State v. Middlebrooks

222 S.E.2d 343, 236 Ga. 52, 1976 Ga. LEXIS 766

• Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
• Decided: January 7, 1976
• Docket: 30344
• Status: Published

Opinions

Hall, Justice.

We granted the state’s application for writ of certiorari to review the decision and judgment of the Georgia Court of Appeals adverse to the state in Middlebrooks v. State, 135 Ga. App. 411 (218 SE2d 110) (1975).

Respondent Middlebrooks was arrested on September 1,1973, and placed in the City of Atlanta jail; he was not taken before a magistrate nor afforded a commitment hearing; he was indicted by a grand jury on September 28, 1973; he was then removed from the city jail to the custody of the Fulton County Sheriff; counsel was then appointed for him, and prior to pleading guilty or not guilty to the indictment, he filed a written motion to quash the indictment for the failure of the state to afford him a commitment hearing; the motion prayed that the indictment be quashed and that he be afforded a commitment hearing; the trial judge conducted a hearing on the motion on November 6,1973, overruled the motion, and called the case for trial; the trial began that same day and resulted in conviction; and the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the conviction saying: "The conviction is reversed, the indictment quashed, and the cause remanded to the trial court to give the defendant his preliminary hearing, after which the case could proceed anew by re-indictment and another trial.” Middlebrooks v. State, supra.

1. Commitment hearing issues which are presented to us in post-conviction proceedings usually arise in one of two situations. In one, a commitment hearing has been held but at the hearing accused was denied the assistance of counsel; in the other, no commitment hearing has been held at all. This case presents the latter situation, and Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S. 1 (1970), is therefore inapposite because it considered only the necessity for counsel at certain "pretrial confrontation[s] of the accused” (id., p. 7), when such a confrontation actually occurred.¹

Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 (95 SC 854, 43 LE2d 54) (1975), sets forth in clear and unambiguous language the Fourth Amendment mandates pertaining to pre-trial hearings. First, the Fourth Amendment does not require a full-fledged adversarial commitment hearing.² Second, what it does require is some minimal "probable cause” hearing that has nothing to do with whether the accused should be prosecuted.³ Third, the sole question is whether he should be detained pending further proceedings.⁴ Fourth, if he is incorrectly detained without a hearing in violation of the Fourth Amendment, while such detention lasts he may be entitled to habeas corpus relief, but in no event will the illegal detention void a subsequent conviction.⁵

2. There is no basis under Georgia law for reversing this conviction because of any failure to hold a commitment hearing under Code Ann. Chs. 27-2 and 27-4. "This court has held on numerous occasions that after indictment and subsequent conviction the lack of a commitment hearing will not be construed as reversible error. See Phillips v. Stynchcombe, 231 Ga. 430 (202 SE2d 26); Thrash v. Caldwell, 229 Ga. 585 (193 SE2d 605); Griffin v. Smith, 228 Ga. 177 (184 SE2d 459).” Wynn v. Caldwell, 231 Ga. 763, 765 (204 SE2d 143) (1974). For a collection of similar holdings see Douglas v. State, 132 Ga. App. 694 (209 SE2d 114) (1974). The ". . . purpose of a commitment hearing is simply to determine whether there is probable cause to believe the accused guilty of the crime charged, and if so, to bind him over for indictment by the grand jury. Code § 27-407.” Jackson v. State, 225 Ga. 39, 42 (165 SE2d 711) (1969). Anything to the contrary found in Manor v. State, 221 Ga. 866 (2) (148 SE2d 305) (1966) is expressly overruled and will not hereafter be followed.

It is of interest to note that our sister state of Alabama, in which Coleman arose, has consistently adhered to these same principles of law following Coleman. Jordan v. State, 318 S2d 793 (Ala., 1974), cert. den. 318 S2d 801 (1975). The same rule is applied in prosecutions in the federal courts. United States v. Walker, 491 F2d 236 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. den. 416 U. S. 990; United States v. Stith, 479 F2d 315 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. den. 414 U. S. 845; 1 Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure; Criminal, § 80, p. 138, Preliminary Proceedings, (1969).

Argued November 12, 1975 Decided January 7, 1976 Rehearing denied January 27, 1976. Lewis R. Slaton, District Attorney, Joseph J. Drolet, Assistant District Attorney, for appellant. James C. Carr, Jr., for appellee.

We hold that a preliminary hearing is not a required step in a felony prosecution and that once an indictment is obtained there is no judicial oversight or review of the decision to prosecute because of any failure to hold a commitment hearing. Finally, in no event will we overturn a conviction on direct appeal or on collateral attack because a commitment hearing was denied appellant.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.

Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concur, except Gunter, Ingram and Hill, JJ., who dissent.

1 "The preliminary hearing is not a required step in an Alabama prosecution. The prosecutor may seek an indictment directly from the grand jury without a preliminary hearing . . . under Alabama law the sole purposes of a preliminary hearing are to determine whether there is sufficient evidence against the accused to warrant presenting his case to the grand jury, and, if so, to fix bail if the offense is bailable.” Coleman, 399 U. S. 8.

2 "These adversary safeguards are not essential for the probable cause determination required by the Fourth Amendment. The sole issue is whether there is probable cause for detaining the arrested person pending further proceedings. This issue can be determined reliably without an adversary hearing.” 43 LE2d 69.

3 ". . . we do not imply that the accused is entitled to judicial ovérsight or review of the decision to prosecute.” 43 LE2d 68.

4 "... we hold that the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint on liberty following arrest.” 43 LE2d 65.

5 "Thus . . . although a suspect who is presently detained may challenge the probable cause for that confinement, a conviction will not be vacated on the ground that the defendant was detained pending trial without a determination of probable cause.” 43 LE2d 68.