Amestoy, C.J.
In these consolidated appeals from convictions for driving while intoxicated and negligent operation of a motor vehicle, with fatality resulting, defendant challenges the imposition of a condition of probation that prohibits him from operating a motor vehicle during the probationary period. Specifically, defendant contends the court was without authority to restrict his operating privileges for a period in excess of the mandatory one-year license suspension imposed by statute. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm.
The material facts are not in dispute. The case arose when the motor vehicle which defendant was driving collided head-on with another vehicle, killing the driver and two passengers in the other car, and injuring a third passenger. Defendant and his passenger were also seriously injured. Defendant v/as nineteen years old, and his blood alcohol concentration at the time of the accident was later determined to be .236%, nearly three times the legal limit.
Defendant entered guilty pleas to one count of driving while intoxicated with fatality resulting, and one count of careless and negligent operation of a motor vehicle with fatality resulting. The trial court imposed a sentence of three-to-thirty years, all but three suspended, and imposed multiple conditions of probation, including that defendant seek and obtain employment or participate in vocational training, submit to alcohol testing and attend alcohol counseling, refrain from purchasing or possessing alcoholic beverages, limit his associates and observe a curfew if ordered by his probation officer, make at least nine presentations per year to local high schools and middle schools, and refrain from operating a motor vehicle.
[127]*127Defendant subsequently moved for reconsideration of sentence on the ground, among others, that the court lacked authority to restrict defendant’s driving for longer than the mandatory one-year suspension period under 28 V.S.A. § 1206(b). The court denied the motion. Defendant filed notices of appeal from the original sentencing order and from the denial of his motion for reconsideration, which we consolidated for purposes of review.
The record reveals that the restriction on defendant’s operating privileges was an important component in the overall matrix of probation conditions imposed by the court; it would sharply limit defendant’s ability to obtain alcohol for himself or others, impede his opportunities to leave the jurisdiction and thereby avoid compliance with his other conditions of probation, and provide a vivid and ongoing testimonial to the high school students whom he was required to address on the consequences of drunk driving.
Defendant nevertheless contends that the condition contravened the statutory DUI scheme and violated the constitutional separation of powers doctrine. See Vt. Const. ch. II, § 5. It is argued that by providing for a mandatory one-year suspension of a driver’s license for DUI with a fatality resulting, and vesting the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles with the exclusisve authority to calculate suspensions and revocations in accordance with applicable law, see 23 V.S.A. § 1201c, the Legislature impliedly preempted the court’s probationary power to limit defendant’s operating privileges for longer periods. On the contrary, virtually nothing in the statutory scheme, the language, or the legislative history of 23 V.S.A. § 1201c demonstrates a legislative intent to constrain the court’s traditional authority to impose reasonable probationary conditions in this area. Indeed, as explained more fully below, the probation condition in this case was entirely consistent with the legislative scheme, the Vermont Constitution, prior case law, and the court’s traditional sentencing discretion.
This and other courts have long held that the “separation of powers doctrine does not contemplate an absolute division of authority among the three branches such that each branch is hermetically sealed from the others.” In re D.L., 164 Vt. 223, 228, 669 A.2d 1172, 1176 (1995); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (Constitution “enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity”). The practical demands of governance necessarily require “a certain amount of overlapping or blending of the powers.” [128]*128D.L., 164 Vt. at 229, 669 A.2d at 1176. Accordingly, we apply a relatively forgiving standard to separation-of-power claims, tolerant of such overlapping institutional arrangements short of one branch virtually “usurp[ing]” from another its constitutionally defined function. Id.; see also Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977) (proper inquiry focuses on extent to which challenged action prevents coordinate branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions).
Criminal sentencing is a quintessential example of shared responsibility among the separate branches of government. The legislature prescribes the penalty and the manner of its enforcement; the courts impose sentence within the limits prescribed by the legislature; and the executive grants paroles and pardons. See State v. Borrell, 482 N.W.2d 883, 889 (Wis. 1992) (discussing shared governmental responsibility in sentencing). Within this tripartite system, however, the imposition of sentence and the exercise of sentencing discretion have long been recognized as “fundamentally and inherently judicial functions.” People v. Navarro, 497 P.2d 481, 487 (Cal. 1972). A trial court’s decision, in particular, to suspend a criminal sentence and impose conditions of probation under 28 V.S.A. § 252 represents an essential tool in the court’s ability to shape a criminal sentence to the rehabilitative needs of the individual defendant. See State v. Hale, 137 Vt. 162, 164, 400 A.2d 996, 998 (1979) (purpose of probation is rehabilitative, to provide opportunity for defendant to voluntarily condition his or her behavior to requirements of law).
Indeed, from as early as 1898, trial courts in Vermont have enjoyed broad statutory authority to suspend all or part of a criminal sentence and place the defendant on probation with such terms and conditions “as the court in its discretion deems reasonably necessary to ensure that the offender will lead a law-abiding life or to assist him to do so.” 28 V.S.A. § 252(a); see also 1898, No. 128, § 2 (trial court may impose probation “for such time and upon such conditions as it may prescribe”); State v. Barnett, 110 Vt. 221, 231, 3 A.2d 521, 525 (1939) (courts traditionally “allowed wide discretion” in imposing conditions of probation). While not without limitation, a trial court’s discretion in this context is expansive, and will generally be upheld if the probation condition is reasonably related to the crime for which the defendant was convicted. See State v. Whitchurch, 155 Vt. 134, 137, 577 A.2d 690, 691-92 (1990); see also State v. Emery, 156 Vt.
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Amestoy, C.J.
In these consolidated appeals from convictions for driving while intoxicated and negligent operation of a motor vehicle, with fatality resulting, defendant challenges the imposition of a condition of probation that prohibits him from operating a motor vehicle during the probationary period. Specifically, defendant contends the court was without authority to restrict his operating privileges for a period in excess of the mandatory one-year license suspension imposed by statute. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm.
The material facts are not in dispute. The case arose when the motor vehicle which defendant was driving collided head-on with another vehicle, killing the driver and two passengers in the other car, and injuring a third passenger. Defendant and his passenger were also seriously injured. Defendant v/as nineteen years old, and his blood alcohol concentration at the time of the accident was later determined to be .236%, nearly three times the legal limit.
Defendant entered guilty pleas to one count of driving while intoxicated with fatality resulting, and one count of careless and negligent operation of a motor vehicle with fatality resulting. The trial court imposed a sentence of three-to-thirty years, all but three suspended, and imposed multiple conditions of probation, including that defendant seek and obtain employment or participate in vocational training, submit to alcohol testing and attend alcohol counseling, refrain from purchasing or possessing alcoholic beverages, limit his associates and observe a curfew if ordered by his probation officer, make at least nine presentations per year to local high schools and middle schools, and refrain from operating a motor vehicle.
[127]*127Defendant subsequently moved for reconsideration of sentence on the ground, among others, that the court lacked authority to restrict defendant’s driving for longer than the mandatory one-year suspension period under 28 V.S.A. § 1206(b). The court denied the motion. Defendant filed notices of appeal from the original sentencing order and from the denial of his motion for reconsideration, which we consolidated for purposes of review.
The record reveals that the restriction on defendant’s operating privileges was an important component in the overall matrix of probation conditions imposed by the court; it would sharply limit defendant’s ability to obtain alcohol for himself or others, impede his opportunities to leave the jurisdiction and thereby avoid compliance with his other conditions of probation, and provide a vivid and ongoing testimonial to the high school students whom he was required to address on the consequences of drunk driving.
Defendant nevertheless contends that the condition contravened the statutory DUI scheme and violated the constitutional separation of powers doctrine. See Vt. Const. ch. II, § 5. It is argued that by providing for a mandatory one-year suspension of a driver’s license for DUI with a fatality resulting, and vesting the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles with the exclusisve authority to calculate suspensions and revocations in accordance with applicable law, see 23 V.S.A. § 1201c, the Legislature impliedly preempted the court’s probationary power to limit defendant’s operating privileges for longer periods. On the contrary, virtually nothing in the statutory scheme, the language, or the legislative history of 23 V.S.A. § 1201c demonstrates a legislative intent to constrain the court’s traditional authority to impose reasonable probationary conditions in this area. Indeed, as explained more fully below, the probation condition in this case was entirely consistent with the legislative scheme, the Vermont Constitution, prior case law, and the court’s traditional sentencing discretion.
This and other courts have long held that the “separation of powers doctrine does not contemplate an absolute division of authority among the three branches such that each branch is hermetically sealed from the others.” In re D.L., 164 Vt. 223, 228, 669 A.2d 1172, 1176 (1995); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (Constitution “enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity”). The practical demands of governance necessarily require “a certain amount of overlapping or blending of the powers.” [128]*128D.L., 164 Vt. at 229, 669 A.2d at 1176. Accordingly, we apply a relatively forgiving standard to separation-of-power claims, tolerant of such overlapping institutional arrangements short of one branch virtually “usurp[ing]” from another its constitutionally defined function. Id.; see also Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977) (proper inquiry focuses on extent to which challenged action prevents coordinate branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions).
Criminal sentencing is a quintessential example of shared responsibility among the separate branches of government. The legislature prescribes the penalty and the manner of its enforcement; the courts impose sentence within the limits prescribed by the legislature; and the executive grants paroles and pardons. See State v. Borrell, 482 N.W.2d 883, 889 (Wis. 1992) (discussing shared governmental responsibility in sentencing). Within this tripartite system, however, the imposition of sentence and the exercise of sentencing discretion have long been recognized as “fundamentally and inherently judicial functions.” People v. Navarro, 497 P.2d 481, 487 (Cal. 1972). A trial court’s decision, in particular, to suspend a criminal sentence and impose conditions of probation under 28 V.S.A. § 252 represents an essential tool in the court’s ability to shape a criminal sentence to the rehabilitative needs of the individual defendant. See State v. Hale, 137 Vt. 162, 164, 400 A.2d 996, 998 (1979) (purpose of probation is rehabilitative, to provide opportunity for defendant to voluntarily condition his or her behavior to requirements of law).
Indeed, from as early as 1898, trial courts in Vermont have enjoyed broad statutory authority to suspend all or part of a criminal sentence and place the defendant on probation with such terms and conditions “as the court in its discretion deems reasonably necessary to ensure that the offender will lead a law-abiding life or to assist him to do so.” 28 V.S.A. § 252(a); see also 1898, No. 128, § 2 (trial court may impose probation “for such time and upon such conditions as it may prescribe”); State v. Barnett, 110 Vt. 221, 231, 3 A.2d 521, 525 (1939) (courts traditionally “allowed wide discretion” in imposing conditions of probation). While not without limitation, a trial court’s discretion in this context is expansive, and will generally be upheld if the probation condition is reasonably related to the crime for which the defendant was convicted. See State v. Whitchurch, 155 Vt. 134, 137, 577 A.2d 690, 691-92 (1990); see also State v. Emery, 156 Vt. 364, [129]*129369, 593 A.2d 77, 79-80 (1991) (probation condition valid so long as it has reasonable nexus with rehabilitation of defendant and protection of public).
Recognizing the importance of probation to a trial court’s performance of its traditional judicial responsibility in sentencing, and the tolerance with which courts have traditionally viewed overlapping spheres of authority, this Court should not lightly infer a legislative intent to strip the trial courts of such power. When it has chosen to do so, the Legislature has made clear its intent to limit a court’s probationary authority. It has, for example, expressly required the imposition of specific probation conditions in certain circumstances, see, e.g., 13 V.S.A. § 7043 (restitution to crime victims who have suffered material loss or incurred medical expenses), and has explicitly prohibited the imposition of probation in others. See id. § 11a (court may not place on probation or suspend sentence of any person sentenced as violent career criminal). It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that if the Legislature had actually intended to eliminate a trial court’s discretion to prohibit a defendant from driving as a condition of probation for grave vehicular offenses, it would have plainly said so.
Indeed, other courts have recognized that the judicial authority to establish a probationary condition restricting a defendant’s operation of a motor vehicle should not be usurped by mere implication. See City of Detroit v. Del Rio, 157 N.W.2d 324, 326 (Mich. Ct. App. 1968) (rejecting contention that revocation and suspension statutes impliedly “preempted” court’s power to restrict operation of motor vehicle as condition of probation); People v. Dickens, 373 N.W.2d 241, 245 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (relying on City of Detroit to uphold condition of probation preventing defendant from driving for five years notwithstanding two-year statutory maximum for license revocation or suspension); Brock v. State, 299 S.E.2d 71, 72 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that Department of Public Safety’s authority to suspend or revoke driving licenses did not “purport to deprive a court ... of the authority to suspend a driver’s license as a condition of probation”); In re A.H.S., 479 S.E.2d 157, 158-59 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (relying on Brock to uphold trial court’s probation condition limiting right to operate motor vehicle beyond statutory suspension period). But cf. Sheppard v. State, 685 A.2d 1176, 1177 (Md. 1996); City of Independence v. Tector, 688 N.E.2d 276, 278 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996).
Nevertheless, defendant argues — and the dissent asserts — that the Legislature has impliedly preempted the court’s authority to [130]*130impose reasonable restrictions upon his operation of a motor vehicle. The argument relies principally on 23 V.S.A. § 1201c, which provides that the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles has exclusive authority to calculate, “in accordance with applicable statutes and rules, the duration of suspensions, [and] whether and when revocations, suspensions and reinstatements shall occur.” Nothing in the statute, however, expressly or impliedly limits a court’s authority to restrict a defendant’s operation of a motor vehicle as a condition of probation. The commissioner’s stated responsibilities are largely administrative; the statutes prescribe the length of suspensions and the conditions of reinstatement, and charge the commissioner with implementing the statutory terms. See 23 V.S.A. § 1 (commissioner shall carry out statutes of motor vehicle title); id. § 1206 (upon conviction of person for driving under the influence, court shall forward conviction report to commissioner, who shall suspend license for 90 days); id. § 2506 (suspension for negligent operation -with fatality occurring shall be for period of one year).
Section 1201c merely vests the commissioner with'exclusive authority to suspend and revoke licenses pursuant to the legislative mandate. It does not implicate a trial court’s broad and independent power under 28 V.S.A. § 252 to prohibit a defendant from driving as a condition of probation. The critical distinction between a commissioner’s administrative authority to suspend or revoke a license, and a trial court’s probationary power to prohibit a defendant from operating a motor vehicle, is not a new one. See Commonwealth v. Kline, 340 A.2d 562, 563 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975) (distinguishing trial court’s invalid order that defendant surrender his license, from court’s inherent authority “to proscribe the operation of a motor vehicle ... as a condition of probation for a length of time not exceeding the period of probation”) (Van der Voort, J., concurring). The probation condition imposed by the trial court here did not require defendant to surrender his driver’s license. Nor did it prohibit defendant from obtaining a driver’s license once the mandatory one-year license suspension required by statute expired. Moreover, nothing in the court’s probationary order precludes defendant from petitioning the court to modify the conditions of probation to allow restricted operation of a motor vehicle (e.g., to travel to and from employment), or to strike the condition in its entirety. See 28 V.S.A. § 253(a).
Finally, nothing in the underlying purposes of the suspension and revocation statutes necessarily conflict with the probation condition in [131]*131this case. Indeed, as this case clearly demonstrates, a condition of probation that limits a defendant’s opportunity to operate a motor vehicle may serve entirely different functions from the statutes that provide for the suspension or revocation of an operating license. The latter serve to punish the defendant, deter others, and protect the public safety. Probation, as noted, is designed primarily for individual rehabilitation. Thus, a lengthy period of probation during which a youthful DUI defendant’s operation of a motor vehicle is prohibited or restricted can serve to assist the defendant in adjusting from a period when recidicism is likely, to a time when the defendant more fully understands and recognizes the gravity of driving a vehicle while intoxicated. See City of Detroit, 157 N.W.2d at 326 (probation condition prohibiting or limiting operation of motor vehicle “may. . . be a useful device in imposing controls upon a particular offender”). The conditions of probation fashioned by the court here were designed to assist defendant in avoiding further DUI-related problems, complying with his other probation conditions, and ultimately “leading] a law-abiding life.” 28 V.S.A. § 252(a). These are hardly, as the dissent would have it, “artificial” distinctions.
The dissent argues that the legislative history of 23 V.S.A. § 1201c reveals that it was prompted in part by a judicial reluctance to administer the full range of available penalties, and that allowing judges to impose conditions of probation affecting driving privileges would defeat the legislative purpose of enforcing consistency and uniformity in DUI license suspensions. As noted, however, nothing that occurred in this case undermines the legislatively mandated one-year suspension of defendant’s license, or the commissioner’s authority to suspend defendant’s license in accordance with the legislative directive. Moreover, nothing in the legislative history reveals any intent to curtail a trial court’s probationary authority. Had the Legislature actually been concerned about confusion or inconsistency caused by judicial “interference” with the DMV through the imposition of probation conditions, presumably the Legislature would have altered or limited the courts’ broad statutory authority to impose reasonable conditions of probation. We decline to read such an intent into a statute which is otherwise silent on the subject.
As for the dissent’s expressed concern with administrative efficiency, we perceive no reason why courts which routinely inform the commissioner of civil suspensions and criminal convictions for purposes of license suspension and revocation may not similarly inform [132]*132the commissioner of driving restrictions resulting from probation. Nor do we perceive the relevance of the dissent’s concern that defendant will find little “solace” in purchasing a worthless driver’s license at the expiration of the one-year license suspension period. Perhaps, as the trial court here intended, it will serve as a sober reminder of defendant’s ongoing probationary conditions.
We are not persuaded, in sum, that the Legislature’s statutory authorization to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles to suspend or revoke a defendant’s driver’s license was intended to prevent a court from imposing a probationary condition proscribing the operation of a motor vehicle when the condition is, in the court’s considered judgment, reasonably necessary to assist an offender in leading a law-abiding life. Accordingly, the judgment must be affirmed.
Affirmed.