State v. . Nelson

156 S.E. 154, 200 N.C. 69, 1930 N.C. LEXIS 29

• Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
• Decided: December 19, 1930
• Status: Published

Opinion

BeogdbN, J.

Tbe paramount question of law presented by the record is whether the cross-examination of character witnesses for defendant was within the law.

The court instructed the jury in two instances that the type of cross-examination pursued was competent only to discredit or impeach the witness himself. In other instances no instruction whatever was given. Cross-examination of a witness is not a matter of privilege or grace, but a matter of right, and is one of the most effective means known to the law for the ascertainment of truth and for testing the soundness or fallacy of the declarations of a witness. Hence for this reason cross-examination must of necessity cover a wide range, and consequently trial courts are justified in permitting wide latitude in subjecting witnesses to proper legal tests.

The decisions of this State have recognized and approved various methods of impeaching witnesses — notably (1) by proof of bad character; (2) proof of materially inconsistent and contradictory statements; (3) by disproving statements made in court by testimony of other witnesses; (4) by cross-examination tending to show (a) that the witness had been convicted of a crime although evidence of mere accusation of crime is incompetent; (b) bias or fallacy; (c) animus, feeling, kinship or mental capacity; (d) lack of veracity or memory. S. v. O'Neale, 26 N. C., 88; S. v. Efler, 85 N. C., 585; Bank v. Pack, 178 N. C., 388, 100 S. E., 615; Rutledge v. Mfg. Co., 183 N. C., 430, 111 S. E., 774; S. v. Jeffreys, 192 N. C., 318, 135 S. E., 32; Milling Co. v. Highway Commission, 190 N. C., 692, 130 S. E., 724; Nichols v. Bradshaw, 195 N. C., 763, 143 S. E., 469; S. v. Maslin, 195 N. C., 537, 143 S. E., 3; Clay v. Connor, 198 N. C., 200; S. v. Beal, 199 N. C., 278.

The primary purpose of impeachment is to reduce or discount the credibility of a witness for the purpose of inducing the jury to give less weight to his testimony in arriving at the ultimate facts in the case. It has been generally held that a character witness may be cross-examined with respect to the extent of his knowledge and acquaintance with the person in whose behalf he testifies or with regard to the sources of information upon which he bases his estimate of character. S. v. Perkins, 66 N. C., 126; S. v. Austin, 108 N. C., 780, 13 S. E., 219; S. v. Killian, 173 N. C., 792, 92 S. E., 499.

Applying the rules of law to the facts, it is clear that the questions propounded to the witness on cross-examination were not intended to disparage the witness, but rather to put before the jury the opinion of the witness upon the charges against the defendant laid in the indictment. In other words, the effect of the cross-examination is to ask the witness, “Would you have done what the defendant is charged in the bill of indictment for doing, or do you approve what the defendant is charged with doing?” In effect this is requiring the witness to express an opinion upon the merits or demerits of the charge laid against the defendant. Indirectly these questions tended to elicit the opinion of witness that the defendant would be a man of bad character if he had done the things alleged against him.

We find no law broad enough and liberal enough to sustain the cross-examination complained of in this case, and the defendant is entitled to a

New trial.