[337]*337GILLETTE, J.
In this criminal case, defendant was charged with sodomy and sexual abuse, based on allegations that he had unlawful sexual contact with his girlfriend’s eight-year-old daughter. The trial court granted defendant’s pretrial motion to suppress certain statements that he made to two Lake Oswego detectives during a police interview. On appeal by the state, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the statements were admissible. State v. Meade, 146 Or App 202, 933 P2d 355 (1997). We allowed review and now affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Two plainclothes police detectives met defendant upon his arrival at the Portland International Airport after a lengthy international flight. The detectives displayed their badges, assured defendant that his family was fine and that his luggage would be taken care of, and then escorted him to an interview room at the Port of Portland Police Department, a few minutes’ drive away from the terminal. Once in the interview room, the detectives advised defendant of his Miranda rights, told him that they were investigating allegations that he had touched his girlfriend’s daughter inappropriately, and informed him that he would be taken into custody at the conclusion of the interview.
The detectives initially questioned defendant for about an hour, during which time defendant folly and freely answered their questions, even to the point of acknowledging that it was “possible” that he had made sexual contact with the child inadvertently or unconsciously. Eventually, defendant admitted that he “might have” had an erection and touched the girl’s bottom, conceding that such an event “could have happened.”
At that point, defendant stated that, if he needed a lawyer, he wanted one. The detectives paused but, before they had the opportunity to say anything further, defendant leaned forward in his chair, put up his hands as if to stop the detectives from speaking, and said, “You’ve talked a lot. I want to say a few things.” He then began talking about how he realized that his relationship with the girl’s mother was “going down the drain.” He complimented the detectives on [338]*338the way in which they had handled the investigation, but said that he thought that they wanted him to confess to something that he had not done. One of the detectives responded, “No, I don’t want you to confess to something that you didn’t do, but I have this investigation and I believe you did it.” The detective then resumed questioning defendant and, again, defendant responded fully, making several additional incriminating statements. At the conclusion of the interview, which lasted for about another hour, the detectives arrested defendant.
Defendant was charged with three counts of sodomy in the first degree and three counts of sexual abuse in the first degree, all involving the eight year old. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress all the statements that he had made during the interview. He claimed that he was never advised of his Miranda rights, that he was overtired from his trip and, therefore, that he was unable to waive his rights knowingly and intelligently, and that the interview continued improperly after he mentioned his need for a lawyer.
The trial court found that defendant had been advised of his Miranda rights and that the statements that he made before he mentioned his need for a lawyer were freely and voluntarily made. However, the court held that defendant’s statement to the effect that, if he needed a lawyer, then he wanted one,1 was an “equivocal” request for counsel and that the police continued questioning after that request but did not limit their questions to an effort to clarify whether defendant desired to have a lawyer present. The trial court concluded that the failure to limit the interrogation in that way warranted suppression of the statements that followed defendant’s equivocal request for counsel.
The state appealed. ORS 138.060(3). The Court of Appeals assumed, without deciding, that defendant’s statement to the effect that, if he needed a lawyer, then he wanted one, was an equivocal request for counsel but concluded, applying federal standards, that “[defendant’s] immediately ensuing unilateral statements to the detectives evinced ‘ “a [339]*339willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation,’ ” and, under the totality of the circumstances, effected a waiver of the right to counsel. * * * Accordingly, subsequent renewal of interrogation did not violate that right.” Meade, 146 Or App at 206 (citations omitted). For the reasons that follow, we agree.
Defendant’s right to the assistance of counsel during custodial interrogation arises out of his right against self-incrimination as provided in Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution,2 and the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.3 This court has recognized that a level of coercion is inherent in any custodial setting and that a lawyer’s presence at a custodial interrogation is one way to ensure the right to be free from compelled self-incrimination. State v. Sparklin, 296 Or 85, 89, 672 P2d 1182 (1983). When a defendant chooses to have the advice of counsel before he responds to police questions and the police honor that choice, “the coercive atmosphere of police interrogation is to some degree dispelled.” Ibid.
For that reason, when a suspect in police custody makes an unequivocal request to talk to a lawyer, all police questioning must cease. State v. Charboneau, 323 Or 38, 54, 913 P2d 308 (1996); State v. Montez, 309 Or 564, 572, 789 P2d 1352 (1990). When the request is equivocal, however, the police may follow up with questions intended to clarify whether the suspect meant to invoke his right to counsel. Charboneau, 323 Or at 55-56; Montez, 309 Or at 572. In either case, the suspect may thereafter waive the right to have counsel present during that or later interrogations. Montez, 309 Or at 572.
As did the Court of Appeals, we assume that defendant’s reference to a lawyer was an equivocal request for counsel. The state argues that defendant waived the right to counsel immediately after making that reference, when he [340]*340prevented the detectives from speaking, stating “You’ve talked a lot. I want to say a few things,” and then went on to speak about his relationship with the victim’s mother, about how the detectives were handling the investigation, and about whether the detectives wanted him to confess to something that he had not done.
We acknowledge at the outset that this case does not present precisely the same factual context as that involved in Montez and Charboneau. In each of those cases, the suspect’s equivocal invocation of the right to counsel was followed by neutral questions from the interviewing officers directed solely at determining whether the suspect was or was not invoking the right to counsel. In the present case, by contrast, the officers were prevented from asking such neutral questions immediately by defendant’s choice to launch into his monologue. When the officers did resume taking part in the discussion, their questions were aimed at the merits of the case. This case thus presents a question not addressed by either Montez
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[337]*337GILLETTE, J.
In this criminal case, defendant was charged with sodomy and sexual abuse, based on allegations that he had unlawful sexual contact with his girlfriend’s eight-year-old daughter. The trial court granted defendant’s pretrial motion to suppress certain statements that he made to two Lake Oswego detectives during a police interview. On appeal by the state, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the statements were admissible. State v. Meade, 146 Or App 202, 933 P2d 355 (1997). We allowed review and now affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Two plainclothes police detectives met defendant upon his arrival at the Portland International Airport after a lengthy international flight. The detectives displayed their badges, assured defendant that his family was fine and that his luggage would be taken care of, and then escorted him to an interview room at the Port of Portland Police Department, a few minutes’ drive away from the terminal. Once in the interview room, the detectives advised defendant of his Miranda rights, told him that they were investigating allegations that he had touched his girlfriend’s daughter inappropriately, and informed him that he would be taken into custody at the conclusion of the interview.
The detectives initially questioned defendant for about an hour, during which time defendant folly and freely answered their questions, even to the point of acknowledging that it was “possible” that he had made sexual contact with the child inadvertently or unconsciously. Eventually, defendant admitted that he “might have” had an erection and touched the girl’s bottom, conceding that such an event “could have happened.”
At that point, defendant stated that, if he needed a lawyer, he wanted one. The detectives paused but, before they had the opportunity to say anything further, defendant leaned forward in his chair, put up his hands as if to stop the detectives from speaking, and said, “You’ve talked a lot. I want to say a few things.” He then began talking about how he realized that his relationship with the girl’s mother was “going down the drain.” He complimented the detectives on [338]*338the way in which they had handled the investigation, but said that he thought that they wanted him to confess to something that he had not done. One of the detectives responded, “No, I don’t want you to confess to something that you didn’t do, but I have this investigation and I believe you did it.” The detective then resumed questioning defendant and, again, defendant responded fully, making several additional incriminating statements. At the conclusion of the interview, which lasted for about another hour, the detectives arrested defendant.
Defendant was charged with three counts of sodomy in the first degree and three counts of sexual abuse in the first degree, all involving the eight year old. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress all the statements that he had made during the interview. He claimed that he was never advised of his Miranda rights, that he was overtired from his trip and, therefore, that he was unable to waive his rights knowingly and intelligently, and that the interview continued improperly after he mentioned his need for a lawyer.
The trial court found that defendant had been advised of his Miranda rights and that the statements that he made before he mentioned his need for a lawyer were freely and voluntarily made. However, the court held that defendant’s statement to the effect that, if he needed a lawyer, then he wanted one,1 was an “equivocal” request for counsel and that the police continued questioning after that request but did not limit their questions to an effort to clarify whether defendant desired to have a lawyer present. The trial court concluded that the failure to limit the interrogation in that way warranted suppression of the statements that followed defendant’s equivocal request for counsel.
The state appealed. ORS 138.060(3). The Court of Appeals assumed, without deciding, that defendant’s statement to the effect that, if he needed a lawyer, then he wanted one, was an equivocal request for counsel but concluded, applying federal standards, that “[defendant’s] immediately ensuing unilateral statements to the detectives evinced ‘ “a [339]*339willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation,’ ” and, under the totality of the circumstances, effected a waiver of the right to counsel. * * * Accordingly, subsequent renewal of interrogation did not violate that right.” Meade, 146 Or App at 206 (citations omitted). For the reasons that follow, we agree.
Defendant’s right to the assistance of counsel during custodial interrogation arises out of his right against self-incrimination as provided in Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution,2 and the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.3 This court has recognized that a level of coercion is inherent in any custodial setting and that a lawyer’s presence at a custodial interrogation is one way to ensure the right to be free from compelled self-incrimination. State v. Sparklin, 296 Or 85, 89, 672 P2d 1182 (1983). When a defendant chooses to have the advice of counsel before he responds to police questions and the police honor that choice, “the coercive atmosphere of police interrogation is to some degree dispelled.” Ibid.
For that reason, when a suspect in police custody makes an unequivocal request to talk to a lawyer, all police questioning must cease. State v. Charboneau, 323 Or 38, 54, 913 P2d 308 (1996); State v. Montez, 309 Or 564, 572, 789 P2d 1352 (1990). When the request is equivocal, however, the police may follow up with questions intended to clarify whether the suspect meant to invoke his right to counsel. Charboneau, 323 Or at 55-56; Montez, 309 Or at 572. In either case, the suspect may thereafter waive the right to have counsel present during that or later interrogations. Montez, 309 Or at 572.
As did the Court of Appeals, we assume that defendant’s reference to a lawyer was an equivocal request for counsel. The state argues that defendant waived the right to counsel immediately after making that reference, when he [340]*340prevented the detectives from speaking, stating “You’ve talked a lot. I want to say a few things,” and then went on to speak about his relationship with the victim’s mother, about how the detectives were handling the investigation, and about whether the detectives wanted him to confess to something that he had not done.
We acknowledge at the outset that this case does not present precisely the same factual context as that involved in Montez and Charboneau. In each of those cases, the suspect’s equivocal invocation of the right to counsel was followed by neutral questions from the interviewing officers directed solely at determining whether the suspect was or was not invoking the right to counsel. In the present case, by contrast, the officers were prevented from asking such neutral questions immediately by defendant’s choice to launch into his monologue. When the officers did resume taking part in the discussion, their questions were aimed at the merits of the case. This case thus presents a question not addressed by either Montez or Charboneau: May the interrogating officers’ obligation, discussed in those cases, to clarify an equivocal invocation of the right to counsel be obviated, if the suspect thereafter, and without prompting from the officers, initiates further substantive conversation concerning the charge under investigation? For the reasons that follow, we hold that the officers’ duty to clarify the suspect’s intention may, under certain circumstances, be obviated.
This court has not been called on previously to rule on whether or under what circumstances a suspect’s initiation of conversation with the police after equivocally invoking the right to counsel constitutes a waiver of that right under the Oregon Constitution. Although unresolved, the question is not difficult. Every case necessarily turns on its own facts, but there is no conflict between Montez and Charboneau and the idea that a suspect’s own actions may, in a given case, eliminate any need for clarification by the officers. The state may show by forms of evidence other than a suspect’s responses to clarifying questions from the police that the suspect had the requisite state of mind, viz., was willing to enter into a generalized discussion of the substance of the charges without the assistance of counsel.
[341]*341Applying the foregoing standard to the facts of this case, we hold that defendant, without prompting from the police, initiated further conversation that evinced a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation. Defendant’s physical gestures cut off further questions by the officers. Having asserted control over the conversation, he then chose to reopen the topic of the investigation. The officers had no obligation to inquire further.4 We agree with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that, on this record, although defendant’s statements
“were not necessarily inculpatory, they pertained directly or indirectly to the substance of the investigation. * * * The tenor and thrust of his statements, from his announcement, ‘I want to say a few things,’ to his statements denying the allegations, indicated his willingness to talk with the detectives about the accuracy of their investigation against him.”
Meade, 146 Or App at 210.5
Having concluded that defendant initiated the conversation with the detectives,6 we turn to the remaining issue, viz., whether the waiver was knowing and voluntary under the totality of the circumstances. See Montez, 309 Or at 572 (suggesting that separate criterion). The Court of Appeals found, as do we, that the following facts are significant: Defendant is highly educated, having earned a doctorate degree in psychology; defendant was advised of his [342]*342Miranda rights at the beginning of the interview, waived them immediately, and engaged in a lengthy, substantive discussion with the detectives about the case; the trial court found that defendant understood his rights when he waived them initially, that he was alert throughout the interview, and that his statements before the equivocal request for counsel were “the result of free, unconstrained, and informed choice;” and, finally, the period between the time when defendant equivocally invoked his rights and then initiated substantive discussion was very short. Nothing occurred during that period that reasonably could have altered defendant’s understanding of his rights.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the totality of the circumstances indicates that defendant voluntarily waived his rights against self-incrimination under both the state and federal constitutions. The detectives permissibly resumed the interrogation when defendant finished his monologue. The trial court erred in suppressing defendant’s later incriminating statements.7
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. The order of the circuit court is reversed. The case is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.