State v. N. Akhmedli

2023 MT 120, 531 P.3d 562, 412 Mont. 538

Opinion

06/20/2023

DA 22-0622 Case Number: DA 22-0622

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 2023 MT 120

STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

NASIMI AKHMEDLI,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, In and For the County of Mineral, Cause No. DC-22-7 Honorable John W. Larson, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Shandor S. Badaruddin, Shandor S. Badaruddin, PC, Missoula, Montana

For Appellee:

Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Michael P. Dougherty, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana

Debra Jackson, Mineral County Attorney, Superior, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: April 26, 2023

Decided: June 20, 2023

Filed:

if-6tA•-if __________________________________________ Clerk Justice Jim Rice delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Nasimi Akhmedli appeals from a Fourth Judicial District Court order denying his

Motion to Dismiss a complaint citing him with violation of 49 C.F.R. 393.11, regulating

commercial vehicle lamps and reflective devices. We address the following issue and

affirm:

Did the District Court err by denying the motion to dismiss for unlawful delegation of legislative authority?

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 On March 3, 2021, Akhmedli was driving his truck and trailer loaded with other

vehicles through Mineral County. When Akhmedli crossed the Haugan Scale, located on

I-90, Motor Carrier Services Officer Matthew Coleman noticed that Akhmedli’s load hung

over his trailer by over six feet and was marked only with a red flag. Coleman cited

Akhmedli with a violation of 49 C.F.R. 393.11(a)(1), incorporated by § 61-10-154, MCA,

which required a red light to be affixed to such protruding loads. Akhmedli was convicted

in justice court, and appealed de novo to the Fourth Judicial District Court, where he sought

dismissal of the charge on the ground the statute violated Art. III, § 1 of the Montana

Constitution, Separation of Powers. Specifically, Akhmedli argued that § 61-10-154,

MCA, which authorizes the Montana Department of Transportation (MDT) to adopt rules

and regulations, and § 61-9-512, MCA, which criminalizes violations of regulations

adopted pursuant to § 61-10-154, MCA, constituted an unconstitutional delegation of

legislative power to an administrative body. The District Court denied Akhmedli’s motion,

reasoning the Legislature had delegated authority to the MDT “specifically and with 2 detail,” and that Akhmedli had failed to demonstrate the challenged statutes were

unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. Akhmedli then entered a guilty plea pursuant

to a plea agreement, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶3 “Whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law, of which this Court

exercises plenary review.” Mont. Indep. Living Project v. State, DOT, 2019 MT 298, ¶ 14,

398 Mont. 204, 454 P.3d 1216. We review a district court’s “application of the

Constitution to determine if it is correct.” State v. Mathis, 2003 MT 112, ¶ 8, 315 Mont.

378, 68 P.3d 756. A statute is “presumed constitutional unless it conflicts with the Montana

Constitution, in the judgement of the [C]ourt, beyond a reasonable doubt.” Mont. Indep.

Living Project, ¶ 14. Further, the “party challenging the constitutionality of the statute

bears the burden of proof, and if any doubt exists, it must be resolved in favor of the

statute.” Mont. Indep. Living Project, ¶ 14.

DISCUSSION

¶4 Did the District Court err by denying the motion to dismiss for unlawful delegation of legislative authority?

¶5 Montana Code Annotated § 61-10-154(2)(a), authorizes the MDT to adopt safety

standards for certain commercial vehicles. State v. Beaver, 2016 MT 332, ¶ 15, 386 Mont.

12, 385 P.3d 956; § 61-10-154(2)(a) (“The department of transportation shall adopt, by

rule, standards for safety of operations of . . . any for hire-motor carrier or any private motor

carrier.”). Pursuant to this authority, MDT adopted and incorporated 49 C.F.R. 393.11, at

issue in this case, which generally governs use of lamps and reflective devices on 3 commercial vehicles and, for purposes of this case, lamps and reflective devices to be used

on trailers with overhang.1 Under § 61-9-512(2), MCA, a violation of a rule adopted

pursuant to § 61-10-154, MCA, is a misdemeanor offense, and requires that an offender

“shall be fined not less than $25 or more than $500 for the first offense and not less than

$25 or more than $1,000 for each subsequent offense.”

¶6 Akhmedli argues the Legislature’s delegation of authority to MDT by §§ 61-9-512

and 61-10-154, MCA, is unconstitutional, initially broadly contending that “[n]o amount

of delegation is allowed with criminal statutes,” and that permissible delegation “applies

exclusively to regulations and administrative proceedings in which a violation amounts to

no more than a civil sanction,” citing limitations upon delegation of criminal authority

adopted in other states. Alternatively, and in response to the State’s argument from our

precedent, Akhmedli argues that, even if delegation is permissible in a criminal context,

“this Court should . . . make clear the nondelegation doctrine requires more precise

legislative guidance in the criminal arena than in the civil arena.” He notes the distinctions

made by the Montana and United States Constitutions between criminal and civil

proceedings, such as application of the exclusionary rule and the heightened due process

protection and standard of proof in criminal cases.

1 Mont. Admin. R. 18.8.1502(1) adopted multiple federal regulations, of which 49 C.F.R. 393.11 comes within one section thereof: “Any commercial motor vehicle or motor carrier subject to regulation by the department under 61-10-154, MCA, shall comply with and the department adopts by reference the following portions of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations . . . . [t]he regulations adopted [include] . . . 49 C.F.R. parts 390 through 399.”

4 ¶7 This Court has considered and approved delegation in the criminal context,

specifically, for traffic offenses. In State v. Mathis, 2003 MT 112, ¶ 1, 315 Mont. 378, 68

P.3d 756, Mathis was cited for speeding in a construction zone, and argued the “provision

unlawfully delegated legislative authority to an administrative agency.” The statute at

issue, § 61-8-314(5)(a), MCA, provided any “person convicted of a traffic violation in a

work zone is guilty of a misdemeanor.” Noting we had previously held that the authority

to establish speed limits was legislative in nature (citing Lee v. State, 195 Mont. 1, 8, 635

P.2d 1282, 1286 (1981) and State v. Stanko, 1998 MT 321, ¶ 28, 292 Mont. 192, 974 P.2d

1132), we again analyzed the delegation issue under the standards we had employed for

civil challenges: “a statute is complete and validly delegates administrative authority when

nothing with respect to a determination of what is the law is left to the administrative

agency, and its provisions are sufficiently clear, definite, and certain to enable the agency

to know its rights and obligation.” Mathis, ¶ 15 (emphasis omitted); cp. The Duck Inn v.

Montana State University-Northern, 285 Mont. 519, 525, 949 P.2d 1179, 1183 (1997)

(“‘the legislature must ordinarily prescribe a policy, standard, or rule for their guidance

and must not vest them with an arbitrary and uncontrolled discretion with regard thereto’”).

We explained:

The law-making power may not be granted to an administrative body to be exercised under the guise of administrative discretion. Accordingly, in delegating powers to an administrative body with respect to the administration of statutes, the legislature must ordinarily prescribe a policy, standard, or rule for their guidance and must not vest them with an arbitrary and uncontrolled discretion with regard thereto, and a statute or ordinance which is deficient in this respect is invalid. In other words, in order to avoid the pure delegation of legislative power by the creation of an administrative 5 agency, the legislature must set limits on such agency’s power and enjoin on it a certain course of procedure and rules of decision in the performance of its function; and, if the legislature fails to prescribe with reasonable clarity the limits of power delegated to an administrative agency, or if those limits are too broad, its attempt to delegate is a nullity.

Mathis, ¶ 15 (emphasis added).

¶8 In State v. Spady, 2015 MT 218, ¶ 9, 380 Mont. 179, 354 P.3d 590, this Court

reversed the District Court’s determination that §§ 44-4-1203(2)-1213(4), MCA, were

unconstitutional as “an improper delegation of legislative authority to the Attorney General

for failure to provide objective criteria.” We held that the statutes, which were criminal in

context and authorized assessment of fees related to a program for conducting alcohol

breath tests, to be a proper delegation of legislative authority. The Court again instructed

that “[t]he Legislature may delegate its legislative powers to an administrative body so long

as it sets forth a policy, rule, or standard for guidance and does not ‘vest them with an

arbitrary and uncontrolled discretion.’” Spady, ¶ 19 (citing In the Petition to Transfer

Territory from High Sch. Dist. No. 6, 2000 MT 342, ¶ 15, 303 Mont. 204, 15 P.3d 447).

After analyzing the statute, the Court rejected Spady’s argument that the provision gave

“the Attorney General unfettered discretion when implementing fees.” Spady, ¶ 20.

¶9 In assessing the propriety of the delegation, we have developed the principle utilized

in The Duck Inn, quoted above, into “a three-part framework for analyzing whether a

statute’s provisions are sufficiently clear and definite,” Mont. Indep. Living Project, ¶ 20,

wherein we consider whether (1) the policy behind the statute is present; (2) the rationale

behind the statute, even if implicit, is evident; and (3) the statute provides a standard or

6 guide for the proper delegation of legislative power. We applied this analysis in Mathis,

concluding the “implicit, but clear rationale behind the statute is to protect drivers and

workers in construction and work zones,” and that sufficient guidance had been provided

to the agency, given that construction and work zones “presumably encompass a diverse

set of driving conditions,” for which “establishing the speed limit for every construction

project would be an impractical, if not impossible, task for the Legislature.” Mathis,

¶¶ 19-20. Similarly, in Spady, we concluded the Legislature had provided ample guidelines

and limiting instructions because the “Legislature limited the fees to reasonable amounts

necessary to pay for the administration of the program.” Spady, ¶ 20. Here, as argued by

the State, the policy of the statute is the adoption of safety standards for a category of

vehicles, primarily commercial motor carriers. The rationale of the statute, implicitly, is

to ensure safety of vehicles, private and commercial, traveling on the State’s highways.

See Beaver, ¶ 16 (noting, in an enforcement context, that the subject regulations were

“intended to help insure the safety of the motoring public in general, and of those engaged

in commercial trucking”).

¶10 The final factor in the framework is whether the statute provides standards or guides

to the agency for proper delegation. Notably, here the Legislature itself established the

penalties for violations, and did not provide any authority for MDT to create sanctions. See

§ 61-9-512, MCA. Then, any safety standard adopted by MDT is restricted to six types of

vehicles, primarily for the commercial transport of freight, passengers, or hazardous

7 materials. See § 61-10-154(2)(a)-(f), MCA.2 This identified subset of vehicles, which

excludes the general motoring public, is a standard that limits and focuses the authority

delegated to the agency. Further, § 61-10-154(3), MCA, provides parameters for the

standards that may be adopted by MDT: “[The] [s]tandards of safety adopted under this

section must substantially comply, within allowed tolerance guidelines, to the federal

motor carrier safety regulations and the federal hazardous material regulations as applied

to motor carriers and vehicles transporting passengers or property in commerce.” Thus,

MDT is required to model its safety standards after the federal commercial rules. Lastly,

the Legislature addressed enforcement of the regulations in § 61-10-154(5), MCA. MDT

is required to designate employees to enforce the “safety standards adopted pursuant to this

section,” who must “be employed in the administration of the motor carrier services

functions” of the Department. Section 61-10-154(5), MCA. Section 61-10-154(5), MCA,

details the duties and authority of these officers, including to “issue citations and make

arrests in connection with violations of safety standards adopted under this section” and to

“enforce the provisions of Title 49 of the United States Code and regulations that have

been adopted under Title 49” (emphasis added). These provisions demonstrate that the

Legislature “set limits on [MDT’s] power and enjoin[ed] on it a certain course of procedure

and rules of decision in the performance of its function” with “provisions [] sufficiently

2 A non-commercial vehicle included within the agency’s delegated regulatory authority is a “motor vehicle that is designed or used to transport at least 16 passengers, including the driver, and that is not used to transport passengers for compensation.” Section 61-10-154(2)(d), MCA.

8 clear, definite, and certain to enable the agency to know its rights and obligation.” Mathis,

¶ 15 (emphasis omitted).

¶11 While Akhmedli’s argument that delegation is not permitted for a criminal statute

is incorrect, his contention that the constitutional attributes at issue in the criminal context

warrant careful review of such delegation by the courts is not without merit and, may, in

an appropriate case, require articulation of a standard of enhanced review. However, on

the record here, we conclude, as discussed above, that the Legislature provided direction

to MDT that cabined the agency’s authority such that the Legislature did not delegate the

lawmaking function, and therefore did not violate Art. III, § 1 of the Montana Constitution.

¶12 Affirmed.

/S/ JIM RICE

We concur:

/S/ MIKE McGRATH /S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA /S/ LAURIE McKINNON /S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR