HOLSTEIN, Judge.
Following an automobile accident on June 3, 1995, Ronald Lee Neff (defendant) was charged with four counts of the class C felony of assault in the second degree, section ShS.OeO.RJ).1 The information alleged that defendant, while under the influence of alcohol, caused physical injury to four people, by pulling into an intersection when another vehicle was approaching so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard, and that he did so with criminal negligence. A jury convicted him of all four counts, and he was sentenced to six months in the county jail and assessed a $1,000 fine on each count.
On this appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in not granting his motion for a mistrial when the prosecutor, while objecting to the closing argument by defendant’s attorney, referred to defendant’s failure to testify. Under the circumstances of this case, we affirm.
Defendant based his contention on the following exchange, which occurred during the state’s closing argument:
[Defendant’s attorney Jack Yocum]: Now, you can make him out a real bad criminal, with no evidence of any criminal activity ever before in his life. None whatever. Or your can—
[Prosecutor]: Judge, I’ll object to that. There is no evidence of that. And you—
[Defendant’s attorney Jack Yocum]: No, there isn’t. That’s why I’m arguing it.
[Prosecutor]: Well, he didn’t take the stand, Judge. I mean, there was no
evidence—
[Defendant’s attorney Jack Yocum]: Wait a minute.
[Prosecutor]: There is no evidence of that.
[Defendant’s attorney Jack Yocum]: Okay. Let’s get a mistrial.
(At this time counsel approached the bench, and the following proceedings were had:)
[343]*343[Defendant’s attorney Jack Yocum]: We’d move for a mistrial, Judge. We’d like to make a record on that right now.
[The Court]: Okay.
[Defendant’s attorney Robert Yocum]: Go ahead and
[Defendant’s attorney Jack Yocum]: Yeah. I’d like to move for a mistrial because the Prosecuting Attorney has just said the Defendant did not take the witness stand, and that’s an improper inference. And we’d move for a mistrial immediately, Judge.
[Prosecutor]: I’m not making any inference, Judge. He just said he didn’t have a criminal record. That’s not — That’s not even true. We would have brought that in at the time—
[Defendant’s attorney .Jack Yocum]: Mistrial—
[The Court]: I understand that.
[Prosecutor]: So what I’m saying is, Judge, it’s—
[Defendant’s attorney Robert Yocum]: That’s irrelevant here what the— We do—
[Defendant’s attorney Jack Yocum]: We—
[Defendant’s attorney Robert Yocum]: We’re entitled to a mistrial. He just turned over to the jury again. The jury can—
[Defendant’s attorney Jack Yocum]: He just said— It was all so the jury can hear that.
[Prosecutor]: They are not entitled to a mistrial on these points.
[Defendant’s attorney Jack Yocum]: Yes, we are. (Inaudible) mistrial.
[Defendant’s attorney Robert Yocum]: Yes, we are. We’re— That’s absolutely true.
[Prosecutor]: Well, I know you’re going to say that. You’re going to say whatever you need to say.
[Defendant’s attorney Jack Yocum]: You bet we are. We’re going to tell the truth at this trial.
[The Court]: You— Okay.
[Prosecutor]: Mistrial at the—
[Defendant’s attorney Robert Yocum]: I move for mistrial, Judge.
[The Court]: Well—
[Prosecutor]: I did not comment on what he said or what he did.
[Defendant’s attorney Jack Yocum]: Yes, you did.
[Defendant’s attorney Robert Yocum]: You just now—
[Defendant’s attorney Jack Yocum]: You just did.
[Defendant’s attorney Robert Yocum]:— Loud enough for the jury to hear.
[The Court]: Okay. Gentlemen, based on what I observed and what I heard, I don’t believe that a mistrial is the appropriate remedy at this time. Your request for a mistrial will be overruled.
[Defendant’s attorney Robert Yocum]: We move the Court to admonish to— the jury disregard the Prosecutor’s statement.
[Defendant’s attorney Jack Yocum]: Entirely.
[Defendant’s attorney Robert Yocum]: Entirely.
[Prosecutor]: Well, and would then the Court admonish the defense not to talk about evidence that is nonexistent and not to—
[Defendant’s attorney Jack Yocum]: We’re not talking about evidence—
[Prosecutor]:— and not to personalize to the jury as he has been doing. I haven’t objected to it, yet.
[The Court]: Well, that— That’s your job. But, gentlemen— Mr. Prosecutor, stay with me. I think it’s improper to talk about the record or an absence of a record at this point in the trial based on what occurred during the trial. So I would admonish both sides not to talk about Defendant and possible record— criminal record.
[Prosecutor]: Judge, are you—
[Defendant’s attorney Robert Yocum]: Are you going to admonish the jury to disregard the statements of the Prosecutor, Judge?
[The Court]: Oh, yeah.
[344]*344[Defendant’s attorney Jack Yocum]: We didn’t take the witness stand.
[The Court]: Yeah. I’m not going to mention the words—
[Defendant’s attorney Jack Yocum]: Oh.
[The Court]:— because I don’t want to bring attention to it.
[Defendant’s attorney Jack Yocum]: Okay.
[Defendant’s attorney Robert Yocum]: All right.
[The Court]: Okay.
[Defendant’s attorney Robert Yocum]: Would you admonish that I— You have overruled the motion that I (inaudible).
(Proceedings returned to open court.)
[The Court]: Okay. The Court will admonish the jury that the last remark made by the Prosecutor will be disregarded by the jury.
(At this time counsel approached the bench, and the following proceedings were had: )
[Defendant’s attorney Robert Yocum]:
And next is a motion for mistrial.
[The Court]: Yeah. Well—
[Defendant’s attorney Robert Yocum]: I moved for a mistrial. That’s— I’m obligated to make the record.
[The Court]: Oh, sure. And the Court will deny your request.
[Defendant’s attorney Robert Yocum]: Very well.
[The Court]: Okay.
On this appeal, defendant contends that the prosecutor’s remark “he didn’t take the stand” was an improper reference to his failure to testify in his own defense. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, article I, section 19 of the Missouri Constitution, section 546.270 and Rule 27.05(a) all grant criminal defendants the right not to testify and forbid comments by others on the exercise of that right. State v. Arnold, 628 S.W.2d 665, 668 (Mo.1982). A direct reference to an accused’s failure to testify is made when the prosecutor uses words such as “defendant,” “accused” and “testify” or their equivalent. State v. Lawhorn, 762 S.W.2d 820, 826 (Mo. banc 1988). An indirect reference is one reasonably apt to direct the jury’s attention to the defendant’s failure to testify. Id. Where an objection is made and overruled, a direct reference to the failure of the defendant to testify will almost invariably require reversal of the conviction, but an indirect reference requires reversal only if there is a calculated intent to magnify that decision so as to call it to the jury’s attention. Id.
Section 546.270 was first enacted in 1877. 1877 Mo. Laws 356.2 Its primary purpose was to negate the common law rule that a defendant could not testify in his own defense. See State v. Chyo Chiagk, 92 Mo. 395, 4 S.W. 704, 707-08 (1887). It also preserved the pre-existing constitutional prohibition against commenting on a defendant’s exercise of his right to remain silent.
By its terms, this statute does not mandate a mistrial in every ease where there is a reference, direct or otherwise, to a defendant’s failure to testify. Neither'has this Court held that a direct reference always requires a mistrial. For example, it is hard to imagine a more direct reference to the defendant’s failure to testify than for the trial court to give a jury an instruction on the subject. Yet, this Court has held, on more than one occasion, that the trial court did not err in instructing the jury not to consider the fact that the defendant had not testified even when the defendant objected to such an instruction. State v. Smart, 485 S.W.2d 90, 95 (Mo.1972); State v. DeWitt, 186 Mo. 61, 84 S.W. 956, 957 (1905); see also State v. Hutchinson, 458 S.W.2d 553, 556-59 (Mo. banc 1970) (Donnelly, concurring).3 In current practice, the defendant alone may make the decision to give such an instruction. Rule 27.05(b); see also MAI-CR 308.14(3d). No sound historical argument, rooted in the statute or the precedent of this Court, supports [345]*345the sweeping claim that regardless of the circumstances, a direct reference to the defendant’s failure to testify mandates a mistrial.
Similarly, several cases have held that, although a direct reference was made to a defendant’s failure to testify, in the absence of a timely objection, the error would not be considered. State v. Kempker, 824 S.W.2d 909, 911 (Mo. banc 1992); State v. Dees, 916 S.W.2d 287, 296 (Mo.App.1995); State v. Dewey, 869 S.W.2d 834, 838 (Mo.App.1994). These eases point out that the reason for the timely objection requirement is clear, “[h]ad objection been made, the trial judge could have taken appropriate steps to make correction.” Kempker, 824 S.W.2d at 911 (Mo. banc 1992). “[T]he prejudice from such comments can normally be cured by an instruction to the jury.” Dees, 916 S.W.2d at 296. If the prejudice were not immediately correctable short of mistrial, the requirement of a timely objection would be illogical.
When considering a defendant’s claim of an improper comment on his right to remain silent, the appellate court must also consider the comment in the context in which it appears. State v. Wickline, 647 S.W.2d 929, 931 (Mo.App.1983). “The prejudicial impact of such a statement is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court and a prompt instruction by the trial court to the jury to disregard the comment may cure any error in a particular case.” Id.; see also Hutchinson, 458 S.W.2d at 556 (Mo. banc 1970); State v. Tiedt, 360 Mo. 594, 229 S.W.2d 582, 588 (1950). Judicial discretion is deemed abused only when a trial court’s ruling is clearly against the logic of the circumstances then before it and is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock the sense of justice and indicate a lack of careful consideration. State ex rel. Webster v. Lehndorff Geneva, Inc., 744 S.W.2d 801, 804 (Mo. banc 1988).
In the present case, the trial court took prompt and appropriate remedial action to protect defendant. It, in effect, granted defendant’s objection by instructing the jury “the last remark made by the Prosecutor will be disregarded”. We hold, according to the prevailing rule in Missouri, that the trial court’s grant of defendant’s objection and its admonition to the jury sufficiently cured any harm the prosecutor’s remarks may have inflicted upon defendant.
Defendant relies primarily upon two decisions of the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, in support of his contention that the declaration of a mistrial was the only remedy available to the trial court. See State v. Bulloch, 785 S.W.2d 753, 755 (Mo.App.1990) (citing State v. Chunn, 657 S.W.2d 292, 294 (Mo.App.1983)). Chunn relies, in turn, upon State v. Shuls, 329 Mo. 245, 44 S.W.2d 94, 96 (1931), for its statement that an admonition such as the one given in the present case is “not a sufficient remedy for the harm that resulted from the direct reference to defendant’s failure to testify.” 657 S.W.2d at 294. However, Shuls simply does not stand for the proposition Chunn claims it does. In Shuls, the prosecutor made two improper references to the defendant’s failure to testify. 44 S.W.2d at 96. Defendant timely objected to both. Id. The trial court overruled the first objection. Id. As for the second, a more direct reference to the defendant’s failure to testify, the trial court sustained the objection and directed the jury to disregard the prosecutor’s remarks. Id. This Court concluded:
If the latter occurrence were all that defendant had to complain of we should be inclined to hold that it was not reversible in view of the court’s ruling and the fact that defendant himself had called the jury’s attention to the fact that he had not testified by requesting the instruction... But the court on that occasion promptly sustained defendant’s objection when counsel for the state started to comment, told the jury to disregard the attorney’s remarks, and in effect reprimanded him. Thus so far as that episode is concerned we think there was no reversible error.
44 S.W.2d at 96-97. Shuls continued on to hold that the first comment, defendant’s objection to which was overruled by the trial court, mandated reversal. 44 S.W.2d at 97. Shuls, therefore, does not stand for the proposition that prompt and timely remedial action, short of a mistrial, taken by a trial court [346]*346in response to an improper comment on an accused’s failure to testify is insufficient. Indeed, it suggests the opposite is true.4 This Court refuses to follow the extreme rale invented in Chunn that an isolated direct reference to a defendant’s failure to testify mandates reversal regardless of corrective action taken by the trial court. Moz’eover, to sustain Chunn would be inconsistent with the more recent precedent of this Court, Kemp-ker, and its progeny. Therefore, to the extent they conflict with this opinion, Chunn and Bulloch are overruled.
There are, of course, cases in which the prosecutor’s remarks are so egregious or the trial court’s admonition so ineffective that this Court has held only a new trial is sufficient to remedy them. In State v. Snyder, the prosecutor made repeated references to the defendant’s failure to testify despite the trial court’s admonitions. 182 Mo. 462, 82 S.W. 12, 31 (1904). Moreover, the trial court pointed out the defendant’s failure and quoted from the statute in the course of its admonition, thereby “aceentuatfing] the allusion.” 82 S.W. at 32. Therefore, reversal for a new trial was required. Id. In another case, the prosecutor made repeated, direct statements that neither defendant nor his wife had testified and continued down the same course of argument despite the trial court’s grant of defendant’s objection. State v. Watson, 1 S.W.2d 837, 840-41 (Mo.1927). Watson pointed out that “a record may present a state of facts and circumstances permitting the court to say that an allusion to the failure of defendant or his or her spouse to testify was not prejudicial error,” but the peculiar facts of the case at bar warranted reversal. 1 S.W.2d at 840.
Notwithstanding these few egregious cases, most cases are consistent with the general rule acknowledging the power of the trial court to cure error with proper instruction and generally reversing only in cases of an overruled objection. See, e.g., State v. Carter, 847 S.W.2d 941, 946 (Mo.App.1993); State v. Cheek, 760 S.W.2d 162, 164 (Mo.App.1988). In a recent case, this Court noted “[t]he trial judge acted within its authority in judging the effect of the argument on the jury and the adequacy of the corrective measures taken” after an objection to an improper argument had been made and sustained and the jury instructed to disregard it. State v. Williams, 673 S.W.2d 32, 35 (Mo. banc 1984); see also State v. Rothaus, 530 S.W.2d 235, 237-38 (Mo. banc 1975) (distinguishing Lindner)-, State v. Sechrest, 485 S.W.2d 96, 99 (Mo.1972) (distinguishing Snyder). Kempker noted that a trial court, faced with a direct comment on a defendant’s failure to testify, could nevertheless “consider the state of the evidence and the apparent effect on the jury and... conclude that it would be sufficient to sustain the objection and then caution the jury”. 824 S.W.2d at 911. It is demeaning to our jury system to assume that Missouri jurors are universally too ignorant or biased to follow the trial court’s direction to disregard an isolated comment made during an objection. Moreover, it is absurd to conclude that Missouri trial judges have suf[347]*347ficient discretion to determine an appropriate response to improper comments except in this one instance in which our trial bench is uniformly incompetent to exercise its otherwise sound judgment and must order a mistrial. In the present case, the prosecutor’s comment is isolated, not directed at the jury, and not obviously intended to poison the minds of the jurors against the defendant. Lawhorn, 762 S.W.2d at 826. In fact, the prosecutor’s mistake may have been invited by defendant’s preceding improper argument. See United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 31-33, 108 S.Ct. 864, 99 L.Ed.2d 23 (1988) (defense can open the door to permissible comment on a defendant’s failure to testify). Thus, no sound reason exists to apply a special rule of mandatory new trial rather than defer to the trial court’s discretion to take immediate corrective action.
This Court does not take lightly defendant’s claims nor do we mean to endorse the prosecutor’s comments. Obviously, if an objection to a prosecutor’s direct reference is made and overruled, a new trial will be ordered on appeal. However, we must defer to the trial court’s discretion where the objection is sustained and immediate remedial action taken. It is important to remember that declaring a mistrial is a drastic remedy not to be lightly granted, and we cannot say the trial court acted capriciously or without careful consideration in deciding to address the disputed remarks as it did. We hold that an abuse of discretion in denying the mistrial has not been demonstrated under the circumstances of this case. The judgment is affirmed.
BENTON, C.J., PRICE, LIMBAUGH, COVINGTON and WOLFF, JJ., concur.
WHITE, J., dissents in separate opinion filed.