State v. Mayor of Rutherford

26 A. 933, 55 N.J.L. 450, 26 Vroom 450, 1893 N.J. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 67
Supreme Court of New Jersey·Decided June 15, 1893·Published·Cited by 1 cases

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Lippincott, J.

By the writ of certiorari in this ease the proceedings of the mayor and council of the borough of Butherford, to adopt a grade for Sylvan street in the borough are certified into this court for review.

The contention in relation to the grade of Sylvan street arises on the part of the street extending from the point where Passaic avenue intersects the street on the south, thence northerly to Park avenue, and more particularly that portion between Passaic avenue and the street known as the Terrace. This part is called the hill, and ascends from Passaic avenue to the summit and thence descends to Park avenue, which lies to the north of the Terrace.

There exists no dissatisfaction with the grade on any other portion of the street.

The prosecutors contend that the proceedings by which the grade was adopted or established are without warrant of law, and therefore illegal, and should be set aside; and that the work of grading the street is not progressing on that part of Sylvan street between Passaic and Park avenues in accordance with the grade heretofore established and adopted by agreement between the prosecutors and the mayor and council of the borough.

The first question presented is whether the mayor and council can legally establish a grade in any other manner than by ordinance. It is contended, on the part of the prosecutors, that the grade of Sylvan street was never adopted by ordi[452]*452nance, and that no grade of any street in the borough can be established or adopted otherwise.

This contention requires an examination of such statutes relative to the matter as have been noticed and considered in the arguments and briefs of counsel.

By an act of the legislature of this state, entitled “A supplement to an act entitled ‘An act for the formation of borough governments/” approved April 3d, 1878, supplement approved March 13th, 1883 (Pamph. L., p. 49), general supervision is given to the mayor and council over the streets, avenues, roads, public places and sidewalks in the borough, and grants power to them to accept unaccepted streets after the same shall have been first opened, worked and graded in conformity to the grade established thereon by the mayor and council, Ac,

The third section of the act provides “ that the mayor and council shall have authority to provide by ordinance for the grading, construction, repairing and keeping in repair all such accepted streets.”

If this act authorizes the mayor and council to establish the grade of any street, it authorizes it to be done only by ordinance by the mayor and council of the borough. There is no authority conferred to establish the grade by any other method.

By a further supplement approved March 26th, 1886 (Pamph. L., p. 122), it is provided that “ it shall be lawful for the mayor and council of any borough to make and establish ordinances for ascertaining and establishing the grades and boundaries of all streets, avenues, alleys and sidewalks therein.”

The next act in order cited is a further supplement to the act of 1878, approved April 1st, 1887 (Pamph. L., p. 126), the first section of which provides that “ the mayor and council, under the act to which this is a further supplement, shall have power and authority, by ordinance, to order and cause any street, road or avenue, Ac., * * * to be graded * * * in such manner as they may deem advisable; pro[453]*453vided, application in writing, signed by the owners of at least one-half the lineal feet of land fronting on the proposed improvement, be first presented to the mayor and council.”

The only other act to which attention has been directed is a further supplement, approved March 23d, 1888. Pamph. L., p. 226.

The first section of this act provides that “ the mayor and council shall have power and authority, by ordinance, to lay out, open, extend, alter, make, straighten and vacate streets, roads, avenues and highways, whether the same be dedicated ■or otherwise obtained, to or for public use, and also to grade, pave, gravel, &c.; * * * provided, however, that the application, in writing, describing the nature, kind and extent of the work or improvement desired, signed by the owners at least of one-quarter of the lineal feet of land fronting on the street, avenue, road, &c., * * * proposed to be opened, laid out, extended, altered, * * * graded, * * * or otherwise improved, be first presented to the mayor and council.”

By section 3 of the act of 1887 (at p. 126), it is provided that after the passage of the ordinance provided for by that act any and all further acts and proceedings necessary to complete the establishment contemplated by the ordinance could be taken by resolution, and it was decided in Meday et al. v. The Mayor of Rutherford, 23 Vroom 499, that where the improvement of a highway had been inaugurated by ordinance under the act of 1887, a change of grade may be lawfully effected by resolution.

This decision was a construction of the act of 1887. The act of 1888 contains no provision similar to section 3 of the act of 1887. The act of 1.888 provides that all proceedings to alter a street or to grade it must be by ordinance, to be enacted only upon an application of a certain proportion of the ■owners of land fronting upon the improvement, and it may become a question upon the construction of this act of 1888 whether an alteration of grade can, in any event, be accom[454]*454plished by resolution, without the consent of the property owners.

Whether the grade of a street can be established, independently of an application, as provided by the acts of 1887 and 1888, is not now a question necessary to determine, but it is certain that upon the legislation under consideration boroughs have no power and authority, except by ordinance, duly enacted by the mayor and council, to establish the grade of any of the streets or other highways within their limits. This certainly is the necessary interpretation of these statutes whenever the legality of the proceeding of the mayor and council in relation to this matter is directly called in question.

It nowhere appears in this case that the grade of Sylvan street was established by ordinance; on the contrary, it appears by the return and the evidence that the grade was not so. established. It is also conceded that no ordinance was ever enacted by the mayor and council of the borough establishing such grade.

Now, this being so, ordinarily, it would be needless to go further. It would follow, necessarily, that the proceedings of the mayor and council for the grading of Sylvan street would be set aside.

But in this case the defendants charge the prosecutors with laches in prosecuting their rights in this matter.

It is an essential element of laches or negligence that the party charged with it should have knowledge of the facts constituting his title to relief, or have failed or omitted to obtain knowledge when it was obtainable, or that there should be circumstances which should have induced an inquiry and an effort to obtain knowledge.

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State v. Mayor of Rutherford, 26 A. 933, 55 N.J.L. 450, 26 Vroom 450, 1893 N.J. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 67 (N.J. 1893).

26 A. 933 (State v. Mayor of Rutherford) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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