of the vehicle. Jamie King also testified that appellant
was seated in the passenger seat in Au’s vehicle, and she saw a gun come out the
passenger side window and fire. Huffman testified that he saw a man on the
passenger side of a white Dodge vehicle brandish a gun and fire four to five shots.
Figures saw a person hanging out of the window on the passenger side and fire four or
five shots. Five shell casings were found by police in the street, and a neighbor found
bullet holes in his home upon returning after work.
{¶59} The judgment is supported by sufficient evidence and is not against the
manifest weight of the evidence. The second and third assignments of error are
overruled.
IV, V
{¶60} Appellant argues that neither gun specification is supported by the
evidence and that the convictions on both gun specifications are against the manifest
weight of the evidence.
{¶61} Appellant was found guilty of two firearm specifications: Richland County App. Case No. 2011-CA-0037 16
{¶62} “(A) Imposition of a three-year mandatory prison term upon an offender
under division (B)(1)(a) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code is precluded unless the
indictment, count in the indictment, or information charging the offense specifies that the
offender had a firearm on or about the offender's person or under the offender's control
while committing the offense and displayed the firearm, brandished the firearm,
indicated that the offender possessed the firearm, or used it to facilitate the offense.”
R.C. 2941.145.
{¶63} “(A) Imposition of a mandatory five-year prison term upon an offender
under division (B)(1)(c) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code for committing a
violation of section 2923.161 of the Revised Code or for committing a felony that
includes, as an essential element, purposely or knowingly causing or attempting to
cause the death of or physical harm to another and that was committed by discharging
a firearm from a motor vehicle other than a manufactured home is precluded unless the
indictment, count in the indictment, or information charging the offender specifies that
the offender committed the offense by discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle other
than a manufactured home.” R.C. 2941.146.
{¶64} Appellant argues again that the State failed to present evidence that he
had used or fired a firearm from a motor vehicle. For the reasons stated in Assignments
II and III above, this argument is without merit.
{¶65} Appellant also argues the State failed to prove the weapon was operable.
The firing of a gun during the commission of an offense is sufficient proof that the
firearm is operable to support a conviction on a firearm offense. State v. Pondexter,
Eighth Dist. 66741, 1995 WL 92174. Richland County App. Case No. 2011-CA-0037 17
{¶66} The fourth and fifth assignments of error are overruled.
{¶67} The judgment of the Richland County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.
By: Edwards, J.
Delaney, P.J. and
Farmer, J. concur
______________________________
JUDGES
JAE/r0120 [Cite as State v. Odums, 2012-Ohio-1724.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO : : Plaintiff-Appellee : : : -vs- : JUDGMENT ENTRY : MAURICE ODUMS : : Defendant-Appellant : CASE NO. 2011-CA-0037
For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion on file, the
judgment of the Richland County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Costs assessed
to appellant.
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