State v. Garee

2026 Ohio 1108

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: March 30, 2026
• Docket: 1-25-45
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Garee, 2026-Ohio-1108.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT ALLEN COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 1-25-45 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

v. OPINION AND CHRISTOPHER A. GAREE, JUDGMENT ENTRY DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Appeal from Allen County Common Pleas Court Trial Court No. CR2023 0351

Judgment Affirmed

Date of Decision: March 30, 2026

APPEARANCES:

Kenneth J. Rexford for Appellant

John R. Willamowski, Jr. for Appellee Case No. 1-25-45

WALDICK, J.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Christopher A. Garee (“Garee”), brings this

appeal from the July 28, 2025 judgment of the Allen County Common Pleas Court.

On appeal, Garee argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of OVI

with the specification that he had 5 prior convictions of OVI within 20 years, that

his conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence, and that the trial

court erred by not sustaining his collateral challenge to his 2009 OVI conviction.

For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Background

{¶2} The parties stipulated to the following facts. On August 15, 2023, at

approximately 1:05 a.m., Garee was operating a motor vehicle in Allen County,

Ohio. He was “pulled over by the Shawnee Township Police Department as part of

a lawful traffic stop and as a result of that traffic stop, Mr. Garee [submitted] to

standard field sobriety tests . . . [wherein] the Officer . . . observe[d] several signs

of impairment.” (Tr. at 2-3). Garee was placed under arrest for Operating a Vehicle

While Intoxicated (“OVI”).

{¶3} A search incident to arrest uncovered a rolled-up twenty dollar bill in

Garee’s front-left pocket that contained white residue. Garee was asked to submit

to a breath test but he refused. A warrant was obtained to acquire Garee’s blood and

his blood was drawn at St. Rita’s Medical Center. Garee’s blood was tested by the -2- Case No. 1-25-45

Ohio State Highway Patrol Crime Lab. Garee’s blood contained 168.99 ng/ml +/-

185.8 ng/ml of cocaine, and 675.82 ng/ml +/- 74.34 ng/ml of Benzoylecgonine, a

cocaine metabolite.

{¶4} On December 14, 2023, Garee was indicted for the following offenses:

(Count 1) OVI in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(j)(ii)/(G)(1)(d), a fourth degree

felony due to Garee having 5 prior OVI convictions within 20 years of the offense;

(Count 2) R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(j)(iii)/(G)(1)(d), a fourth degree felony due to Garee

having 5 prior OVI convictions within 20 years of the offense; (Count 3) OVI in

violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a)/(G)(1)(d), a fourth degree felony due to Garee

having 5 prior OVI convictions within 20 years of the offense; and (Count 4) OVI

in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(2)(a)/(A)(2)(b)/(G)(1)(d), a fourth degree felony

due to Garee having 5 prior OVI convictions within 20 years of the offense. All four

counts of the indictment contained specifications for a mandatory additional prison

term pursuant to R.C. 2941.1413(A) asserting that within 20 years of the offense

Garee had 5 or more prior convictions of R.C. 4511.19 or its equivalent. Garee pled

not guilty to the charges.

{¶5} On December 5, 2024, Garee filed a joint motion to suppress and

motion in limine arguing that three of his prior OVI “convictions” were not final

appealable orders and thus did not constitute prior OVI “convictions” for purposes

of enhancing the OVI offense in this instance. In addition, on December 13, 2024,

-3- Case No. 1-25-45

Garee filed a “collateral attack on 2009 alleged prior” contending that the prior

conviction did not have a proper waiver of counsel.

{¶6} A hearing was held on Garee’s motions on March 24, 2025. Garee

testified at the hearing, specifically regarding his collateral attack on his 2009 OVI.

He testified that he entered his guilty plea in 2009 and was sentenced the same day.

He testified he thought he remembered having a female attorney or legal intern

representing him at the time of his plea. The 2009 judgment entry indicated that he

was represented by the “PD” or public defender.

{¶7} With regard to the three challenged prior convictions, Garee’s attorney

argued that the convictions were not final appealable orders because the prior entries

did not dispose of all counts against Garee. All of the judgment entries from the

contested convictions were introduced into evidence and the trial court took the

matter under advisement.

{¶8} On March 28, 2025, the trial court issued two separate journal entries

overruling Garee’s motion to suppress and denying his collateral attack on the 2009

conviction.

{¶9} On June 23, 2025, Garee proceeded to a bench trial. However, rather

than presenting testimony, the parties stipulated to the facts as stated above. The

parties then entered numerous exhibits into evidence by agreement, including

judgment entries of conviction for Garee’s prior OVI offenses and the toxicology

report finding cocaine and cocaine metabolites in his system. Garee maintained his

-4- Case No. 1-25-45

argument that three of the prior OVI convictions were not final orders and should

not be considered enhancing offenses. The trial court maintained its prior ruling,

and found Garee guilty.

{¶10} On July 28, 2025, Garee proceeded to a sentencing hearing. The trial

court determined that all counts of the indictment merged for purposes of sentencing

and the State elected to proceed to sentencing on Count 4. Garee was then sentenced

to serve a mandatory two year prison term. It is from this judgment that Garee

appeals, asserting the following assignments of error for our review.

First Assignment of Error

The trial court erred in finding Mr. Garee guilty of the enhanced felony O.V.I. and of the attached specification of 5 priors within 20 years because three of the required priors lacked finality and hence were not prior convictions, such that the verdict was not supported by sufficient evidence.

Second Assignment of Error

The trial court erred in finding Mr. Garee guilty of the enhanced felony O.V.I. and of the attached specification of 5 priors within 20 years because three of the required priors lacked finality and hence were not prior convictions, such that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.

Third Assignment of Error

The Trial Court erred by not sustaining Mr. Garee’s collateral challenge to the 2009 prior for lack of counsel and lack of a proper waiver of counsel.

-5- Case No. 1-25-45

First and Second Assignments of Error

{¶11} In his first and second assignments of error, Garee argues that there

was insufficient evidence presented to convict him, and that his conviction was

against the manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, Garee contends that three

of his alleged priors “lacked finality” or were not final appealable orders, thus they

could not be used to enhance the offense in this case or support the specification.

Standards of Review

{¶12} “An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the

evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at

trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average

mind of the defendant’s guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio

St.3d 259 (1981), paragraph two of the syllabus, superseded by state constitutional

amendment on other grounds. Accordingly, “[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after

viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Id. “In deciding if the evidence was sufficient, we neither resolve

evidentiary conflicts nor assess the credibility of witnesses, as both functions are

reserved for the trier of fact.” State v. Jones, 2013-Ohio-4775, ¶ 33 (1st Dist.); State

v. Berry, 2013-Ohio-2380, ¶ 19 (3d Dist.) (“Sufficiency of the evidence is a test of

adequacy rather than credibility or weight of the evidence.”).

-6- Case No. 1-25-45

{¶13} In determining whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of

the evidence, we must examine the entire record, weigh the evidence and all

reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses, and determine whether

in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the factfinder clearly lost its way and created

such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the convictions must be reversed and a

new trial ordered. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997). When

applying the manifest weight standard, “[o]nly in exceptional cases, where the

evidence ‘weighs heavily against the conviction,’ should an appellate court overturn

the trial court’s judgment.” State v. Haller, 2012-Ohio-5233, ¶ 9 (3d Dist.), quoting

State v. Hunter, 2011-Ohio-6524, ¶ 119.

Analysis

{¶14} Garee argues that three of his alleged prior convictions should be

suppressed because they lacked a complete sentence and were not final appealable

orders. For example, the 2004 judgment entry convicting him of OVI begins:

On August 231, 2004, the Defendant appeared in open Court with/waived counsel, PD Chamberlain, on the charge of DRIVING WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE AND/OR A PROHIBITED BLOOD ALCOHOL CONCENTRATION IN VIOLATION OF O.R.C. 4511.19(A)(1) & (A)(4) . . . this being the 1st offense within the last five/six year period preceeding [sic] arrest for this charge.

(x) Defendant withdrew his/her plea of Not Guilty and entered a plea of No Contest/Guilty.

1 Areas in bold were handwritten or crossed out in the entry.

-7- Case No. 1-25-45

(State’s Ex. 10). Garee was sentenced to serve 5 days in jail; however, as a first time

offender he was offered to complete the “ASTOP class in lieu of actual

incarceration” so long as he was registered for the class by September 23, 2004.

{¶15} Garee contends that the 2004 judgment entry, and the 2009 and 2013

judgment entries, all contain the same flaw. He contends that the OVI charges all

referenced multiple OVI subsections under R.C. 4511.19, but there is only one

sentence. He argues that since there is no mention of allied offenses or merger in

the judgment entries, there are outstanding OVI counts that have not been disposed

of or dismissed, rendering the judgment entries of conviction not final appealable

orders. He argues that if the prior “convictions” did not constitute final appealable

orders because of these flaws, the prior convictions could not be used to enhance

the offense in this matter.

{¶16} Initially, we emphasize that R.C. 4511.19 and the specification in this

case, R.C. 2941.1413, both require that the defendant “previously ha[s] been

convicted of or pleaded guilty to five or more” violations/or equivalent offenses.

(Emphasis added.) The General Assembly has thus indicated that a final judgment

entry of conviction is not necessary to enhance the penalty. According to the

General Assembly, the enhancement can be established by showing that Garee had

pleaded guilty to the prior offenses. See State v. Gwen, 2012-Ohio-5046, ¶ 11; State

v. Ansley, 2006-Ohio-511, ¶ 14 (5th Dist.). All three of the judgment entries at issue

specifically show that Garee had pleaded guilty to an OVI offense in 2004, 2009, -8- Case No. 1-25-45

and 2013. In fact, Garee actually testified that he had a prior conviction for OVI in

2009 at the suppression hearing. Garee has not established how the entries indicating

he had pleaded guilty on these three prior occasions to OVI offenses are insufficient

given the language of the General Assembly.

{¶17} Nevertheless, although there are alternative means pursuant to the

statute to establish a prior offense such as a prior guilty plea, the Supreme Court of

Ohio has detailed the process of using a judgment entry to establish a prior

conviction in State v. Gwen, supra.

[W]hile R.C. 2945.75(B)(1) permits the state to prove a prior conviction by submitting a judgment entry of the conviction, the statute does not restrict the manner of proof to that method alone. We hold further that when the state chooses to prove a prior conviction by using a judgment entry, that entry must comply with Crim.R. 32(C).

(Emphasis sic.)

{¶18} The question then becomes do the prior judgment entries convicting

Garee of OVI comply with Crim.R. 32(C). Criminal Rule 32(C) reads as follows:

A judgment of conviction shall set forth the fact of conviction and the sentence. Multiple judgments of conviction may be addressed in one judgment entry. If the defendant is found not guilty or for any other reason is entitled to be discharged, the court shall render judgment accordingly. The judge shall sign the judgment and the clerk shall enter it on the journal. A judgment is effective only when entered on the journal by the clerk.

{¶19} The Supreme Court of Ohio has determined that there are four

requirements for a judgment entry of conviction under Crim.R. 32(C).

-9- Case No. 1-25-45

A final, appealable judgment entry of conviction must contain (1) the fact of the conviction, (2) the sentence, (3) the judge's signature, and (4) the time stamp indicating the entry upon the journal by the clerk.

Gwen at ¶ 20. The entries in this case establish the four requirements of Crim.R. 32;

however, Garee maintains that that the second requirement “the sentence” is not

complete because all counts have not been resolved in the judgment entry.

{¶20} There are multiple issues with Garee’s argument. First, we rejected

similar arguments to Garee’s in State v. Medford, 2025-Ohio-140 (3d Dist.). In

Medford, we determined that a sentencing entry that was “flawed” such that the

entry was perhaps not final and appealable could still be used to enhance a later

charge. ¶ 14. Second, the Supreme Court of Ohio has held that Crim.R. 32(C) only

requires “‘a full resolution of those counts for which there were convictions. It does

not require a reiteration of those counts and specifications for which there were no

convictions, but were resolved in other ways, such as dismissals, nolled counts, or

not guilty findings.’” State ex rel. Davis v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common

Pleas, 2010-Ohio-4728, ¶ 2, quoting State ex rel. Davis v. Cuyahoga County Court

of Common Pleas, 2010-Ohio-1066, ¶ 8. Third, the Supreme Court of Ohio has held,

“Where questions arise concerning a prior conviction, a reviewing court must

presume all underlying proceedings were conducted in accordance with the rules of

law and a defendant must introduce evidence to the contrary in order to establish a

-10- Case No. 1-25-45

prima-facie showing of constitutional infirmity.” State v. Brandon, 45 Ohio St.3d

85 (1989) at syllabus. We do not find that Garee has met his burden.2

{¶21} In its entry overruling Garee’s challenges, the trial court determined

that “the issues raised by defendant may require greater attention to detail by the

municipal trial court in fashioning entries, but they do not impact the use of the

entries to prove prior convictions in this case.” (Doc. No. 74). We agree with the

trial court. Medford at ¶ 14.

{¶22} After reviewing the record, we find that the submitted entries were

sufficient evidence to establish that Garee had pleaded guilty to, or been convicted

of, 5 prior OVI offenses within 20 years. The stipulated evidence was also sufficient

to establish that Garee committed an OVI on August 15, 2023. Moreover, given that

the prior judgment entries clearly indicate guilty pleas and sentences for OVIs, we

do not find that Garee’s most recent conviction is against the manifest weight of the

evidence. We do not find that this is one of the exceptional cases where the evidence

weighs heavily against the conviction. For all of these reasons, Garee’s first and

second assignments of error are overruled.

2 Garee argues that his case is similar to State v. Lupardus, 2008-Ohio-2660 (4th Dist.), wherein the Fourth District Court of Appeals determined that an OVI sentencing entry was not final on direct appeal where the judgment entry did not clearly address all outstanding counts. Lupardus is readily distinguishable from the case sub judice because none of the prior offenses in this case are on direct appeal. Lupardus thus does not address the issue presented in this case or compel a different outcome.

-11- Case No. 1-25-45

{¶23} In his third assignment of error, Garee argues that the trial court erred

by denying his collateral attack on the 2009 prior conviction for lack of counsel/lack

of a proper waiver for counsel.

{¶24} “Generally, a past conviction cannot be attacked in a subsequent case.

However, there is a limited right to collaterally attack a conviction when the

state proposes to use the past conviction to enhance the penalty of a later criminal

offense.” State v. Brooke, 2007-Ohio-1533, ¶ 9. We have held that while there is a

limited right to collaterally attack a prior conviction used as a penalty enhancement,

the only recognized constitutional infirmity to attack the prior conviction is that the

defendant was denied the fundamental right to be represented by counsel or an

invalid waiver of counsel. State v. Hogue, 2018-Ohio-1109, ¶ 16 (3d Dist.).

{¶25} Garee contends that he made a prima facie showing that his 2009 plea

was uncounseled. We disagree.

{¶26} The parties agree that the judgment entry for the 2009 case indicates

that Garee was represented by the “PD,” or public defender. Then, at the suppression

hearing, Garee was asked if he knew who had represented him. Garee testified, “[i]t

was a female. I think she was like an intern or something.” (Tr. at 6). Garee

described the female as “[m]id-twenties,” and skinny with brown hair. (Id.) He was

-12- Case No. 1-25-45

then asked if he knew the difference between a regular lawyer and an intern, and

Garee stated “I just knew she was there to represent me.” (Id.)

{¶27} Garee contends that there were no female employees of the public

defender’s office at the time of his plea. However, Garee’s judgment entry indicated

he was represented by a public defender and Garee has specific memories of being

represented by someone. Under these circumstances, we do not find that the trial

court erred by determining that Garee had not made a prima facie showing that his

2009 plea was uncounseled. In fact, the only evidence in the record indicates that

his plea was counseled. Therefore, Garee’s third assignment of error is overruled.

Conclusion

{¶28} Having found no error prejudicial to Garee in the particulars assigned

and argued, his assignments of error are overruled and the judgment of the Allen

County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.

ZIMMERMAN, P.J. and MILLER, J., concur.

-13- Case No. 1-25-45

JUDGMENT ENTRY

For the reasons stated in the opinion of this Court, the assignments of error

are overruled and it is the judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the

trial court is affirmed with costs assessed to Appellant for which judgment is hereby

rendered. The cause is hereby remanded to the trial court for execution of the

judgment for costs.

It is further ordered that the Clerk of this Court certify a copy of this Court’s

judgment entry and opinion to the trial court as the mandate prescribed by App.R.

27; and serve a copy of this Court’s judgment entry and opinion on each party to the

proceedings and note the date of service in the docket. See App.R. 30.

Juergen A. Waldick, Judge

William R. Zimmerman, Judge

Mark C. Miller, Judge

DATED: /jlm

-14-