State v. Nerswick

2025 Ohio 1802

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: May 21, 2025
• Docket: C-240304
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Nerswick, 2025-Ohio-1802.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-240304 TRIAL NO. C/23/CRB/7383 Plaintiff-Appellee, :

vs. : JUDGMENT ENTRY NICK NERSWICK, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

This cause was heard upon the appeal, the record, and the briefs. For the reasons set forth in the Opinion filed this date, the judgment of the trial court is vacated, and the cause is remanded. Further, the court holds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal, allows no penalty, and orders that costs be taxed under App.R. 24. The court further orders that (1) a copy of this Judgment with a copy of the Opinion attached constitutes the mandate, and (2) the mandate be sent to the trial court for execution under App.R. 27.

To the clerk: Enter upon the journal of the court on 5/21/2025 per order of the court.

By:_______________________ Administrative Judge [Cite as State v. Nerswick, 2025-Ohio-1802.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-240304 TRIAL NO. C/23/CRB/7383 Plaintiff-Appellee, :

vs. : OPINION NICK NERSWICK, :

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Municipal Court

Judgment Appealed From Is: Vacated and Cause Remanded

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: May 21, 2025

Connie Pillich, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Judith Anton Lapp, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,

Bryan R. Perkins, for Defendant-Appellant. [Cite as State v. Nerswick, 2025-Ohio-1802.]

CROUSE, Judge.

{¶1} In this case, defendant-appellant Nick Nerswick, a.k.a. Shaykh-Esa An-

Nierzwicki-Ar-Rabbani (“Appellant”),1 contends that his conviction for domestic

violence was invalid, because the officer who filed the complaints against him did not

do so under oath. The State concedes that Appellant is correct, and we agree. Because

no complaint was made under oath in compliance with Crim.R. 3(A), the trial court

was without jurisdiction to hear the case. We therefore vacate Appellant’s conviction

and order the complaints dismissed.

I. BACKGROUND

{¶2} On May 7, 2023, two criminal complaints, along with a supporting

affidavit, were filed against Appellant in the Hamilton County Municipal Court. The

complaints charged Appellant with domestic violence against and the assault of his

estranged (now former) wife, in violation of R.C. 2919.25 and 2903.13. All three

documents were signed by a single complainant/affiant, Delhi Police Officer Chett

Williams. All three bore the signature and seal of Delhi Police Officer Goddard2 on the

line reserved for a “Notary Public/Deputy Clerk,” indicating that Officer Williams had

“[s]worn to and subscribed” the documents in Officer Goddard’s presence.

{¶3} After a bench trial, the municipal court found Appellant guilty of both

offenses and merged the assault charge into the domestic-violence charge. The court

sentenced Appellant to 180 days’ incarceration, crediting him for the 24 days he had

already served and suspending the remainder of the sentence. The court also placed

1 Appellant was charged as “Nick Nerswick,” but he made clear, both in his brief and before the trial

court, that he wished to be referred to as Shaykh-Esa An-Nierzwicki-Ar-Rabbani. To eliminate any confusion, we refer to him simply as “Appellant.” 2 Although Officer Goddard’s signatures on the documents are not legible, we can be certain they

came from Officer Goddard’s hand based on footage from Officer Williams’s body-worn camera, as we explain later in this opinion. Several of the illegible signatures on the notary/clerk/judge lines appeared next to “#59.” OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

Appellant on two years’ probation. Appellant timely appealed.

II. FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: CRIM.R. 3(A)

{¶4} In his first assignment of error, Appellant asserts that the trial court

“lacked subject matter jurisdiction over these charges.” Specifically, he argues that

“the complaints and affidavits were not properly notarized under oath as required by

Crim.R. 3(A) and as needed to invoke the jurisdiction of the municipal court.” The

State concedes this error in its brief. While the State’s confession of error does not bind

this court, we may nevertheless “accept the concession as part of our analysis,” so long

as it has a sound basis in law and fact. See State v. Hermes, 2023-Ohio-2011, ¶ 26 (6th

Dist.); see also Young v. United States, 315 U.S. 257, 258 (1942). In this case, the

State’s confession of error is well-founded.

{¶5} While the State may prosecute felonies only by indictment or

information, the Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure allow the prosecution of

misdemeanors “by complaint . . . in courts inferior to the court of common pleas.”

Crim.R. 7(A). Filing a criminal complaint is an act of jurisdictional significance. “The

filing of a complaint invokes the jurisdiction of the municipal court,” and if a

“complaint is not filed in a case, the trial court has not obtained jurisdiction over it.”

Zanesville v. Rouse, 2010-Ohio-2218, ¶ 5, vacated in part on other grounds,

2010-Ohio-3754; accord State v. Bess, 2012-Ohio-3333, ¶ 8 (1st Dist.). A criminal

complaint must (1) include “a written statement of the essential facts constituting the

offense charged,” (2) cite “the numerical designation of the applicable statute,” and (3)

“be made upon oath before any person authorized by law to administer oaths.” Crim.R.

3(A); accord Bess at ¶ 6.

{¶6} This case turns on the last requirement—that the complaint be made

“upon oath.” If a court determines that a criminal complaint was not made under a

4 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

proper oath, then it “must find the complaint defective and dismiss the case for lack of

jurisdiction.” State v. W.T.D., 2021-Ohio-873, ¶ 14 (2d Dist.).

{¶7} As is the case with affidavits and other sworn documents, courts

generally accept a criminal complaint as duly sworn if it was signed by an official

authorized to administer the oath. See State v. Davies, 2013-Ohio-436, ¶ 25 (11th

Dist.). A notary’s signature and seal are evidence to prove that a complainant swore to

the truth of their complaint. See id. at ¶ 24 (“[A] jurat is merely a certificate which is

intended to establish that the oath was duly administered by a duly authorized

individual.”); Stern v. Bd. of Elections, 14 Ohio St.2d 175, 181 (1968) (jurat bearing

notary’s signature and seal is “prima facie evidence of the fact that the affidavit was

properly made before such notary”). But even when a complaint is not notarized, it

may still comply with Crim.R. 3 if it is evident that the complaint was “made upon

oath” by someone “authorized by law to administer oaths.” See State v. Taylor,

2015-Ohio-819, ¶ 10-12 (12th Dist.) (“While the complaint . . . was not notarized, it was

nonetheless signed by the deputy clerk of the Hamilton Municipal Court, who was

authorized to administer the oath required by Crim.R. 3.”). The text of Crim.R. 3(A) is

concerned with the oath itself, not merely the manner of its verification.

{¶8} In this case, the complaints and affidavit bore Officer Goddard’s

signature and seal, by which Officer Goddard attested that the documents had been

“[s]worn to and subscribed” by Officer Williams in his presence. Officer Goddard’s

seal, which took the form of a round ink stamp, bore the words, “PEACE OFFICER,”

in the middle, and the words, “AUTHORIZED TO ADMINISTER OATHS PURSUANT

TO O.R.C. 2935.081,” along its circumference. The Revised Code section cited by the

seal empowers certain peace officers, after training and designation, to “administer

oaths and acknowledge criminal and juvenile court complaints, summonses,

5 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

affidavits, and returns of court orders in matters related to the peace officer’s official

duties.” R.C. 2935.081(B).

{¶9} Standing alone, Goddard’s signature and seal would likely be enough to

show that Officer Williams made his complaints under oath and signed the documents

in Officer Goddard’s presence. But Appellant points us to Officer Williams’s body-

worn-camera video from the night Officer Williams responded to the home of

Appellant’s ex-wife, which was admitted into evidence at trial, to rebut this

presumption.

{¶10} In the video, a Delhi police officer, identified as Goddard by the name

on his uniform,3 can be seen at the window of Officer Williams’s cruiser. Officer

Goddard is signing and stamping what he describes to Officer Williams as an assault

complaint and affidavit, which he has brought with him from his own vehicle. Officer

Goddard explains to Officer Williams, “What I’m doing is I’m going to notarize these.

Then you’ll just need to sign them. Then you can just go straight down from here to

the jail.” Officer Williams then pulls out a third form—a visibly blank domestic-

violence complaint—which he hands to Officer Goddard for his stamp and signature.

Officer Goddard obliges before handing it back to Williams with the whole stack of

papers and cautioning him that the forms “still need to be filled out.” Officer Williams’s

camera shows that the domestic-violence complaint atop the stack remains blank,

apart from Officer Goddard’s signature, seal, and date. Officer Williams places the

stack on his vehicle’s dashboard without signing them. Shortly thereafter, Officer

Goddard departs.

{¶11} The body-worn-camera footage does not show Officer Williams taking

3 The trial transcript also refers to an Officer Goddard who was at the scene that night but did not

testify at trial.

6 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

any oath or signing any of the documents. Thus, contrary to Officer Goddard’s

attestations by signature and seal, the complaints and affidavit were neither “[s]worn

to” nor “subscribed” at the time Officer Goddard put pen to paper. Officer Goddard’s

attestations to that effect were therefore false, and his signature on those documents

a nullity. A notary public could have his commission revoked for such actions. See

R.C. 147.141(A)(8) (“A notary public shall not . . . [a]ffix the notary’s signature to a

blank form of an affidavit or certificate of acknowledgment and deliver that form to

another person with the intent that it be used as an affidavit or acknowledgment

. . . .”); see also former R.C. 147.14 (providing that, at the time these complaints were

filed, any notary who “certif[ied] to the affidavit of a person without administering the

appropriate oath or affirmation to the person . . . shall be removed from office by the

secretary of state”). An attorney, too, would risk serious reprimand for notarizing an

affidavit to be signed and completed outside their presence. See, e.g., Dayton Bar

Assn. v. Brown, 2009-Ohio-6424, ¶ 10-14, 23 (imposing sanctions on attorney in part

for signing and mailing affidavits for a client to sign outside his presence); Cincinnati

Bar Assn. v. Thompson, 2011-Ohio-3095, ¶ 3-5 (upholding consent-to-discipline

agreement for attorney who stipulated to notarizing documents to be signed outside

his presence).

{¶12} Oaths are not vain formalities. They “‘lay[] hold of the conscience of the

witness, and appeal[] to his sense of accountability,’” in the hope of “‘best insur[ing]

the utterance of truth.’” State v. Ballou, 21 Ohio App.2d 59, 61 (1st Dist. 1969), quoting

Clinton v. State, 33 Ohio St. 27, 33 (1877). Oaths carry legal, as well as moral heft, as

they threaten to “expose [the declarant] to the penalty of a prosecution for perjury if

he testifies falsely and corruptly.” (Cleaned up.) State ex rel. Ross v. King, 70 Ohio

Law Abs. 554, 556 (C.P. 1955). The administration of oaths is thus a matter “of

7 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

substance, not form,” and constitutes “an essential component of . . . legal

proceedings.” See State v. Tye, 2001 WI 124, ¶ 19.

{¶13} We are therefore troubled by the casual disregard the officers in the

video showed for the duties that come with the power to administer oaths under Ohio

law, and for the safeguards and formalities of the legal process. By disregarding the

requirements of the law, these officers invalidated the complaints they filed on behalf

of the victim, deprived the municipal court of jurisdiction, and secured the dismissal

of Appellant’s domestic-violence conviction.

{¶14} Given the “public trust reposed in [the State’s] law enforcement officers”

to see that justice be properly done, the State was right to confess this error. See Young,

315 U.S. at 258. We accept that confession and sustain Appellant’s first assignment of

error.

III. CONCLUSION

{¶15} For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the judgment of conviction and

remand the cause to the municipal court with instructions to dismiss the complaints

against Appellant for lack of jurisdiction. See R.C. 2501.02(C) (courts of appeals “shall

have jurisdiction upon an appeal . . . to review, affirm, modify, set aside, or reverse

judgments or final orders” (Emphasis added.)). Because this disposition renders

Appellant’s other assignments of error moot, we do not address them.

Judgment accordingly.

KINSLEY, P.J., and NESTOR, J., concur.