[Cite as State v. Medford, 2025-Ohio-140.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT VAN WERT COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 15-24-04 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
THOMAS C. MEDFORD, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Van Wert County Common Pleas Court Trial Court No. CR-23-11-131
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: January 21, 2025
APPEARANCES:
Kenneth J. Rexford for Appellant
Dillon W. Staas, IV for Appellee Case No. 15-24-04
ZIMMERMAN, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Thomas C. Medford (“Medford”), appeals the
April 25, 2024 judgment entry of sentence of the Van Wert County Court of
Common Pleas. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
{¶2} On November 2, 2023, the Van Wert County Grand Jury indicted
Medford on a single count of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence
of alcohol or drugs of abuse (“OVI”) in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(h),
(G)(1)(d), a fourth-degree felony. The indictment specified that Medford had three
OVI convictions within the previous ten years—namely, Medford was convicted of
OVI on April 13, 2023 and June 30, 2020 in the Van Wert Municipal Court and on
December 9, 2016 in the Lima Municipal Court. On November 8, 2023, Medford
appeared for arraignment and pleaded not guilty to the indictment.
{¶3} On February 1, 2024, Medford filed a motion “to suppress the alleged
prior in Van Wert Municipal Court Case No. TRC 20 01370.” (Doc. No. 22).
Specifically, Medford argued that his 2020 OVI conviction “is constitutionally
infirm and unavailable as an enhancing prior” because it “was taken with
insufficient waiver of the right to counsel.” (Id.). Medford further argued that “the
resulting entry [in that case] is so flawed as to not result in a final, appealable order”
and that “its use as an enhancing ‘prior’ is res judicata . . . .” (Emphasis in original.)
(Id.). The State filed a memorandum in opposition to Medford’s motion to suppress
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on February 20, 2024. On March 8, 2024, the trial court denied Medford’s motion
to suppress after determining that Medford “waived counsel and entered the plea
knowingly, intelligently and of his own free will” in the prior case; the resulting
judgment entry of sentence in the prior case was a final, appealable order; and
Medford’s conviction in the prior case was not barred by the doctrine of res judicata
for enhancement purposes. (Doc. No. 26).
{¶4} The case proceeded to a bench trial on March 25, 2024. That same day,
the trial court found Medford guilty of the charge alleged in the indictment. On
April 25, 2024, the trial court sentenced Medford to 30 months in prison. (Doc. No.
37). The trial court also imposed a lifetime driver’s license suspension.
{¶5} Medford filed his notice of appeal on May 2, 2024. He raises five
assignments of error for our review. For ease of our discussion, we will begin by
addressing Medford’s first, second, and third assignments of error together,
followed by his fourth and fifth assignments of error together.
First Assignment of Error
The Trial Court erred in denying the defense motion to suppress and exclude an alleged prior tainted by an incomplete and ineffective waiver of counsel.
Second Assignment of Error
The Trial Court erred in denying a defense motion to exclude the sentencing entry as to one alleged Van Wert Municipal Court prior for lack of a final, appealable order in that case.
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Third Assignment of Error
The Trial Court erred in finding Mr. Medford guilty of a felony O.V.I. for res judicata reasons.
{¶6} In his first, second, and third assignments of error, Medford argues that
trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his 2020 OVI conviction from
being used to enhance the degree of his OVI offense in this case. In particular,
Medford contends in his first assignment of error that his 2020 OVI conviction
“should not have been used to enhance penalty in this case” because he “was
sentenced [in that case] to actual incarceration without the assistance of counsel . . .
.” (Appellant’s Brief at 8). Medford specifically argues in his second assignment
of error that the trial court should have suppressed his 2020 OVI conviction due to
flaws with the sentencing entry in that case. Finally, Medford argues in his third
assignment of error that, because the charge in the April 2023 OVI case was
amended “to a first offense,” “the lack of appeal by the State of Ohio on that
reduction should have made the issue of whether the instant offense is a ‘fourth
offense’ a matter of res judicata.” (Emphasis in original.) (Id. at 18).
Standard of Review
{¶7} A review of the denial of a motion to suppress involves mixed questions
of law and fact. State v. Burnside, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. At a suppression hearing,
the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and, as such, is in the best position to
evaluate the evidence and the credibility of witnesses. Id. See also State v. Carter,
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72 Ohio St.3d 545, 552 (1995). When reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress,
“an appellate court must accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported
by competent, credible evidence.” Burnside at ¶ 8. With respect to the trial court’s
conclusions of law, however, our standard of review is de novo, and we must
independently determine whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard. Id.
Analysis
{¶8} R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) provides that “[n]o person shall operate any
vehicle . . . within this state, if, at the time of the operation, . . . [t]he person is under
the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or a combination of them.” “In general,
an offender who violates this provision is guilty of a first degree misdemeanor.”
State v. Gerken, 2023-Ohio-2244, ¶ 22 (6th Dist.), citing R.C. 4511.19(G)(1)(a). If,
however, the offender, within ten years of the offense, previously has been
convicted of OVI on three or four prior occasions, the offense of OVI becomes
chargeable as a fourth-degree felony. R.C. 4511.19(G)(1)(d). “In cases where
‘“existence of a prior conviction does not simply enhance the penalty but transforms
the crime itself by increasing its degree, the prior conviction is an essential element
of the crime and must be proved by the state.”’” Gerken at ¶ 22, quoting State v.
Meyers, 2015-Ohio-5499, ¶ 10 (6th Dist.), quoting State v. Brooke, 2007-Ohio-
1533, ¶ 8. “‘R.C. 2945.75(B)(2) requires the state to make a prima facie showing
of the prior convictions.’” Id., quoting Meyers at ¶ 10.
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{¶9} Here, the record reflects that Medford was convicted of OVI on three
separate occasions in the previous ten years. Specifically, Medford was convicted
of OVI on April 13, 2023 and June 30, 2020 in the Van Wert Municipal Court and
on December 9, 2016 in the Lima Municipal Court. In his first, second, and third
assignments of error, Medford argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion
to suppress his 2020 OVI conviction for use as a penalty enhancement in this case.
Medford contends that his 2020 OVI conviction cannot be used to enhance the
penalty in this case because (1) the judgment entry of sentence is not a final,
appealable order since it does not comport with Crim.R. 32(C); (2) he was sentenced
to a term of incarceration without the assistance of counsel in that case; and (3) it is
barred by the doctrine of res judicata since the infirmities with the 2020 OVI were
litigated in the April 2023 OVI case.
Final, Appealable Order
{¶10} Medford argues in his second assignment of error that the trial court
erred by denying his motion to suppress his 2020 OVI conviction because the
sentencing entry in that case contains certain defects which render the order not final
and appealable. Specifically, Medford contends that the sentencing entry in the
2020 case is defective because it does not “indicate what the offense was” and “the
document itself was fundamentally flawed as to form, in several ways.”
(Appellant’s Brief at 12, 14). Medford identifies those “flaws” as (1) the entry
“indicates that it is a ‘Journal Entry’ regarding a plea change and not a “Judgment
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Entry’ of Sentencing”; (2) “[t]here is no proof of service within this document”; (3)
it does “not indicate that the 20 days imposed would be mandatory, which is
required for an OVI second offense”; and (4) it does not indicate whether “Mr.
Medford had proceeded without counsel or that he had waived counsel.” (Id. at 14,
16).
{¶11} Courts of appeal in Ohio have appellate jurisdiction over “final
appealable orders.” Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 3(B)(2). Crim.R. 32(C)
requires that a “judgment of conviction shall set forth the fact of conviction and the
sentence” and that the judge “sign the judgment and the clerk . . . enter it on the
journal.” Analyzing the requirements of Crim.R. 32(C), the Supreme Court of Ohio
advised that “[a] judgment of conviction is a final order subject to appeal under R.C.
2505.02 when it sets forth (1) the fact of the conviction, (2) the sentence, (3) the
judge’s signature, and (4) the time stamp indicating the entry upon the journal by
the clerk.” State v. Lester, 2011-Ohio-5204, syllabus.
{¶12} R.C. 2945.75(B)(1) provides that, “[w]henever in any case it is
necessary to prove a prior conviction, a certified copy of the entry of judgment in
such prior conviction together with evidence sufficient to identify the defendant
named in the entry as the offender in the case at bar, is sufficient to prove such prior
conviction.” “When, pursuant to R.C. 2945.75(B)(1), the [S]tate offers judgment
entries to prove the element of prior OVI convictions in order to increase the offense
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level of a later OVI charge under R.C. 4511.19(G)(1)(d), the judgments must
comply with Crim.R. 32(C).” Gerken, 2023-Ohio-2244, at ¶ 36 (6th Dist.).
{¶13} The entry in the 2020 OVI case comports with the requirements of
Crim.R. 32(C). Id. at ¶ 39 (addressing Gerken’s collateral attack of a prior
conviction to subsequently enhance a penalty in a later case based on an argument
that it did not comply with Crim.R. 32(C)). Specifically, the sentencing entry
reflects Medford’s guilty plea, the trial court’s finding of guilt, Medford’s sentence,
the judge’s signature, and a time stamp for entry on the clerk’s file. Compare State
v. Ellis, 2018-Ohio-898, ¶ 14 (3d Dist.) (concluding that the judgment entry of
sentence satisfied the requirements of Crim.R. 32(C) because it contained “Ellis’s
plea of no contest, the trial court’s finding of guilt, Ellis’s sentence, the judge’s
signature, and a time stamp for entry on the clerk’s file”). See also State v. Allen,
2017-Ohio-7976, ¶ 15 (6th Dist.) (analyzing that “although Allen’s sentence omits
the degree of the offense, this is not one of the substantive requirements of Crim.R.
32(C) and its omission does not void his sentence”).
{¶14} In other words, the issues raised by Medford “may require greater
attention to detail by the trial court in fashioning its entries, but they do not impact
the appealability” of the entry. Ellis at ¶ 15 (rejecting Ellis’s contention that the
entry was not final and appealable, in part, because it did not direct the clerk of
courts to serve a copy on him). For instance, “[w]hile it is certainly better practice
for a trial court to label its final entry as a ‘judgment entry’ rather than a ‘journal
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entry’ it does not impact the appealability of the order provided it otherwise
complies with . . . Crim.R. 32(C).” Id. at ¶ 14. Therefore, Medford’s contention
that his 2020 OVI conviction cannot be used to enhance the penalty in this case
based on defects in the sentencing entry is without merit. Accordingly, Medford’s
argument, alleging that that trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his
2020 OVI conviction due to a defective sentencing entry, is without merit.
Assistance of Counsel
{¶15} Medford further argues in his first assignment of error that his 2020
OVI conviction cannot be used to enhance the penalty in this case since he was
sentenced to a term of incarceration without the assistance of counsel in that case.
“‘Generally, a past conviction cannot be attacked in a subsequent case; however,
there is a limited right to collaterally attack a conviction when the state proposes to
use the past conviction to enhance the penalty of a later criminal offense.’” Gerken,
2023-Ohio-2244, at ¶ 25 (6th Dist.), quoting State v. Phillips, 2010-Ohio-1941, ¶ 6
(12th Dist.). “To date, a conviction obtained without the assistance of counsel or
with an invalid waiver of the right to counsel has been the only constitutional
infirmity that has been recognized by the Ohio or the United States Supreme Courts
with regard to a collateral attack on a conviction that was used to enhance a criminal
penalty.” Id. “Thus, ‘[i]n repeat OVI offender cases where prior convictions for
OVI are used to enhance the penalty for a later OVI conviction, a defendant may
attack the constitutionality of a prior conviction if the conviction was obtained in
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violation of the defendant’s right to counsel.’” Id., quoting Meyers, 2015-Ohio-
5499, at ¶ 11 (6th Dist.). “‘“Where questions arise concerning a prior conviction, a
reviewing court must presume all underlying proceedings were conducted in
accordance with the rules of law and a defendant must introduce evidence to the
contrary in order to establish a prima-facie showing of constitutional infirmity.”’”
Id. at ¶ 27, quoting Brooke, 2007-Ohio-1533, at ¶ 11, quoting State v. Brandon, 45
Ohio St.3d 85 (1989), syllabus.
{¶16} “‘With respect to “uncounseled” pleas, we presume that the trial court
in the prior convictions proceeded constitutionally until a defendant introduces
evidence to the contrary.’” Id., quoting State v. Thompson, 2009-Ohio-314, ¶ 6.
For purposes of penalty enhancement in later convictions under R.C. 4511.19, after the defendant presents a prima facie showing that the prior convictions were unconstitutional because the defendant had not been represented by counsel and had not validly waived the right to counsel and that the prior convictions had resulted in confinement, the burden shifts to the state to prove that the right to counsel was properly waived.
Thompson at syllabus. “In making the showing that a defendant had not been
represented by counsel and had not validly waived the right to counsel, ‘a defendant
need only provide an affidavit or testimony supporting his allegation[s].’” Gerken,
at ¶ 28, quoting State v. Biazzo, 2010-Ohio-4485, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.). “Once this
showing has been made, the burden shifts to the state to demonstrate that the right
to counsel was properly waived.” Id.
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{¶17} In his first assignment of error, Medford contends that his 2020
conviction cannot be used to enhance the penalty of the offense at issue in this case
because he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his right to the
assistance of counsel in that case. However, as an initial matter, Medford’s
argument collaterally attacking his 2020 OVI conviction from being used as a
penalty enhancement in this case may be barred by the doctrine of res judicata since
he has an intervening OVI conviction. See State v. Menkhaus, 2016-Ohio-550, ¶ 15
(12th Dist.). Notwithstanding that issue, based on the argument that Medford raises
in his third assignment of error, we will address the merits of Medford’s argument
raised in his first assignment of error.
{¶18} Under Crim.R. 44(B), a defendant may not be sentenced “unless after
being fully advised by the court, he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives
assignment of counsel.” “In determining whether a defendant properly waived
counsel in a prior case, a distinction must be made between serious offenses and
petty offenses.” Gerken at ¶ 29. “A petty offense is defined as ‘a misdemeanor
other than a serious offense.’” Id., quoting Crim.R. 2(D). “A serious offense is
“any felony, and any misdemeanor for which the penalty prescribed by law includes
confinement for more than six months.’” Id., quoting Crim.R. 2(C). “In petty
offense cases, waiver of counsel shall be made in open court and recorded.” Id.,
citing Crim.R. 22 (asserting that “[i]n petty offenses all waivers of counsel required
by Rule 44(B) shall be recorded”) and Crim.R. 44(C) (stating that “[w]aiver of
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counsel shall be in open court and the advice of waiver shall be recorded as provided
in Rule 22”). “And in serious offense cases, the waiver shall be in writing, made in
open court, and recorded.” Id.
{¶19} “‘“The requirements of Crim.R. 44 and 22 are mandatory, and failure
to [substantially] comply with these procedures constitutes error.”’” State v.
Thompson, 2009-Ohio-185, ¶ 10 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Constable, 2005-Ohio-
1239, ¶ 31 (12th Dist.), quoting Mason v. Krivinsky, 1998 WL 314384, *2 (12th
Dist. June 15, 1998). See also Akron v. Ragle, 2005-Ohio-590, ¶ 9 (9th Dist.)
(“Substantial compliance with Crim.R. 44 waiver of counsel is sufficient in a petty
offense case like the one at bar.”). “Substantial compliance means that under the
totality of the circumstances the defendant subjectively understands the implications
of his plea and the rights he is waiving.” State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108
(1990).
{¶20} It is clear to us that the trial court did not err by denying Medford’s
motion to suppress his 2020 conviction because the trial court substantially
complied with the requirements of Crim.R. 22 and 44 when accepting Medford’s
waiver of counsel in that case. Critically, the evidence that Medford presented at
the suppression hearing reflects that the Van Wert Municipal Court substantially
complied with the requirements of the criminal rules when Medford knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel in open court prior to
pleading guilty in the 2020 case. Indeed, since the 2020 OVI conviction was for a
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petty offense, Medford’s waiver of counsel was required to be in open court and
recorded, but it did not have to be in writing. Compare Gerken at ¶ 30 (addressing
that, since “[t]he record indicates that the 2004 OVI conviction was for a petty
offense,” “a waiver of Gerken’s right to counsel had to be in open court and
recorded, but it did not have to be in writing”). The evidence that Medford presented
at the suppression hearing reflects that his waiver of counsel comported with the
requirements of the Rules of Criminal Procedure—that is, his waiver was in open
court and was recorded. See Meyers, 2015-Ohio-5499, at ¶ 22 (6th Dist.).
{¶21} Nevertheless, Medford contends that the Van Wert Municipal Court
failed to conduct a proper colloquy to determine whether he knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. Specifically, Medford
contends (without any citation to authority) that his waiver of counsel in the 2020
case was invalid because “any discussion of possible withdrawal of counsel and
waiver of counsel should not have occurred without counsel present.” (Appellant’s
Brief at 10). Medford further contends that his uncounseled plea is constitutionally
infirm because the Van Wert Municipal Court failed “to engage in a colloquy with
[him] regarding ‘the nature of the charges the statutory offenses included within
them, the range of allowable punishments thereunder, possible defenses to the
charges, and circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other facts essential to a
broad understanding of the whole matter’ . . . .” (Id. at 10-11).
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{¶22} “To establish an effective waiver of the right to counsel, the trial court
must ‘make sufficient inquiry to determine whether [the] defendant fully
understands and intelligently relinquishes that right.’” State v. Conard, 2024-Ohio-
1906, ¶ 14 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Gibson, 45 Ohio St.2d 366 (1976), paragraph
two of the syllabus. “For a petty offense, voluntary and knowing waiver may be
shown through the court’s colloquy with the defendant.” Brooke, 2007-Ohio-1533,
at ¶ 54.
{¶23} “‘To discharge this duty properly in light of the strong presumption
against waiver of the constitutional right to counsel, a judge must investigate as long
and as thoroughly as the circumstances of the case before him demand.’” State v.
Dingman, 2024-Ohio-3327, ¶ 18 (2d Dist.), quoting Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S.
708, 723-724 (1948). “There is no formula or script that a trial court must follow
in every case in order to comport with the requirements of the Sixth Amendment.”
State v. Tucker, 2016-Ohio-1353, ¶ 11 (9th Dist.). Thus, “[t]o be valid, a waiver of
counsel ‘“must be made with an apprehension of the nature of the charges, the
statutory offenses included within them, the range of allowable punishments
thereunder, possible defenses to the charges and circumstances in mitigation
thereof, and all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole matter.”’”
Conard at ¶ 14, quoting Gibson at 377, quoting Von Moltke at 723. See also State
v. Yeager, 2005-Ohio-4932, ¶ 8 (9th Dist.) (noting that “the trial court’s discussion
of possible defenses and mitigating circumstances need not be fact specific”).
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“Additionally, ‘the defendant “should be made aware of the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation.”’” Conard at ¶ 14, quoting State v. Perdue,
2010-Ohio-565, ¶ 44 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Gatewood, 2009-Ohio-5610, ¶ 33
(2d Dist.).
{¶24} “While no one factor is dispositive, the trial court should consider
whether the defendant was advised of the nature of the charges and the range of
allowable punishments, and, in addition, may consider whether the trial court
advised the defendant of the possible defenses to the charges and applicable
mitigating circumstances.” State v. Trikilis, 2005-Ohio-4266, ¶ 13 (9th Dist.). “The
trial court, however, does not need to ‘undertake pseudo-legal representation of a
defendant by specifically advising him of possible viable defenses or mitigating
circumstances,’ and, instead ‘a broader discussion of defenses and mitigating
circumstances as applicable to the pending charges is sufficient.’” (Emphasis
added.) State v. Bloodworth, 2013-Ohio-248, ¶ 12 (9th Dist.), quoting State v.
Ragle, 2005-Ohio-590, ¶ 12 (9th Dist.). “A court may also consider various other
factors, including the defendant’s age, education, and legal experience.” Trikilis at
¶ 13.
{¶25} “Whether a defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
waived the right to counsel is an issue that we review de novo.” State v. Reece,
2019-Ohio-2259, ¶ 14 (6th Dist.). See also Thompson at ¶ 8 (“Generally, Ohio
courts look to see whether under the totality of the circumstances, the defendant’s
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waiver of his or her right to counsel was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently
given.”). “In doing so, we must independently examine the record to determine
‘whether the totality of circumstances demonstrates a knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary waiver of the right to counsel.’” State v. Smallwood, 2020-Ohio-5556, ¶
9 (6th Dist.), quoting State v. Guess, 2014-Ohio-771, ¶ 9 (4th Dist.).
{¶26} In its March 8, 2024 decision denying Medford’s motion to suppress,
the trial court determined that Medford “waived counsel and entered the plea
knowingly, intelligently and of his own free will” after he “had an extensive
dialogue with the [Van Wert Municipal Court] on his desire to go forward without
counsel . . . .” (Doc. No. 26). In reaching its decision, the trial court further found
that Medford “appeared for arraignment [in the 2020 case] and was advised of his
rights, acknowledged understanding his rights, . . . and was informed of the
maximum sentence in [the] matter.” (Id.). The trial court further found that, at the
change-of-plea hearing, Medford “reiterated his desire to represent himself and
requested to enter a guilty plea and proceed to sentencing so he could move on from
[the] charge as soon as possible” and the Van Wert Municipal Court “properly and
adequately engaged in a Crim.[R.] 11 dialogue.” (Id.).
{¶27} Based on our review of the record, we conclude that Medford did not
present a prima facie showing that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily waive his right to the assistance of counsel before pleading guilty in the
2020 OVI case. Indeed, the trial court’s determination that Medford knowingly,
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intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel in the 2020 case is
supported by competent, credible evidence. Specifically, the audio recording
presented by Medford at the suppression hearing reflects that Medford, at his
arraignment, unequivocally stated that he understood his rights (as presented to him)
and the pleas available to him. (See Joint Ex. A). That audio recording further
reflects that Medford assented that he understood the charges against him and the
possible punishment that he was facing.
{¶28} Furthermore, the record reflects that counsel was appointed for
Medford after his arraignment. However, prior to the next hearing, Medford’s
appointed counsel filed a motion (at Medford’s request) to withdraw as counsel in
the case. The audio recording of Medford’s change-of-plea hearing reflects that the
Van Wert Municipal Court (before granting the motion) inquired why Medford
wished to discharge his appointed counsel. Medford explained that he wanted to
resolve the matter quickly so that he could obtain employment. Medford further
explained that he desired to accept the offer presented by the State, which Medford
believed was more favorable than what was presented to him by his appointed
counsel. The Van Wert Municipal Court cautioned Medford about the effect of a
sentencing recommendation and Medford maintained that he wished to waive his
right to counsel and plead guilty.
{¶29} Moreover, even though his waiver was not required to be in writing,
the record reflects that the Van Wert Municipal Court presented Medford with a
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written waiver of counsel. Compare Parma v. Romain, 2006-Ohio-3952, ¶ 13 (8th
Dist.) (resolving that the prior “OVI conviction cannot be held to have been
uncounseled, and it was entirely proper for the trial court to have considered that
prior conviction for enhancement purposes” since “there is clear evidence of a form
signed by appellant waiving his constitutional right to counsel”). “[I]n a petty
offense case, even in the absence of a hearing transcript, a waiver of counsel form
signed by the judge and the defendant at the plea hearing and filed with the court
may be sufficient to satisfy the[] requirements.” State v. Combs, 2007-Ohio-7035,
¶ 16 (9th Dist.). Here, the written waiver (signed by Medford) states:
Having been fully advised of my right to assistance of counsel at all stages of these proceedings, including my right to have counsel appointed without costs, to represent me if I am unable to employ counsel on my own; and fully understanding this explanation, I do hereby KNOWINGLY, INTELLIGENTLY & VOLUNTARILY WAIVE my right to counsel.
(Emphasis in original.) (Doc. No. 22). Critically, the record reflects that Medford
was presented the written waiver in open court, asked to read it, and then signed it
in open court prior to the Van Wert Municipal Court accepting his guilty plea. See
Brooke, 2007-Ohio-1533, at ¶ 47.
{¶30} Based on that evidence, we conclude that the totality of the
circumstances demonstrate that Medford knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
waived his right to the assistance of counsel before pleading guilty in the 2020 OVI
case. See State v. Rodeheaver, 2023-Ohio-3283, ¶ 20 (5th Dist.). As a result,
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Medford did not present a prima facie showing of a constitutional infirmity
regarding his 2020 conviction. Therefore, the burden of establishing that Medford
validly waived assistance of counsel did not shift to the State. See Thompson, 2009-
Ohio-314, at ¶ 8. Consequently, the trial court did not err by denying Medford’s
motion to suppress his 2020 OVI conviction for this reason.
Res Judicata
{¶31} Finally, Medford argues in his third assignment of error that the trial
court erred by denying his motion to suppress his 2020 OVI conviction for use as a
penalty enhancement in this case since his April 2023 OVI conviction was amended
to a first offense. In other words, Medford contends that the infirmities with the
2020 OVI were litigated in the April 2023 OVI case and, therefore, the 2020 entry
is barred by the doctrine of res judicata from enhancing his penalty in this case. We
disagree.
{¶32} Generally, “[u]nder the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment of
conviction bars a convicted defendant who was represented by counsel from raising
and litigating in any proceeding except an appeal from that judgment, any [claim]
that was raised or could have been raised . . . on an appeal from that judgment.”
State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d 175, 176 (1967).
{¶33} In its entry denying Medford’s motion to suppress, the trial court
rejected that Medford’s res judicata argument. Specifically, the trial court reasoned
that, “[f]or enhancement purposes, Ohio’s OVI statute merely requires a set number
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of prior convictions for operating a vehicle while under the influence within a
specific period.” (Doc. No. 26). That is, the trial court further reasoned that “[t]he
total number of OVI convictions within a ten-year period remains the same,
regardless of how those convictions are described or enumerated in a law
enforcement officer’s citation or a court’s judgment entry.” (Id.).
{¶34} The trial court did not err by rejecting Medford’s res judicata
argument. Importantly, there is no evidence in the record that Medford’s April 2023
OVI conviction was amended to a “first offense” because of any alleged infirmity
with his 2020 OVI conviction. See State v. Hogue, 2018-Ohio-1109, ¶ 21, 23 (3d
Dist.). Even so, based on our resolution of Medford’s first and second assignments
of error, his 2020 OVI conviction is not infirm.
{¶35} For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err by
denying Medford’s motion to suppress his 2020 OVI conviction. See State v.
Ruggiero, 2019-Ohio-2545, ¶ 9 (9th Dist.); Gerken, 2023-Ohio-2244, at ¶ 34.
{¶36} Therefore, Medford’s first, second, and third assignments of error are
overruled.
Fourth Assignment of Error
The Trial Court erred in finding Mr. Medford guilty because the conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence.
Fifth Assignment of Error
The Trial Court erred in finding Mr. Medford guilty because the conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
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{¶37} In his fourth and fifth assignments of error, Medford argues that his
OVI conviction is based on insufficient evidence and is against the manifest weight
of the evidence. In particular, Medford contends that his OVI conviction “as a
felony offense” is based on insufficient evidence and is against the manifest weight
of the evidence since his 2020 OVI conviction was defective. (Appellant’s Brief at
20).
{¶38} Manifest “weight of the evidence and sufficiency of the evidence are
clearly different legal concepts.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 389
(1997). Thus, we address each legal concept individually.
{¶39} “An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at
trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average
mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio
St.3d 259 (1981), paragraph two of the syllabus, superseded by state constitutional
amendment on other grounds, State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89 (1997). Accordingly,
“[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. “In deciding if the
evidence was sufficient, we neither resolve evidentiary conflicts nor assess the
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credibility of witnesses, as both are functions reserved for the trier of fact.” State v.
Jones, 2013-Ohio-4775, ¶ 33 (1st Dist.). See also State v. Berry, 2013-Ohio-2380,
¶ 19 (3d Dist.) (“Sufficiency of the evidence is a test of adequacy rather than
credibility or weight of the evidence.”), citing Thompkins at 386.
{¶40} On the other hand, in determining whether a conviction is against the
manifest weight of the evidence, a reviewing court must examine the entire record,
“‘weigh[ ] the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider[ ] the credibility of
witnesses and determine[ ] whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier
of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that
the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” Thompkins at 387,
quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983). A reviewing
court must, however, allow the trier of fact appropriate discretion on matters relating
to the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. State v. DeHass,
10 Ohio St.2d 230, 231 (1967). When applying the manifest-weight standard,
“[o]nly in exceptional cases, where the evidence ‘weighs heavily against the
conviction,’ should an appellate court overturn the trial court’s judgment.” State v.
Haller, 2012-Ohio-5233, ¶ 9 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Hunter, 2011-Ohio-6524,
¶ 119.
{¶41} Based on our resolution of Medford’s first, second, and third
assignments of error in which we resolved that his 2020 OVI conviction is not
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defective for penalty-enhancement purposes in this case, Medford’s challenge to the
sufficiency and weight of the evidence is without merit. That is, Medford’s
argument that his OVI conviction is based on insufficient evidence and is against
the manifest weight of the evidence since his 2020 OVI conviction was “so flawed
that” it could not be used to enhance his penalty in this case is specious since
Medford’s 2020 OVI conviction is not infirm.
{¶42} Medford’s fourth and fifth assignments of error are overruled.
{¶43} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the
particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
WILLAMOWSKI J., concurs.
MILLER, J., concurs in Judgment Only.
/hls
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