OPINION ON APPELLEE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
CAMPBELL, Judge.
Appellee was charged by information with operating a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated. Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. art. 67011-1 et seq. Appellee filed a pretrial motion to suppress an intoxilyzer breath test result and to strike a paragraph of the state’s information. The trial court granted appellee’s motion and the State timely filed a notice of appeal, pursuant to Tex.Code Crim.Proc. art. 44.01.1 More than eight months after the original notice of appeal was filed, the State filed an amended notice of appeal with permission of the court of appeals. The First Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court, ordered the information reinstated and remanded the case for trial. State v. Muller, 798 S.W.2d 315 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990). We granted the ap-pellee’s petition for discretionary review to determine: (1) whether the State’s original notice of appeal complied with Article 44.-01, and (2) if not, whether the State was entitled to cure the defective notice by filing an amended notice of appeal. We will reverse.
I.
On appeal to the First Court of Appeals, appellee argued that the State’s original notice of appeal, although timely filed on February 17,1989, was defective because it had not been signed by the elected District Attorney of Harris County, John B. Holmes, Jr., as required by Article 44.01.2 At oral argument before the court of appeals, the State identified the signature on the notice as that of the first assistant to Holmes.
On October 30, 1989, some eight months after the original filing of the notice of appeal, the State filed both (1) a motion for leave to file an amended notice of appeal, and (2) an amended notice of appeal.3 The [807]*807court of appeals granted the State’s motion and ordered the record supplemented with the amended notice of appeal. The court of appeals then reversed the judgment of the trial court and ordered the information reinstated. This first opinion was subsequently withdrawn and a second opinion issued on appellee’s motion for rehearing. State v. Muller, 798 S.W.2d 315 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990).
In its opinion on rehearing, the court of appeals held that when the State filed the amended notice of appeal it cured any defect in the original notice. Muller, supra at 317-18. The court of appeals then assumed jurisdiction over the case and again ordered the information reinstated and remanded the case for trial. Id. at 318. En route to its decision, the court of appeals held that Article 44.01 does not require the “prosecuting attorney,” as designated therein, to personally sign the written notice of appeal:
We find it improbable that the legislature intended that the State may only appeal if, but only if, the district attorney personally signs the notice of appeal. There are many occasions when the district attorney may be compelled to be “out of state,” or “at other places,” and is not physically present to sign the notice of appeal. It is, therefore, logical that some other “prosecuting attorney” would be authorized to sign the name of the district attorney, or that an amendment of that notice of appeal could be filed with the court to “show” the district attorney’s intent and consent, as occurred in this cause.
Muller, supra at 318.
Justice Michol O’Connor filed a written dissent on the issue of amending the notice of appeal, arguing that because the prosecuting attorney did not sign the original notice of appeal, and because the certification required by Article 44.01(a)(5) was not made until nine months after the judgment, the State did not perfect its appeal and the court of appeals did not have jurisdiction over the case. Id. at 326.
II.
The arguments of the parties can be distilled as follows. First, appellee contends that the notice of appeal filed by the State was invalid because Article 44.01 requires that a State’s notice of appeal must manifest “some indication that [the prosecuting attorney] intended to appeal.” Ap-pellee argues that:
Clearly, the requirement that the district attorney himself initiate and personally certify the appeal is legislatively mandated to make the State’s appellate process not only a hard one, but also, a limited one. Here, the limitation was to require the district attorney to personally decide to appeal a case on the front end and not after the appeal had been filed and the 15 day filing period expired.
Appellee further argues that the provisions of Article 44.01 are specific limitations on the State’s substantive right to appeal. Thus, claims appellee, the State’s noncompliance with the provisions of Article 44.01 deprives an appellate court of jurisdiction to hear the case. Appellee asserts that because Article 44.01 is an embodiment of the State’s substantive right to appeal, it would be error to allow the Rules of Appellate Procedure to enlarge this substantive right by circumventing the clear limitations set forth in Article 44.01.
The State counters that because Article 44.01 does not expressly require the signature of the prosecuting attorney to appear on an original notice of appeal, it would be disingenuous to read such a requirement into the statute. The State’s argument, essentially, is that, when read as a whole, the language of Article 44.01 does not require the personal signature of the prosecuting attorney. The State asserts that even if subsection (a)(5) were construed to require a written certification by the prosecutor, this requirement should not be extended to appeals brought under any other subsection. The State avers that section (d) refers only to the time within which an appeal must be made, and has nothing to [808]*808do with requiring the prosecuting attorney to personally make the appeal.
The State then asserts that the legislative intent supports its construction of Article 44.01. The State further argues that nothing in Article 44.01 indicates that it is intended to address appellate jurisdiction. Finally, the State contends that even if Article 44.01 requires the prosecuting attorney’s signature, the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure provide a means for correcting and amending defects in the original notice of appeal, whether those defects are of form or substance.
III.
In deciding whether the State’s original notice of appeal was defective, we are called on to interpret Article 44.01 with regard to the specific procedures the State must follow to properly appeal an adverse ruling of a trial court. This Court’s recent decision in Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex.Cr.App.1991), delimits with great specificity the appropriate role of the courts in construing statutes. In Boykin, we held that when interpreting a statute an appellate court should “necessarily focus ... on the literal text of the statute in question and attempt to discern the fair, objective meaning of that text at the time of its enactment.” Id.
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OPINION ON APPELLEE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
CAMPBELL, Judge.
Appellee was charged by information with operating a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated. Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. art. 67011-1 et seq. Appellee filed a pretrial motion to suppress an intoxilyzer breath test result and to strike a paragraph of the state’s information. The trial court granted appellee’s motion and the State timely filed a notice of appeal, pursuant to Tex.Code Crim.Proc. art. 44.01.1 More than eight months after the original notice of appeal was filed, the State filed an amended notice of appeal with permission of the court of appeals. The First Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court, ordered the information reinstated and remanded the case for trial. State v. Muller, 798 S.W.2d 315 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990). We granted the ap-pellee’s petition for discretionary review to determine: (1) whether the State’s original notice of appeal complied with Article 44.-01, and (2) if not, whether the State was entitled to cure the defective notice by filing an amended notice of appeal. We will reverse.
I.
On appeal to the First Court of Appeals, appellee argued that the State’s original notice of appeal, although timely filed on February 17,1989, was defective because it had not been signed by the elected District Attorney of Harris County, John B. Holmes, Jr., as required by Article 44.01.2 At oral argument before the court of appeals, the State identified the signature on the notice as that of the first assistant to Holmes.
On October 30, 1989, some eight months after the original filing of the notice of appeal, the State filed both (1) a motion for leave to file an amended notice of appeal, and (2) an amended notice of appeal.3 The [807]*807court of appeals granted the State’s motion and ordered the record supplemented with the amended notice of appeal. The court of appeals then reversed the judgment of the trial court and ordered the information reinstated. This first opinion was subsequently withdrawn and a second opinion issued on appellee’s motion for rehearing. State v. Muller, 798 S.W.2d 315 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990).
In its opinion on rehearing, the court of appeals held that when the State filed the amended notice of appeal it cured any defect in the original notice. Muller, supra at 317-18. The court of appeals then assumed jurisdiction over the case and again ordered the information reinstated and remanded the case for trial. Id. at 318. En route to its decision, the court of appeals held that Article 44.01 does not require the “prosecuting attorney,” as designated therein, to personally sign the written notice of appeal:
We find it improbable that the legislature intended that the State may only appeal if, but only if, the district attorney personally signs the notice of appeal. There are many occasions when the district attorney may be compelled to be “out of state,” or “at other places,” and is not physically present to sign the notice of appeal. It is, therefore, logical that some other “prosecuting attorney” would be authorized to sign the name of the district attorney, or that an amendment of that notice of appeal could be filed with the court to “show” the district attorney’s intent and consent, as occurred in this cause.
Muller, supra at 318.
Justice Michol O’Connor filed a written dissent on the issue of amending the notice of appeal, arguing that because the prosecuting attorney did not sign the original notice of appeal, and because the certification required by Article 44.01(a)(5) was not made until nine months after the judgment, the State did not perfect its appeal and the court of appeals did not have jurisdiction over the case. Id. at 326.
II.
The arguments of the parties can be distilled as follows. First, appellee contends that the notice of appeal filed by the State was invalid because Article 44.01 requires that a State’s notice of appeal must manifest “some indication that [the prosecuting attorney] intended to appeal.” Ap-pellee argues that:
Clearly, the requirement that the district attorney himself initiate and personally certify the appeal is legislatively mandated to make the State’s appellate process not only a hard one, but also, a limited one. Here, the limitation was to require the district attorney to personally decide to appeal a case on the front end and not after the appeal had been filed and the 15 day filing period expired.
Appellee further argues that the provisions of Article 44.01 are specific limitations on the State’s substantive right to appeal. Thus, claims appellee, the State’s noncompliance with the provisions of Article 44.01 deprives an appellate court of jurisdiction to hear the case. Appellee asserts that because Article 44.01 is an embodiment of the State’s substantive right to appeal, it would be error to allow the Rules of Appellate Procedure to enlarge this substantive right by circumventing the clear limitations set forth in Article 44.01.
The State counters that because Article 44.01 does not expressly require the signature of the prosecuting attorney to appear on an original notice of appeal, it would be disingenuous to read such a requirement into the statute. The State’s argument, essentially, is that, when read as a whole, the language of Article 44.01 does not require the personal signature of the prosecuting attorney. The State asserts that even if subsection (a)(5) were construed to require a written certification by the prosecutor, this requirement should not be extended to appeals brought under any other subsection. The State avers that section (d) refers only to the time within which an appeal must be made, and has nothing to [808]*808do with requiring the prosecuting attorney to personally make the appeal.
The State then asserts that the legislative intent supports its construction of Article 44.01. The State further argues that nothing in Article 44.01 indicates that it is intended to address appellate jurisdiction. Finally, the State contends that even if Article 44.01 requires the prosecuting attorney’s signature, the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure provide a means for correcting and amending defects in the original notice of appeal, whether those defects are of form or substance.
III.
In deciding whether the State’s original notice of appeal was defective, we are called on to interpret Article 44.01 with regard to the specific procedures the State must follow to properly appeal an adverse ruling of a trial court. This Court’s recent decision in Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex.Cr.App.1991), delimits with great specificity the appropriate role of the courts in construing statutes. In Boykin, we held that when interpreting a statute an appellate court should “necessarily focus ... on the literal text of the statute in question and attempt to discern the fair, objective meaning of that text at the time of its enactment.” Id. When the literal text of a statute is clear, an appellate court must give effect to the statute’s plain language and purposely eschew reliance on its legislative history. Boykin, supra at 785.
It is only when the literal text of the statute is either unclear or would lead to results so absurd that the Legislature could not possibly have intended them, that the courts should then resort to legislative history or other extraneous means to assist them in their interpretation of a statute. Id.; see also, Faulk v. State, 608 S.W.2d 625, 630 (Tex.Cr.App.1980).
IY.
With regard to the instant case, our established method of statutory construction makes it manifestly apparent that if the literal text of Article 44.01 is clear on its face, this Court will not strain its plain meaning in order to give the statute a “desirable” reading. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 789 S.W.2d 590 (Tex.Cr.App.1990). Thus, we will delve into the labyrinth of legislative history only if our examination of the literal text of Article 44.01 discloses some obfuscation or patent ambiguity. Because, on its face, the literal text of Article 44.01 is clear, we will construe the statute according to its plain meaning and dispose of this case without reliance on its legislative history.4
We begin our analysis with the literal language of the relevant sections of Article 44.01 and attempt to discern its “fair, objective meaning ... at the time of its enactment.” Boykin, supra at 785. In other words, we focus on the meaning a typical legislator would have given the specific language of the statute at the time of its enactment.
We begin with section (i) of Article 44.01, which defines the term “prosecuting attorney” as used in the article:
[809]*809In this article, “prosecuting attorney” means the county attorney, district attorney, or criminal district attorney who has the primary responsibility of prosecuting cases in the court hearing the case and does not include an assistant prosecuting attorney.
Because it would have been difficult for the Legislature to have more clearly excluded assistant prosecutors from its definition of “prosecuting attorney,” we interpret section (i) to mean what it plainly states on its face: a “prosecuting attorney,” as used in Article 44.01, does not include under any circumstance an assistant prosecutor or other subordinate.
Our next determination is which of the various actions contemplated by Article 44.01 are required to be personally authorized by the “prosecuting attorney” and which actions, if any, may be delegated to subordinates.
In the instant case, the State appealed two separate actions by the trial court — the striking of a paragraph in the information and the suppression of evidence. The appeal of a dismissal of an information is governed by subsection (a)(1) of Article 44.-01, which states in relevant part: “The state is entitled to appeal an order [dismissing] an indictment, information, or complaint, or any portion of an indictment information, or complaint.” The suppression of evidence is governed by subsection (a)(5) of Article, which states in relevant part: “The state is entitled to appeal an order [that] grants a motion to suppress evidence ... if the prosecuting attorney certifies to the trial court that the appeal is not taken for the purpose of delay and ... is of substantial importance in the case.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The plain language of subsection (a)(5) requires the prosecuting attorney to “certify” to the trial court that the appeal is not taken for purposes of delay and that the evidence is of substantial importance to the case. Clearly, the word “certify” contemplates a writing executed by the prosecuting attorney. See Black’s Law Dictionary 288 (6th ed. 1990) (“Certify,” defined as: “To authenticate or vouch for a thing in writing. To attest as being true or as represented.”).
By contrast, subsection (a)(1) contains no corresponding certification requirement. In addition, subsection (a)(1) does not specifically state that it is the “prosecuting attorney” who must file an appeal of a dismissal of an indictment. The State argues that the differences between these two subsections militate towards a finding that even if subsection (a)(5) requires the prosecuting attorney to execute a written certification, neither subsection (a)(1) nor section (d) requires a prosecuting attorney to personally authorize a specific notice of appeal when the prosecuting attorney has delegated his authority to prosecute appeals to a subordinate.
Stated another way, the State asserts that because subsection (a)(5) explicitly requires a certification of the “prosecuting attorney,” this inexorably leads to the conclusion that the prosecuting attorney is not required to personally make notices of appeal brought pursuant to other subsections — i.e., he may generally delegate to subordinates the responsibility of making appeals.5 We disagree, and find that the [810]*810plain language of 44.01(d) militates toward the opposite conclusion.
When construing a statute, we must presume that the entire statute is intended to be effective. See, e.g., Allegheny Mut. Cas. v. State, 710 S.W.2d 139 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref’d). Thus, when the statute is read as a cohesive, integrated whole, it is apparent that appeals taken under subsections (a)(1) and (5) are further governed by section (d). Section (d) limits the amount of time in which the “prosecuting attorney” may make an appeal. The plain language of this section indicates two things: (1) this section limits the time within the State can file a notice of appeal to fifteen days; and (2) it limits the right to “make an appeal” on behalf of the State to only the “prosecuting attorney,” as defined above. Using section (d) as a guide for understanding the implications of other provisions within the statute, we conclude that only the “prosecuting attorney” is authorized to “make an appeal” on behalf of the State — regardless of whether the appeal is made pursuant to subsection (a)(1) or (5).
V.
We must next interpret the term “make an appeal,” as used in section (d) of Article 44.01. When considered in light of section (i)’s express exclusion of assistant prosecutors from its definition of “prosecuting attorney,” it is clear that the phrase “make an appeal” clearly requires — at the minimum — the prosecuting attorney to personally supervise and authorize the appeals to be undertaken by his office on behalf of the State. That is, the statute, when construed as an internally consistent and integrated whole, seeks to ensure that the prosecuting attorney himself personally authorize specific appeals filed on behalf of the State.
We do not suggest that Article 44.01 necessarily requires that a State’s notice of appeal must, in all cases, reflect the personal signature of the prosecuting attorney. However, the plain meaning of the literal text of Article 44.01(d) requires the prosecuting attorney to “make an appeal” by personally authorizing — in some fashion — the specific notice of appeal in question. More specifically, to comply with the statute, he must either physically sign the notice of appeal or personally instruct and authorize a subordinate to sign the specific notice of appeal in question.6 Because of the jurisdictional limitations of Article 44.-01, discussed infra, we further read the statute to require this personal authorization to occur prior to the expiration of the fifteen day window of appeal.
We recognize that the statute places a significant burden on the prosecuting attorney. If he is unavailable during the window of opportunity for making an appeal, [811]*811he must either return and sign the notice of appeal or personally authorize the filing of appeal in some other fashion. As should be apparent, a statement that the appeal is taken “by and through the prosecuting attorney” is not, of itself, adequate to fulfill the requirement of the statute, as it gives no assurance that the prosecuting attorney has performed the safeguard function demanded by a plain reading of the statute. The plain meaning of the literal text of Article 44.01 is clear and unambiguous. And, although arguably burdensome on an elected prosecuting attorney, this procedure is not so absurd that it could not have possibly been contemplated by the legislature. Therefore, we interpret Article 44.01 according to its clear terms and plain language.7
In conclusion, we hold that Article 44.01 requires the elected “prosecuting at[812]*812torney” (and not his assistant) to “make” the State’s notice of appeal, within the prescribed fifteen-day time period, either through the physical act of signing the notice or by personally and expressly authorizing an assistant to file a specific notice of appeal on his behalf. See footnote 6, supra. Because John B. Holmes, Jr., the “prosecuting attorney” with the primary responsibility of prosecuting cases in Harris County did not personally authorize the filing of the original notice of appeal in this case within the statutorily required fifteen day period, we hold that the original notice of appeal was defective.
VI.
Having determined that the original notice of appeal filed in the instant case was defective, we must next decide whether the court of appeals was correct in holding that the State had the right to amend the original notice of appeal, thereby curing any defect in the original notice. The court of appeals based its holding on Tex.
R.App.Pro. 83, which provides that no appeal shall be “dismissed for defects or irregularities, in appellate procedure, either of form or substance, without allowing a reasonable time to correct or amend such defects.... ”
However, the filing of a notice of appeal by an assistant prosecuting attorney is not a defect of appellate procedure; it is a failure to abide by the substantive statutory requirements of Tex.Code Crim.Proc. art. 44.01. In State v. Demaret, 764 S.W.2d 857, 858 (Tex.App.—Austin 1989, no pet.), the Austin Court of Appeals aptly held:
The State argues, and we agree, that the Rules of Appellate Procedure are generally applicable to appeals by the State. However, the rules were not intended and may not be employed to enlarge the substantive rights of the litigants. In our view, art. 44.01(d) does more than merely prescribe a procedural guideline for filing the State’s notice of appeal. Rather it limits the State’s substantive authority to appeal.... On the sixteenth day [following entry of the court’s order], the State’s authority to appeal under the statute ceases to exist, and this court may not revive that right.
See also, e.g., State v. McKinney, 803 S.W.2d 374, 377 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no pet.) (“The State of Texas does not have the legal power to file a notice of appeal after its fifteenth day deadline has expired.”); but see, State v. Sanchez, 800 S.W.2d 292, 299 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1990, pet. granted) (amended notice of appeal cured defect, if any, in original notice that was signed and filed by an assistant prosecutor on behalf of the criminal district attorney). It was therefore error for the court of appeals to allow the State to amend the original notice of appeals by adding the required authorization after the fifteen-day filing period had elapsed.
In other words, the State’s noncompliance with the specific provisions of Article 44.01 was a substantive failure to invoke the court of appeals’ statutorily defined jurisdiction. This noncompliance was not susceptible to correction through application of the “amendment and cure” provisions of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.8 We hold that, under our well-established guidelines for statutory construction, it was manifestly improper for the court of appeals to read such a broad exception into the plain jurisdictional requirements of Article 44.01. As a consequence, the court of appeals erred in using the Rules of Appellate Procedure to create a jurisdictional-enlarging procedure neither expressly contained nor implicated by the literal text of the statute.9
[813]*813Article 44.01(d) expressly requires that the State can perfect an appeal only if (1) the notice of appeals is filed within fifteen days, and (2) the notice of appeal is “made” (i.e., signed or personally authorized) by the prosecuting attorney. In the case at bar, the record reflects that John B. Holmes, Jr., the prosecuting attorney, did not personally authorize the original notice of appeal. Therefore, at the time the fifteen day filing window had closed, the State had not yet complied with the express provisions of Article 44.01 and the court of appeals thus had no jurisdiction to hear the merits of the State’s appeal.
Because the court of appeals was without jurisdiction to act in this case, the ruling of the trial court must be upheld. The judgment of the court of appeals is therefore reversed, and this case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
CLINTON, J., concurs in result.