State v. Neal
This text of 2015 Ohio 3666 (State v. Neal) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
[Cite as State v. Neal, 2015-Ohio-3666.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LUCAS COUNTY
State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. L-13-1157
Appellee Trial Court No. CR0200902368
v.
Rochelle Neal DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellant Decided: September 10, 2015
*****
Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and David F. Cooper, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
J. Peter Millon and Sarah K. Skow, for appellant.
JENSEN, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Rochelle Neal, appeals from a judgment of the Lucas County
Court of Common Pleas that denied his petition for postconviction relief. Finding that
the petition was properly denied, we affirm the judgment of the Lucas County Court of
Common Pleas. {¶ 2} On May 29, 2007, in case No. CR0200702127, appellant was indicted by the
Lucas County Grand Jury on one count of felonious assault, in violation of R.C.
2903.11(A)(1), a felony of the second degree. On September 25, 2007, appellant entered
a plea of guilty pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27
L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), to the lesser included offense of attempted felonious assault, in
violation of R.C. 2923.02(A) and 2903.11(A)(1), a felony of the third degree. Appellant
was sentenced to two years in prison.
{¶ 3} On January 11, 2009, the victim died. Three months later, in case No.
CR0200900731, appellant was indicted by the grand jury on one count of murder, in
violation of R.C. 2903.02(B) and 2929.02.
{¶ 4} On July 15, 2009, the Lucas County prosecutor filed an information
charging appellant with involuntary manslaughter, a violation of R.C. 2903.04(A), a
felony of the first degree. The following day, appellant entered an Alford plea to that
charge. Appellant was sentenced to nine years in prison, to be served concurrently with
the two-year prison sentence imposed in case No. CR0200702127. A nolle prosequi was
entered on the murder charge in case No. CR0200900731.
{¶ 5} On May 23, 2013, appellant pro se, moved to vacate the involuntary
manslaughter conviction pursuant to the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in State v.
Carpenter, 68 Ohio St.3d 59, 623 N.E.2d 66 (1993). The trial court denied the motion
asserting, in part, that the argument could have been raised on direct appeal and was,
therefore, barred under the doctrine of res judicata.
2. {¶ 6} In his brief, appellant has raised two assignments of error for our
consideration.
I. Appellant’s conviction in Case No. CR09-2368 must be vacated
because the Trial Court erred in denying Defendant-Appellant[’s] Motion
to Vacate the Judgment based on an improper application of [Carpenter].
II. The Appellant was denied his right to due process under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution when the
State failed to disclose their knowledge of the victim’s medical condition to
the trial court.
{¶ 7} In his first assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court did not
properly apply the Supreme Court’s ruling in Carpenter,1 supra, when it denied his
motion to vacate his conviction for involuntary manslaughter. In his second assignment
of error, appellant asserts that he was denied due process when the trial court refused to
allow a hearing on his motion to vacate. Since common legal principles are
determinative of both assignments of error, we will consider them together.
{¶ 8} Appellant’s May 23, 2013 motion to vacate judgment and void plea
agreement, despite its caption, meets the definition of a motion for postconviction relief
1 In Carpenter, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that the “state cannot indict a defendant for murder after the court has accepted a negotiated guilty plea to a lesser offense and the victim later dies of injuries sustained in the crime, unless the state expressly reserves the right to file additional charges on the record at the time of the defendant’s plea.” Carpenter at syllabus.
3. set forth in R.C. 2953.21(A)(1). See State v. Reynolds, 79 Ohio St.3d 158, 160, 679
N.E.2d 1131 (1997).
{¶ 9} Pursuant to R.C. 2953.21(A)(2), if no direct appeal is taken from the
judgment of conviction, a petition for postconviction relief must be filed no later than 180
days after the expiration of the time for filing the appeal. In this case, appellant was
convicted and sentenced on August 4, 2009, and did not file his petition until June 18,
2013, which is more than three and one-half years beyond the statutory time limit.
{¶ 10} A trial court has no jurisdiction to consider an untimely petition for
postconviction relief unless the untimeliness is excused under R.C. 2953.23(A)(1). See
State v. Gonzales, 6th Dist. No. WD-09-078, 2010-Ohio-4703, ¶ 15. Pursuant to R.C.
2953.23(A)(1)(a), an untimely petition may be entertained if the petitioner shows either
(1) that he or she was unavoidably prevented from discovering facts necessary to assert
the claim for relief, or (2) that the United States Supreme Court recognized a new federal
or state right that applies retroactively to a person in the petitioner’s situation.
{¶ 11} Here, appellant argues that prior to the plea agreement in case No.
CR0200702127, the state knew the victim would likely die from her injuries. Appellant
asserts that he was unavoidably prevented from discovery of facts necessary to assert his
claim because “[o]nly the State was aware of what it actually knew, and the State did not
disclose this information to appellant.” We are unpersuaded by appellant’s argument
because the state’s awareness has no bearing on how appellant was allegedly unavoidably
delayed in timely filing his petition for postconviction relief.
4. {¶ 12} Further, if appellant, at the time he entered the plea in case No.
CR0200702127, had any expectation that the plea would end criminal prosecution based
on the incident, he should have made that expectation known prior to the expiration of the
statutory time limit for postconviction petitions in this case. See State v. Harrison, 122
Ohio St.3d 512, 2009-Ohio-3547, 912 N.E.2d 1106, ¶ 45 (“The focus in Carpenter was
on the reasonableness of the defendant’s belief that the plea agreement would terminate
any future charges based upon the same incident.”).
{¶ 13} Finally, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that appellant’s petition
for postconviction relief was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. “Under the doctrine
of res judicata, a final judgment of conviction bars the convicted defendant from raising
and litigating in any proceeding, except an appeal from that judgment, any defense or any
claimed lack of due process that was raised or could have been raised by the defendant at
the trial which resulted in that judgment of conviction or on an appeal from that
judgment.” State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d 175, 180, 226 N.E.2d 104 (1967).
{¶ 14} In this case, appellant could have raised the Carpenter holding as a defense
to the information charging involuntary manslaughter, or on an appeal from the judgment
entered as a result of his plea to that offense. He failed to do so.
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