[240]*240WARREN, J.
Defendant appeals his conviction for theft on the ground that the trial court should have suppressed his confession. We agree and reverse.
Detective McGuire, knowing that there were several outstanding warrants for defendant’s arrest, obtained a search warrant authorizing him to search for defendant at 54 N.W. 13th Avenue, Apt. 4, in Gresham. The record does not show that McGuire or any other officer at any time developed any reason to believe that defendant would be present at that location other than the information in the affidavit for the search warrant. The record does not show that the apartment was defendant’s. The evening of the day that he obtained it, McGuire and several other officers executed the warrant. At approximately 9:15 p.m., they banged on the door, listened for sounds from within, kicked in the door and arrested defendant in a hallway between a bedroom and a bathroom. They took defendant to the police station in downtown Portland, advised him of his rights at 10:58 p.m. and interrogated him for approximately three hours. During the interrogation, defendant confessed to stealing $1,211 from the Washington Park Zoo.
Before trial, defendant moved to suppress the confession, arguing that the search warrant was invalid, making the confession the fruit of an illegal search. The trial court denied the motion. It appears that the court held that the warrant was invalid and then decided that the illegality did not require suppression.1 The court found defendant guilty in a trial to the court on stipulated facts.
Defendant argues that a search warrant was required but that the one obtained was invalid, that the search was a violation of his rights under Article I, section 9, and the Fourth Amendment and that the post-arrest confession is a product of the illegality and must be suppressed. Under ORS [241]*241133.235(5),2 police may enter premises to make an arrest only if they have probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested is present. Only if the police had probable cause to search but had no valid search warrant do we reach the constitutional question of whether a search warrant was required. We first address the issue of probable cause.
The legislature has codified the test for probable cause when issuing search warrants based on hearsay statements from unnamed informants in ORS 133.545(4).3 The same test is appropriate to determine whether the officers had probable cause to search for defendant on the basis of hearsay information. ORS 133.545(4) requires that affidavits in support of search warrants set forth “(1) the basis of the informant’s knowledge, and (2) facts showing the informant’s ‘veracity,’ i.e., that he is credible or that his information is reliable.” State v. Villagran, 294 Or 404, 409 n 3, 657 P2d 1223 (1983). Defendant only challenges the informant’s “basis of knowledge.” The affidavit states:
“I have been told by a confidential informant in the past three hours that JOHN QUINTON [sic] MUNRO is known by name and appearance to the informant and is presently hiding from police at 54 NW 13th Avenue, Apartment #4, City of Gresham, County of Multnomah, State of Oregon and that JOHN QUINTON [sic] MUNRO is planning to flee this jurisdiction tonight.”
The state argues that the phrase “by appearance” implies that the informant saw and recognized defendant at that address and that otherwise such a phrase would be superfluous in the affidavit. We disagree. The phrase merely establishes that the informant recognizes defendant, not the basis for his knowledge that defendant had been at a particular location at a [242]*242particular time. There is insufficient other information in the affidavit to provide the required probable cause and, because the officers provided no other basis for probable cause, the search was illegal.
The next issue is whether the illegality of the search requires suppression of defendant’s subsequent confession. There is no express statutory result provided for a violation of ORS 133.235(5). The requirement of probable cause to enter private premises, however, is based on the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Or Const, Art I, § 9; US Const, Amend IV; State v. Jordan, 288 Or 391, 402, 605 P2d 646 (1980);4 see also State v. Kosta, 304 Or 549, 748 P2d 72 (1987).
Whether a violation requires supression of evidence derived from the illegal search depends on whether the search violated a protected interest of defendant. We first discuss the issue under the Oregon Constitution. State v. Kennedy, 295 Or 260, 666 P2d 1316 (1983). In State v. Tanner, 304 Or 312, 320-21, 745 P2d 757 (1987), the Supreme Court described who could assert a privacy interest protectible from governmental interference during a search of premises. Invited guests who are in areas of a home that an invitation would reasonably cover, such as dinner guests in a dining room, are protected. 304 Or at 321. In this case, defendant had spent the night in the residence and was found in a hallway between a bedroom and bathroom. The state did not show that defendant’s “invitation” and zone of privacy did not include the area in which he was discovered. The search violated his Article I, section 9, privacy interest.
ORS 133.683(1) requires suppression of evidence discovered as a result of a search or seizure “carried out in a manner that things seized in the course of the search would be [243]*243subject to suppression.”5 ORS 133.683 is Oregon’s codification of the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine. To apply it to the suppression of defendant’s confession, the confession must have been “discovered” as a result of and after a search that would have required suppression of anything seized in the course of that search.
Clearly, any physical evidence seized during the illegal search must be suppressed. We have held that testimonial evidence that is derived from illegal police conduct is subject to suppression under the same standards as is physical evidence derived from illegal police conduct. State v. Staunton, 79 Or App 332, 338, 718 P2d 1379 (1986). In reaching that conclusion, Oregon courts have relied on the federal exclusionary rule announced in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 US 471, 486, 83 S Ct 407, 9 L Ed 2d 441 (1963), which excludes evidence procured by the “exploitation” of the primary illegality, the illegal search. See State v. Jones, 248 Or 428, 423, 435 P2d 317 (1967). In Wong Sun the Court found that the policies underlying the exclusionary rule did not invite any logical distinction between physical and verbal evidence, including post-arrest confessions. 371 US at 486.
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[240]*240WARREN, J.
Defendant appeals his conviction for theft on the ground that the trial court should have suppressed his confession. We agree and reverse.
Detective McGuire, knowing that there were several outstanding warrants for defendant’s arrest, obtained a search warrant authorizing him to search for defendant at 54 N.W. 13th Avenue, Apt. 4, in Gresham. The record does not show that McGuire or any other officer at any time developed any reason to believe that defendant would be present at that location other than the information in the affidavit for the search warrant. The record does not show that the apartment was defendant’s. The evening of the day that he obtained it, McGuire and several other officers executed the warrant. At approximately 9:15 p.m., they banged on the door, listened for sounds from within, kicked in the door and arrested defendant in a hallway between a bedroom and a bathroom. They took defendant to the police station in downtown Portland, advised him of his rights at 10:58 p.m. and interrogated him for approximately three hours. During the interrogation, defendant confessed to stealing $1,211 from the Washington Park Zoo.
Before trial, defendant moved to suppress the confession, arguing that the search warrant was invalid, making the confession the fruit of an illegal search. The trial court denied the motion. It appears that the court held that the warrant was invalid and then decided that the illegality did not require suppression.1 The court found defendant guilty in a trial to the court on stipulated facts.
Defendant argues that a search warrant was required but that the one obtained was invalid, that the search was a violation of his rights under Article I, section 9, and the Fourth Amendment and that the post-arrest confession is a product of the illegality and must be suppressed. Under ORS [241]*241133.235(5),2 police may enter premises to make an arrest only if they have probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested is present. Only if the police had probable cause to search but had no valid search warrant do we reach the constitutional question of whether a search warrant was required. We first address the issue of probable cause.
The legislature has codified the test for probable cause when issuing search warrants based on hearsay statements from unnamed informants in ORS 133.545(4).3 The same test is appropriate to determine whether the officers had probable cause to search for defendant on the basis of hearsay information. ORS 133.545(4) requires that affidavits in support of search warrants set forth “(1) the basis of the informant’s knowledge, and (2) facts showing the informant’s ‘veracity,’ i.e., that he is credible or that his information is reliable.” State v. Villagran, 294 Or 404, 409 n 3, 657 P2d 1223 (1983). Defendant only challenges the informant’s “basis of knowledge.” The affidavit states:
“I have been told by a confidential informant in the past three hours that JOHN QUINTON [sic] MUNRO is known by name and appearance to the informant and is presently hiding from police at 54 NW 13th Avenue, Apartment #4, City of Gresham, County of Multnomah, State of Oregon and that JOHN QUINTON [sic] MUNRO is planning to flee this jurisdiction tonight.”
The state argues that the phrase “by appearance” implies that the informant saw and recognized defendant at that address and that otherwise such a phrase would be superfluous in the affidavit. We disagree. The phrase merely establishes that the informant recognizes defendant, not the basis for his knowledge that defendant had been at a particular location at a [242]*242particular time. There is insufficient other information in the affidavit to provide the required probable cause and, because the officers provided no other basis for probable cause, the search was illegal.
The next issue is whether the illegality of the search requires suppression of defendant’s subsequent confession. There is no express statutory result provided for a violation of ORS 133.235(5). The requirement of probable cause to enter private premises, however, is based on the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Or Const, Art I, § 9; US Const, Amend IV; State v. Jordan, 288 Or 391, 402, 605 P2d 646 (1980);4 see also State v. Kosta, 304 Or 549, 748 P2d 72 (1987).
Whether a violation requires supression of evidence derived from the illegal search depends on whether the search violated a protected interest of defendant. We first discuss the issue under the Oregon Constitution. State v. Kennedy, 295 Or 260, 666 P2d 1316 (1983). In State v. Tanner, 304 Or 312, 320-21, 745 P2d 757 (1987), the Supreme Court described who could assert a privacy interest protectible from governmental interference during a search of premises. Invited guests who are in areas of a home that an invitation would reasonably cover, such as dinner guests in a dining room, are protected. 304 Or at 321. In this case, defendant had spent the night in the residence and was found in a hallway between a bedroom and bathroom. The state did not show that defendant’s “invitation” and zone of privacy did not include the area in which he was discovered. The search violated his Article I, section 9, privacy interest.
ORS 133.683(1) requires suppression of evidence discovered as a result of a search or seizure “carried out in a manner that things seized in the course of the search would be [243]*243subject to suppression.”5 ORS 133.683 is Oregon’s codification of the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine. To apply it to the suppression of defendant’s confession, the confession must have been “discovered” as a result of and after a search that would have required suppression of anything seized in the course of that search.
Clearly, any physical evidence seized during the illegal search must be suppressed. We have held that testimonial evidence that is derived from illegal police conduct is subject to suppression under the same standards as is physical evidence derived from illegal police conduct. State v. Staunton, 79 Or App 332, 338, 718 P2d 1379 (1986). In reaching that conclusion, Oregon courts have relied on the federal exclusionary rule announced in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 US 471, 486, 83 S Ct 407, 9 L Ed 2d 441 (1963), which excludes evidence procured by the “exploitation” of the primary illegality, the illegal search. See State v. Jones, 248 Or 428, 423, 435 P2d 317 (1967). In Wong Sun the Court found that the policies underlying the exclusionary rule did not invite any logical distinction between physical and verbal evidence, including post-arrest confessions. 371 US at 486.
The Oregon Supreme Court recently distinguished Oregon constitutional search and seizure analysis from federal analysis by pointing out that the Fourth Amendment protections are based on a theory of deterrence, while Article I, section 9, protects a personal right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. State v. Tanner, supra, 304 Or at 315.
“The unlawfulness of which defendant complains was a search of the Best residence. If the police violated any right of defendant’s, it was a right against the search that uncovered the effects, not some right in the effects themselves. An unlawful search that uncovers effects such as stolen goods or [244]*244contraband, which also may not legally be possessed, will nevertheless result in suppression of those effects because the unlawfulness involves an infringement of rights apart from possessory interests (or the lack thereof) in the stolen goods or contraband seized as a consequence of the unlawful search.” 304 Or at 316. (Emphasis supplied.)
We hold that, under Article I, section 9, an unlawful search that would require the suppression of physical evidence involves an infringement of personal rights that would also result in the suppression of testimonial evidence derived as a result of that search. In this case, the illegal search would have required the suppression of any physical evidence seized. Defendant would not have confessed had he not been taken into custody as a result of the illegal search. The confession is the “fruit of the poisonous tree,” and the exclusionary rule codified in ORS 133.683 applies. The state does not contend, and we do not find, that the taint of the illegality was avoided by reason of any exception to the exclusionary rule.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.