319 Ga. 607 FINAL COPY
S24A0749. THE STATE v. NEWSOM.
BOGGS, Chief Justice.
A Georgia State Patrol trooper observed Christopher James
Newsom complete an illegal left turn into the right lane of Georgia
Highway 61 southbound and pulled Newsom over. The trial court
ruled that OCGA § 40-6-120 (2) (B), the statute the trooper observed
Newsom violate, is unconstitutionally vague as applied to Newsom
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, and dismissed an accusation filed
against Newsom arising out of the traffic stop. On appeal, the State
contends that OCGA § 40-6-120 (2) (B) is not unconstitutionally
vague; that the trial court erred by examining whether the traffic
stop underlying the accusation in this case was supported by
probable cause, instead of asking whether the trooper had
reasonable suspicion for the stop; and that even if the statute is
vague, the trooper made a reasonable mistake of law such that the stop was lawful.
We hold that OCGA § 40-6-120 (2) (B) as applied to Newsom
does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The statute provides clear notice to a driver making a
left turn that he must complete the turn in the far-left lane.
Furthermore, our ruling in the State’s favor makes it unnecessary
to reach other arguments that the parties make. We reverse.
The material facts are undisputed. On November 9, 2019,
Newsom was driving westbound on U.S. Highway 78. Newsom
entered the sole left-turn lane on U.S. Highway 78 as he approached
Georgia Highway 61. Georgia Highway 61 has a northbound portion
made up of two lanes traveling north and a southbound portion
consisting of two lanes traveling south. A median wider than 30 feet
separates the southbound and northbound lanes.
Newsom turned left onto Georgia Highway 61 southbound. He
completed the turn into the right lane of Georgia Highway 61
southbound. A trooper observed Newsom end the turn in the right
lane and initiated a traffic stop. The trooper later determined that
2 Newsom was driving under the influence of alcohol.
The State filed an accusation charging Newsom with DUI less
safe, DUI per se, and improper turn at an intersection. Newsom filed
a “Motion to Suppress and Motion in Limine,” in which he argued
that OCGA § 40-6-120 (2) (B) is unconstitutionally vague “for the
same reasons” that this Court invalidated a previous version of
OCGA § 40-6-120 (2) (B) in McNair v. State, 285 Ga. 514 (678 SE2d
69) (2009); he further argued that the area where he turned included
multiple “intersections” within the meaning of Title 40, so it was
unclear at which intersection he had to comply with OCGA § 40-6-
120 (2) (B), or whether he had to comply with OCGA § 40-6-120 (2)
(B) in areas where crosswalks or stop lines crossed. The motion did
not specify whether he was raising his claim under the United
States or Georgia Constitution.1 Furthermore, Newsom argued that
because OCGA § 40-6-120 (2) (B) is unconstitutionally vague, the
trooper pulled him over illegally. Newsom’s argument rested on the
1 As explained below, because Newsom makes no specific argument about the Georgia Constitution, our holding in this case is based solely on the United States Constitution. 3 assumption that if a statute is unconstitutionally vague, a traffic
stop pursuant to that vague statute would be unlawful. The State
subsequently filed an amended accusation alleging the same
charges, and the trial court held a hearing on Newsom’s motion. At
the end of the hearing, the trial court orally ordered:
I’m going to grant the motion based on it being — when you read it in conjunction with [OCGA §] 40-6-40, I don’t think a reasonable person can understand what they’re trying to do. [OCGA §] 40-6-40 says all vehicles need to be driven to the right of the center when it’s four lanes or more permitting traffic on each side including movement of traffic unless there’s a traffic control device designating certain lanes to the left of center — there’s no marking on the road and there’s nothing that shows me that that left lane is suggesting that you need to stay in the left lane. So I think it is vague and the driver doesn’t know what they’re supposed to do. So I’ll grant the motion.
The trial court implicitly treated Georgia Highway 61 as a single
roadway within the meaning of Title 40 when it noted that OCGA §
40-6-40 (c) generally prohibits driving “to the left of the center of the
roadway.” That statute, the trial court ruled, is inconsistent with
OCGA § 40-6-120 (2) (B)’s command to exit an intersection in the left
lane of traffic traveling in the same direction on the roadway onto
4 which the driver turned. Moreover, the trial court’s written order
stated, in part, “[T]his Court has determined that the traffic stop
from which this matter originated was conducted by law
enforcement without Probable Cause and thus this Court also:
orders and adjudges that this accusation and charges be forever
dismissed.” The record from the trial court hearing and the written
order that memorialized the trial court’s ruling show that the trial
court, like Newsom, assumed that a stop pursuant to an
unconstitutionally vague statute would be unlawful. Moreover, the
trial court did not clarify in its oral ruling or written order whether
it was applying the United States or Georgia Constitution. The State
appealed to the Court of Appeals. See OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (1), (4). The
Court of Appeals transferred the case here, recognizing that this
Court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over cases involving novel
constitutional challenges to statutes. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI,
Sec. VI, Par. II.
The State argues that the trial court erred in concluding that
OCGA § 40-6-120 (2) (B) is unconstitutionally vague. We agree.
5 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution “prohibits the government from taking
away someone’s life, liberty, or property under a criminal law so
vague that it fails to give ordinary people fair notice of the conduct
it punishes, or so standardless that it invites arbitrary
enforcement.” Daddario v. State, 307 Ga. 179, 188 (835 SE2d 181)
(2019) (cleaned up). “Vagueness challenges to statutes which do not
involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in the light of
the facts of the case at hand.” Smallwood v. State, 310 Ga. 445, 447
(851 SE2d 595) (2020) (cleaned up). Here, Newsom raises only an
as-applied challenge to OCGA § 40-6-120 (2) (B) under the United
States Constitution based on the statute’s alleged failure to provide
fair notice.2
2 Newsom’s arguments focus on the facts at hand here, which show that
he argues the statute is unconstitutional as applied to him. In any event, to the extent that Newsom does raise a facial challenge, such a challenge necessarily fails because his as-applied challenge fails. See Smallwood, 310 Ga. at 448 (noting that “for a court to reach a facial challenge, a challenger must be able to successfully bring an as-applied challenge”). Additionally, because Newsom does not argue that the statute is unconstitutionally vague under the Georgia Constitution, we analyze the statute under the United States Constitution only. See id. at 447 n.2 (declining to analyze void-for-
6 OCGA § 40-6-120 (2) (B) states:
The driver of a vehicle intending to turn left shall approach the turn in the extreme left-hand lane lawfully available to traffic moving in the direction of travel of the turning vehicle. Whenever practicable, the left turn shall be made to the left of the center of the intersection and so as to exit the intersection or other location in the extreme left-hand lane lawfully available to traffic moving in the same direction as the turning vehicle on the roadway being entered.
A previous version of the statute read:
The driver of a vehicle intending to turn left shall approach the turn in the extreme left-hand lane lawfully available to traffic moving in the direction of travel of such vehicle. Whenever practicable, the left turn shall be made to the left of the center of the intersection and so as to leave the intersection or other location in the extreme left-hand lane lawfully available to traffic moving in the same direction as such vehicle on the roadway being entered.
OCGA § 40-6-120 (a) (2) (effective until 2010).
vagueness argument under the Georgia Constitution where the defendant “cite[d] in passing the due process clause of the Georgia Constitution” but made “no separate argument and cite[d] no cases regarding the Georgia Constitution”). See also Rockdale County v. U.S. Enterprises, 312 Ga. 752, 761 n.10 (865 SE2d 135) (2021). Finally, Newsom makes no argument about arbitrary enforcement, so we do not consider that aspect of the vagueness analysis. Compare Smallwood, 310 Ga. at 446-450 (addressing fair-warning and arbitrary-and-discriminatory-enforcement where the defendant raised arguments as to each).
7 In 2010, among other changes not relevant here, the General
Assembly amended the former statute to use the word “exit” instead
of “leave.” See Ga. L. 2010, p. 256, § 1.
OCGA § 40-6-120 (2) (B) is not unconstitutionally vague as
applied to Newsom, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In McNair, 285 Ga. at 515-517, we held that the
previous version of the statute was unconstitutionally vague
because a driver making a left turn would not know in which lane
he should “leave” an intersection. See id. (concluding that OCGA §
40-6-120 (a) (2) (effective until 2010) was “too vague to be enforced
against . . . a driver of a vehicle making a left turn into a multi-lane
roadway that lacks official traffic-control devices directing the driver
into which lane to turn”). McNair reasoned that the previous version
failed to provide clear notice based on the interplay between the
word “leave” and the rest of the statutory language. See id. When
the word “leave” was read together with the rest of the statute, the
previous version could have two, diametrically opposed meanings.
See id. See also OCGA § 40-6-120 (a) (2) (effective until 2010)
8 (providing that “the left turn shall be made to the left of the center
of the intersection and so as to leave the intersection or other
location in the extreme left-hand lane lawfully available to traffic
moving in the same direction as such vehicle on the roadway being
entered” (emphasis supplied)). The former statute could have
required a driver to “move into the right lane and leave the extreme
left-hand lane available to other vehicles so they can travel
unencumbered by the turning vehicle’s presence,” or it could have
commanded a driver to do the opposite: “to exit, i.e., leave, the
intersection or other location while the turning vehicle then
proceeds to travel in the extreme left-hand lane lawfully available
to traffic moving in the same direction.” McNair, 285 Ga. at 515-517.
In short, McNair concluded that the use of the word “leave” and its
interaction with the other statutory language gave two conflicting
directions to drivers. See id.
By contrast, the current version of the statute is not so vague
that it violates due process. The current version of the statute
eliminates the first possible meaning that McNair identified,
9 because the current version cannot be interpreted to mean that a
driver making a left turn must permit the left lane to remain open.
Compare OCGA § 40-6-120 (a) (2) (effective until 2010). Moreover,
Newsom does not point to any other contradictory meaning that the
current version could have; indeed, in his brief he specifies that “the
relevant current statutory provision remains void for vagueness for
the same reasons analyzed in McNair.”
The current version of the statute has been amended to
substitute “exit” for “leave.” See Ga. L. 2010, p. 256, § 1. That change
is material because that portion of the current version no longer
suffers from multiple possible meanings. Contemporaneous
dictionaries consistently define “exit” as meaning to depart from a
place. See, e.g., The American Heritage Dictionary of the English
Language (5th ed. 2011) (“[t]o make one’s exit; depart”); New Oxford
American Dictionary (3d ed. 2010) (“go out of or leave a place”); The
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4th ed.
2000) (“[t]o make one’s exit; depart”). See also Conyers v. State, 260
Ga. 506, 506 (397 SE2d 423) (1990) (consulting dictionary definition
10 to decide whether the statute at issue defined “the criminal offense
with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand
what conduct is prohibited” (cleaned up)). OCGA § 40-6-120 (2) (B)’s
statutory text provided clear direction to Newsom here. First, he had
to complete his turn in a lane that moved traffic in the same
direction he was driving. See OCGA § 40-6-120 (2) (B) (requiring a
driver to turn consistently with “traffic moving in the same direction
as the turning vehicle on the roadway being entered”). Plainly, he
was not permitted to drive into oncoming traffic. See id.
Furthermore, Georgia Highway 61 southbound has two lanes going
south, so OCGA § 40-6-120 (2) (B)’s text required Newsom to “exit
the intersection” — that is, complete his turn and travel away from
the place where Georgia Highway 61 southbound and U.S. Highway
78 meet — in the left lane of Georgia Highway 61 southbound. Id.
He could not use the right lane. See id. Unlike the previous version
of the statute, nothing about the current statutory language
suggests that a driver should occupy the right lane when completing
a turn. Compare OCGA § 40-6-120 (a) (2) (effective until 2010).
11 Additionally, this clear direction is consistent with OCGA § 40-
6-120 (2) (C) when read in context. See Payne v. State, 275 Ga. 181,
183-184 (563 SE2d 844) (2002) (reading a statute in context when
considering a vagueness challenge); Steele v. State, 260 Ga. 835, 836
(400 SE2d 1) (1991) (“conclud[ing] that the statute, when read in its
entirety,” was not unconstitutionally vague); Bilbrey v. State, 254
Ga. 629, 631 (331 SE2d 551) (1985) (“While [the statute at issue]
standing alone does not meet the constitutional certainty
requirements, we find the statute furnishes sufficient criteria when
read in conjunction with” another statute in the same title.). OCGA
§ 40-6-120 (2) (C), which immediately follows OCGA § 40-6-120 (2)
(B), requires a driver making a left turn at an intersection with
multiple left turn lanes to
exit the intersection in the same relative travel lane as the vehicle entered the intersection. If the vehicle is in the second extreme left-hand lane entering the intersection, the vehicle shall exit the intersection in the second extreme left-hand lane. Where there are multiple lanes of travel in the same direction safe for travel, a vehicle shall not be permitted to make a lane change once the intersection has been entered.
12 OCGA § 40-6-120 (2) (C). Both OCGA § 40-6-120 (2) (B) and (C)
require a driver making a left turn to start and end that turn in the
left lane.
Finally, tools of statutory interpretation that we commonly use
further support our conclusion. When interpreting statutes, we
presume that the General Assembly “enact[s] statutes with full
knowledge of existing law, including court decisions.” McIver v.
State, 314 Ga. 109, 120 (875 SE2d 810) (2022) (cleaned up).
Similarly, “it is a core principle of statutory interpretation that
changes in statutory language generally indicate an intent to change
the meaning of the statute.” Id. (cleaned up). One of the possible
meanings that McNair attributed to the former statute was that it
“requir[ed] the driver making the left turn to exit, i.e., leave, the
intersection or other location while the turning vehicle then
proceeds to travel in the extreme left-hand lane lawfully available
to traffic moving in the same direction.” 285 Ga. at 517 (emphasis
supplied). In the 2010 amendment, the General Assembly used the
same word, “exit.” See Ga. L. 2010, p. 256, § 1. Such a textual change
13 signals an intent to change the statute’s meaning. See McIver, 314
Ga. at 120. And the change is material because the portion of the
statute at issue here no longer has the multiple, contradictory
meanings to which McNair pointed: only the single, clear meaning
that we identified above.
In summary, the language of OCGA § 40-6-120 (2) (B) provided
clear notice to Newsom that he was required to complete his turn in
the left lane of Georgia Highway 61 southbound. See OCGA § 40-6-
120 (2) (B). That clear notice is consistent with other portions of the
statute when read in context, see OCGA § 40-6-120 (2) (C), and
confirmed by ordinary tools of statutory interpretation. See McIver,
314 Ga. at 120. Accordingly, OCGA § 40-6-120 (2) (B) as applied to
Newsom is not void for vagueness under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Nonetheless, the trial court determined that OCGA § 40-6-120
(2) (B) is unconstitutionally vague when read in conjunction with
OCGA § 40-6-40 (c), reasoning that the statutes provide conflicting
directions to a driver. Pretermitting whether the conflict the trial
14 court believed existed between OCGA §§ 40-6-120 (2) (B) and 40-6-
40 (c) could render OCGA § 40-6-120 (2) (B) unconstitutionally
vague, we conclude that the trial court erred in determining that
there was a conflict. OCGA § 40-6-40 (c) provides:
Upon any roadway having four or more lanes for moving traffic and providing for two-way movement of traffic, no vehicle shall be driven to the left of the center of the roadway except when authorized by official traffic- control devices designating certain lanes to the left of the center of the roadway for use by traffic not otherwise permitted to use such lanes or except as permitted under paragraph (2) of subsection (a) of this Code section. However, this subsection shall not be construed as prohibiting the crossing of the center of the roadway in making a left turn into or from an alley, private road, or driveway.
As explained above, the trial court implicitly ruled that
Georgia Highway 61 should be considered a single roadway when it
stated:
[OCGA §] 40-6-40 says all vehicles need to be driven to the right of the center when it’s four lanes or more permitting traffic on each side including movement of traffic unless there’s a traffic control device designating certain lanes to the left of center. . . . So I think it is vague and the driver doesn’t know what they’re supposed to do.
However, as the State correctly points out, because Georgia
15 Highway 61 is a type of highway, not a single roadway, OCGA § 40-
6-40 (c) does not apply here. A “[r]oadway” refers to “that portion of
a highway improved, designed, or ordinarily used for vehicular
travel, exclusive of the berm or shoulder. In the event a highway
includes two or more separate roadways, the term ‘roadway’ shall
refer to any such roadway separately, but not to all such roadways
collectively.” OCGA § 40-1-1 (53) (2019) (emphasis supplied). By
contrast, a “[h]ighway” is “the entire width between the boundary
lines of every way publicly maintained when any part thereof is open
to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel.” OCGA § 40-
1-1 (19) (2019).3 For example, both the northbound and southbound
lanes of Georgia Highway 61 form one highway. As these definitions
make clear, that highway has two roadways: the lanes going north
form one roadway, and the lanes going south make up another. See
OCGA § 40-1-1 (53) (2019). More specifically, Georgia Highway 61
3 If the statutes at issue have been amended since Newsom’s alleged offenses, we cite the versions in effect at the time. See Widner v. State, 280 Ga. 675, 677 (631 SE2d 675) (2006) (“A crime is to be construed and punished according to the provisions of the law existing at the time of its commission.” (cleaned up)). 16 as it existed at the time of the stop in question here was a “[d]ivided
highway,” consisting of two roadways, because it was “a highway
divided into two or more roadways by leaving an intervening space
or by a physical barrier or by a clearly indicated dividing section so
constructed as to impede vehicular traffic.” OCGA § 40-1-1 (13)
(2019). See also OCGA § 40-1-1 (53) (2019).
Other provisions of Title 40 confirm that one highway can have
multiple roadways. See, e.g., OCGA § 40-1-1 (22) (B) (2019) (“Where
a highway includes two roadways 30 feet or more apart, then every
crossing of each roadway of such divided highway by an intersecting
highway shall be regarded as a separate intersection.”); OCGA § 40-
6-50 (b) (requiring vehicles on a divided highway to be “driven only
upon the right-hand roadway” and prohibiting vehicles from being
“driven over, across, or within any dividing space, barrier, gore,
paved shoulder, or section separating the roadways of a divided
highway”); OCGA § 40-6-163 (b) (2019) (“The driver of a vehicle upon
a highway with separate roadways that are separated by a grass
median, unpaved area, or physical barrier need not stop upon
17 meeting or passing a school bus which is on the separate
roadway[.]”); OCGA § 40-6-203 (a) (1) (J) (prohibiting stopping,
standing, or parking a vehicle “[i]n the area between roadways of a
divided highway”). In short, contrary to the trial court’s treatment
of Georgia Highway 61 as a single roadway, OCGA § 40-6-40 (c) does
not apply to Georgia Highway 61 as a whole. See OCGA § 40-1-1 (53)
(2019). Nor does it apply to Georgia Highway 61’s individual
roadways. OCGA § 40-6-40 (c) applies only to a “roadway having four
or more lanes for moving traffic and providing for two-way
movement of traffic.” However, each of Highway 61’s roadways
consists of two lanes that move traffic in the same direction. Because
OCGA § 40-6-40 (c) does not apply here, the trial court erred in
concluding that it could render OCGA § 40-6-120 (2) (B)
unconstitutionally vague as applied to Newsom.
Newsom further argues that OCGA § 40-6-120 (2) (B) is
unconstitutionally vague when read in context with the definition of
“intersection” in Title 40. See OCGA § 40-1-1 (22) (B) (2019).
According to Newsom, the area where he turned has multiple
18 intersections, so it is not clear at which intersection OCGA § 40-6-
120 (2) (B) governed his conduct, or whether OCGA § 40-6-120 (2)
(B) controlled his actions in areas where crosswalks and stop lines
crossed each other.
The trial court did not rule on this argument below because it
concluded that OCGA § 40-6-120 (2) (B) is unconstitutionally vague
when read in conjunction with OCGA § 40-6-40 (c). Because we reject
that conclusion now, we leave it for the trial court to address this
argument in the first instance on remand.4
4 The trial court also concluded that “the traffic stop from which this
matter originated was conducted by law enforcement without Probable Cause” and used this probable-cause conclusion as a means to effectuate its vagueness ruling. Specifically, the trial court concluded that, because in its estimation OCGA § 40-6-120 (2) (B) was unconstitutionally vague, the officer necessarily lacked probable cause to stop Newsom pursuant to the statute: STATE: I was also asking on the record if her ruling today would suppress the probable cause for the stop, which would deal with the sole reason of the stop — the improper left-hand turn. TRIAL COURT: Yes. DEFENSE COUNSEL: Thank you. TRIAL COURT: I mean, that was the sole reason for the stop; right? STATE: Right, Your Honor. We have already concluded that the statute is not unconstitutionally vague and that the trial court erred in suppressing the evidence or otherwise dismissing the charges on that basis. Because any argument Newsom made below with respect to a lack of reasonable suspicion to justify a traffic stop was
19 Judgment reversed and case remanded. All the Justices concur.
inextricably linked to his contention that the statute was unconstitutionally vague and because the trial court offered no independent reason in support of its conclusion that the stop was unconstitutional, that aspect of the trial court’s ruling necessarily falls along with its vagueness conclusion. And in any event, had there been an independent legal challenge to the standard the officer used in stopping Newsom after his turn, the correct legal standard would have been reasonable suspicion, not probable cause. See Jones v. State, 291 Ga. 35, 38 (727 SE2d 456) (2012). See also Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. 376, 380 (140 SCt 1183, 206 LE2d 412) (2020); Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 60 (135 SCt 530, 190 LE2d 475) (2014); Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 396 (134 SCt 1683, 188 LE2d 680) (2014). Because probable cause is a more stringent standard than reasonable suspicion, probable cause can justify a traffic stop. But unlike the trial court’s suggestion, probable cause is not required. See Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 365-366 (135 SCt 1609, 191 LE2d 492) (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Moreover, citing Heien, 574 U.S. at 60, the State argues that even if OCGA § 40-6-120 (2) (B) is unconstitutionally vague, the trooper made a reasonable mistake of law in believing that Newsom violated the statute. Based on our holding reversing the trial court’s ruling against the State and because the State may have waived this argument by failing to raise it below, we do not reach this issue. 20 Decided August 13, 2024.
OCGA § 40-6-120 (2) (B); constitutional question. Carroll State
Court. Before Judge Tisinger.
Rebecca L. Jackson, Solicitor-General, Robert L. Hunnicutt,
Assistant Solicitor-General; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General,
Beth A. Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Clint C. Malcolm, Meghan
H. Hill, Senior Assistant Attorneys General, for appellant.
The Pilgrim Law Group, Jerry M. C. Pilgrim, for appellee.