State v. Mayor of Rutherford

27 A. 172, 55 N.J.L. 441, 26 Vroom 441, 1893 N.J. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 68
CourtSupreme Court of New Jersey
DecidedJune 15, 1893
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 27 A. 172 (State v. Mayor of Rutherford) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of New Jersey primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Mayor of Rutherford, 27 A. 172, 55 N.J.L. 441, 26 Vroom 441, 1893 N.J. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 68 (N.J. 1893).

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Lippincott, J.

This certiorari brings up for review the final assessment for grading Union avenue from Erie avenue to the Passaic river, in the borough of Rutherford.

The whole length of the improvements was thirteen thousand four hundred and nine and ninety-six one-hundredths feet. There are two plots assessed to the prosecutors.’ The plot on the northwesterly side of the avenue has a frontage thereon of two thousand and sixty-five and six one-hundredths feet, and is designated as plot No. 47 on the assessment map, and is assessed for the sum of $1,497.16. The plot on the southeasterly side of the avenue has a frontage thereon of two thousand and sixty-two and fifty one-hundredths feet, and is designated as plot No. 81 on the assessment map, and is assessed for the sum of $1,495.31. The total cost and expense of the improvement amounted to the sum of $9,706.43.

The whole of the amount, with the exception of $183.44, was assessed as benefits received upon the owners of lands claimed to have been benefited.

[442]*442This sum of $183.44 was by the commissioners of assessments adjudged to be an excess of benefits, and was placed upon the borough at large.

The reasons for setting aside the assessment will be taken up in the order in which they were discussed in the argument.

The sixth reason or objection is that the commissioners making the assessment are taxpayers in the borough, and therefore are not disinterested.

The objection is not well founded. By the fifth section of the act entitled “A further supplement to an act entitled ‘An act for the formation of borough governments/ approved April 5th, 1878,” which further supplement was approved April 1st, 1887 (Pamph. L., p. 126), it is provided “ that the mayor and council shall appoint three disinterested freeholders of said borough residing in different wards, if the borough be divided into wards, commissioners to make the assessment of the costs and expenses of such improvement or work done in the manner herein contemplated.” It is not contended that this provision of the statute was not followed in the appointment of these commissioners. This statute was approved in the ease of The State, ex rel. Poillon, v. The Mayor, &c., of Rutherford, at the June Term, 1891, of this court. A memorandum of that decision is filed.

The seventh objection is that the commissioners admitted that they favored making every street pay for its own improvements ; that is, pay for itself, without regard to benefits, and that, therefore, they are not disinterested commissioners.

It appears from the evidence of Mr. Ely, a witness in the case, that after the making and filing of the report of assessment, and upon the hearing of objections at the time appointed for such hearing, in the discussion which ensued, the chairman of the commissioners said to him that it was the policy of the borough to assess the cost of the improvement of the streets upon the streets so improved, and they calculated to make each street pay for its own improvement, and that at this time there was no dissent expressed by the other commissioners.

[443]*443It does not appear that their attention was again called to the matter in connection with this street improvement, or that it was anything more than a casual remark, and it is not such an expression as would warrant a legal conclusion that the commissioners were not disinterested. It might well be found, upon examination of all the circumstances, that the policy of making each street in the borough of Rutherford pay for its own improvement might not be discordant to the application, practically, of the principle that for such improvements lands should be assessed only in proportion to benefits received.

Union avenue was an old street or road, and a thoroughfare between Newark and Passaic, with the exception of that part which crosses the lands of the prosecutors. This old road, or old street, extends, as will be seen by referring to the map, from what is known as Erie avenue, running along the Erie railroad, to Riverside avenue. It connects with the Newark and -Hackensack road on the east of the borough, and with the river road which leads from Newark to Passaic. It is one of the two thoroughfares in the borough of Rutherford. It is the principal road between Rutherford and Passaic. The river road is what is now marked on the assessment map as Riverside avenue. It is about two thousand to two thousand one hundred feet from the point where Riverside avenue intersects Union avenue to the river. The lands of the prosecutors lie west of Riverside avenue, and extend as shown on the map of this section of country, from the Erie railroad on the north to about a mile to the south; these lands are bounded on the west by the river, and the tract of their land through which Union avenue, as now graded, extends contains about one hundred and fifty acres. Union avenue, before it was graded, did not extend through these lands but ended at Riverside avenue. Before Union avenue was graded there existed no street through their lands. There was, as shown by the evidence, a sort of a passable road or driveway through the lands of the prosecutors from Riverside avenue to the river, a little to the north of the middle of their property. When it was contemplated to grade Union avenue the prose[444]*444cutors dedicated to the borough of Rutherford the land needed for its extension from Riverside avenue, sometimes called River road,” to the river, a dedication practically coinciding with the old driveway already there.

The commissioners’ map of the improvement through the lands of the prosecutors shows a number of cross streets intersecting Union avenue. These appear to have been made in accordance with a plan of development of this property by the prosecutors.. None of these cross streets are yet public streets, by dedication or otherwise. It is shown that the prosecutors had done some filling and grading in reference to the lines of these streets.

There can be but little question that this improvement renders the lands of the plaintiffs much more available for the only purpose for which they hold them. Before this improvement these lands were almost entirely without any outlet and unavailable. It is apparent, from the evidence, that the whole of this large tract of land was held by the prosecutors with the expectation of bringing it into market. The feasibility of the erection of a bridge over the Passaic river at the end of Union street as now graded has been much discussed by them. The situation of the lands, as shown in connection with their communication with the borough of, Rutherford and other places, indicates at once that this improvement is one very desirable to the lands of the prosecutors.

The prosecutors themselves dedicated the lands for this improvement by deeds of dedication formally executed and delivered to the borough, and also with others formally petitioned for this improvement, and, as is shown by the evidence, expected to be quite heavily assessed for its benefits.

I notice that in the argument and brief of counsel for the prosecutors, it is contended that the assessment includes various items of expenses not properly chargeable to the landowners assessed. It appears that no objection was taken on this ground, although the prosecutors appeared before the’ mayor and council before the report was confirmed.

[445]

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Bluebook (online)
27 A. 172, 55 N.J.L. 441, 26 Vroom 441, 1893 N.J. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 68, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-mayor-of-rutherford-nj-1893.