State v. Murphy

244 S.E.2d 36, 270 S.C. 642, 1978 S.C. LEXIS 440

• Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina
• Decided: May 2, 1978
• Docket: 20674
• Status: Published

Opinions

Ness, Justice:

This is an appeal from a conviction for housebreaking. We affirm.

Appellant Murphy and one Scott were jointly indicted for housebreaking after being discovered hiding in a small room in the. Fairwold Middle School. Sheriff’s deputies alerted to the scene by a silent burglar alarm found an unlocked exterior door, a partially open window, and an interior door with one pane removed. A soft drink machine had been pried open and another vending machine had been tampered with in the teachers’ lounge.

Several weeks before Murphy’s trial, Scott pled guilty to the housebreaking charge.

At trial, Murphy testified he had gone to a store with Scott and they were returning by way of the schoolyard when Scott entered the school through an unlocked door. Appellant stated Scott had said nothing to him about committing a crime and he had no reason to think Scott intended to do so.

The trial judge allowed Scott’s prior guilty plea into evidence as a refutation of appellant’s contention that Scott had not indicated an intention to commit a crime. Appellant asserts this was prejudicial error entitling him to a new trial. We disagree.

It is well established in the federal courts that the jury may be informed of a codefendant’s guilty plea, provided the proper cautionary instructions are given. Wood v. United States, 279 F. (2d) 359, 363 (8th Cir. 1960); United States v. Aronson, 319 F. (2d) 48, 52 (2nd Cir. 1963); United States v. Earley, 482 F. (2d) 53, 58 (10th Cir. 1973); Fahning v. United States, 299 F. (2d) 579, 580 (5th Cir. 1962). The trial judge here properly narrowed the scope of the jury’s consideration of Scott’s guilty plea in his instructions.

In Smith v. United States, 431 F. (2d) 1 (8th Cir. 1970), the appellant asserted his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was violated where his codefendant admitted at trial he had entered a plea of guilty to the offense. The Court of Appeals examined the case according to the standards established in Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123, 88 S. Ct. 1620, 20 L. Ed. (2d) 476 (1968), and concluded the wealth of evidence against appellant independent of his co-defendant’s admission eliminated any possible error.

In this case, appellant was found hiding in a restroom at the scene of the crime. Vending machines had been tampered with and burglary tools were found nearby. Appellant’s excuse for being in the school at night was that he was taking a shortcut home. There was strong and clear evidence of appellant’s culpability apart from the guilty plea of his codefendant.

We conclude it was not error to apprise the jury of the state of the record. See Richards v. United States, 193 F. (2d) 554 (10th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U. S. 930, 72 S. Ct. 764, 96 L. Ed. 1340 (1951). Scott’s plea of guilty was relevant to the issue of appellant’s knowledge of Scott’s intentions.

Moreover, it has long been established in this State that when a defendant elects to testify he may be cross-examined as any other witness. State v. Robertson, 26 S. C. 117, 1 S. E. 443 (1887); State v. Kennedy, 85 S. C. 146, 67 S. E. 152 (1910); State v. Holmes, 171 S. C. 8, 171 S. E. 440 (1933). Appellant elected to take the stand in his own behalf. When he asserted his lack of knowledge of his co-defendant’s motive for entering the school building, it was proper for the solicitor to introduce Scott’s guilty plea.¹

Appellant’s remaining exceptions are without merit.

Affirmed.

Lewis, C. J., and Littlejohn, J., concur. Gregory, J., concurs in result. Rhodes, J., dissents.

1 Our resolution of this issue, though breaking new ground to some extent, is consistent with prior decisions where we held the testimony of a co-defendant who has pleaded guilty admissible against another defendant. State v. Harvey, 253 S. C. 328, 170 S. E. (2d) 657 (1969); State v. Lewis, 255 S. C. 466, 179 S. E. (2d) 616 (1971). See also 23 C. J. S. Criminal Law § 804(3), p. 67.