[Cite as State v. McNeal, 2025-Ohio-3304.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LUCAS COUNTY
State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. L-24-1184
Appellee Trial Court No. CR0202302448
v.
Dean Michael McNeal DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellant Decided: September 12, 2025
***** Julia R. Bates, Esq., Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and Randy L. Meyer, Esq., Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Laurel A. Kendall, Esq., for appellant.
*****
ZMUDA, J.
I. Introduction
{¶ 1} Appellant, Dean Michael McNeal, appeals from his July 17, 2024 conviction
on one count of aggravated possession of drugs. Appellant argues that the trial court
erred when it denied his pretrial motion to suppress prior to his conviction. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s denial of appellant’s motion and affirm his
conviction.
A. Facts and Procedural Background
{¶ 2} On September 19, 2023, appellant was indicted on one count of aggravated
trafficking in drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) and (C)(1)(d), a second-degree
felony; and one count of aggravated possession of drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A)
and (C)(1)(c), a second-degree felony. The charges arose from an incident that occurred
on April 6, 2023, when a police officer observed appellant and two other individuals
approaching a vehicle on foot in a “high crime area” of the city of Toledo in Lucas
County, Ohio. The officer then observed appellant, while at the vehicle, pull an item
from his waistband and exchange it with the driver of the vehicle. Another officer then
stopped appellant and, upon performing a search, discovered small glass jars containing
methamphetamine.
{¶ 3} Appellant appeared for his arraignment on December 13, 2023. At that time,
he was determined to be indigent and was appointed counsel. He then entered a not
guilty plea to both charges.
{¶ 4} On March 5, 2024, appellant filed a motion to suppress all evidence seized
during the officer’s search. Appellant argued that the officers observing his conduct had
no reasonable, articulable suspicion that he had engaged in criminal conduct and,
therefore, the search was unreasonable and violated his 4th Amendment right to be free
2. from unreasonable searches.1 The trial court held a hearing on appellant’s motion on
April 18, 2024. The state called a single witness, Detective Matthew Sulick, whose
testimony is summarized below:2
{¶ 5} At the time of the hearing, Detective Sulick had been employed with the
Toledo Police Department in Toledo, Ohio, for approximately 12 years. On April 23,
2023, the date appellant was searched by Toledo Police officers, Detective Sulick was
assigned to the department’s gang task force. In that role, his task was to “investigate,
identify, apprehend, [and] prosecute individuals involved in criminal activity.” The task
force accomplishes these goals through “traffic stops, suspect stops, going to hot calls for
service, responding to shots fired, [and] incidents of that nature.”
{¶ 6} On the date appellant was searched, Detective Sulick and his assigned
partner were on “routine patrol.” While driving by an apartment complex, they observed
three males approach a silver vehicle. Detective Sulick noted that one of the individuals,
ultimately determined to be appellant, was wearing a distinctive backpack with a shark
graphic on it. Detective Sulick observed appellant approach the driver’s side of the
vehicle. While at the driver’s door, appellant removed an item from his “waist area” and
conducted a “hand-to-hand” exchange with the driver. Appellant and the other
1 Appellant’s motion also alleged that the officers conducting the search elicited incriminating statements from him prior to advising him of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Appellant does not appeal the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress those statements. 2 Testimony unrelated to the issue on appeal has been omitted.
3. individuals with him then walked away from the vehicle, traveling eastbound. Detective
Sulick could not identify the object appellant gave the driver, but testified that his
training and experience showed that hand-to-hand transactions indicated drug-related
activity. He estimated that approximately 50% of his investigations into drug activity
involved hand-to-hand transactions. He also noted that the transaction occurred in a high
crime area of the city.
{¶ 7} After appellant walked away from the transaction, Detective Sulick and his
partner pulled into a parking lot ahead of him in his direction of travel. Upon seeing the
patrol vehicle, appellant and the other individuals immediately turned northbound toward
the apartment complex, an evasive maneuver Detective Sulick believed was to avoid an
encounter with him. As appellant continued in the opposite direction, Detective Sulick
provided a description of the individuals over the radio seeking other task force
members’ assistance in stopping them. Another officer, Sergeant Krabill, “made contact”
with the individuals a short time later.
{¶ 8} Detective Sulick testified that when he joined Sergeant Krabill, he observed
a strong odor of both raw and burnt marijuana. He then conducted a “pat down and
search” of appellant and discovered a pouch in his waistband. The pouch contained a
glass jar with several “colorful pills” as well as marijuana. The officers seized the pills
and marijuana, provided appellant a property receipt, and then released him.
{¶ 9} After describing the search, Detective Sulick then provided a detailed
description of the location at which he first observed appellant through aerial views and
4. maps the state introduced into evidence. He described the area in which the search
occurred as a “high crime, high drug area.” He testified that prior to becoming a
detective, he served on patrol in that area and would respond to “at least * * * one to two
incidents during an eight-hour shift.” He stated it was common for these incidents to
involve drug-related activity.
{¶ 10} Detective Sulick then testified that after completing the search, he returned
to the department’s “Safety Building” and performed a field test on the pills seized from
appellant. The field test revealed that the pills contained methamphetamine and they
were submitted to the department’s lab for testing. The lab’s chemical analysis
confirmed the field test results and appellant was indicted on the possession and
trafficking offenses.
{¶ 11} On cross-examination, Detective Sulick testified that the hand-to-hand
transaction he observed appellant conduct lasted approximately 5 to 10 seconds. He
noted that during the transaction, appellant reached into a pouch in his “waistband area.”
He conceded that he did not see what item was passed between appellant and the driver,
but that the nature of the transaction and the area in which it occurred is what raised his
suspicion that appellant was selling drugs.
{¶ 12} At the conclusion of Detective Sulick’s testimony, the parties offered brief
arguments regarding whether Detective Sulick had articulable, reasonable suspicion that
appellant had engaged in criminal activity. The trial court determined that he did have
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[Cite as State v. McNeal, 2025-Ohio-3304.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LUCAS COUNTY
State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. L-24-1184
Appellee Trial Court No. CR0202302448
v.
Dean Michael McNeal DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellant Decided: September 12, 2025
***** Julia R. Bates, Esq., Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and Randy L. Meyer, Esq., Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Laurel A. Kendall, Esq., for appellant.
*****
ZMUDA, J.
I. Introduction
{¶ 1} Appellant, Dean Michael McNeal, appeals from his July 17, 2024 conviction
on one count of aggravated possession of drugs. Appellant argues that the trial court
erred when it denied his pretrial motion to suppress prior to his conviction. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s denial of appellant’s motion and affirm his
conviction.
A. Facts and Procedural Background
{¶ 2} On September 19, 2023, appellant was indicted on one count of aggravated
trafficking in drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) and (C)(1)(d), a second-degree
felony; and one count of aggravated possession of drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A)
and (C)(1)(c), a second-degree felony. The charges arose from an incident that occurred
on April 6, 2023, when a police officer observed appellant and two other individuals
approaching a vehicle on foot in a “high crime area” of the city of Toledo in Lucas
County, Ohio. The officer then observed appellant, while at the vehicle, pull an item
from his waistband and exchange it with the driver of the vehicle. Another officer then
stopped appellant and, upon performing a search, discovered small glass jars containing
methamphetamine.
{¶ 3} Appellant appeared for his arraignment on December 13, 2023. At that time,
he was determined to be indigent and was appointed counsel. He then entered a not
guilty plea to both charges.
{¶ 4} On March 5, 2024, appellant filed a motion to suppress all evidence seized
during the officer’s search. Appellant argued that the officers observing his conduct had
no reasonable, articulable suspicion that he had engaged in criminal conduct and,
therefore, the search was unreasonable and violated his 4th Amendment right to be free
2. from unreasonable searches.1 The trial court held a hearing on appellant’s motion on
April 18, 2024. The state called a single witness, Detective Matthew Sulick, whose
testimony is summarized below:2
{¶ 5} At the time of the hearing, Detective Sulick had been employed with the
Toledo Police Department in Toledo, Ohio, for approximately 12 years. On April 23,
2023, the date appellant was searched by Toledo Police officers, Detective Sulick was
assigned to the department’s gang task force. In that role, his task was to “investigate,
identify, apprehend, [and] prosecute individuals involved in criminal activity.” The task
force accomplishes these goals through “traffic stops, suspect stops, going to hot calls for
service, responding to shots fired, [and] incidents of that nature.”
{¶ 6} On the date appellant was searched, Detective Sulick and his assigned
partner were on “routine patrol.” While driving by an apartment complex, they observed
three males approach a silver vehicle. Detective Sulick noted that one of the individuals,
ultimately determined to be appellant, was wearing a distinctive backpack with a shark
graphic on it. Detective Sulick observed appellant approach the driver’s side of the
vehicle. While at the driver’s door, appellant removed an item from his “waist area” and
conducted a “hand-to-hand” exchange with the driver. Appellant and the other
1 Appellant’s motion also alleged that the officers conducting the search elicited incriminating statements from him prior to advising him of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Appellant does not appeal the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress those statements. 2 Testimony unrelated to the issue on appeal has been omitted.
3. individuals with him then walked away from the vehicle, traveling eastbound. Detective
Sulick could not identify the object appellant gave the driver, but testified that his
training and experience showed that hand-to-hand transactions indicated drug-related
activity. He estimated that approximately 50% of his investigations into drug activity
involved hand-to-hand transactions. He also noted that the transaction occurred in a high
crime area of the city.
{¶ 7} After appellant walked away from the transaction, Detective Sulick and his
partner pulled into a parking lot ahead of him in his direction of travel. Upon seeing the
patrol vehicle, appellant and the other individuals immediately turned northbound toward
the apartment complex, an evasive maneuver Detective Sulick believed was to avoid an
encounter with him. As appellant continued in the opposite direction, Detective Sulick
provided a description of the individuals over the radio seeking other task force
members’ assistance in stopping them. Another officer, Sergeant Krabill, “made contact”
with the individuals a short time later.
{¶ 8} Detective Sulick testified that when he joined Sergeant Krabill, he observed
a strong odor of both raw and burnt marijuana. He then conducted a “pat down and
search” of appellant and discovered a pouch in his waistband. The pouch contained a
glass jar with several “colorful pills” as well as marijuana. The officers seized the pills
and marijuana, provided appellant a property receipt, and then released him.
{¶ 9} After describing the search, Detective Sulick then provided a detailed
description of the location at which he first observed appellant through aerial views and
4. maps the state introduced into evidence. He described the area in which the search
occurred as a “high crime, high drug area.” He testified that prior to becoming a
detective, he served on patrol in that area and would respond to “at least * * * one to two
incidents during an eight-hour shift.” He stated it was common for these incidents to
involve drug-related activity.
{¶ 10} Detective Sulick then testified that after completing the search, he returned
to the department’s “Safety Building” and performed a field test on the pills seized from
appellant. The field test revealed that the pills contained methamphetamine and they
were submitted to the department’s lab for testing. The lab’s chemical analysis
confirmed the field test results and appellant was indicted on the possession and
trafficking offenses.
{¶ 11} On cross-examination, Detective Sulick testified that the hand-to-hand
transaction he observed appellant conduct lasted approximately 5 to 10 seconds. He
noted that during the transaction, appellant reached into a pouch in his “waistband area.”
He conceded that he did not see what item was passed between appellant and the driver,
but that the nature of the transaction and the area in which it occurred is what raised his
suspicion that appellant was selling drugs.
{¶ 12} At the conclusion of Detective Sulick’s testimony, the parties offered brief
arguments regarding whether Detective Sulick had articulable, reasonable suspicion that
appellant had engaged in criminal activity. The trial court determined that he did have
reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity and denied appellant’s motion to
5. suppress at the conclusion of the hearing. The trial court filed a written order denying the
motion shortly after the hearing.
{¶ 13} On May 21, 2024, appellant appeared for a change of plea hearing before
the trial court. At that time, pursuant to an agreement with the state, appellant entered a
no-contest plea to the aggravated possession charge. In exchange, the state moved to
dismiss the aggravated trafficking in drugs charge. The trial court accepted the plea
agreement, dismissed the trafficking offense, and on July 17, 2024, sentenced appellant to
an indefinite prison term of a minimum of four years and a maximum of six years. The
trial court memorialized appellant’s sentence in a judgment entry later that day.
B. Assignments of Error
{¶ 14} Appellant timely appealed the trial court’s judgment and alleged the
following error for our review:
The trial court abused its discretion when it denied appellant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained from an arguably illegal Terry stop.
II. Law and Analysis
{¶ 15} In his single assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred
in denying his motion to suppress. Specifically, he argues that he was the subject of an
illegal Terry search in violation of the 4th Amendment of the United States Constitution
and that the evidence discovered during that search should have been suppressed.
{¶ 16} “Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law
and fact.” State v. Colby, 2021-Ohio-4405, ¶ 14 (6th Dist.), citing State v.
6. Burnside,2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. “When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court
assumes the role of trier of fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve factual
questions and evaluate the credibility of witnesses.” Burnside at ¶ 8, citing State v. Mills,
62 Ohio St.3d 357, 366 (1992). “Consequently, an appellate court must accept the trial
court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent credible evidence”. Id. at ¶ 8.
“Accepting these facts as true, the appellate court must then independently, without
deference to the conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal
standard.” Id.
{¶ 17} The legal question at issue here is whether Detective Sulick satisfied the
standard necessary to search appellant through a Terry stop. A Terry stop, so named
because of Terry v. Ohio, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968), is an investigatory detention that can
only be initiated when an officer has reasonable suspicion that an individual was engaged
in criminal activity. State v. Mckenzie, 2025-Ohio-150, ¶ 24 (5th Dist.). “Reasonable
suspicion entails some minimal level of objective justification for making a stop—that is,
something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch but less than
the required level of suspicion required for probable cause.” State v. Purley, 2019-Ohio-
3931, ¶ 25 (6th Dist.), citing State v. Jones, 70 Ohio App.3d 554, 556-557 (2d Dist.1990).
For a Terry stop to be valid, “an officer must be able to point to specific and articulable
facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrants
that intrusion.” State v. Daniels, 2013-Ohio-1081, ¶ 10 (6th Dist.) The actions of the
officer to determine whether a Terry stop is valid is viewed through “the eyes of a
7. reasonable and cautious police officer on the scene, guided by his experience and
training.” State v. Bobo, 37 Ohio St.3d 177, 179 (1988), citing United States v. Hall, 525
F.2d 857, 859 (D.C.Cir. 1976).
{¶ 18} We begin our analysis by reviewing the facts in the record. Burnside at ¶ 8.
We find that the facts are undisputed. Detective Sulick testified that he observed
appellant conduct a hand-to-hand transaction with an individual in a vehicle in a high
crime area of the city. He then observed appellant, when leaving the transaction, turn and
travel in the opposite direction of his patrol vehicle. When officers detained appellant,
their search revealed glass jars containing methamphetamine. Appellant does not
challenge this testimony or the results of the search. He merely argues that these facts are
insufficient to permit the Terry stop that resulted in the discovery of the
methamphetamine. Because the facts are undisputed, our analysis is limited to whether
those facts satisfy the applicable legal standard to determine whether the stop was valid,
that is, whether these facts show that Detective Sulick had reasonable, articulable
suspicion that appellant was engaged in criminal activity to warrant the Terry stop that
resulted in the discovery of the methamphetamine. Id.
{¶ 19} As described above, Detective Sulick identified several undisputed facts—a
hand-to-hand transaction in a high crime area coupled with appellant’s attempt to evade
interaction with police officers—that formed the basis of his suspicion that appellant was
engaged in criminal activity. Each of these facts are relevant to determining whether
Detective Sulick had sufficient reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop of appellant.
8. See State v. Manning, 2009-Ohio-2605, ¶ 14-16 (6th Dist.) (holding that an officer’s
observation of hand-to-hand transactions in an area with a history of drug complaints was
sufficient to show reasonable suspicion of criminal activity); State v, Williams, 2018-
Ohio-5202, ¶ 45 (6th Dist.), citing State v. Bobo, 37 Ohio St.3d 177 (1988) (“Ohio courts
recognize that the reputation of an area for criminal activity is an articulable fact upon
which a police officer may legitimately rely in determining whether an investigative stop
is warranted.”); State v. Knicely, 2014-Ohio-3437, ¶ 10 (6th Dist.) (“Unusual conduct,
including evasive behavior, which is observed by a police officer provides a reasonable
basis for the officer to suspect, in light of the officer’s experience, that criminal activity
may be afoot and that a [Terry] stop is warranted.”) (Emphasis added). Viewing these
facts through “the eyes of a reasonable and cautious police officer on the scene, guided
by his experience and training,” we find that Detective Sulick had reasonable suspicion
that appellant was engaged in criminal activity. Bobo at 179. As a result, the legal
standard for initiating a Terry stop was satisfied and the trial court did not err in denying
his motion to suppress. Burnside at ¶ 8.
{¶ 20} In his brief, appellant argues that because Detective Sulick could not
identify what was exchanged during the hand-to-hand transaction, that his search was “a
fishing expedition by the detective, because appellant was in a high crime area.”
Essentially, appellant argues that because Detective Sulick did not actually see drugs
being exchanged, that the only reason he stopped appellant was because he was in a high
crime area, a fact that on its own is insufficient to warrant a Terry stop.
9. {¶ 21} Appellant is correct that an individual’s presence in a high crime area,
without any indicators of criminal activity, is insufficient to warrant a Terry stop. State v.
Mosby, 2021-Ohio-2255 (6th Dist.). However, the fact that the suspicious conduct an
officer observed occurred in a high crime area is one of many factors that can be
considered to support an officer’s reasonable suspicion that an individual is engaged in
criminal activity. Williams at ¶ 45; See also State v. Partin, 2023-Ohio-4056 (2d Dist.);
State v. Wilson, 2023-Ohio-409 (11th Dist.). Appellant’s argument that Detective Sulick
initiated the Terry stop simply because he was in a high crime area is unfounded as it
ignores that Detective Sulick also observed him engage in other suspicious conduct in
that high crime area—namely, his participation in a hand-to-hand transaction and his
attempt to evade interaction with Detective Sulick. Put simply, appellant’s argument that
he was only stopped because he was present in a high crime area is not supported by the
record.
{¶ 22} Moreover, appellant’s argument that the stop was invalid because Detective
Sulick could not identify what appellant exchanged with the driver, if adopted by this
court, would improperly add an extra requirement to the standard an officer must satisfy
to conduct a Terry stop. There is no requirement that an officer identify specific evidence
that a crime had been committed prior to initiating a Terry stop. The only requirement is
that an officer identify specific and articulable facts showing that they have reasonable
suspicion that criminal activity occurred. Daniels, 2013-Ohio-1081 at ¶ 10 (6th Dist.).
Had Detective Sulick known that appellant exchanged drugs with the individual, he
10. would not have needed to conduct a Terry stop for further investigation and could have
simply arrested appellant. Based on appellant’s assignment of error in this appeal, the
only issue before this court is whether Detective Sulick had reasonable suspicion that
appellant committed a crime. His acknowledgement that he could not identify the item
appellant exchanged with the driver is irrelevant to that analysis.
{¶ 23} In sum, the record shows that Detective Sulick had reasonable suspicion
that appellant had engaged in criminal activity. As a result, he satisfied the legal standard
necessary to conduct an investigatory Terry stop and the trial court did not err in denying
appellant’s motion to suppress. For these reasons, we find appellant’s single assignment
of error not well-taken.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 24} We find appellant’s single assignment of error not-well taken. As a result,
we affirm the trial court’s April 18, 2024 denial of appellant’s motions to suppress and
his July 17, 2024 conviction.
{¶ 25} Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R.24.
Judgment affirmed.
11. State of Ohio v. Dean Michael McNeal Appeals Court No.: L-24-1184 Trial Court No.: CR0202302448
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Christine E. Mayle, J. JUDGE
Gene A. Zmuda, J. JUDGE
Myron C. Duhart, J. CONCUR JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
12.