[Cite as State v. Mosby, 2021-Ohio-2255.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LUCAS COUNTY
State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. L-20-1010
Appellee Trial Court No. CR0201902483
v.
Timothy N. Mosby, Jr. DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellant Decided: June 30, 2021
*****
Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and Lauren Carpenter, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Autumn D. Adams, for appellant.
ZMUDA, P.J.
I. Introduction
{¶ 1} Appellant, Timothy Mosby, appeals the judgment of the Lucas County Court
of Common Pleas, sentencing him to 42 months in prison after he pled no contest to
carrying a concealed weapon, receiving stolen property, having weapons under disability, resisting arrest, and obstructing official business. Because we find that appellant’s
motion to suppress should have been granted, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and
remand this matter to the trial court.
A. Facts and Procedural Background
{¶ 2} During the early morning hours of August 16, 2019, law enforcement
officers began searching a crowd of people that were congregated in a parking lot at the
Greenbelt Apartments in Toledo. Appellant, who was seated in the rear of a parked
vehicle in that lot, was ordered to exit the vehicle. During the encounter, appellant was
found to be in possession of a firearm. Consequently, on August 23, 2019, appellant was
indicted on one count of carrying a concealed weapon in violation of R.C. 2923.12(A)(2)
and (F)(1), a felony of the fourth degree, one count of receiving stolen property in
violation of R.C. 2913.51(A) and (C), a felony of the fourth degree to which a firearm
specification was attached, one count of having weapons while under disability in
violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2) and (B), a felony of the third degree, one count of
resisting arrest in violation of R.C. 2921.33(A) and (D), a misdemeanor of the second
degree, and one count of obstructing official business in violation of R.C. 2921.31(A) and
(B), a misdemeanor of the second degree.
{¶ 3} On September 24, 2019, after entering a plea of not guilty to the
aforementioned charges, appellant filed a motion to suppress, in which he argued that his
August 16 detainment was unconstitutional under both the Constitution of the United
States as well as the Ohio Constitution, because the initial stop of the vehicle was not
2. supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion. In its memorandum in opposition to the
motion to suppress, the state argued that the stop was permissible under the totality of the
circumstances, pointing to the timing of the stop (around 2 a.m.), the high crime location
of the stop (a parking lot to which officers had previously responded for weapons-related
offenses), and the fact that appellant was a participant in “a large disorderly disturbance.”
{¶ 4} A hearing on appellant’s motion to suppress was held on November 26,
2019. At the hearing, the state called four witness. Its first witness was sergeant Melvin
Stachura of the Toledo Police Department’s gang task force.
{¶ 5} Stachura testified that he was on duty on the morning of August 16, 2019,
and participated in detaining appellant at a parking lot located adjacent to an apartment
complex known as the Greenbelt Place Apartments. According to Stachura, the parking
lot at which the stop was initiated is known as the Wayne Lot, so named after a deceased
Cherrywood Crip gang member who was murdered there in early 2018. Stachura
explained that the Greenbelt Place Apartments are also known as the Cherrywood
apartments, which is a reference to the Cherrywood Crips who occupied the territory
surrounding the apartment complex. Stachura testified that the Cherrywood apartment
complex is a high crime area in the city of Toledo.
{¶ 6} As he continued, Stachura indicated that the Cherrywood Crips had an
ongoing feud with the Gear Gang Crips in Toledo, which led to frequent police calls to
the area around the Greenbelt Place apartments. According to Stachura, police “were in
that area every night” in response to reports of disorderly conduct, open containers,
3. drinking, drug use, loitering, and shots fired. These encounters, according to Stachura,
led to the confiscation of “a lot of weapons.”
{¶ 7} Stachura patrolled the area around the Wayne Lot earlier in his shift on
August, 16, 2019, taking note of the large crowd that had gathered there. Upon his return
to the Wayne Lot at 2 a.m., Stachura observed that there were “at least 25 people” in the
parking lot. He testified that he observed “open alcohol consumption” and detected the
odor of burnt marijuana in the area. He further explained that the individuals in the
parking lot were “hanging out,” which he determined met the definition of loitering.
Stachura explained that loitering was a “huge problem” at the Wayne Lot, where
Stachura frequently encountered “from 20 all the way up to a hundred people * * *, and
there would be several fights that would break out.”
{¶ 8} Before engaging the crowd at the Wayne Lot, additional police units were
requested. Stachura explained that the request for additional units was made out of
concern for officer safety based upon prior incidents of violence and the prevalence of
weapons confiscations in that area. Moreover, Stachura stated that the decision to engage
in the crowd was made by law enforcement and was not the product of any citizen
complaints of criminal activity occurring at that location.
{¶ 9} When he arrived on the scene, Stachura noticed that there were “two or three
cars” parked with the engines not running, around which there were individuals who were
drinking alcohol. He stated that “at that point we were going to make a stop on
everybody.” He proceeded to the vehicle where appellant was seated as a rear passenger,
4. and “asked all the occupants of that vehicle to please exit their vehicle.” He stated at the
suppression hearing that he ordered the occupants out of the vehicle for officer safety in
light of the “type of activities that go on in that area,” which he again identified as
“several instances of weapons and shootings even with police on scene.” He further
elaborated that he wanted to detain everyone at the scene so that he could “find out who
is actually doing the open consumption of alcohol, all the other various criminal activity
that’s going on at that moment.” Moreover, Stachura indicated that he wanted to check
everyone’s identification so that he could ascertain who belonged at the apartment
complex and who was loitering.
{¶ 10} Appellant initially ignored the command to exit the vehicle. Eventually,
appellant was removed from the vehicle by police, at which point Stachura overheard
other officers stating that they saw a firearm. Thereafter, officers removed appellant
from the vehicle, confiscated a firearm from his waistband, and arrested him.
{¶ 11} On cross-examination, Stachura was pressed on his claim that the
individuals, including appellant, were loitering at the Wayne Lot. He acknowledged that
one of the passengers in the vehicle was a resident of the apartment complex, and was
thus permitted to be there at the time. He also admitted that the vehicle was not impeding
access to the parking lot or denying anyone passage.
{¶ 12} As to his observation of criminal activity, Stachura stated that the odor of
burnt marijuana was not localized to the subject vehicle, and he acknowledged that the
odor of burnt marijuana “can carry” over a distance depending on the wind and “several
5. factors.” Stachura testified that he did not see appellant or any of the occupants of the
vehicle drinking alcohol, using marijuana, or engaging in any specific criminal activity.
Nonetheless, Stachura indicated that he stopped the vehicle “because there [were] several
individuals around it drinking and smoking marijuana.”
{¶ 13} As its second witness at the suppression hearing, the state called Benjamin
Kiser. Kiser is a police officer for the Toledo Police Department, assigned to the Special
Operations Bureau. Like Stachura, Kiser indicated that the Wayne Lot is located in an
area of heavy drug gang activity, and he noted that he spent “most of July responding to
numerous shots fired calls.”
{¶ 14} Kiser was dispatched to the Wayne Lot on August 16, 2019, in order to
provide “overwatch for officer safety.” Upon his arrival, Kiser observed individuals
openly consuming alcohol and he detected an odor of burnt marijuana. Kiser noticed that
officers who were already on the scene were detaining individuals, but he focused his
attention on the vehicle in which appellant was seated because he noticed that “most of
the individuals were hanging around” the vehicle. As he approached the vehicle, Kiser
heard officers directing the occupants to exit the vehicle. He then ordered appellant to
exit the vehicle, and appellant “essentially ignored [him], was moving around in the back
seat of the vehicle.” Kiser again instructed him to exit the vehicle, and appellant
indicated that he was trying to do so. When appellant ignored Kiser’s commands to exit
the vehicle, Kiser became concerned that appellant was attempting to conceal a weapon
or drugs. Thereafter, Kiser grabbed appellant’s left arm and pulled appellant out of the
6. vehicle. On cross-examination, Kiser acknowledged that he did not observe appellant
consuming alcohol or using marijuana prior to appellant’s arrest.
{¶ 15} As its third witness, the state called Toledo Police officer Michael
Ellerbrock to the stand. Ellerbrock was one of the officers who responded to the Wayne
Lot on the night of appellant’s arrest. He generally corroborated the previous testimony
concerning the open consumption of alcohol and the odor of burnt marijuana in the
Wayne Lot, acknowledging that he did not observe appellant taking part in either of those
activities. Ellerbrock testified that he was the officer who noticed the firearm in
appellant’s waistband as Kiser was pulling appellant out of the vehicle. Upon noticing
the firearm, he grabbed appellant by the arm and removed the weapon from appellant’s
waistband. Ellerbrock’s bodycam footage depicting his encounter with appellant was
introduced into the record and published for the jury.
{¶ 16} For its fourth and final witness, the state called detective Nicholas Bocik of
the Toledo Police Department’s gang task force. Like the other witnesses, Bocik was
present at the Wayne Lot on the morning of August 16, 2019. Bocik testified that Toledo
police had responded to “over 20 reports involving firearms or shots fired or something
of that type of incident” in the area around the Wayne Lot during the three months
preceding appellant’s arrest. Bocik characterized the Wayne Lot as a high crime area,
and proceeded to recount several specific incidents of shots fired and other violent crimes
involving firearms that took place near the Greenbelt Place Apartments between May
7. 2019 and August 2019. Notably, Bocik did not testify as to any reports of shots fired in
connection with the August 16, 2019 Wayne Lot encounter.
{¶ 17} After the state finished presenting its witnesses, appellant elected not to call
any witnesses, and the parties presented their closing arguments. For his part, appellant
argued that the state failed to establish the existence of reasonable suspicion to support its
investigative stop of the vehicle or appellant. Appellant highlighted the fact that the
state’s witnesses testified that they neither detected an odor of marijuana emanating from
the vehicle nor observed any of the occupants of the vehicle consuming alcohol.
Appellant further explained that the stop was not premised upon an ongoing emergency
or a citizen complaint. Thus, appellant reasoned, the police should have simply issued
citations to those who were openly consuming alcohol, and then order the crowd to
disperse. Contending that reasonable suspicion was lacking here, appellant argued that
the officers were not permitted to detain everyone who was present, including the
occupants of the vehicle in which he was a passenger, which was legally parked in the
Wayne Lot.
{¶ 18} During its closing argument, the state argued that the totality of the
circumstances supported the notion that the officers had reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity to initiate the stop of appellant and the others in the vehicle. First, the state relied
upon the fact that the stop occurred in a high crime area, and referenced the testimony
that the Wayne Lot is “one of the most dangerous places in the city of Toledo.” Second,
the state pointed to the fact that each of the officers who testified indicated that extensive
8. criminal activity had occurred in and around the area of the Wayne Lot during the
summer of 2019. Third, the state relied upon the time of day in which the stop took place
as a factor weighing in favor of a finding that officer’s had reasonable suspicion to justify
the stop. Fourth, the state contended that the stop was justified based upon appellant’s
suspicious activity, namely his “repeated refusal to exit the vehicle when he was ordered
to do so.” Finally, the state cited the training and experience of the officers, who testified
that had been involved in gang suppression for many years and were familiar with the
area around the Wayne Lot and the Greenbelt Place Apartments.
{¶ 19} Upon hearing the arguments of the parties, the trial court rendered its
decision on appellant’s motion to suppress from the bench. The court found that the state
established reasonable suspicion based upon the expertise of the officers, their knowledge
of an ongoing gang war, their observation of open container violations and the odor of
burnt marijuana, the high crime nature of the Wayne Lot area, and appellant’s refusal to
exit the vehicle upon command. In light of these factors, and upon finding that officer
safety concerns justified the police in ordering appellant out of the vehicle, the trial court
denied appellant’s motion to suppress from the bench. The court issued a written
decision summarily denying the motion to suppress on November 27, 2019.
{¶ 20} Thereafter, on December 5, 2019, appellant appeared before the trial court
for a change of plea hearing, at which he entered a plea of no contest to the charges
contained in the indictment. The trial court accepted appellant’s plea, found him guilty of
the charges, and continued the matter for sentencing.
9. {¶ 21} At a December 23, 2019 sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered
appellant to serve prison sentences of 12 months for carrying a concealed weapon, 12
months for receiving stolen property, 18 months for having weapons while under
disability, 90 days for resisting arrest, and 90 days for obstructing official business.
Additionally, the trial court imposed a sentence of one year for the firearm specification
attached to the charge of receiving stolen property. Appellant was then ordered to serve
the 12-month sentences and 90-day sentences concurrently to one another, but
consecutively to the remaining 18-month sentence and one-year sentence, for an
aggregate prison sentence of 42 months. Thereafter, appellant filed his timely notice of
appeal.
B. Assignment of Error
{¶ 22} On appeal, appellant assigns the following error for our review:
The Trial Court erred in denying Appellant’s Motion to Suppress
when the officer lacked a reasonable and articulable suspicion to justify the
stop and detention of Appellant in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments and Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution.
II. Analysis
{¶ 23} In his sole assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred in
denying his motion to suppress.
{¶ 24} Our review of the trial court’s denial of appellant's motion to suppress
“presents a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Wesson, 137 Ohio St.3d 309, 2013-
10. Ohio-4575, 999 N.E.2d 557, ¶ 40, quoting State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-
Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. We must accept the trial court’s factual findings if they
are supported by competent credible evidence, and “independently determine, without
deference to the conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal
standard.” Wesson at ¶ 40, quoting Burnside at ¶ 8.
{¶ 25} Here, appellant argues that the trial court should have granted his motion to
suppress, because the discovery of a firearm on his person was the product of an
investigatory detention that was not supported by reasonable suspicion and was therefore
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution, both of which protect citizens from
unreasonable searches and seizures.
{¶ 26} “‘The U.S. Supreme Court has created three categories of police-citizen
contact to identify the separate situations where constitutional guarantees are implicated:
(1) consensual encounters, (2) investigative or “Terry [v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868,
20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)]” stops, and (3) arrests.’” (Citations omitted.) State v. Williams,
6th Dist. Lucas No. L-17-1148, 2018-Ohio-5202, ¶ 20, quoting State v. Staten, 4th Dist.
Athens No. 03CA1, 2003-Ohio-4592, ¶ 16. Here, the encounter between appellant and
police falls into the category of an investigative Terry stop.
{¶ 27} In order to pass constitutional muster, an investigative stop must be
premised upon an officer’s reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity.
Bowling Green v. Murray, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-18-045, 2019-Ohio-4285, ¶ 12, citing
11. State v. Mesley, 134 Ohio App.3d 833, 840, 732 N.E.2d 477 (6th Dist.1999). Such
suspicion must be objective, particularized, and based on the totality of the circumstances
confronted by the officer prior to the stop. State v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St.3d 86, 87, 565
N.E.2d 1271 (1991); see also United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-418, 101 S.Ct.
690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981) (“Based upon that whole picture the detaining officers must
have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of
criminal activity.”).
{¶ 28} In analyzing suppression arguments challenging the propriety of
investigative stops, courts must view the totality of the circumstances “‘through the eyes
of a reasonable and cautious police officer on the scene, guided by his experience and
training.’” State v. Freeman, 64 Ohio St.2d 291, 295, 414 N.E.2d 1044 (1980), quoting
United States v. Hall, 525 F.2d 857, 859 (D.C.Cir.1976). To be sure, an investigative
stop cannot be “based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches * * *.”
Terry at 22. Rather, “before stopping a person, the officers must have an objective basis
for suspecting that that particular person was involved in the criminal activity.
(Emphasis sic.) State v. Hairston, 156 Ohio St.3d 363, 2019-Ohio-1622, 126 N.E.3d
1132, ¶ 26 (Donnelly, J., concurring), citing Cortez at 417-418 and Ybarra v. Illinois, 444
U.S. 85, 94, 100 S.Ct. 338, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979). In determining whether or not the
officer has a reasonable suspicion we look at the totality of the circumstances and not to
any one factor. Andrews at 87.
12. {¶ 29} The investigative stop at issue in this case took place upon officers’ arrival
at the Wayne Lot. Ellerbrock’s bodycam footage of his encounter with appellant and
testimony from the officers reveals that the vehicle in which appellant was a passenger
was targeted for detention almost immediately upon officers’ arrival on the scene,
without any observation of criminal or even suspicious conduct on appellant’s part.
{¶ 30} In its brief to this court (and in its arguments before the trial court at the
suppression hearing), the state relies upon several factors that appear in the Ohio
Supreme Court’s decision in Andrews. The state claims that these factors provided
officers with reasonable suspicion to conduct their investigative stop of the vehicle and
its passengers (including appellant). The factors cited by the state include (1) the high
crime area in which the Wayne Lot is located, (2) the time of day of the encounter
(approximately 2 a.m.), (3) the training and experience of the detaining officers, who
were long-time members of the gang task force unit, and (4) appellant’s suspicious
conduct after he was ordered to exit the vehicle.
{¶ 31} As noted, the factors relied upon the by the state were previously used to
justify an investigative stop in the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Andrews. Id. at ¶
88; see also State v. Williams, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-17-1148, 2018-Ohio-5202
(examining the foregoing factors in the context of a reasonable suspicion analysis).
However, as set forth below, we find that one of the factors articulated by the Ohio
Supreme Court in Andrews (suspicious activity of the defendant) is not supported by any
13. evidence in this case, and the other factors do not give rise to a particularized suspicion
that appellant was engaged in criminal activity.
{¶ 32} Initially, we reject the state’s reliance upon appellant’s allegedly suspicious
activity after he was ordered to exit the vehicle. In Andrews, the suspicious activity
occurred prior to the stop. Specifically, the officer observed the defendant running away
from the police cruiser, and when the defendant saw the officer he suddenly stopped and
threw down what he was carrying in his hand. Id.
{¶ 33} By contrast, appellant’s activity occurred after the investigative stop was
already underway. The investigative stop began, and appellant was detained, at the
moment he was ordered out of the car. State v. Johnson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92540,
2009-Ohio-5377, ¶ 22. Logically, appellant’s conduct in responding to the officers’
orders to exit the vehicle could not form the basis for the officers to approach the vehicle
and initiate the stop in the first place. Unlike the defendant’s prior conduct in Andrews,
which could give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, appellant’s actions in
response to the officers’ commands, whether suspicious or not, are irrelevant to the
question of whether the investigative stop in this case was supported by reasonable
suspicion.
{¶ 34} Turning to the remaining factors, we agree with the state that the testimony
provided at the suppression hearing established that the stop was initiated by experienced
14. officers, in a high crime area, late at night.1 However, these factors alone do not support
the initiation of an investigative stop, because the officers who responded to the Wayne
Lot did not possess the requisite reasonable suspicion to believe that appellant was
engaged in criminal activity. Indeed, there is a dirth of evidence in the record that
appellant or any of the other passengers in the vehicle were suspected of any criminal
activity.
{¶ 35} According to Stachura and the other officers, a large crowd of individuals
were gathered at the Wayne Lot upon his arrival on the scene. Some of these individuals
were openly consuming alcohol, but appellant and the other occupants of the vehicle
were not. Further, there was an odor of burnt marijuana in the air, but none of the
officers testified that it was emanating from the vehicle, and the officers acknowledged
that they did not see the vehicle’s occupants using marijuana.
{¶ 36} Rather than limit their encounter to the individuals who were engaged in
criminal activity, Stachura decided to “make a stop on everybody” so that he could “find
1 The dissent emphasizes the facts supporting these factors, and finds that we fail to tie these facts to the officer’s treatment of appellant. While we acknowledge that the area in which the stop in this case occurred was a high crime area, this fact does not eclipse the need for a particularized suspicion in order to justify a Terry stop. Otherwise, officers patrolling in high crime areas would be given carte blanche to stop an individual simply because the individual is found in an area associated with crime. This would encourage the arbitrary exercise of law enforcement power, and usher in something akin to “Fourth- Amendment-free zones” in certain locations. We recognize that the high crime nature of an area is a factor to be considered in evaluating a stop under Terry, but we reject the state’s attempt to make high crime, standing alone, a sufficient factor to support a Terry stop.
15. out who is actually doing the open consumption of alcohol, all the other various criminal
activity that’s going on at that moment.” Stachura indicated that he stopped the vehicle
“because there [were] several individuals around it drinking and smoking marijuana.”
{¶ 37} This testimony is revealing, because it demonstrates that officers lacked
any particularized suspicion that the occupants of the vehicle (including appellant) were
engaged in, or about to be engaged in, any criminal activity. In essence, the investigative
stop at issue here was premised upon officers’ knowledge of historical criminal activity
in this high crime area, and observations of conduct of other individuals outside the
vehicle, not any observations specific to appellant or the other occupants of the vehicle.
Moreover, despite extensive testimony as to the prevalence of gang activity in this area
generally, there was no evidence adduced by the state at the suppression hearing to
suggest that gang activity was underway at the Wayne Lot at the time of appellant’s
detention, and officers did not testify that appellant or any of the occupants of the vehicle
were engaged in gang activity.
{¶ 38} The record below establishes that (1) the Wayne Lot is a high crime area in
the city of Toledo and (2) other individuals in the parking lot were engaged in illegal
activity.2 In State v. Carter, 69 Ohio St.3d 57, 630 N.E.2d 355 (1994), the Ohio Supreme
2 At the suppression hearing, officers briefly asserted that the individuals at the Wayne Lot were loitering, without elaborating as to whether appellant’s presence in the vehicle constituted a violation of the city of Toledo’s loitering ordinance or any other loitering law. Moreover, the officers acknowledged that one of the occupants of the vehicle was a resident of the Greenbelt Place apartments and was therefore permitted to be at the parking lot. On this record, we find that loitering did not provide a basis for the
16. Court examined the propriety of an investigative stop that took place in a high crime area,
and stated “that factor alone is not sufficient to justify an investigative stop. * * * To hold
otherwise would result in the wholesale loss of the personal liberty of those with the
misfortune of living in high crime areas.” Id. at 65; see also Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S.
47, 52, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979) (being “in a neighborhood frequented by
drug users, standing alone, is not a basis for concluding that appellant himself was
engaged in criminal conduct”). Further, appellant’s “mere proximity to others
independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, provide a sufficient
constitutional basis to [stop] that person.” State v. Rosa, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 85247,
2005-Ohio-3028, ¶ 14; see also Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91, 100 S.Ct. 338, 62
L.Ed.2d 238 (1979) (examining the issue of particularity in the context of the search of a
person, and stating that “a person’s mere propinquity to others independently suspected
of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search that
person.”).
investigative stop in this case. See State v. Griffin, 133 Ohio App.3d 490, 500, 728 N.E.2d 1097 (6th Dist.1999), quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940) (“Subjectively interpreting the loitering laws to provide probable cause to arrest in order to search an individual in a high crime or drug area, where there was no probable cause to believe any drug offense had occurred, creates a convenient but impermissible tool for ‘harsh and discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting officials against particular groups deemed to merit their displeasure.’”); Johnson, supra, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92540, 2009-Ohio-5377, at ¶ 24 (“merely because [the defendant] was in a car parked in an area where several people were loitering on a sidewalk does not give the state justification to search [him] or the car he was occupying.”).
17. {¶ 39} While the officers may have had the requisite reasonable suspicion to
initiate an investigative stop of the individuals outside the vehicle, they possessed nothing
more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion,” or a “hunch” that appellant was
engaged in criminal activity. State v. Rivera, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-04-1369, 2006-Ohio-
1867, ¶ 18, quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889. Because the
officers failed to articulate an objectively reasonable basis to suspect that appellant was
engaged in criminal activity, relying instead on the fact that appellant was sitting in a
parked car in a high crime area, we hold that reasonable suspicion was lacking here.3
{¶ 40} Were we to hold otherwise, we would obliterate the particularization
requirement set forth in Terry and its progeny, and establish an “unwise precedent that a
police officer may conduct an investigative stop of any person present in a so-called ‘high
crime’ area * * *, without any specific and articulable facts pointing more directly to that
3 The dissent focuses on officer safety as a basis for the officers to order appellant out of the vehicle, concluding that the officers exercised reasonable and prudent precaution by clearing the vehicle while conducting the investigation of those individuals who were loitering at the Wayne Lot. We recognize the need for officers to ensure their own safety in carrying out legitimate police functions, but we reject the notion that such safety concerns trump the constitutional rights enjoyed by those individuals with whom police interact. Instead, safety precautions must be crafted by officers to both protect the officer and safeguard the individual’s constitutional rights. In this case, the officers could have fulfilled this dual objective by, for example, simply ordering the driver of the vehicle in which appellant was a passenger to depart from the Wayne Lot, thereby removing the vehicle and its occupants from the area entirely. This would have been especially appropriate here, because the officers had no indication that the detected odor of marijuana was emanating from the vehicle at the time of the encounter and there were no other indicia of criminal activity specific to the occupants of the vehicle.
18. particular person’s being engaged in criminal activity.” Hairston, supra, 156 Ohio St.3d
363, 2019-Ohio-1622, 126 N.E.3d 1132, at ¶ 32 (O’Connor, C.J., dissenting).
{¶ 41} Having found that officers lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate the
investigative stop of appellant, it follows that the firearm discovered during the
investigative stop should have been suppressed as “fruits of the poisonous tree.” See
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-488, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).
The trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion to suppress such evidence, and we
therefore find appellant’s sole assignment of error well-taken.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 42} In light of the foregoing, the judgment of the Lucas County Court of
Common Pleas denying appellant’s motion to suppress is reversed, and this matter is
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this decision. Pursuant
to App.R. 24, appellee is hereby ordered to pay the costs incurred on appeal.
Judgment reversed, and remanded.
Christine E. Mayle, J. _______________________________ JUDGE Gene A. Zmuda, P.J. CONCUR. _______________________________ JUDGE
Myron C. Duhart, J. DISSENTS AND WRITES SEPARATELY.
19. DUHART, J.
{¶ 43} I respectfully dissent from the majority's opinion reversing the trial court's
denial of Mosby’s motion to suppress. I conclude that the facts as articulated do not
accurately reflect the reality of the situation with which officers were faced, and,
therefore, led to a faulty analysis and result in this case.
{¶ 44} While the majority acknowledges that there was evidence of “over 20
reports involving firearms or shots fired” in the area around the Wayne Lot during the
three month’s preceding appellant’s arrest, they seem to ignore specific evidence of a
recent report, from August 10, 2019, of an incident during which some 40 people who
had gathered in the Wayne Lot were fighting. They also fail to mention a report from
August 15, 2019 -- the night before appellant’s arrest in this matter -- of an incident
during which a large group of individuals were loitering at the Wayne Lot and then fled,
after which police recovered a firearm on the tire of a vehicle. As testified to by the
officers, the Greenbelt Apartments/Wayne Lot area was a high crime area that officers
responded to frequently in the summer of 2019.
{¶ 45} Although the majority acknowledges: (1) that the area in question was a
high crime area, (2) that people gathered in the area with appellant -- at 2:00 a.m. -- were
openly consuming alcohol, and (3) that there was the odor of burnt marijuana in the air,
they largely fail to tie these facts to the officer’s treatment of appellant. The scene of the
arrest was not just a high crime area; it was a high crime area in which a crowd was
gathered and where yet-to-be-identified individuals in that crowd were unquestionably
20. involved in illegal activity. While the majority admits that “the officers may have had the
requisite reasonable suspicion to initiate an investigative stop of [other unnamed or
otherwise identified] individuals outside the vehicle,” they puzzlingly conclude that the
officers “possessed nothing more than an ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion,’ or a
‘hunch’ that appellant was engaged in criminal activity inside the car.
{¶ 46} When the majority states that “the investigative stop * * * was premised
upon officers’ knowledge of historical criminal activity in this high crime area, and
observations of conduct of other individuals outside the vehicle, [and] not any
observations specific to appellant or the other occupants of the vehicle,” they erroneously
isolate appellant, his behavior, and his treatment, on the night in question from highly
relevant surrounding circumstances. The circumstances of this case involve more than
appellant’s “mere proximity” to others engaging in illegal activity. Because appellant
was a part of the crowd in which as-yet-unidentified members were engaged in illegal
activity, and because the crowd was located in an area where crowds were frequently and
recently the source of violence and illegal firearms, officers had a reasonable basis to
suspect that appellant, himself, was involved in criminal activity.
{¶ 47} Sgt. Stachura testified that when the 2:00 a.m. detention of appellant
occurred, appellant was seated in the back seat of a vehicle that was surrounded by
loitering individuals. He further testified that appellant was asked to exit the vehicle for
officer safety, because it was difficult to see appellant’s hands or any weapons he may
have possessed. Given the circumstances, I believe that the officers’ precaution in this
21. regard was lawful, reasonable, and prudent. Officer Kiser testified that appellant refused
to exit the vehicle and was “moving around” in the back seat, although nothing was
impeding him from exiting and, instead, he was merely ignoring officer directions.
Officer Kiser testified that he was concerned that appellant was concealing weapons or
drugs, something that Officer Kiser had commonly experienced suspects doing. Officer
Ellerbrock likewise testified that appellant refused to exit the vehicle, and Officer
Ellerbrock subsequently observed the firearm in appellant’s waistband.
{¶ 48} In sum, the chain of events that led to appellant being taken out of the car
should be viewed in its totality, as a continuum of suspicion, where each circumstance
reasonably increased the officers’ level of suspicion. In so doing, I conclude that
evidence of appellant’s suspicious conduct as described by the officers clearly favors a
finding of reasonable, articulable suspicion. Likewise, I believe the majority errs in
limiting the focus of its analysis to the narrow question of whether criminal activity may
or may not have been occurring inside the vehicle at the precise time that the officers
approached, apparently giving little or no weight to the totality of the circumstances that
brought appellant to the attention of the officers in the first place.
22.