State v. Meza-Rodriguez

• Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina
• Decided: June 3, 2014
• Docket: 13-1190
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA13-1190 NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 3 June 2014

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v. Wake County No. 11CRS216911 MIGUEL ANTONI MEZA-RODRIGUEZ Defendant.

Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 20 March 2013 by

Judge Michael J. O’Foghludha in Wake County Superior Court.

Heard in the Court of Appeals 5 March 2014.

Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Special Deputy Attorney General Kimberly D. Potter, for the State.

Appellate Defender Staples S. Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender Andrew DeSimone, for Defendant- appellant.

DILLON, Judge.

Miguel Antoni Meza-Rodriguez (“Defendant”) appeals from a

conviction for first-degree murder. For the following reasons,

we find no reversible error.

I. Background -2- On 9 August 2011, Defendant was indicted on one count of

first-degree murder. Defendant was tried on this charge at the

18 March 2013 Criminal Session of Wake County Superior Court.

The State’s evidence tended to show that Pedro Fernandez

discovered that his mother was having an affair with Santiago

Hernandez-Arredondo. Mr. Fernandez asked Chris Reina, Alfredo

Acosta, and Defendant to help him beat up Mr. Hernandez-

Arredondo and promised to pay Defendant $500 for his assistance.

After hearing from Mr. Fernandez about his plans, Defendant and

the others agreed to “help [Mr. Fernandez] go and beat him

down.”

Mr. Fernandez initially contacted Mr. Hernandez-Arredondo

by phone under the pretense that he needed a quote from him for

a construction job. Mr. Fernandez did not tell him his real

name but used the alias “Jorge” or “George.” On the morning of

17 July 2011, Mr. Fernandez drove Mr. Acosta, Mr. Reina, and

Defendant to meet up with Mr. Hernandez-Arredondo at a

lumberyard. Mr. Fernandez brought a table leg and a baseball

bat to use in the beating. Mr. Reina testified that it was his

understanding that Defendant would hold a gun on Mr. Hernandez-

Arredondo, while the others beat and robbed him. -3- When they arrived at the lumberyard, Mr. Fernandez became

concerned because of the number of cars in the area, so he asked

Mr. Hernandez-Arredondo to follow him to the house that needed

the work. Not having planned for this, Mr. Fernandez drove to

the first house he saw with a “for sale” sign in the yard and

pulled into the driveway, followed by Mr. Hernandez-Arredondo.

Mr. Fernandez and Mr. Hernandez-Arredondo got out of their

respective vehicles and began talking, as they walked towards

the house. The others stayed in the car. After about five

minutes, Defendant told Mr. Reina and Mr. Acosta that he was

going to get out of the car and point the gun at Mr. Hernandez-

Arredondo. Defendant exited out of the car, tucked the gun in

the waistline of his pants, and walked up to Mr. Fernandez and

Mr. Hernandez-Arredondo as they talked.

During their conversation, Mr. Hernandez-Arredondo asked

Mr. Fernandez for his real name but he responded that his real

name was “George.” Mr. Hernandez-Arredondo then asked if Mr.

Fernandez’s name was “George” or “Pedro.” Defendant then called

Mr. Hernandez-Arredondo by an offensive name and shot him in the

face.

Mr. Fernandez and Defendant returned to the car, but

Defendant went back to retrieve Mr. Hernandez-Arredondo’s -4- wallet, as he lay on the ground. Mr. Fernandez then drove away

from the scene, while Defendant counted the money from Mr.

Hernandez-Arredondo’s wallet, giving Mr. Reina $50 of the $400

he got. Mr. Fernandez then drove the four of them to a

restaurant, where they were joined by Mr. Fernandez’s father and

uncle. Mr. Fernandez paid Defendant the $500. Defendant was

subsequently interviewed by police during the investigation and

told them that he slept late on Sunday, 17 July 2011, and stayed

at home until 2 p.m. that day. Defendant did not testify or

offer any evidence at trial.

On 20 March 2013, a jury found Defendant guilty of first-

degree murder based on the felony murder rule. The trial court

sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment without parole.

Defendant gave notice of appeal in open court.

II. Argument

On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the trial court

committed reversible error by allowing Mr. Fernandez to testify

regarding his motive to kill, (2) the trial court committed

plain error by admitting evidence regarding the victim’s good

character, and (3) the trial court committed plain error by

admitting evidence regarding his alleged alcohol and drug use -5- before and after the killing. We address each argument in turn

below.

A. Testimony Regarding Defendant’s Motive

Defendant contends that the trial court erred in allowing

Mr. Fernandez to give speculative testimony regarding

Defendant’s motive or intent to kill Mr. Hernandez-Arredondo.

Specifically, Defendant points to the following testimony from

Mr. Fernandez, which he contends represents Mr. Fernandez’s

opinion regarding Defendant’s motives or intentions when

Defendant shot Mr. Hernandez-Arredondo:

[Prosecutor]. And when you got back in the car, did you ask [Defendant] why he did it?

[Mr. Fernandez]. No.

Q. Do you have any idea why [Defendant] did that?

[Defense Counsel]: Objection. Calls for speculation.

THE COURT: Overruled.

[Prosecutor]. Do you know why [Defendant] did that?

A. I think because the man recognized me. He say my name. And I don’t know if [Defendant] got nervous and shot him by accident. Because it was not part of the plan to shoot anyone. -6- From the record, it appears that Defendant objected to the

admission of this evidence and the trial court overruled his

objection. Therefore, this argument is properly preserved for

our review. See N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(1).

North Carolina Courts have generally held that a witness’s

opinion of another person’s intention on a particular occasion

has been generally inadmissible. State v. Patterson, 288 N.C.

553, 566, 220 S.E.2d 600, 610 (1975), death sentence vacated,

428 U.S. 904, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1211 (1976); Ballard v. Ballard, 230

N.C. 629, 634, 55 S.E.2d 316, 320 (1949); State v. Vines, 93

N.C. 493, 496-97 (1885). Additionally,

[t]he burden is on the party who asserts that evidence was improperly admitted to show both error and that he was prejudiced by its admission. The admission of evidence which is technically inadmissible will be treated as harmless unless prejudice is shown such that a different result likely would have ensued had the evidence been excluded.

State v. Taylor, 154 N.C. App. 366, 372, 572 S.E.2d 237, 242

(2002) (citing State v. Gappins, 320 N.C. 64, 68, 357 S.E.2d

654, 657 (1987)); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1443(a) (2011).

We note that Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder

based on the felony murder rule and the underlying felony of

robbery with a firearm. Our Supreme Court has stated that -7- “[f]elony murder, by its definition, does not require ‘intent to

kill’ as an element that must be satisfied for a conviction.”

State v. Cagle, 346 N.C. 497, 517, 488 S.E.2d 535, 548 (citation

omitted), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1032, 139 L. Ed. 2d 614 (1997).1

Also, intent to kill is not an element of robbery with a

firearm. State v. Kearns, 27 N.C. App. 354, 356, 219 S.E.2d

228, 230 (1975), disc. review denied, 289 N.C. 300, 222 S.E.2d

700 (1976).

Defendant, however, argues that – although intent to kill

or motive is not an element of the crime of felony murder – Mr.

Fernandez’s opinion testimony was evidence which tended to show

that Defendant was the person who pulled the trigger. See State

v. Van Landingham, 283 N.C. 589, 600, 197 S.E.2d 539, 546 (1973)

(stating that “[e]vidence of motive is relevant as a

circumstance to identify an accused as the perpetrator of an

offense[.]” (citation and quotation marks omitted)). However,

even assuming that Mr. Fernandez’s testimony had this effect, we

do not believe Defendant was prejudiced by its admission because

of the other evidence presented that put the gun in Defendant’s

1 Our Supreme Court has recognized that motive is not an element of felony murder but can be relevant as to sentencing in a felony murder conviction. See State v. Irwin, 304 N.C. 93, 107, 282 S.E.2d 439, 448 (1981). Defendant raises no issues as to sentencing. -8- hands. For example, the key aspect of Mr. Fernandez’s testimony

which incriminates Defendant as being the shooter is not his

statement regarding Defendant’s intent or motive, but rather his

statement that he actually saw Defendant pull the trigger.

Accordingly, Defendant’s argument is overruled.

B. Testimony Regarding the Victim’s Good Character

Defendant next contends that the trial court’s admission of

the victim’s daughter’s testimony regarding the good character

of Mr. Hernandez-Arredondo was inadmissible, as Defendant had

not challenged the victim’s character. Defendant concludes that

this error amounted to plain error and he is entitled to a new

trial, as this testimony tended to distract the jury, created

sympathy for the victim and excited prejudice against Defendant,

allowing the jury to decide the case not on what happened but

upon the characters of Defendant and the victim.

The trial transcripts shows that the victim’s daughter

Anabel Hernandez testified that the victim was responsible,

hard-working, provided for his family, non-violent, concerned

about her education, concerned about his community, and ran his

own construction business. The record shows that Defendant

failed to object to this testimony regarding the victim’s

character. See N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(1). Therefore, review for -9- plain error is appropriate. See N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(4). To

establish plain error, Defendant must show

that a fundamental error occurred at trial. See [State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 660, 300 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1983)]. To show that an error was fundamental, a defendant must establish prejudice that, after examination of the entire record, the error “had a probable impact on the jury’s finding that the defendant was guilty.” See id. (citations and quotation marks omitted) . . . . Moreover, because plain error is to be “applied cautiously and only in the exceptional case,” Odom, 307 N.C. at 660, 300 S.E.2d at 378, the error will often be one that “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings,” Odom, 307 N.C. at 660, 300 S.E.2d at 378[.]

State v. Lawrence, ____ N.C. ___, ___, 723 S.E.2d 326, 334

(2012). Therefore, “[i]n order to prevail under a plain error

analysis, Defendant must establish not only that the trial court

committed error, but that absent the error, the jury probably

would have reached a different result.” State v. Steen, 352

N.C. 227, 269, 536 S.E.2d 1, 25-26 (2000) (citation and

quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1167, 148 L.

Ed. 2d 997 (2001).

After examining all of the evidence presented, we note that

Ms. Hernandez’s testimony was only a small portion of the

evidence from one of the eleven witnesses presented by the State -10- against Defendant. Given the overwhelming evidence of

Defendant’s guilt presented by the State, including testimony

from Defendant’s friends Mr. Fernandez and Mr. Reina that

Defendant pointed the handgun at the victim, shot the victim in

the face, and returned to take the victim’s wallet, we cannot

say that any error in the admission of this testimony “had a

probable impact on the jury’s finding that Defendant was

guilty,” see Lawrence, ___ N.C. at ___, 723 S.E.2d at 334, and

its exclusion would have resulted in a different result at

trial. Accordingly, we find no plain error; and Defendant’s

argument is overruled.

C. Testimony Regarding Defendant’s Alleged Alcohol and Drug Use

Lastly, Defendant contends that the trial court committed

plain error in admitting irrelevant and prejudicial “other

crimes” evidence that Defendant sought drugs before the killings

and drank alcohol and snorted cocaine afterwards. As Defendant

did not object at trial to the introduction of this testimony,

we review this argument under a plain error standard of review.

See N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(4); Lawrence, ____ N.C. at ___, 723

S.E.2d at 334; Steen, 352 N.C. at 269, 536 S.E.2d at 25-26.

Even assuming arguendo that it was error for the trial

court to allow testimony regarding Defendant’s alcohol and drug -11- use, we again conclude that it did not rise to the level of

plain error. The highlighted testimony regarding Defendant’s

alcohol and drug use was only a small portion of the testimony

from two of the numerous witnesses the State put forth in this

case. In contrast to Defendant’s argument that the evidence

against him was not “particularly strong[,]” a thorough

examination of the whole record contains overwhelming evidence

of Defendant’s guilt; and we are not persuaded that the jury’s

verdict would have probably been different if the evidence of

Defendant’s drug and alcohol use had not been admitted.

Accordingly, Defendant failed to show plain error.

For the foregoing reasons, we find no reversible error in

Defendant’s trial.

NO ERROR.

Judge BRYANT and Judge STEPHENS concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).