[Cite as State v. Mosser, 2025-Ohio-5536.]
COURT OF APPEALS LICKING COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO, Case No. 2025 CA 00028
Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion & Judgment Entry
-vs- Appeal from the Licking County Municipal Court, DESTINY R. MOSSER, Case No. 2025 CRB 00156
Defendant - Appellant Judgment: Affirmed
Date of Judgment: December 11, 2025
BEFORE: Andrew J. King; Robert G. Montgomery; David M. Gormley, Judges
APPEARANCES: Christopher D. Brigdon, for Defendant-Appellant.
Gormley, J.
{¶1} Defendant Destiny Mosser pled guilty in the Licking County Municipal Court
to two first-degree-misdemeanor charges — violating a protection order and aggravated
menacing — and to a third-degree-misdemeanor charge of unlawful restraint. The trial
court then imposed on Mosser a community-control sentence that included both a jail
term and a one-year supervision period. Finding no error in the trial court’s acceptance
of Mosser’s guilty pleas and no error in the sentence imposed, we now affirm.
The Key Facts
{¶2} In February 2025, M.W. called 9-1-1 to report that Mosser was at M.W.’s
residence with a machete. M.W. also advised the 9-1-1 dispatcher that a protection order
was in place prohibiting Mosser from coming within 500 feet of M.W. or her home. {¶3} M.W.’s boyfriend recorded a video on his cellphone that day showing
Mosser standing behind M.W.’s vehicle and swinging the machete around in the air.
When law-enforcement officers arrived at M.W.’s home, Mosser had already returned to
her own residence, which was across the street from M.W.’s home. Mosser refused to
speak with the officers who knocked on her door, and she placed a metal pipe behind the
door to jam it. The officers forced their way into Mosser’s home, found her inside, and
arrested her.
{¶4} Mosser initially faced five misdemeanor charges in connection with the
February 2025 incident. The trial court appointed an attorney to represent Mosser in the
case, and the parties reached a plea agreement in April 2025 that called for Mosser to
plead guilty to violating a protection order (M1), aggravated menacing (M1), and unlawful
restraint (M3).
{¶5} The trial judge held the plea-change hearing on the record, and the judge
also conducted the hearing in the way that Criminal Rules 11(E) and 11(F) require. The
trial judge thoroughly addressed, as well, Mosser’s right to a jury trial or a trial to the court,
the right to question witnesses, and the right to have the State prove her guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Mosser expressed on the record not only her understanding of each
of those rights but also her desire to waive them. Mosser herself, along with her counsel
and the trial judge, signed a written plea of guilty, and that document was promptly filed
in the clerk’s office of the Licking County Municipal Court.
{¶6} Once the trial judge accepted Mosser’s guilty pleas and made guilty findings
on those pleas, he afforded the parties an opportunity to be heard in accordance with
Criminal Rule 32(A). The trial judge then imposed sentences on each of the three charges, ordering Mosser to spend an additional 107 days in the county jail (on top of the
73 days that she had spent in the jail before the sentencing date), remain under
community-control supervision for one year, complete an inpatient-treatment program,
abide by any protection orders, and comply with various other standard supervision terms.
{¶7} Mosser filed a timely notice of appeal, and new counsel was appointed to
represent her here.
{¶8} Mosser’s appellate counsel has now filed in the case a brief that comports
with the procedure described in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). After receiving
that Anders brief, we sent a notice to Mosser herself indicating that she was welcome to
file her own appellate brief in the case. No additional briefs from either Mosser herself or
from the State have been filed here.
Our Review of the Record Supports the View of Mosser’s Counsel: This Appeal Is Frivolous
{¶9} Under Anders, of course, court-appointed appellate counsel in a criminal
case is permitted to indicate — after the attorney has conscientiously reviewed the full
record — that any possible grounds for an appeal in the case appear to be frivolous. See
id. at 744. When such a brief is filed, Anders instructs counsel to file a brief identifying
anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal. See State v. Sergent,
2016-Ohio-2696, ¶ 8, fn. 1. The court of appeals should then ensure that the indigent
defendant receives a copy of that brief and should give the defendant an opportunity to
raise any arguments that he or she would like to present in the appeal. Anders at 744.
And then finally, the court itself should fully examine the case record to determine whether
the appeal is frivolous. Id. {¶10} All those steps have occurred in this appeal. Though the Anders brief filed
by Mosser’s appellate counsel in fact indicates that that lawyer could not find any issues
that might arguably support the appeal, we have undertaken our duty to independently
examine the record so that we can determine for ourselves whether the appeal is
frivolous. We agree with Mosser’s attorney and find that it is.
A. The Guilty-Plea Hearing Was Properly Conducted
{¶11} The trial judge conducted the plea-change hearing in this misdemeanor
case on the record, and he addressed at that hearing Mosser’s constitutional rights, the
nature of the charges, and the effect of a guilty plea. The trial judge’s colloquy with the
defendant demonstrates, too, that the defendant entered her guilty pleas knowingly and
voluntarily and with a full understanding of not only her rights but also the implications of
the plea change.
{¶12} Mosser acknowledged at the hearing that she had signed a plea of guilty.
That written plea was also signed by Mosser’s counsel and then by the trial judge, and
that plea document was promptly filed in the trial court after the hearing.
{¶13} In short, the plea fully comported with Ohio law. State v. Engle, 74 Ohio
St.3d 525, 527 (1996) (“When a defendant enters a plea in a criminal case, the plea must
be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily”).
B. Mosser’s Sentence Was Not Contrary to Law
{¶14} At the sentencing hearing, the trial judge gave the attorneys and Mosser
one last opportunity to address the court about the sentence before it was imposed. The
State recommended a sentence of 180 days in jail with placement for Mosser afterwards
at an inpatient-treatment facility, while Mosser’s counsel urged the court to allow Mosser to participate in a reentry program after any jail term. Mosser herself then spoke,
describing the transportation-related difficulties that she had encountered when she
sought treatment in the past for her anxiety disorder.
{¶15} Under R.C. 2929.21 and R.C. 2929.22, trial courts have broad discretion
when determining what sentence is appropriate in a misdemeanor case. State v. Todd,
2025-Ohio-2559, ¶ 48 (12th Dist.). And “‘[w]hen the court’s sentence is within the
statutory limit, a reviewing court will presume that the trial judge followed the standards
[for misdemeanor sentencing], absent a showing to the contrary.’” State v. Inman, 2021-
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[Cite as State v. Mosser, 2025-Ohio-5536.]
COURT OF APPEALS LICKING COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO, Case No. 2025 CA 00028
Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion & Judgment Entry
-vs- Appeal from the Licking County Municipal Court, DESTINY R. MOSSER, Case No. 2025 CRB 00156
Defendant - Appellant Judgment: Affirmed
Date of Judgment: December 11, 2025
BEFORE: Andrew J. King; Robert G. Montgomery; David M. Gormley, Judges
APPEARANCES: Christopher D. Brigdon, for Defendant-Appellant.
Gormley, J.
{¶1} Defendant Destiny Mosser pled guilty in the Licking County Municipal Court
to two first-degree-misdemeanor charges — violating a protection order and aggravated
menacing — and to a third-degree-misdemeanor charge of unlawful restraint. The trial
court then imposed on Mosser a community-control sentence that included both a jail
term and a one-year supervision period. Finding no error in the trial court’s acceptance
of Mosser’s guilty pleas and no error in the sentence imposed, we now affirm.
The Key Facts
{¶2} In February 2025, M.W. called 9-1-1 to report that Mosser was at M.W.’s
residence with a machete. M.W. also advised the 9-1-1 dispatcher that a protection order
was in place prohibiting Mosser from coming within 500 feet of M.W. or her home. {¶3} M.W.’s boyfriend recorded a video on his cellphone that day showing
Mosser standing behind M.W.’s vehicle and swinging the machete around in the air.
When law-enforcement officers arrived at M.W.’s home, Mosser had already returned to
her own residence, which was across the street from M.W.’s home. Mosser refused to
speak with the officers who knocked on her door, and she placed a metal pipe behind the
door to jam it. The officers forced their way into Mosser’s home, found her inside, and
arrested her.
{¶4} Mosser initially faced five misdemeanor charges in connection with the
February 2025 incident. The trial court appointed an attorney to represent Mosser in the
case, and the parties reached a plea agreement in April 2025 that called for Mosser to
plead guilty to violating a protection order (M1), aggravated menacing (M1), and unlawful
restraint (M3).
{¶5} The trial judge held the plea-change hearing on the record, and the judge
also conducted the hearing in the way that Criminal Rules 11(E) and 11(F) require. The
trial judge thoroughly addressed, as well, Mosser’s right to a jury trial or a trial to the court,
the right to question witnesses, and the right to have the State prove her guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Mosser expressed on the record not only her understanding of each
of those rights but also her desire to waive them. Mosser herself, along with her counsel
and the trial judge, signed a written plea of guilty, and that document was promptly filed
in the clerk’s office of the Licking County Municipal Court.
{¶6} Once the trial judge accepted Mosser’s guilty pleas and made guilty findings
on those pleas, he afforded the parties an opportunity to be heard in accordance with
Criminal Rule 32(A). The trial judge then imposed sentences on each of the three charges, ordering Mosser to spend an additional 107 days in the county jail (on top of the
73 days that she had spent in the jail before the sentencing date), remain under
community-control supervision for one year, complete an inpatient-treatment program,
abide by any protection orders, and comply with various other standard supervision terms.
{¶7} Mosser filed a timely notice of appeal, and new counsel was appointed to
represent her here.
{¶8} Mosser’s appellate counsel has now filed in the case a brief that comports
with the procedure described in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). After receiving
that Anders brief, we sent a notice to Mosser herself indicating that she was welcome to
file her own appellate brief in the case. No additional briefs from either Mosser herself or
from the State have been filed here.
Our Review of the Record Supports the View of Mosser’s Counsel: This Appeal Is Frivolous
{¶9} Under Anders, of course, court-appointed appellate counsel in a criminal
case is permitted to indicate — after the attorney has conscientiously reviewed the full
record — that any possible grounds for an appeal in the case appear to be frivolous. See
id. at 744. When such a brief is filed, Anders instructs counsel to file a brief identifying
anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal. See State v. Sergent,
2016-Ohio-2696, ¶ 8, fn. 1. The court of appeals should then ensure that the indigent
defendant receives a copy of that brief and should give the defendant an opportunity to
raise any arguments that he or she would like to present in the appeal. Anders at 744.
And then finally, the court itself should fully examine the case record to determine whether
the appeal is frivolous. Id. {¶10} All those steps have occurred in this appeal. Though the Anders brief filed
by Mosser’s appellate counsel in fact indicates that that lawyer could not find any issues
that might arguably support the appeal, we have undertaken our duty to independently
examine the record so that we can determine for ourselves whether the appeal is
frivolous. We agree with Mosser’s attorney and find that it is.
A. The Guilty-Plea Hearing Was Properly Conducted
{¶11} The trial judge conducted the plea-change hearing in this misdemeanor
case on the record, and he addressed at that hearing Mosser’s constitutional rights, the
nature of the charges, and the effect of a guilty plea. The trial judge’s colloquy with the
defendant demonstrates, too, that the defendant entered her guilty pleas knowingly and
voluntarily and with a full understanding of not only her rights but also the implications of
the plea change.
{¶12} Mosser acknowledged at the hearing that she had signed a plea of guilty.
That written plea was also signed by Mosser’s counsel and then by the trial judge, and
that plea document was promptly filed in the trial court after the hearing.
{¶13} In short, the plea fully comported with Ohio law. State v. Engle, 74 Ohio
St.3d 525, 527 (1996) (“When a defendant enters a plea in a criminal case, the plea must
be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily”).
B. Mosser’s Sentence Was Not Contrary to Law
{¶14} At the sentencing hearing, the trial judge gave the attorneys and Mosser
one last opportunity to address the court about the sentence before it was imposed. The
State recommended a sentence of 180 days in jail with placement for Mosser afterwards
at an inpatient-treatment facility, while Mosser’s counsel urged the court to allow Mosser to participate in a reentry program after any jail term. Mosser herself then spoke,
describing the transportation-related difficulties that she had encountered when she
sought treatment in the past for her anxiety disorder.
{¶15} Under R.C. 2929.21 and R.C. 2929.22, trial courts have broad discretion
when determining what sentence is appropriate in a misdemeanor case. State v. Todd,
2025-Ohio-2559, ¶ 48 (12th Dist.). And “‘[w]hen the court’s sentence is within the
statutory limit, a reviewing court will presume that the trial judge followed the standards
[for misdemeanor sentencing], absent a showing to the contrary.’” State v. Inman, 2021-
Ohio-1573, ¶ 8 (4th Dist.)., quoting State v. Downie, 2009-Ohio-4643, ¶ 48 (7th Dist.).
{¶16} The sentence in this case comports with all relevant sentencing provisions.
The amount of jail time imposed by the trial judge on each of the three charges did not
exceed the statutory maximums set by R.C. 2929.24(A), the length of Mosser’s
supervision period did not exceed the five-year maximum set by R.C. 2929.25(A)(2), and
the non-residential sanctions that were imposed as community-control conditions in the
case all appear to have been designed to discourage Mosser from committing similar
crimes in the future and all appear to have been — in the words of R.C. 2929.27(C) —
“reasonably related to the overriding purposes and principles of misdemeanor
sentencing.”
{¶17} Nothing about the sentence or its imposition was improper, and any
challenge to it now is frivolous. {¶18} For the reasons explained above, we agree with the assessment of
Mosser’s appellate counsel and conclude that this appeal is frivolous. In accordance with
Anders, we grant counsel’s request to withdraw as Mosser’s lawyer, and we affirm the
trial court’s judgment. Costs are to be paid by Appellant Destiny Mosser.
By: Gormley, J.;
King, P.J. and
Montgomery, J. concur.