[649]*649LEESON, J.
Defendant was convicted of three counts of furnishing obscene materials to minors, ORS 167.065(l)(a), and three counts of endangering the welfare of minors, ORS 163.575(l)(a). The indictment stated, in part, that defendant violated ORS 167.065(l)(a) by unlawfully and knowingly furnishing to three minor children
“a picture, photograph, or other visual representation or image depicting sexual intercourse, a male touching a female vagina with his mouth, a female touching a male penis with her mouth, or an erect male penis, knowing or having good reason to know the character of the material furnished
Defendant demurred to the indictment, contending that the statute is an unconstitutional restriction on free expression under Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution, and the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.1 The trial court denied his demurrer and he was convicted following a stipulated facts trial.
On appeal, defendant challenges only his convictions on the counts involving the furnishing of obscene materials to minors. He contends that this case is controlled by State v. Frink, 60 Or App 209, 653 P2d 553 (1982), and State v. House, 66 Or App 953, 676 P2d 892, mod 68 Or App 360, 681 P2d 173 (1984), aff’d on other grounds 299 Or 78, 698 P2d 951 (1985), in which, he maintains, we held that ORS 167.065(l)(a) was unconstitutionally overbroad. The state responds that our decision in Frink addressed only the statutory prohibition against furnishing materials depicting nudity to minors and left intact the remaining prohibitions in ORS 167.065(l)(a). It maintains that defendant’s reliance on House is misplaced, because in that case we did not consider whether a proscription against furnishing similar materials to minors should be [650]*650upheld as “an historical exception” to the constitutional guarantee in Article I, section 8.
ORS 167.065 provides, in part:
“(1) A person commits the crime of furnishing obscene materials to minors if, knowing or having good reason to know the character of the material furnished, the person furnishes to a minor:
“(a) Any picture, photograph, drawing, sculpture, motion picture, film or other visual representation or image of a person or portion of the human body that depicts nudity, sadomasochistic abuse, sexual conduct or sexual excitement[.]”
ORS 167.060 defines the terms used in the statute:
“(3) ‘Furnishes’ means to sell, give, rent, loan or otherwise provide.
;p * * >p
“(5) ‘Nudity’ means uncovered, or less than opaquely covered, post-pubertal human genitals, pubic areas, the post-pubertal human female breast below a point immediately above the top of the areola, or the covered human male genitals in a discernibly turgid state. For purposes of this definition, a female breast is considered uncovered if the nipple only or the nipple and areola only are covered.
í (:p tp ;p ip ip
“(9) ‘Sadomasochistic abuse’ means flagellation or torture by or upon a person who is nude or clad in undergarments or in revealing or bizarre costume, or the condition of being fettered, bound or otherwise physically restrained on the part of one so clothed.
“(10) ‘Sexual conduct’ means human masturbation, sexual intercourse, or any touching of the genitals, pubic areas or buttocks of the human male or female, or the breasts of the female, whether alone or between members of the same or opposite sex or between humans and animals in an act of apparent sexual stimulation or gratification.
“(11) ‘Sexual excitement’ means the condition of human male or female genitals or the breasts of the female when in a state of sexual stimulation, or the sensual experiences of humans engaging in or witnessing sexual conduct or nudity.”
[651]*651The threshold issue in this case is the effect of Frink and House on ORS 167.065(l)(a). The state contends that we should sever the unconstitutional portion of the statute and consider independently the remaining provisions. Defendant responds that that would amount to an impermissible attempt to use a “narrowing” construction of the statute. We agree with the state.
In Frink, we held that the “mere depiction of nudity may not be prohibited, because it impinges on the constitutionally protected right of free expression[,]” and that the statute’s prohibition on furnishing all materials depicting nudity to minors, regardless of the context in which the nudity was presented, swept too broadly. 60 Or App at 212-13. (Footnote omitted.) We limited our holding to that portion of the statute dealing with furnishing materials depicting nudity to minors. Id. at 212 n 4.
In House, the defendant appealed his conviction for engaging in sexual conduct in a live public show. ORS 167.060(10); ORS 167.062. We noted that the sweep of the statute would include ballets, operas, musicals and dramas that may contain scenes in which a performer may touch the buttocks, breasts or genitals of another performer “ ‘in an act of apparent sexual stimulation or gratification.’ ” House, 66 Or App at 958. We held that the following definition of “sexual conduct” in ORS 167.062 and 167.060(10) was over-broad and violated Article I, section 8:
“ ‘any touching of the genitals, pubic areas or buttocks of the human male or female, or the breasts of the female, whether alone or between members of the same or opposite sex or between humans and animals’ * * * ‘in an act of apparent sexual stimulation or gratification.’ ” Id. at 957.
On reconsideration, we held that the terms “human masturbation” and “sexual intercourse” were severable. House, 68 Or App at 365.
ORS 174.040
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[649]*649LEESON, J.
Defendant was convicted of three counts of furnishing obscene materials to minors, ORS 167.065(l)(a), and three counts of endangering the welfare of minors, ORS 163.575(l)(a). The indictment stated, in part, that defendant violated ORS 167.065(l)(a) by unlawfully and knowingly furnishing to three minor children
“a picture, photograph, or other visual representation or image depicting sexual intercourse, a male touching a female vagina with his mouth, a female touching a male penis with her mouth, or an erect male penis, knowing or having good reason to know the character of the material furnished
Defendant demurred to the indictment, contending that the statute is an unconstitutional restriction on free expression under Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution, and the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.1 The trial court denied his demurrer and he was convicted following a stipulated facts trial.
On appeal, defendant challenges only his convictions on the counts involving the furnishing of obscene materials to minors. He contends that this case is controlled by State v. Frink, 60 Or App 209, 653 P2d 553 (1982), and State v. House, 66 Or App 953, 676 P2d 892, mod 68 Or App 360, 681 P2d 173 (1984), aff’d on other grounds 299 Or 78, 698 P2d 951 (1985), in which, he maintains, we held that ORS 167.065(l)(a) was unconstitutionally overbroad. The state responds that our decision in Frink addressed only the statutory prohibition against furnishing materials depicting nudity to minors and left intact the remaining prohibitions in ORS 167.065(l)(a). It maintains that defendant’s reliance on House is misplaced, because in that case we did not consider whether a proscription against furnishing similar materials to minors should be [650]*650upheld as “an historical exception” to the constitutional guarantee in Article I, section 8.
ORS 167.065 provides, in part:
“(1) A person commits the crime of furnishing obscene materials to minors if, knowing or having good reason to know the character of the material furnished, the person furnishes to a minor:
“(a) Any picture, photograph, drawing, sculpture, motion picture, film or other visual representation or image of a person or portion of the human body that depicts nudity, sadomasochistic abuse, sexual conduct or sexual excitement[.]”
ORS 167.060 defines the terms used in the statute:
“(3) ‘Furnishes’ means to sell, give, rent, loan or otherwise provide.
;p * * >p
“(5) ‘Nudity’ means uncovered, or less than opaquely covered, post-pubertal human genitals, pubic areas, the post-pubertal human female breast below a point immediately above the top of the areola, or the covered human male genitals in a discernibly turgid state. For purposes of this definition, a female breast is considered uncovered if the nipple only or the nipple and areola only are covered.
í (:p tp ;p ip ip
“(9) ‘Sadomasochistic abuse’ means flagellation or torture by or upon a person who is nude or clad in undergarments or in revealing or bizarre costume, or the condition of being fettered, bound or otherwise physically restrained on the part of one so clothed.
“(10) ‘Sexual conduct’ means human masturbation, sexual intercourse, or any touching of the genitals, pubic areas or buttocks of the human male or female, or the breasts of the female, whether alone or between members of the same or opposite sex or between humans and animals in an act of apparent sexual stimulation or gratification.
“(11) ‘Sexual excitement’ means the condition of human male or female genitals or the breasts of the female when in a state of sexual stimulation, or the sensual experiences of humans engaging in or witnessing sexual conduct or nudity.”
[651]*651The threshold issue in this case is the effect of Frink and House on ORS 167.065(l)(a). The state contends that we should sever the unconstitutional portion of the statute and consider independently the remaining provisions. Defendant responds that that would amount to an impermissible attempt to use a “narrowing” construction of the statute. We agree with the state.
In Frink, we held that the “mere depiction of nudity may not be prohibited, because it impinges on the constitutionally protected right of free expression[,]” and that the statute’s prohibition on furnishing all materials depicting nudity to minors, regardless of the context in which the nudity was presented, swept too broadly. 60 Or App at 212-13. (Footnote omitted.) We limited our holding to that portion of the statute dealing with furnishing materials depicting nudity to minors. Id. at 212 n 4.
In House, the defendant appealed his conviction for engaging in sexual conduct in a live public show. ORS 167.060(10); ORS 167.062. We noted that the sweep of the statute would include ballets, operas, musicals and dramas that may contain scenes in which a performer may touch the buttocks, breasts or genitals of another performer “ ‘in an act of apparent sexual stimulation or gratification.’ ” House, 66 Or App at 958. We held that the following definition of “sexual conduct” in ORS 167.062 and 167.060(10) was over-broad and violated Article I, section 8:
“ ‘any touching of the genitals, pubic areas or buttocks of the human male or female, or the breasts of the female, whether alone or between members of the same or opposite sex or between humans and animals’ * * * ‘in an act of apparent sexual stimulation or gratification.’ ” Id. at 957.
On reconsideration, we held that the terms “human masturbation” and “sexual intercourse” were severable. House, 68 Or App at 365.
ORS 174.040 provides that if any part of a statute is held unconstitutional, the remaining parts shall remain in force unless the statute provides otherwise, the remaining parts would not have been enacted without the unconstitutional part, or the remaining parts are “incomplete and incapable of being executed in accordance with the legislative [652]*652intent.” None of those conditions is present in ORS 167.065-(l)(a). Our severing of the word “nudity” from the statute in Frink does not prevent us from considering independently the remaining provisions. Our declaration in House that part of the definition of “sexual conduct” in ORS 167.060(10) is unconstitutionally overbroad left intact the terms “human masturbation” and “sexual intercourse” as definitions of the term “sexual conduct.”
At the time defendant was indicted, ORS 167.065(l)(a) prohibited furnishing to a minor material that “depicts sadomasochistic abuse, sexual conduct or sexual excitement.” Following House, sexual conduct is defined in ORS 167.060(10) as “human masturbation” or “sexual intercourse.” The narrow question in this case is whether the prohibitions against furnishing materials to minors that depict sexual conduct or sexual excitement violates Article I, section 8.2
Under the established framework for analyzing an Article I, section 8, challenge that we followed in State v. Stoneman, 132 Or App 137, 139-40, 888 P2d 39 (1994), rev allowed, 321 Or 94 (1995), the first step is to determine whether the prohibited activity involves speech or expression. Moser v. Frohnmayer, 315 Or 372, 375, 845 P2d 1284 (1993). The depictions of sexually explicit materials described in ORS 167.065(l)(a) are expression encompassed by Article I, section 8. State v. Henry, 302 Or 510, 515, 732 P2d 9 (1987) (Article I, section 8, “covers any expression of opinion, including verbal and nonverbal expressions contained in films, pictures, paintings, sculpture and the like.”).
The next step is to determine if the law is directed at the content of an opinion or communication, or if it is directed at forbidden effects. Stoneman, 132 Or App at 140. A content-based restriction on speech violates Article I, section 8, unless
“it is ‘wholly confined within some historical exception that was well established when the first American guarantees of freedom of expression were adopted and that the guarantees then or in 1859 demonstrably were not intended to reach.’ ” Moser, 315 Or at 376 (quoting State v. Robertson, 293 Or 402, 412, 649 P2d 569 (1982)).
[653]*653 A statute that restricts speech may be valid “if ‘the focus of the enactment, as written, is on an identifiable actual effect or harm that may be proscribed, rather than on the communication itself.’ ” Moser, 315 Or at 379. Such a law must “specify expressly or by clear inference what serious and imminent effects it is designed to prevent.” Oregon State Police Assn. v. State of Oregon, 308 Or 531, 541, 783 P2d 7 (1989), cert den 498 US 810 (1990) (Linde, J., concurring). A law that focuses on harmful effects may take the form of expressly prohibiting expression used to achieve those effects. Such a law
“ ‘must be scrutinized to determine whether it appears to reach privileged communication or whether it can be interpreted to avoid such “overbreadth.” ’ ” State v. Plowman, 314 Or 157, 164, 838 P2d 558 (1992), cert den 509 US_, 113 S Ct 2967, 125 L Ed 2d 666 (1993) (quoting Robertson, 293 Or at 418).
Alternatively, a law may focus on harmful effects without referring to expression at all. Such a law is scrutinized for vagueness or unconstitutional application. Plowman, 314 Or at 164.
The indictments against defendant alleged that he violated ORS 167.065(l)(a) by furnishing materials to minors that depicted sexual conduct or sexual excitement.3 He argues that the terms “sexual conduct” and “sexual excitement” are unconstitutionally overbroad. The state argues that ORS 167.065(l)(a) is aimed not at the content of speech, but at the effects of speech. The state maintains that, because that statute proscribes only furnishing to minors various types of visual representations of sexual conduct or sexual excitement, its focus is on the harmful effects that result from allowing children to view pornographic materials.
The state’s argument is unpersuasive. The text of ORS 167.065(l)(a) makes it unlawful for a person to furnish to a minor particular expressive material precisely because its content includes the depiction of sexually explicit conduct. See Stoneman, 132 Or App at 143 (content-based statute made it unlawful for a person to give value to view or obtain [654]*654material that depicted sexually explicit conduct by a child). Nowhere does the text of ORS 167.065(l)(a) expressly or by clear inference identify the serious or imminent effects that the state contends the statute is designed to prevent. ORS 167.065(l)(a) is a content-based statute directed solely at prohibiting certain communication with minors.
Even if ORS 167.065(l)(a) proscribes expression on the basis of content, the state contends that it is nonetheless valid because it represents a modern version of a historically established exception to Article I, section 8.4 According to the state, the 1853 territorial legislation analyzed in Henry and Stoneman provides the basis on which to find a historical exception. That legislation provided, in relevant part, that it was a crime for
“any person [to] import, print, publish, sell or distribute any book or any pamphlet, ballad, printed paper or other thing containing obscene language or obscene prints, pictures, figures, or other descriptions, manifestly tending to the corruption of the morals of youth * * Statutes of Oregon 1854, ch XI, § 10, pp 210-11.
The state, as the party opposing defendant’s claim of constitutional protection, has the “heavy burden” of demonstrating that the restriction on speech falls within an historical exception. Henry, 302 Or at 521. Examples of historical exceptions to the guarantees of free expression include “perjury, solicitation or verbal assistance in crime, some forms of theft, forgery and fraud[.]” Robertson, 293 Or at 412.
We have already declared that the 1853 territorial legislation “ ‘is in no way equivalent of statutes punishing libel, perjury, forgery and the like.’ ” Stoneman, 132 Or App at 146 (quotingHenry, 302 Or at 522). The territorial legislation did not define “obscene,” leaving us unable to determine the scope of its restriction. Consequently, we have no basis on which to determine whether ORS 167.065(l)(a) extends beyond the 1853 restriction. Id. at 147. Even assuming that the 1853 legislation created a historical exception, its terms are too undefined to conclude that ORS 167.065(l)(a) falls within its scope. Id.
[655]*655The state’s final contention is that it
“has a strong and legitimate interest in protecting children against exposure to hard-core pornography of the kind prohibited by ORS 167.065(l)(a), and nothing in the text or history of Article I, section 8 requires the conclusion that the legislature may not enact statutes forbidding dissemination of pornographic materials to children.”
The state relies on In re Lasswell, 296 Or 121, 673 P2d 855 (1983) and In re Fadeley, 310 Or 548, 802 P2d 31 (1990), for the proposition that it should not be deterred from pursuing that interest by Article I, section 8’s prohibition on restricting speech, because that restriction is not absolute and there are exceptions to its sweep.
Lasswell and Fadeley involved the speech of a district attorney and a judge, respectively, who allegedly violated a code of professional conduct. The disciplinary rule in Lass-well survived constitutional challenge under Article I, section 8, only because the court narrowly interpreted the rule to limit its scope to “a prosecutor’s ‘abuse’ of the right ‘to speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever.’ ” 296 Or at 125. (Emphasis supplied.) In Fadeley, the court held that the speech rights of Article I, section 8, had been modified by Article VII (amended), section 8, which allows discipline of judges for violating rules of judicial conduct. 310 Or at 560. Consequently, these cases do not aid the state’s argument. We are also constrained to reject the state’s argument for the reasons we expressed in Stoneman:
“Essentially, the state asks us to treat expression involving [furnishing obscene materials to minors] differently than other types of expression. The problem with the state’s argument is that the Oregon Supreme Court has developed a unique analysis that treats different types of speech equally under Article I, section 8. * * *
“The state may regulate ‘obscene’ material in the interest of children * * *, but that regulation must fall within the parameters of the harmful effects analysis. * * * Whatever the extent of the state’s power to protect children, it must be exercised legislatively, and when the protection implicates ' constitutionally protected expression, it must be exercised explicitly and precisely.” 132 Or App at 148-49. (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
[656]*656In sum, in the light of the well-established framework for interpreting statutes in the light of Article I, section 8, challenges, the prohibition in ORS 167.065(l)(a) against furnishing obscene materials to minors that depict sexual conduct or sexual excitement contains content-based restrictions on speech that cannot be justified by either a historical exception or by the purpose of preventing an identified actual effect or harm. We need not reach the question of whether the prohibition in ORS 167.065(l)(a) on furnishing materials to minors that depict sadomasochistic abuse violates Article I, section 8.
Convictions on Counts 2, 3, and 4 reversed; otherwise affirmed.