[Cite as State v. McClanahan, 2014-Ohio-5597.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OTTAWA COUNTY
State of Ohio Court of Appeals Nos. OT-14-024
Appellee Trial Court Nos. 13-CR-181 v.
Cody McClanahan DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellant Decided: December 19, 2014
*****
Mark Mulligan, Ottawa County Prosecuting Attorney, Joseph H. Gerber, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Howard C. Whitcomb, III, for appellant.
***** YARBROUGH, P.J.
I. Introduction
{¶ 1} Appellant, Cody McClanahan, appeals the judgment of the Ottawa County
Court of Common Pleas, sentencing him to 11 years in prison upon acceptance of
appellant’s guilty plea to one count of robbery and one count of intimidation of a witness.
We affirm. A. Facts and Procedural Background
{¶ 2} This matter arises as a result of a robbery that occurred in Oak Harbor,
Ottawa County, Ohio, on December 5, 2013. On that date, appellant, along with three
co-defendants, forced his way into a house belonging to James Edens, Jr. At the time,
James was present with his sons Jimmy Edens, Ryan DeVincent, and Kevin Edens.
Jimmy was with appellant earlier in the evening. Appellant, along with the co-
defendants, believed that Jimmy had stolen a pack of cigarettes and $25 from them.
{¶ 3} Upon entering the home, appellant began punching James and threw him to
the ground. After assaulting James, appellant turned his attention to Jimmy in an effort to
reacquire his cigarettes. Both James and Jimmy were subsequently treated at a local
hospital.
{¶ 4} In addition to the physical altercation involving James and Jimmy, appellant
and his co-defendants also threatened Ryan and Kevin, who were upstairs at the time.
Appellant explained that he would harm the family if they told police of the incident. On
his way out of the home, appellant destroyed the victims’ cell phones and television.
Further, appellant stole 30 DVDs from the residence.
{¶ 5} As a result of the December 5 incident, appellant was indicted on one count
of burglary in violation of R.C. 2911.12(B), two counts of aggravated burglary in
violation of R.C. 2911.11(A), four counts of aggravated robbery in violation of R.C.
2911.01(A)(1), four counts of intimidation of a witness in violation of R.C. 2921.04(B),
and one count of tampering with evidence in violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1). Appellant
2. initially entered a plea of not guilty at his arraignment on December 13, 2013. However,
on March 17, 2014, appellant entered a plea of guilty to one count of robbery and one
count of intimidation of a witness. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the remaining charges
were dismissed. The matter was continued for sentencing and a presentence investigation
report was ordered and prepared.
{¶ 6} On May 22, 2014, a sentencing hearing was held, and the trial court imposed
the maximum sentence on each count, consisting of eight years in prison for robbery and
three years in prison for intimidation of a witness. The court ordered the sentences
served consecutively. Further, the court ordered appellant to pay the costs of prosecution
and restitution. Appellant’s timely appeal followed.
B. Assignments of Error
{¶ 7} On appeal, appellant assigns the following errors for our review:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING A MAXIMUM
ELEVEN (11) YEAR SENTENCE UPON DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
IN THAT IT DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF
OHIO REVISED CODE SECTIONS 2929.11 ET SEQ AND BY DOING
SO, VIOLATED DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS.
3. II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
IMPOSING A MAXIMUM ELEVEN (11) YEAR SENTENCE UPON
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT AS IT WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
II. Analysis
{¶ 8} In appellant’s first assignment of error, he argues that the trial court, in its
imposition of sentence, failed to comply with the mandates contained in R.C. 2929.11
and R.C. 2929.12. In his second assignment of error, appellant contends that the trial
court abused its discretion in imposing a sentence that “exceeds other sentences for
similar crimes in this as well as other courts.” We will address appellant’s assignments
of error simultaneously.
{¶ 9} We note at the outset that abuse of discretion is no longer the applicable
standard of review for appeals of felony sentences. See State v. Tammerine, 6th Dist.
Lucas No. L-13-1081, 2014-Ohio-425; see also R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) (“The appellate
court’s standard for review is not whether the sentencing court abused its discretion.”).
Rather, we review felony sentences under the two-prong approach set forth in R.C.
2953.08(G)(2). R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) provides that an appellate court may increase,
reduce, modify, or vacate and remand a dispute sentence if it clearly and convincingly
finds either of the following:
4. (a) That the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings
under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of
section 2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the Revised Code,
whichever, if any, is relevant;
(b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.
{¶ 10} While the abuse of discretion standard set forth in State v. Kalish, 120 Ohio
St.3d 23, 2008-Ohio-4912, 896 N.E.2d 124, is no longer controlling in our review of
felony sentences, Kalish is still useful in determining whether a sentence is clearly and
convincingly contrary to law. In that regard, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that a
sentence was not clearly and convincingly contrary to law where the trial court
considered the purposes and principles of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11 along with the
seriousness and recidivism factors under R.C. 2929.12, properly applied postrelease
control, and imposed a sentence within the statutory range. Id. at ¶ 18.
{¶ 11} R.C. 2929.11(A) provides, in relevant part: “The overriding purposes of
felony sentencing are to protect the public from future crime by the offender and others
and to punish the offender using the minimum sanctions that the court determines
accomplish those purposes * * *.” In order to comply with the mandates of R.C.
2929.11, a trial court must impose a sentence that is “reasonably calculated to achieve the
two overriding purposes of felony sentencing * * * commensurate with and not
demeaning to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and its impact upon the victim,
and consistent with sentences imposed for similar crimes committed by similar
5. offenders.” R.C. 2929.11(B). In carrying out its obligations to impose a sentence that is
consistent with the purposes and principles of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11, the trial
court must weigh the factors indicating that the offender’s conduct is more serious than
conduct normally constituting the offense under R.C. 2929.12(B) against those factors
indicating that the offender’s conduct is less serious than conduct normally constituting
the offense under R.C. 2929.12(C). Further, the court must weigh the factors contained
in R.C. 2929.12(D) indicating the likelihood that the offender will commit future crimes
against the factors contained in R.C. 2929.12(E) indicating that the offender is not likely
to commit future crimes.
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[Cite as State v. McClanahan, 2014-Ohio-5597.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OTTAWA COUNTY
State of Ohio Court of Appeals Nos. OT-14-024
Appellee Trial Court Nos. 13-CR-181 v.
Cody McClanahan DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellant Decided: December 19, 2014
*****
Mark Mulligan, Ottawa County Prosecuting Attorney, Joseph H. Gerber, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Howard C. Whitcomb, III, for appellant.
***** YARBROUGH, P.J.
I. Introduction
{¶ 1} Appellant, Cody McClanahan, appeals the judgment of the Ottawa County
Court of Common Pleas, sentencing him to 11 years in prison upon acceptance of
appellant’s guilty plea to one count of robbery and one count of intimidation of a witness.
We affirm. A. Facts and Procedural Background
{¶ 2} This matter arises as a result of a robbery that occurred in Oak Harbor,
Ottawa County, Ohio, on December 5, 2013. On that date, appellant, along with three
co-defendants, forced his way into a house belonging to James Edens, Jr. At the time,
James was present with his sons Jimmy Edens, Ryan DeVincent, and Kevin Edens.
Jimmy was with appellant earlier in the evening. Appellant, along with the co-
defendants, believed that Jimmy had stolen a pack of cigarettes and $25 from them.
{¶ 3} Upon entering the home, appellant began punching James and threw him to
the ground. After assaulting James, appellant turned his attention to Jimmy in an effort to
reacquire his cigarettes. Both James and Jimmy were subsequently treated at a local
hospital.
{¶ 4} In addition to the physical altercation involving James and Jimmy, appellant
and his co-defendants also threatened Ryan and Kevin, who were upstairs at the time.
Appellant explained that he would harm the family if they told police of the incident. On
his way out of the home, appellant destroyed the victims’ cell phones and television.
Further, appellant stole 30 DVDs from the residence.
{¶ 5} As a result of the December 5 incident, appellant was indicted on one count
of burglary in violation of R.C. 2911.12(B), two counts of aggravated burglary in
violation of R.C. 2911.11(A), four counts of aggravated robbery in violation of R.C.
2911.01(A)(1), four counts of intimidation of a witness in violation of R.C. 2921.04(B),
and one count of tampering with evidence in violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1). Appellant
2. initially entered a plea of not guilty at his arraignment on December 13, 2013. However,
on March 17, 2014, appellant entered a plea of guilty to one count of robbery and one
count of intimidation of a witness. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the remaining charges
were dismissed. The matter was continued for sentencing and a presentence investigation
report was ordered and prepared.
{¶ 6} On May 22, 2014, a sentencing hearing was held, and the trial court imposed
the maximum sentence on each count, consisting of eight years in prison for robbery and
three years in prison for intimidation of a witness. The court ordered the sentences
served consecutively. Further, the court ordered appellant to pay the costs of prosecution
and restitution. Appellant’s timely appeal followed.
B. Assignments of Error
{¶ 7} On appeal, appellant assigns the following errors for our review:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING A MAXIMUM
ELEVEN (11) YEAR SENTENCE UPON DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
IN THAT IT DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF
OHIO REVISED CODE SECTIONS 2929.11 ET SEQ AND BY DOING
SO, VIOLATED DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS.
3. II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
IMPOSING A MAXIMUM ELEVEN (11) YEAR SENTENCE UPON
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT AS IT WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
II. Analysis
{¶ 8} In appellant’s first assignment of error, he argues that the trial court, in its
imposition of sentence, failed to comply with the mandates contained in R.C. 2929.11
and R.C. 2929.12. In his second assignment of error, appellant contends that the trial
court abused its discretion in imposing a sentence that “exceeds other sentences for
similar crimes in this as well as other courts.” We will address appellant’s assignments
of error simultaneously.
{¶ 9} We note at the outset that abuse of discretion is no longer the applicable
standard of review for appeals of felony sentences. See State v. Tammerine, 6th Dist.
Lucas No. L-13-1081, 2014-Ohio-425; see also R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) (“The appellate
court’s standard for review is not whether the sentencing court abused its discretion.”).
Rather, we review felony sentences under the two-prong approach set forth in R.C.
2953.08(G)(2). R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) provides that an appellate court may increase,
reduce, modify, or vacate and remand a dispute sentence if it clearly and convincingly
finds either of the following:
4. (a) That the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings
under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of
section 2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the Revised Code,
whichever, if any, is relevant;
(b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.
{¶ 10} While the abuse of discretion standard set forth in State v. Kalish, 120 Ohio
St.3d 23, 2008-Ohio-4912, 896 N.E.2d 124, is no longer controlling in our review of
felony sentences, Kalish is still useful in determining whether a sentence is clearly and
convincingly contrary to law. In that regard, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that a
sentence was not clearly and convincingly contrary to law where the trial court
considered the purposes and principles of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11 along with the
seriousness and recidivism factors under R.C. 2929.12, properly applied postrelease
control, and imposed a sentence within the statutory range. Id. at ¶ 18.
{¶ 11} R.C. 2929.11(A) provides, in relevant part: “The overriding purposes of
felony sentencing are to protect the public from future crime by the offender and others
and to punish the offender using the minimum sanctions that the court determines
accomplish those purposes * * *.” In order to comply with the mandates of R.C.
2929.11, a trial court must impose a sentence that is “reasonably calculated to achieve the
two overriding purposes of felony sentencing * * * commensurate with and not
demeaning to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and its impact upon the victim,
and consistent with sentences imposed for similar crimes committed by similar
5. offenders.” R.C. 2929.11(B). In carrying out its obligations to impose a sentence that is
consistent with the purposes and principles of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11, the trial
court must weigh the factors indicating that the offender’s conduct is more serious than
conduct normally constituting the offense under R.C. 2929.12(B) against those factors
indicating that the offender’s conduct is less serious than conduct normally constituting
the offense under R.C. 2929.12(C). Further, the court must weigh the factors contained
in R.C. 2929.12(D) indicating the likelihood that the offender will commit future crimes
against the factors contained in R.C. 2929.12(E) indicating that the offender is not likely
to commit future crimes.
{¶ 12} Here, appellant acknowledges that the trial court considered R.C. 2929.11
and R.C. 2929.12 in arriving at its sentence. However, appellant maintains that the
record “is void of any information that the trial court considered all of the factors
specified in [R.C. 2929.12].” Further, he contends that his sentence is disproportionate to
other sentences received by defendants in the same court for the same crimes.
{¶ 13} With regard to its consideration of the relevant sentencing statutes in this
case, the court indicated the following in its sentencing entry:
The Court has considered the record, oral statements, any victim
impact statement, and the pre-sentence report prepared, as well as the
principle and purposes of sentencing under Ohio Revised Code Section
2929.11. The Court has further balanced the seriousness and recidivism
factors under Ohio Revised Code 2929.12.
6. {¶ 14} Moreover, the trial court noted its consideration of the relevant statutes at
the sentencing hearing, stating: “When the Court determines what sentencing should be,
we look to 2929.11 of the Ohio Revised Code.” The court then went on to recite the
language of the R.C. 2929.11 in its entirety, also indicating that it “considered the
sentencing factors set forth in 2929.12.” Ultimately, the court found that the more likely
recidivism factors outweighed the less likely factors and the more serious factors
outweighed the less serious factors. The court’s findings were embodied in its sentencing
entry and were verbally explained at the sentencing hearing.
{¶ 15} Notwithstanding the foregoing, appellant argues that the evidence does not
support the trial court’s conclusions with respect to the weighing of factors under R.C.
2929.12. Regarding the trial court’s examination of the factors contained in R.C.
2929.12, we have previously stated: “While the phrase ‘shall consider’ is used throughout
R.C. 2929.12, the sentencing court is not obligated to give a detailed explanation of how
it algebraically applied each seriousness and recidivism factor to the offender. Indeed, no
specific recitation is required. * * * Merely stating that the court considered the statutory
factors is enough.” State v. Brimacombe, 195 Ohio App.3d 524, 2011-Ohio-5032, 960
N.E.2d 1042, ¶ 11 (6th Dist.), citing State v. Arnett, 88 Ohio St.3d 208, 215, 724 N.E.2d
793 (2000). In light of the trial court’s statements at the sentencing hearing, as well as
the language contained in the sentencing entry, we conclude that the trial court complied
with its obligations under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.
7. {¶ 16} Further, we find no merit as to appellant’s assertion that his sentence was
disproportionate to sentences received by other defendants found guilty of similar crimes
in the same court. In State v. Dahms, 6th Dist. No. S-11-028, 2012-Ohio-3181, this court
stated the following concerning consistency and proportionality requirements under R.C.
2929.11(B):
The consistency and proportionality requirements of R.C.
2929.11(B) require that sentencing courts impose punishment and sentence
“consistent with the sentences imposed for similar crimes committed by
similar offenders.” Consistency does not necessarily mean uniformity;
rather, consistency has a goal of similar sentences for similar offenses. See
State v. Battle, 10th Dist. No. 06AP-863, 2007-Ohio-1845. As a result,
consistency includes a range of sentences, taking into consideration a trial
court’s discretion to weigh the relevant statutory factors. Id. Even though
offenses may be similar, “distinguishing factors may justify dissimilar
sentences.” Id. at ¶ 24; State v. King, 5th Dist. No. CT06-0020, 2006-Ohio-
6566, ¶ 23.
In addition, consistency in sentencing does not result from a case-by-
case comparison, but by the trial court’s proper application of the statutory
sentencing guidelines. State v. Hall, 179 Ohio App.3d 727, 2008-Ohio-
6228, 903 N.E.2d 676, ¶ 10 (10th Dist.). An offender cannot simply
present other cases in which an individual convicted of the same offense
8. received a lesser sentence to demonstrate that his sentence is
disproportionate. State v. Hayes, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-233, 2009-Ohio-
1100, ¶ 10, citing State v. Battle, 10th Dist. No. 06AP-863, 2007-Ohio-
1845, ¶ 23. Rather, to demonstrate that a sentence is inconsistent, an
offender must show that the trial court did not properly consider applicable
sentencing criteria found in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. State v. Holloman,
10th Dist. No. 07AP-875, 2008-Ohio-2650, ¶ 19. Id. at ¶ 21-22.
{¶ 17} Having already concluded that the trial court complied with its obligations
under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, we find that appellant has failed to demonstrate any
inconsistency or disproportionality in his sentence. Further, while we recognize that the
citation of similar cases that contain lesser sentences is insufficient, standing alone, to
render a sentence disproportionate, we note that appellant has failed to cite any such
examples to support his contention that his sentence “exceeds other sentences for similar
crimes in this as well as other courts.”
{¶ 18} Having concluded that the trial court complied with R.C. 2929.11 and
2929.12 in its imposition of appellant’s sentence, we find that appellant’s sentence is not
clearly and convincingly contrary to law.
{¶ 19} Accordingly, appellant’s assignments of error are not well-taken.
9. III. Conclusion
{¶ 20} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Ottawa County Court of
Common Pleas is affirmed. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant
to App.R. 24.
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Arlene Singer, J. _______________________________ JUDGE Stephen A. Yarbrough, P.J. _______________________________ James D. Jensen, J. JUDGE CONCUR. _______________________________ JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/newpdf/?source=6.
10.