State v. Mayfield
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Opinion
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STATE OF DELAWARE ) ) v. ) I.D. No. 1504011040A ) ATIBA MAYFIELD, ) ) Defendant. )
Submitted: April 4, 2025 Decided: April 25, 2025
Upon Defendant Atiba Mayfield’s Amended Motion for Postconviction Relief DENIED.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Andrew J. Vella, Esquire, Chief of Appeals, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 820 North French Street, Wilmington, DE 19801, Attorney for the State of Delaware.
Herbert W. Mondros. Esquire, RIDGROSKY & LONG, P.A., 300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 210, Wilmington, DE 19801; Stephanie M. McArdle, Esquire, (pro hac vice) 220 North Jackson Street, Media, PA 19063, Attorneys for Defendant Atiba Mayfield.
WHARTON, J. I. INTRODUCTION
This case is before the Court on Defendant Atiba Mayfield’s (“Mayfield”)
Amended Motion for Postconviction Relief (“AMPCR”). Mayfield was convicted
at trial of Murder First Degree, two counts of Possession of a Firearm During the
Commission of a Felony (“PFDCF”), Conspiracy First Degree, Reckless
Endangering First Degree, and Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited. In a
separate trial, his codefendant Michael Broomer (“Boomer”) was convicted of
Murder Second Degree, two counts of PFDCF, and one count of Reckless
Endangering First Degree. Mayfield appealed his convictions to the Delaware
Supreme Court. That Court affirmed the judgment of this Court.
Through counsel, Mayfield presents five claims: (1) Fraudulent Ballistics
Examiner Carl Rone; (2) Failure to Perform Exculpatory GSR Testing; (3) Failure
to Timely Disclose Immunity Agreement; (4) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
(“IAC”) both at trial and on direct appeal; and (5) Mandatory Life without Probation
or Parole Sentence. His IAC claim against trial counsel is subdivided into 11 alleged
deficiencies. His IAC claim against appellate counsel, who was one of his trial
attorneys also, has two allegations of ineffectiveness. The Court has carefully
considered each claim. All are without merit. Accordingly, the AMPCR is
DENIED.
2 II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Mayfield and his co-defendant Broomer were both charged with Murder First
Degree and various other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Raekwan
Mangrum (“Mangrum”) on April 4, 2015 in Wilmington. The homicide was
witnessed, at least in part, by Wilmington Police Officer Matthew Begany. Officer
Begany heard what he thought were multiple gunshots while on patrol in the 800
block of West 4th Street.1 He turned southbound onto Monroe Street and heard
another round of multiple shots.2 As he turned southbound, he observed a blue Ford
Focus at the end of an alleyway between 2nd and 3rd Streets. 3 He also saw a man
standing outside of the Focus firing a handgun.4 Officer Begany wrote in his report
that the man jumped inside the Focus, but when he testified at trial he acknowledged
the man may have retreated down the alleyway.5 He called for backup and drove
down the alleyway toward the Focus and the man firing the gun. 6 The Focus began
to head northbound towards his car and then turned suddenly onto a pedestrian
alleyway, narrowly avoiding a collision. 7 At that point, Officer Begany saw two
black males in the vehicle and broadcast the Focus’ license plate over the radio.8 He
1 Trial Tr. at 59:20-23 (Jun. 21, 2016) 2 Id. at 63:6-7; 64:3-11. 3 Id. at 65:16-17; 66:20-23 4 Id. at 66:23-67:4. 5 Id. at 67:5-15. 6 Id. at 8-10. 7 Id. at 73:1-16. 8 Id. at 74:3-75:21. 3 continued down the alleyway and observed Mangrum, who had been shot multiple
times, a woman who had also been shot once in the leg, and her young child, who
was not injured. 9 The woman survived, but Mangrum died hours later at the
hospital. 10
After several Wilmington Police Officers spotted the Focus, a high-speed
vehicle chase involving multiple police officers ensued.11 During the chase
northbound on I-95, one of the officers observed a handgun being thrown from the
passenger side of the Focus.12 A CZ .40 caliber semi-automatic firearm was
recovered in the area where the officer saw a weapon being thrown.13 Ultimately,
the chase ended in Pennsylvania where Broomer, the driver, and Mayfield, the
passenger, fled on foot, but quickly were taken into custody.14 A .380 Cobra FS 380,
with one spent casing and five live rounds of ammunition was also found along the
path of the chase.15 Subsequent DNA testing established that Mayfield was the
“major contributor” to DNA located on the grip of the .380 firearm. 16 The police
also recovered a box of .380 ammunition from under the driver’s seat of the Focus
and a spent shell casing under the passenger side floor mat.17
9 Id. at 77:20-78:5. 10 Id. at 85:15-86:6. 11 Trial Tr. at 59:1-6; 61:23; 10-16 (Jun. 14, 2016). 12 Id. at 73:18-74:4. 13 Id. at 90:7-91:19; 163:8-165:20. 14 Id. at 83:20-84:15; 85:20-87:2; 90:2-6. 15 Id. at 171:18-172:2; 179:21-180:14. 16 Trial Tr. at 52:17-54:1 (Jun. 15, 2026, AM). 17 Id. at 72:3-17; 71:2-6. 4 At Mayfield’s request, Wilmington Detective Robert Fox, the chief
investigating officer, went to Ridley Township about nine hours after the shooting
to speak with Mayfield.18 There, Det. Fox conducted an audiotaped interview.19
Mayfield confirmed that he requested to speak to Det. Fox, was read his Miranda
rights and agreed to waive them. 20 At trial, the State played the audiotape for the
jury.21 Mayfield spoke to Det. Fox on two other occasions. The first was when he
was taken to the Delaware County, Pennsylvania jail to await extradition to
Delaware.22 The second was in Delaware on April 16th at the Wilmington Police
station after Mayfield had been returned to Delaware.23 The State did not seek to
introduce either of these two statements into evidence at trial.
Wilmington Police processed the scene in the 200 block of Monroe Street and
collected ballistic evidence. Det. Hugh Stephy photographed and collected six .40
caliber shell casings from north of a manhole cover in the pedestrian walkway. 24 He
also recovered two .40 caliber projectiles – one in the walkway and the other inside
220 Monroe Street. 25 Det. Stephy collected five 9mm shell casings as well. 26 The
.40 caliber and 9mm shell casings were found in two separate clusters with all of the
18 Trial Tr. at 191:13-192:7; 198:111-16. (Jun. 21, 2016). 19 Id. at 197:16-20. App’x. to State’s Resp., at B-278-351, D.I. 110. 20 App’x. to State’s Resp., at B-278, D.I.110. 21 Trial Tr. at 201:21-22 (Jun. 21, 2016). 22 AMPCR at 13, D.I. 100. 23 Id. at 14. 24 Trial Tr. at 101:18-108:19 (Jun. 15, 2016 PM). 25 Id. at 111:19-23; 105:4-13. 26 Id. at 118:9-10. 5 .40 caliber casings north of a manhole and all of the 9mm casings south of it.27
Because the calibers are not interchangeable, all of the casings could not have come
from the same firearm. 28
Carl Rone (“Rone”), a forensic firearms examiner for the Delaware State
Police testified for the State as a ballistics expert.29 He examined both firearms that
were recovered, and all of the .40 caliber and 9mm shell casings and projectiles.30
He concluded that the .40 caliber handgun functioned properly and that it fired all of
the .40 caliber shell casings found on Monroe Street.31 He also concluded that the
five 9mm casings were fired from the same firearm.32 Finally, the Cobra .380
handgun did not properly feed cartridges into the chamber which required him to
manually manipulate the weapon to seat a cartridge to fire.33
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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STATE OF DELAWARE ) ) v. ) I.D. No. 1504011040A ) ATIBA MAYFIELD, ) ) Defendant. )
Submitted: April 4, 2025 Decided: April 25, 2025
Upon Defendant Atiba Mayfield’s Amended Motion for Postconviction Relief DENIED.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Andrew J. Vella, Esquire, Chief of Appeals, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 820 North French Street, Wilmington, DE 19801, Attorney for the State of Delaware.
Herbert W. Mondros. Esquire, RIDGROSKY & LONG, P.A., 300 Delaware Avenue, Suite 210, Wilmington, DE 19801; Stephanie M. McArdle, Esquire, (pro hac vice) 220 North Jackson Street, Media, PA 19063, Attorneys for Defendant Atiba Mayfield.
WHARTON, J. I. INTRODUCTION
This case is before the Court on Defendant Atiba Mayfield’s (“Mayfield”)
Amended Motion for Postconviction Relief (“AMPCR”). Mayfield was convicted
at trial of Murder First Degree, two counts of Possession of a Firearm During the
Commission of a Felony (“PFDCF”), Conspiracy First Degree, Reckless
Endangering First Degree, and Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited. In a
separate trial, his codefendant Michael Broomer (“Boomer”) was convicted of
Murder Second Degree, two counts of PFDCF, and one count of Reckless
Endangering First Degree. Mayfield appealed his convictions to the Delaware
Supreme Court. That Court affirmed the judgment of this Court.
Through counsel, Mayfield presents five claims: (1) Fraudulent Ballistics
Examiner Carl Rone; (2) Failure to Perform Exculpatory GSR Testing; (3) Failure
to Timely Disclose Immunity Agreement; (4) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
(“IAC”) both at trial and on direct appeal; and (5) Mandatory Life without Probation
or Parole Sentence. His IAC claim against trial counsel is subdivided into 11 alleged
deficiencies. His IAC claim against appellate counsel, who was one of his trial
attorneys also, has two allegations of ineffectiveness. The Court has carefully
considered each claim. All are without merit. Accordingly, the AMPCR is
DENIED.
2 II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Mayfield and his co-defendant Broomer were both charged with Murder First
Degree and various other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Raekwan
Mangrum (“Mangrum”) on April 4, 2015 in Wilmington. The homicide was
witnessed, at least in part, by Wilmington Police Officer Matthew Begany. Officer
Begany heard what he thought were multiple gunshots while on patrol in the 800
block of West 4th Street.1 He turned southbound onto Monroe Street and heard
another round of multiple shots.2 As he turned southbound, he observed a blue Ford
Focus at the end of an alleyway between 2nd and 3rd Streets. 3 He also saw a man
standing outside of the Focus firing a handgun.4 Officer Begany wrote in his report
that the man jumped inside the Focus, but when he testified at trial he acknowledged
the man may have retreated down the alleyway.5 He called for backup and drove
down the alleyway toward the Focus and the man firing the gun. 6 The Focus began
to head northbound towards his car and then turned suddenly onto a pedestrian
alleyway, narrowly avoiding a collision. 7 At that point, Officer Begany saw two
black males in the vehicle and broadcast the Focus’ license plate over the radio.8 He
1 Trial Tr. at 59:20-23 (Jun. 21, 2016) 2 Id. at 63:6-7; 64:3-11. 3 Id. at 65:16-17; 66:20-23 4 Id. at 66:23-67:4. 5 Id. at 67:5-15. 6 Id. at 8-10. 7 Id. at 73:1-16. 8 Id. at 74:3-75:21. 3 continued down the alleyway and observed Mangrum, who had been shot multiple
times, a woman who had also been shot once in the leg, and her young child, who
was not injured. 9 The woman survived, but Mangrum died hours later at the
hospital. 10
After several Wilmington Police Officers spotted the Focus, a high-speed
vehicle chase involving multiple police officers ensued.11 During the chase
northbound on I-95, one of the officers observed a handgun being thrown from the
passenger side of the Focus.12 A CZ .40 caliber semi-automatic firearm was
recovered in the area where the officer saw a weapon being thrown.13 Ultimately,
the chase ended in Pennsylvania where Broomer, the driver, and Mayfield, the
passenger, fled on foot, but quickly were taken into custody.14 A .380 Cobra FS 380,
with one spent casing and five live rounds of ammunition was also found along the
path of the chase.15 Subsequent DNA testing established that Mayfield was the
“major contributor” to DNA located on the grip of the .380 firearm. 16 The police
also recovered a box of .380 ammunition from under the driver’s seat of the Focus
and a spent shell casing under the passenger side floor mat.17
9 Id. at 77:20-78:5. 10 Id. at 85:15-86:6. 11 Trial Tr. at 59:1-6; 61:23; 10-16 (Jun. 14, 2016). 12 Id. at 73:18-74:4. 13 Id. at 90:7-91:19; 163:8-165:20. 14 Id. at 83:20-84:15; 85:20-87:2; 90:2-6. 15 Id. at 171:18-172:2; 179:21-180:14. 16 Trial Tr. at 52:17-54:1 (Jun. 15, 2026, AM). 17 Id. at 72:3-17; 71:2-6. 4 At Mayfield’s request, Wilmington Detective Robert Fox, the chief
investigating officer, went to Ridley Township about nine hours after the shooting
to speak with Mayfield.18 There, Det. Fox conducted an audiotaped interview.19
Mayfield confirmed that he requested to speak to Det. Fox, was read his Miranda
rights and agreed to waive them. 20 At trial, the State played the audiotape for the
jury.21 Mayfield spoke to Det. Fox on two other occasions. The first was when he
was taken to the Delaware County, Pennsylvania jail to await extradition to
Delaware.22 The second was in Delaware on April 16th at the Wilmington Police
station after Mayfield had been returned to Delaware.23 The State did not seek to
introduce either of these two statements into evidence at trial.
Wilmington Police processed the scene in the 200 block of Monroe Street and
collected ballistic evidence. Det. Hugh Stephy photographed and collected six .40
caliber shell casings from north of a manhole cover in the pedestrian walkway. 24 He
also recovered two .40 caliber projectiles – one in the walkway and the other inside
220 Monroe Street. 25 Det. Stephy collected five 9mm shell casings as well. 26 The
.40 caliber and 9mm shell casings were found in two separate clusters with all of the
18 Trial Tr. at 191:13-192:7; 198:111-16. (Jun. 21, 2016). 19 Id. at 197:16-20. App’x. to State’s Resp., at B-278-351, D.I. 110. 20 App’x. to State’s Resp., at B-278, D.I.110. 21 Trial Tr. at 201:21-22 (Jun. 21, 2016). 22 AMPCR at 13, D.I. 100. 23 Id. at 14. 24 Trial Tr. at 101:18-108:19 (Jun. 15, 2016 PM). 25 Id. at 111:19-23; 105:4-13. 26 Id. at 118:9-10. 5 .40 caliber casings north of a manhole and all of the 9mm casings south of it.27
Because the calibers are not interchangeable, all of the casings could not have come
from the same firearm. 28
Carl Rone (“Rone”), a forensic firearms examiner for the Delaware State
Police testified for the State as a ballistics expert.29 He examined both firearms that
were recovered, and all of the .40 caliber and 9mm shell casings and projectiles.30
He concluded that the .40 caliber handgun functioned properly and that it fired all of
the .40 caliber shell casings found on Monroe Street.31 He also concluded that the
five 9mm casings were fired from the same firearm.32 Finally, the Cobra .380
handgun did not properly feed cartridges into the chamber which required him to
manually manipulate the weapon to seat a cartridge to fire.33
Since his testimony at trial, Rone has become a controversial figure. In May
2018, he was indicted on charges of Theft by False Pretense and Falsifying Business
Records. 34 He later pled guilty to those charges. 35 The allegations involved Rone
27 Id. at 118:4-17. 28 Id. 29 Trial Tr. at 121:14-23 (June 21, 2016). 30 Id. at 130:8-131:23. 31 Id. at 131:20-132:8. 32 Id. at 132:9-16. The 9mm handgun was never recovered. 33 Id. at 132:17-133:16. 34 AMPCR, at 22, D.I. 100. 35 Id.; State’s Resp., at 26, D.I. 109. 6 falsifying payroll records and receiving pay for time when he was not working from
2016-2017.36 The falsified records were not ballistics reports.37
Clothing was seized from both Mayfield and Broomer. Wilmington Police
Master Corporal William Gearhart seized two sweatshirts and a pair of jeans from
Mayfield.38 He also took samples from Mayfield’s hands to test for gunshot residue
(“GSR”). 39 He followed the same procedure with Broomer.40
Michael Gorski of the RJ Lee Group presented the results of his tests for GSR.
Broomer’s left palm sample yielded a single particle GSR characteristic while
Mayfield had at least one particle of GSR on the fronts and backs of his left and right
hands. 41 Additionally, he found significantly more GSR particles on Mayfield’s
sweatshirt than Broomer’s.42 No GSR particles were found on Broomer’s glove.43
Until shortly before the homicide it appears Mayfield, Broomer, Mangrum,
and Nicodemus Morris (“Morris”) all had been on good terms.44 But two incidents
soured relationships among them. The first occurred on March 21, 2015. On that
date, all four individuals were together riding around Wilmington in a car jointly
36 Id. 37 Id. 38 Trial Tr. at 198:12-21 (June 14, 2016). 39 Id. at 201:9-203:8. 40 Id. at 205:5-8. 41 Trial Tr. at 27:15-28:12 (Jun. 16, 2016 PM). 42 Id. at 32:4-6. 43 Id. at 20-23. 44 Trial Tr. at 96:14-22; 156:18-21 (Jun. 16, 2016). 7 owned by Mangrum and Broomer.45 When they stopped for gas, an argument over
who was going to drive started between Mangrum and Mayfield. 46 The argument
ended after Mangrum told Morris to drive to Mangrum’s house where he retrieved
a .380 handgun, and then to Windsor Street where Mangrum shot Mayfield in the
leg.47 The second incident involved bad blood between Mangrum and Broomer.
Prior to both the shooting and the homicide, Broomer and Mangrum were arrested
on felony drug charges. 48 At their joint trial, days before the homicide, Broomer
testified that the drugs were Mangrum’s, angering Mangrum and ending their
relationship.49 Mangrum began telling people, including on Facebook, what
Broomer had done causing Broomer to be angry in return. 50
Such was the state of things between Mayfield and Mangrum and Broomer
and Mangrum on April 4, 2015. That afternoon, about an hour before the homicide,
Mangrum, Morris and Tyezghaire Stevens (“Stevens”), and her young son met at the
Fresh Grocer supermarket in Wilmington.51 Mangrum and Morris were helping
Stevens shop for groceries with her grandmother and sister.52 After grocery
shopping, Morris, Stevens, and her son walked to McDonald’s on 4th Street, while
45 Id. at 96:23-97:23. 46 Id. at 98:3-14. 47 Id. at 101:2-104:9. 48 Id. at 108:6-18. 49 Id. at 108:20-109:13; 155:19-156:2. 50 Id. at 156:3-17. 51 Trial Tr. at 6:19-7:4; 7:22-8:1 (Jun. 21, 2016). 52 Id. 8 Mangrum went to his grandmother’s house.53 While headed to McDonald’s, Morris
saw Broomer at the drive-through.54 Morris left McDonald’s to tell Mangrum he
had seen Broomer because he knew that there must be a reason Broomer was in the
city and because he knew of the history between the two.55
Later, Stevens, her son, Morris and Mangrum all met in the alleyway on
Monroe Street, a block from McDonald’s.56 Morris stood on the sidewalk and
busied himself on his cell phone while Mangrum and Stevens flirted as Stevens’ son
played a short distance away.57 Morris looked up from his phone and saw an arm
with a gun come out of a car window.58 He immediately ran to where he had secreted
a 9mm Glock handgun. 59 As he was running, he heard 6-7 gunshots. 60 While Morris
was returning, he saw Mangrum fall after being shot.61 Morris stood next to
Mangrum and fired what he thought were five rounds at the blue car. 62 He then
noticed a police car at the end of the alley and fled because he was not legally
permitted to possess a firearm. 63
53 Id. at 8:4-9; Trial Tr. at 86:21-89:16 (Jun. 20, 2016). 54 Trial Tr. at 89:17-90:3 (Jun. 20, 2016). 55 Id. at 94:6-95:5. 56 Id. 65:9-12; 66:3-6; Trial Tr. at 11:23-12:7; 13:19-14:18 (Jun. 21, 2016). 57 Trial Tr. at 68:3-20 (Jun. 20, 2016); Trial Tr. at 16:22-18:8 (Jun. 21, 2016). 58 Trial Tr. at 69:14-18 (Jun. 20, 2016). 59 Id.; 144:12-145:1. 60 Trial Tr. at 73:17-74:9 (Jun. 20, 2016). 61 Id. at 77:20-78:11. 62 Id. at 78:17-21; 79:5-6. 63 Id. at 79:2-5; 81:4-23. 9 Stevens had been talking to Mangrum when she heard shots and felt her leg.64
She tried to get up but could not.65 She was able to locate her son who appeared
uninjured. 66 At first, she could not tell if Mangrum had been shot, but then she
realized he had been hit. 67 After the shooting started, she saw the blue car that she
had seen earlier at McDonald’s.68
After a nine day trial, the jury returned verdicts of guilty as charged on all but
the severed PDWBPP charge, which the State declined to pursue.69 Mayfield was
sentenced on November 4, 2016 to a term of life imprisonment without probation
or parole on the murder charge, plus an additional five years at Level V on each of
the other charges.70
Mayfield appealed to the Delaware Supreme Court, raising two issues both
involving this Court’s denial of certain jury instructions he requested.71 One was
based on various justification defenses.72 The other was for lesser included
offenses.73 The Supreme Court affirmed on the basis of this Court’s reasons stated
in its rulings at the Prayer Conference.74
64 Trial Tr. at 18:6-10 (Jun. 21, 2016). 65 Id. 66 Id. at 21:8-10. 67 Id. at 21:11-23:20. 68 Id. at 23:21-24:12. 69 D.I. 35; Trial Tr. at 7:10-14 (June 24, 2016). 70 D.I. 42. 71 State’s Resp. at Ex. A (Appellant’s Opening Brief), D.I. 109. 72 Id. 73 Id. 74 Mayfield v. State, 2017 WL 6015762 (Del. Dec. 4, 2017). 10 On October 4, 2018, Mayfield filed a pro se Motion for Postconviction
Relief75 and Motion for Appointment of Counsel. 76 Benjamin S. Gifford, IV,
Esquire was appointed postconviction counsel. 77 On August 28, 2020, current
postconviction counsel Herbert W. Mondros, Esquire substituted his appearance for
Mr. Gifford. 78 Stefanie M. McArdle, Esquire was admitted pro hac vice as co-
counsel with Mr. Mondros on October 12, 2020.79 Both Mr. Mondros and Ms.
McArdle were privately retained.80 However, private funding eventually dried up
and counsel applied to represent Mayfield as appointed counsel.81 After a hearing
at which the Court determined that Mayfield was indigent, Mr. Mondros and Ms.
McArdle were appointed as counsel for Mayfield.82 Appointed counsel ultimately
filed this AMPCR motion on May 6, 2024. 83 The AMPCR included a number of
IAC allegations. John S. Malik, Esquire, who was both trial counsel and appellate
counsel, and Andrew J. Witherell, Esquire, who was trial co-counsel submitted
separate affidavits in response to the IAC allegations.84 The State answered on
75 Pro Se Motion for Postconviction Relief, D.I. 59. 76 Pro Se Motion for Appointment of Counsel, D.I. 60. 77 D.I. 66. 78 D.I. 82. 79 D.I. 75. 80 D.I. 83. Two copies of this motion have different docket item numbers. The copy incorrectly marked D.I. 81 is a complete copy. The copy correctly marked D.I. 83 is incomplete because only the odd numbered pages are copied. 81 Id. 82 D.I. 88. 83 AMPCR, D.I. 100.. 84 Affidavit of John S. Malick, Esquire, D.I. 107; Affidavit of Andrew J. Witherell, Esquire, D.I. 106. 11 October 31, 2024.85 Postconviction counsel submitted a Reply to the State’s Answer
on April 4, 2025. 86
III. THE PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS
The AMPCR raises five claims, one of which is an IAC claim. That claim is
subdivided into 11 allegations of ineffectiveness against trial counsel and two
against appellate counsel. Three claims relate to the prosecution function and the
last claim to Mayfield’s sentencing.
A. Mayfield’s Claims Related to the Prosecution Function
Mayfield’s first claim is that the verdict was tainted by the fact that within
five months of the Delaware Supreme Court affirming his convictions, Rone was
charged with Theft by False Pretense and Falsifying Business Records. 87 He notes
the importance of Rone expert ballistics testimony at trial and contends that
testimony is tainted by Rone’s criminal misconduct.88
Mayfield’s second claim is that the State failed to perform exculpatory GSR
testing. 89 Specifically, despite Det. Fox testifying at Mayfield’s preliminary hearing
that the State intended to send the bags that covered Mangrum’s hands out for GSR
testing, it never did.90 He claims the State had a fundamental discovery obligation
85 State’s Ans., D.I. 110. 86 Def.’s Resp., D.I. 112. 87 AMPCR, at 22, D.I. 100. 88 Id. at 24. 89 Id. at 26. 90 Id. 12 to inform Mangrum’s trial counsel of its decision to reverse course and not test the
bags.91
The third claim Mayfield brings is an allegation that the State failed to timely
disclose an immunity agreement it entered into with Morris on May 1, 2015. 92 The
State did not disclose the agreement until Morris took the stand at trial, nearly 13
months later. 93 He argues that timely disclosure “would have changed the course of
[defense counsels’] preparation of this case in many ways.”94
B. Mayfield’s IAC Claims Against Trial Counsel
Mayfield’s IAC claims represent the bulk of the AMPCR. He alleges that trial
counsel: (1) failed to adequately investigate and prepare for trial, particularly in the
areas of crime scene reconstruction and ballistics evidence; 95 (2) failed to move to
suppress Mayfield’s statements to police; 96 (3) failed to move to suppress evidence
recovered from a search of Mayfield’s room at his grandmother’s house; 97 (4) failed
to prepare and use expert witness Jeffrey Miller, who apparently did a crime scene
reconstruction; 98 (5) failed to interview witnesses Tyrie Burton (“Burton”), who
claimed to be an eyewitness, and Mayfield’s younger brother Jowan Whitley
91 Id. 92 Id. at 28. 93 Id. 94 Id. 95 Id. at 29-31. 96 Id. 31-32. 97 Id. at 33-35. 98 Id. at 35-36. 13 (“Whitley”), both of whom Mayfield claims would have provided exculpatory
information, Mayfield’s grandmother, and trial witnesses Brittany Mangrum and
Dorothy Mangrum, who Mayfield claims counsel never interviewed before their
testimony;99 (6) failed to investigate the relationship between Broomer and
Mangrum; 100 (7) failed to conduct independent GSR forensic testing which “would
have likely produced exculpatory evidence;” 101 (8) failed to seek a favorable pre-
trial resolution;102 (9) failed to object to Det. Fox testifying as an expert regarding
cell phone extractions;103 (10) failed to prepare to use cell phone records of
communications between Mangrum and Broomer leading up to the homicide; 104 and
(11) failed to humanize Mayfield before the jury.105
C. Mayfield’s IAC Claims Against Appellate Counsel.
Mayfield makes two claims of IAC on direct appeal. He contends appellate
counsel was ineffective in failing to appeal the trial court’s denial of lesser included
offense instructions and Det. Fox improperly testifying as an expert on cell phone
extractions.106
D. Mayfield’s Sentencing Claim
99 Id. at 36-37. 100 Id. at 37-39. 101 Id. at 39. 102 Id. at 40. 103 Id. at 40-41. 104 Id. at 41-42. 105 Id. at 42-42 106 Id. at 44. 14 Mayfield argues that his mandatory life without parole sentence for his first
degree murder conviction violate he 8th and 14th Amendments of the United States
Constitution and the Delaware Constitution because he was a 21-year old with no
prior violent history.
E. State’s Response to Mayfield’s Claims Related to the Prosecution Function
In response, the State contends that a number of Mayfield’s claims are barred
by Rule 61(i). Specifically, it relies upon Rule 61(i)(3) to argue all but his IAC
claims are barred and not subject to Rule 61(i)(5)’s exception.107 Rule 61(i)(3) bars
claims not raised in the proceedings leading up to the judgment of conviction unless
Mayfield can show cause for the default and actual prejudice. The State contends
Mayfield is unable to show either.
The State first addresses the Carl Rone issue. It downplays the importance of
Rone’s testimony and points out that Rone’s crimes did not involve the mishandling
of evidence or the falsification of documents related to his examination of evidence
or his reports.108
As to Mayfield’s claim that the State’s failure to conduct GSR testing violated
his due process rights, the State argues that Mayfield has no such right requiring the
State to inform him that it would not be testing the bags on Mangrum’s hands for
107 State’s Resp. at 20, D.I. 109. 108 Id. at 26-32. 15 GSR.109 It also disputes Mayfield’s conclusory allegation that the results of such
testing would have been exculpatory.110
The State acknowledges that it did not disclose Morris’ immunity agreement
to the defense prior to trial.111 But, it maintains that Mayfield’s trial counsel made
effective use of it in attacking Morris’ credibility on cross-examination and in
argument.112
F. State’s Response to Mayfield’s Claims Related to Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel
The State addresses Mayfield’s IAC claims in sequence. It contends where
Mayfield does not establish IAC, his claims are barred by Rule 61(i)(3). Further, in
each instance, Mayfield failed to meet both the performance and prejudice prongs of
Strickland v. Washington. 113
First, the State addresses Mayfield’s claim that trial counsel failed to
“investigate the physical evidence and forensics in the case” because the three
different caliber guns in the case warranted crime scene reconstruction and ballistics
analysis.114 State maintains that the record refutes this claim – trial counsel visited
and examined the scene and engaged a crime scene analyst, Jeffrey Miller, to review
109 Id. at 32-34. 110 Id. 111 Id. at 35. 112 Id. 113 466 U.S. 668 (1994). 114 State’s Resp. at 36, D.I. 109. 16 the evidence.115 Miller determined that the physical evidence did not support
Mayfield’s version of what happened. 116 Thus, Counsel was not ineffective for not
utilizing him as a witness, and further, Mayfield has failed to state with particularity
any prejudice. 117
Mayfield next claims trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to
suppress his statements. The State argues that Mayfield has failed to “develop the
claim beyond reciting the facts attendant to each statement and offers no legal basis
upon which a motion to suppress would have rested.”118
Mayfield claims that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to move to
suppress a laser-sight for a handgun seized from his room at his grandmother’s house
and/or to move in limine to exclude it from evidence on other bad acts grounds. The
State does not address the argument that a motion to suppress should have been filed,
but does argue that the laser-sight was relevant and that there was no basis for a
motion in limine because possession of the laser sight did not rise to the level of a
bad act under DRE 404(b).119
115 Id. 116 Id. at 37. 117 Id. 118 Id. at 39. 119 Id. at 42. 17 Mayfield’s next IAC claim is that trial counsel failed to prepare and use expert
witness Jeffrey Miller. The State points out again that the witness’ testimony would
not have helped Mayfield.120
Mayfield claims that trial counsel failed to speak to Burton and Whitley, who
he contends would have provided exculpatory information about the homicide, and
failed to meet with trial witnesses Dorothy Mangrum and Brittany Mangrum before
they testified. The State contends that Mayfield has failed to proffer the exculpatory
evidence that Burton and Whitley would have provided.121 While it is true proffered
exculpatory evidence was not set out in the body of the AMPCR, investigators’
summaries of interviews of them are found in the Appendix to the AMPCR.122 As
to Dorothy and Brittany Mangrum, the State maintains that trial counsel did talk to
them. 123
The State next turns to Mayfield’s claim that trial counsel failed to investigate
the relationship between Broomer and Mangrum, their joint trial, and to present
evidence of Mangrum’s propensity for violence. But, according to the State, trial
counsel were well aware of the relationship between Mangrum and Broomer and
their joint trial.124 Mayfield fails to specify what evidence in addition to what was
120 Id. at 44. 121 Id. at 47. 122 AMPCR at Exs. 6 (Whitley) and 7 (Burton), D.I. 100. 123 State’s Resp. at 46, D.I. 109. 124 Id. at 48. 18 presented at trial further investigation would have unearthed. 125 Regarding
Mangrum’s propensity, the State argues Mayfield has failed to identify that evidence
with particularity and also failed to offer a theory for its admissibility. 126
Mayfield’s next claim is that trial counsel failed to conduct forensic testing.
The State points out that, beyond the statement that additional forensic testing
“would have likely produced exculpatory evidence” Mayfield offers nothing. The
claim is conclusory and unsubstantiated and can be denied for that reason.127
Mayfield next alleges the trial counsel failed in their duty to seek a resolution
of the case prior to trial. The State responds that Mayfield’s postconviction
counsel’s “good faith belief” that plea negotiations did not occur has no basis in
fact.128 Further the State was not obliged to offer a plea and Mayfield has not stated
he would have accepted one.129
Mayfield’s next claim is that trial counsel failed to object to Det. Fox
testifying as an expert regarding Cellebrite phone records extractions. The State
notes trial counsel’s strategic decision not to object to the extractions due the
exculpatory nature of some of the records.130 To the extent Mayfield argues that
admission of the records violated his confrontation rights under the 6th Amendment
125 Id. at 49. 126 Id. at 49-50. 127 Id. at 51. 128 Id at 52. 129 Id. 130 Id. at 54. 19 and Crawford v. Washington,131 the State argues that Mayfield did not develop that
argument, and in any event, Det. Fox’s testimony did not violate Crawford because
he did not recount the statement of any non-appearing witness.132
Mayfield contends that trial counsel were ineffective in failing to use phone
records provided in discovery to show a constant back and forth between Broomer
and Mangrum and looked unprepared to address the cell phone evidence offered by
the State to Mayfield’s detriment. The State responds that trial counsel did introduce
cell phone evidence in Mayfield’s defense. It also argues that Mayfield has failed
to make a concrete claim of prejudice and to substantiate it.133
Mayfield’s final claim of ineffectiveness against trial counsel is that they
failed to humanize him before the jury. He faults trial counsel for calling Mayfield
by Mangrum’s name four times in closing argument. The State responds by pointing
out that Mayfield offers no authority for his contention that trial counsel was
constitutionally ineffective in mistakenly confusing the names of Mayfield and
Mangrum. 134
C. IAC Claims Against Appellate Counsel.
Mayfield’s first IAC claim against appellate counsel is that he failed to raise
a meritorious issue on appeal by failing to appeal this Court’s denial of his request
131 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 132 State’s Resp. at 54, D.I. 109. 133 Id. at 58. 134 Id. at 57. 20 for lesser included offenses. The State notes that appellate counsel did in fact raise
that issue on appeal.135
His second claim of IAC against appellate counsel is that trial counsel failed
to object to Det. Fox testifying as an expert witness on cell phone extraction
evidence. In the State’s view, the allegation is conclusory, and because he fails to
identify the legal basis for his argument, he cannot demonstrate that it is clearly
stronger than the issues appellate counsel raised.136
D. Sentencing Claim
Mayfield argues that his mandatory life without parole sentence on his first
degree murder conviction violate he 8th and 14th Amendments of the United States
Constitution and the Delaware Constitution because he was a 21-year old with no
prior violent history. The State argues that Mayfield’s sentencing claim is
conclusory.137 It should be dismissed on that basis alone. 138
G. Mayfield’s Reply
Mayfield’s reply comes in six subsections: (1) the State is incorrect that
certain of his claims are barred; (2) Rone’s crimes require a new trial; (3) Trial
Counsel’s prejudicial IAC requires a new trial; (4) the legal standards governing
effective assistance of counsel support a new trial; (5) trial counsel’s affidavits raise
135 Id. at 58. 136 Id. at 59. 137 Id. at 60. 138 Id. 21 more questions than they answer; and (6) an evidentiary hearing is necessary to
demonstrate trial counsel’s ineffectiveness, the resulting prejudice, and to allow
Mayfield to introduce evidence to support his claims.139
Mayfield challenges the State’s contention that all but his IAC claims are
barred under Rule 61(i). He suggests that it is inappropriate to apply the exceptions
related to successive postconviction relief motions found in Rules 61(d)(i) or (ii) to
his first such motion. 140 He points out that his first claim of error concerning Rone
could not have been raised at trial or on direct appeal. 141 He claims that the failure
to raise his second and third claims of error – the State’s failure to conduct GSR
testing of the bags on Mangrum’s hands or to inform him of its decision not to do
that testing and its untimely production of Morriss’ immunity agreement – are
attributable to trial counsel’s ineffectiveness and excuse any default.142 He also
ascribes the failure to raise his sentencing claim to ineffective assistance of
counsel. 143
He insists Rone’s testimony was critical to the State’s case. He cites Rone’s
testimony regarding the inoperability of the .380 handgun, the fact that there were
three guns at the scene with conflicting theories of “who shot who with what gun
and from where,” and the medical examiner’s inability to identify the gun
139 Def.’s Reply at 1-2, D. I. 112. 140 Id. at 3. 141 Id. at 4. 142 Id. at 5. 143 Id. 22 responsible for Mangrum’s fatal injury to establish how critical Rone’s testimony
was. 144
Turning to his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims, Mayfield
substantially repeats the allegations in the AMPCR. He emphasizes trial counsel’s
failure to file any motions to suppress: (1) Mayfield’s original statement; (2) other
bad acts relating to the firearm accessory found at his grandmother’s house; and (3)
pictures from Broomer’s cell phone which Mayfield used.145 He makes a new claim
that had trial counsel had the bullet removed from Mayfield’s leg when he was shot
by Mangrum ballistically analyzed they “likely would have discovered that the same
weapon Mangrum possessed on March 21, 2015 was the same weapon that he still
had at the time of this shootout two [2] weeks later.”146 He makes another new claim
that trial counsel should have conducted tests on the car which “likely would have
had exculpatory evidence to prove their defense theory – this was a person-to-person
fight when shots rang out and gunfire was exchanged across a parking lot and
alleyway.”147 He reiterates claims he made in his AMPCR regarding what he
considers the inadequacy of trial counsel’s investigation and trial preparation, but
does not address with any specificity the State’s response to those allegations. 148
144 Id. at 7. 145 Id. at 10-12. 146 Id. at 12-13. 147 Id. at 13. 148 Id. at 13-19. 23 Mayfield’s Reply contains 2 ½ pages discussing what constitutes effective
assistance of counsel in criminal cases. 149 But, that terrain is well worn and the Court
has travelled it many times.
Mayfield is unsatisfied with trial counsel’s affidavits, insisting they raise more
questions than they answer. He claims they do little to shed light on what strategy,
if any, trial counsel employed in defending him.150 He insists an evidentiary hearing
is necessary to explore certain “discrepancies” in the affidavits. 151
Mayfield requests an evidentiary hearing for other reasons as well. An
evidentiary hearing is necessary to “resolve disputes over material facts, including
the amount of time counsel spent with their client, their reasons for not filing
motions, the investigation they did or did not do, to answer questions about their
invoices in this case, and other things relevant to their performance in this matter.”152
It is also necessary to resolve the “dispute” over plea negotiations, and whether such
negotiations were communicated to Mayfield, to present testimony from Burton,
unnamed “police experts,” investigators from True Blue Detective Agency, Morris,
and Stevens to explore her bias and the “intricate contours of her relationship with
the participants.”153
149 Id. at 19-22. 150 Id. at 22. 151 Id. at 23. 152 Id. at 24. 153 Id. at 24-27. 24 IV. STANDARD AND SCOPE OF REVIEW
Before addressing the merits of a defendant’s motion for postconviction relief,
the Court must first apply the procedural bars of Superior Court Criminal Rule
61(i).154 If a procedural bar exists, then the Court will not consider the merits of the
postconviction claim. 155 Under Delaware Superior Court Rules of Criminal
Procedure, a motion for postconviction relief can be barred for time limitations,
repetitive motions, procedural defaults, and former adjudications. A motion exceeds
time limitations if it is filed more than one year after the conviction becomes final
or if it asserts a newly recognized, retroactively applied right more than one year
after it was first recognized.156 A second or subsequent motion is repetitive and
therefore barred.157 The Court considers a repetitive motion only if the movant was
convicted at trial and the motion pleads with particularity either: (1) actual
innocence; 158 or (2) the application of a newly recognized, retroactively applied rule
of constitutional law rendering the conviction invalid.159 Grounds for relief “not
asserted in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction” are barred as
procedurally defaulted unless the movant can show “cause for relief” and “prejudice
from [the] violation.” 160 Grounds for relief formerly adjudicated in the case,
154 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 155 Id. 156 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1). 157 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2). 158 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2)(i). 159 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2)(ii). 160 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3). 25 including “proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, in an appeal, in a post-
conviction proceeding, or in a federal habeas corpus hearing” are barred. 161 The
above bars to relief do not apply either to a claim the court lacked jurisdiction or to
one claiming: (1) actual innocence; or (2) the application of a newly recognized,
retroactively applied, rule of constitutional law rendering the conviction invalid. 162
To successfully bring an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a claimant
must demonstrate: (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) that the
deficiencies prejudiced the claimant by depriving him of a fair trial with reliable
results.163 To prove counsel’s deficiency, a defendant must show that counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.164 Moreover, a
defendant must make concrete allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them
or risk summary dismissal. 165 “[A] court must indulge in a strong presumption that
counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance.” 166 A successful Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel requires a showing “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.”167 An inmate must satisfy the proof requirements of both prongs to
161 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4). 162 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5), citing Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2)(i) and (ii). 163 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). 164 Id. at 667-68. 165 Wright v. State, 671 A.2d 1353, 1356 (Del. 1996). 166 Strickland, 446 U.S. at 689. 167 Id. at 694. 26 succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Failure to do so on either prong
will doom the claim and the Court need not address the other.168
In the appellate context, “[t]he [d]efendant must first show that his counsel
was objectively unreasonable in failing to find arguable issues on appeal – that is,
that counsel unreasonably failed to discover nonfrivolous issues and to file a merits
brief raising them.”169 Appellate counsel “need not (and should not) raise every
nonfrivolous claim, but rather may select from among them in order to maximize the
likelihood of success on appeal.”170 Nonetheless, it is “still possible to bring a
Strickland claim based on counsel’s failure to raise a particular claim, but it is
difficult to demonstrate that counsel was incompetent.” 171 A defendant faces a
tougher burden of “showing that a particular nonfrivolous issue was clearly stronger
than issues that counsel did present” where appellate counsel filed a merits brief,
than in the case where appellate counsel filed a no merit brief.172 Further, Mayfield
must still show prejudice, “That is, [the defendant] must show a reasonable
probability that, but for his counsel’s unreasonable failure [to raise a clearly stronger
issue], he would have prevailed on his appeal.”173
168 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697; Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 811, 825 (Del. 2013) (“Strickland is a two-pronged test, and there is no need to examine whether an attorney performed deficiently if the deficiency did not prejudice the defendant.”). 169 Neal v. State, 80 A.3d 935, 946 (Del. 2013) (quoting Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000)). 170 Id. (citing Smith, 528 U.S. at 288). 171 Id. 172 Id. 173 Id. at 947 (quoting Smith, 528 U.S. 285). 27 V. DISCUSSION
Before addressing the merits of Mayfield’s AMPCR, the Court applies the
procedural bars of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i).174 If a procedural bar exists,
then the Court will not consider the merits of the postconviction claim. 175 Grounds
for relief “not asserted in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction” are
barred as procedurally defaulted unless the movant can show “cause for relief” and
“prejudice from [the] violation.”176 None of the bars to relief apply either to a claim
the court lacked jurisdiction or to one claiming: (1) actual innocence; or (2) the
application of a newly recognized, retroactively applied, rule of constitutional law
rendering the conviction invalid. 177
In his Reply, Mayfield now couches his claims regarding Rone, GSR, the late
production of Morris’ immunity agreement, and his sentencing claim in IAC terms
in order to show cause for his failure to raise them previously since IAC claims are
not subject to the procedural default of Rule 61(i)(3). As this Court has observed in
State v. Gattis: “However, this path creates confusion if the defendant does not
understand that the test for ineffective assistance of counsel and the test for cause
and prejudice are distinct, albeit similar, standards.”178 For example the United
States Supreme Court has held that:
174 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 175 Id. 176 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3). 177 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5), citing Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2)(i) and (ii). 178 State v. Gattis, 1995 WL 790961, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 28, 1995). 28 [i]f the procedural default is the result of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Sixth Amendment itself requires that the responsibility for the default be imputed to the State, which may not “conduc[t] trials at which persons who face incarceration must defend themselves without adequate legal assistance;” Ineffective assistance of counsel then is cause for a procedural default. 179
But:
A movant who interprets the final sentence of the quoted passage to mean that he can simply assert ineffectiveness and thereby meet the cause requirement will miss the mark. Rather, to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a movant must engage in the two- part analysis enunciated in Strickland v. Washington and adopted by the Delaware Supreme Court in Albury v. State. 180
Accordingly, the Court discusses those four claims bearing in mind the “cause and
prejudice” necessary to overcome 61(i)(3)’s bar to relief and Strickland’s
performance deficiency and prejudice requirements.
A. Claim I – Fraudulent Ballistics Examiner Carl Rone
Rone’s transgressions first came to light in 2018 in Fowler v. State 181 while
Fowler’s appeal from this Court’s denial of his postconviction relief motion was
before the Delaware Supreme Court. 182 They were unknown at the time of
179 Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 466 U.S. 335, 344 (1980)). 180 Gattis, 1995 WL 790961, at *4 (internal citations omitted). 181 194 A.3d 16 (Del. 2018). 182 Id. at 17. 29 Mayfield’s trial and direct appeal. 183 Since this issue was not raised before, Mayfield
must show cause for relief from the procedural default bar of Rule 61(i)(3) and actual
prejudice. Mayfield does not address the bar until his Reply, but the timing of the
revelation of Rone’s crimes is a sufficient cause for not raising the issue at trial or
on appeal. Whether he is entitled to relief and was prejudiced requires the Court to
examine the claim.
At trial in this case Rone offered expert ballistics testimony about the two
handguns that were recovered – the .40 caliber and the .380 and multiple shell
casings. 184 He matched all of the .40 caliber shell casings found on Monroe Street
to the .40 caliber handgun thrown from the Focus during the police chase. 185 He
concluded that all of the 9mm casings were fired from the same weapon. 186 Lastly,
he testified that the Cobra .380 also recovered after the chase, did not properly feed
cartridges into the chamber requiring him to manually manipulate it to seat a
cartridge to fire.187 The calibers of the shell casings recovered at the Monroe Street
scene had been determined earlier by Det. Stephy. 188
183 Mayfield’s trial was in 2016 and his convictions were affirmed in 2017. See Mayfield v. State, 2017 WL 6015762 (Del. Dec. 4, 2017). 184 Trial Tr. at 121:14-23 (Jun. 21, 2016). 185 Id. at 131:20-132:8. 186 Id. at 132:9-16. 187 Id. at 132:17- 33:16. 188 Trial Tr. at 101:18-108:19, 111:19-23 (Jun. 15, 2016). 30 In Fowler, Rone testified that a single gun was used in two separate shooting
incidents for which Fowler was charged. 189 This testimony was significant because
“[T]he fact that ballistic evidence linked the same weapon to both incidents makes
the evidence of Fowler’s guilt in each separate incident mutually reinforcing” and
supported the Court’s finding that the State’s failure to provide Jencks material for
four witnesses to the defense was harmless. 190 After the Rone revelations, the State
reversed field.
Having argued below that its four Jencks violations were harmless in substantial part because of the ballistics evidence it presented, on appeal it did a 180. Now, it tells us that we need not worry that its ballistics expert has serious credibility issues because he claimed pay for work he did not do. Why? Because its witness testimony, including that of the four witnesses for whom it had failed to provide Jencks statements was so strong. 191
In reversing, the Delaware Supreme Court held that “Rone’s testimony was vital to
both the State’s trial case and the Superior Court’s opinion because if one accepted
the expert’s testimony, that the same weapon was present at each incident, it gave
the jury and the Superior Court a basis other than eye witness testimony to conclude
that Fowler was the shooter.” 192 In combination, the State’s multiple Jencks
189 State v. Fowler, 2017 WL 4381384, at *6 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 29, 2017) 190 Id., at 6-7. 191 Fowler v. State, 194 A.3d at 17-18. 192 Id. at 23. 31 violations and Rone’s crimes were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and
entitled Fowler to a new trial. 193
Cases after Fowler have delt with Rone’s trial testimony and subsequent
criminal conduct. In Thompson v. State,194 the Supreme Court observed:
This is not the first case dealing with the fallout from Rone's arrest and conviction. A number of defendants have tried to use Rone's falsification of time sheets to upset convictions. But “every court” to consider the issue has concluded that “evidence that tends to impeach Rone's character is not a ground for invalidating a conviction unless Rone was ‘vital’ to proving the defendant's guilt.” General character impeachment of Rone in this case was neither vital to Thompson's conviction nor does it suggest that Rone crossed the line from falsifying time sheets to providing a compromised expert report and testimony. 195
Similarly, here the Court finds that Rone’s testimony was not “vital” to proving
Mayfield’s guilt. It mostly either confirmed what was obvious – that the .40 caliber
casings were fired from the .40 caliber handgun discarded by the Defendants as they
fled police, or confirmed other testimony - that the 9mm casings came from the 9mm
handgun Morris said he fired, 196 and that the .380 was inoperable as described by
Det. Henry Law 197 and Mayfield himself in his first statement to Det. Fox.198 His
193 Id. at 27. 194 Thompson v. State, 296 A.2d 872 (Del. 2023) (internal citations omitted). 195 Id. at 879-80 196 Trial Tr., at 78:17-21; 79:5-6; 144:12-145:1. 197 Trial Tr. at 81:11-12 (Jun. 15, 2016 AM) (“Yes – no, I’m sorry, I’m sorry, the .380 did not function.”). 198 AMPCR, at Ex. 9 at 15, D.I. 100 (“AM: I shot the .380 three times. DF: Three times. AM: And after that it didn’t shoot anymore.”). 32 one uncorroborated finding was favorable to Mayfield – that a 9mm casing found at
the scene of the shooting at Mayfield’s grandmother’s house was fired by Morris’
gun.
In Fowler, the Delaware Supreme Court articulated the unusual issues the case
presented:
Because of these new developments [Rone’s arrest and the Jencks violation] Fowler sought leave to argue that he should receive a new trial during which Rone’s credibility and reliability could be tested in light of this new information. That leave was granted and the key issues before us therefore are whether Fowler is entitled to a new trial because of (i) the confidence-undermining nature of the State’s decision to indict its own expert, and (ii) the prejudice caused by the four Jencks violations. 199
But, in reality, Fowler would never have gotten the chance to test Rone’s credibility
and reliability at a new trial. After all, why would the State call as its expert someone
it had prosecuted for crimes involving dishonesty? It would not. Rone was not an
eyewitness whose observations could not be replicated by a substitute witness. He
conducted examinations of physical objects that remained in the State’s custody and
were available for re-examination. The State would do what it did in every other
Rone case with which the Court is aware that went to trial. It would have the
evidence re-examined by a different expert unburdened by Rone’s baggage.200
199 Fowler v. State, 194 A.2d at 22-23. 200 Just as Mayfield proposed to have the ballistics evidence re-examined. 33 The Court assumes the State would submit the ballistics evidence to a different
examiner in this case if the Court were to grant Mayfield’s motion based on Rone’s
post-trial arrest and guilty plea. Rone would never testify at a re-trial of this case.
All of the foregoing begs the obvious question – “Was Rone wrong?” The answer
is that Mayfield has not given the Court any forensically based reason to conclude
he was.
The Court concludes that this claim fails for two equal and independent
reasons. First, Rone’s testimony was not vital to proving Mayfield’s guilt. Second,
he has failed to challenge forensically the accuracy of Rone’s testimony. As a result,
he has failed to show he is entitled to relief and was prejudiced. At best, he has
shown he would be able to impeach the character of a witness whose convictions
occurred after his trial and will never testify at a retrial.
B. GSR Testing.
The State did not perform GSR testing on the bags that covered Mangrum’s
hands during his autopsy despite Det. Fox testifying at Mayfield’s preliminary
hearing that it would do so.201 Mayfield contends he had a right to “rely upon the
preservation and testing of this evidence” and that he should have been notified prior
to trial that the State was not going to have the testing performed. 202 He claims this
201 AMPCR at 26, D.I. 100. 202 Id. at 27. 34 evidence was exculpatory and he was prejudiced by the State’s violation of its
“constitutional obligation to inform the defense of this change in course.” 203
Mayfield did not raise this claim either at trial or on direct appeal. Thus, it is
procedurally defaulted under Rule 61(i)(3) unless he can show cause for relief from
the default and actual prejudice. He has done neither. His assertion that a GSR
analysis of the bags on Mangrum’s hands would have produced exculpatory
evidence is speculative at best. His argument that the State had a constitutional
obligation to inform him that it did not intend to have the bags tested is unsupported
by any citation to authority. This claim is procedurally defaulted under Rule
61(i)(3). To the extent he recasts it as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in
order to avert procedural default, he is unpersuasive for the reasons set out in section
V.D.7, infra.
C. Morris’ Immunity Agreement.
The State entered into an immunity agreement with Morris on May 1, 2015,
but did not inform Mayfield’s defense counsel of it until Morris took the stand, an
obvious discovery violation.204 He alleges that “diligent defense counsel operating
with adequate notice that one of the shooters had been given transactional immunity
203 Id. 204 Id. 28. 35 would have changed the course of their preparation in many ways.” 205 He does not
say how.206
Mayfield did not raise this claim at trial or on direct appeal. Thus, it is subject
to procedural default under Rule61(i)(i)(3) unless he can show cause for the default
and actual prejudice from it. He has failed to do so. Simply incanting ineffective
assistance of counsel is insufficient to remove the procedural default bar. Strickland
requires that he demonstrate trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, there
was a reasonable likelihood of a different result. He must do more than allege that
earlier production would have caused a change in trial strategy. He must identify
that change and how that changed strategy would have been effective. Again,
Mayfield has done neither. Accordingly, he has shown no reason why the bar should
not apply, and so, this claim is barred by Rule 61(i)(3) as well.
D. IAC Claims Against Trial Counsel
Mayfield makes 11 IAC claims against trial counsel. Rule 61 requires that a
motion for postconviction relief “set forth in summary form the facts each of the
grounds thus specified [in the motion].”207 A predicate for a successful IAC claim
is that a defendant “must make concrete allegations of actual prejudice and
205 Id. 206 Interestingly, Mayfield does not allege that trial counsel failed to make effective use of the agreement in cross-examining Morris and in closing argument. 207 Super. Ct Crim. R. 61(b)(2). 36 substantiate them or risk summary dismissal.”208 All of Mayfield’s IAC claims fail
to clear that hurdle. In the IAC context, Mayfield must show both that his trial
counsel’s performance was deficient and that such deficiency prejudiced him.
Mayfield’s IAC allegations are conclusory and lack substantial factual or legal
support to establish that trial counsel’s performance was deficient or he suffered
actual prejudice.
1. Claim 1 – Failure to Prepare and Investigate
Mayfield identifies two critical factors in the case – crime scene
reconstruction and ballistics evidence.209 He asserts that it was critical for trial
counsel to investigate the forensics in the case and provide the jury with a credible
self-defense case. 210 The first part of that sentence undoubtedly is true. The second
part depends on what the forensic evidence establishes. Mayfield acknowledges that
trial counsel hired a crime scene and law enforcement investigations expert, Jeffrey
Miller, M.S. (“Miller”), but fault them for not calling him as a witness at trial.211 But
Mayfield never makes any concrete allegation that he was prejudiced by Miller’s
absence from the witness stand. He never informs the Court of the helpful testimony
Miller was prepared to offer.
208 Wright v. State, 671 A.2d at 1356. 209 AMPCR at 29, D.I. 100. 210 Id. 211 AMPCR at 30, D.I. 100. 37 On the other hand, trial counsel, John S. Malik, Esquire did discuss Miller’s
report in his affidavit. Mr. Malik quoted Miller as writing:
The victim, Rae’Kwon Mangrum, has no evidence he was in a fight. He has no abrasions or contusions to his face, elbows, knees, or the knuckles of his hands. No witness describes two subjects fighting. In addition, Mangrum has numerous perforating bullet wounds. If he and Mayfield were in a fighting embrace when Mayfield was fired on by Nicodemus “Nick” Morris then Mayfield would have likely either been struck directly or by bullets exiting Mangrum’s body. This forensic and pathological evidence is contrary to Mayfield’s statement to Det. Fox during his interview.212
Mr. Malik concluded that Miller’s opinion that the physical evidence did not support
Mayfield’s version of events “would not have been helpful for the defense at
trial,”213 certainly a reasonable conclusion. Not only has Mayfield has failed to
substantiate this claim of actual prejudice, but he has failed to show that trial
counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
2. No Motions to Suppress Mayfield’s Statement Were Filed
Mayfield gave three statements to the police, but only one was introduced into
evidence. That statement was the one he gave to Det. Fox in Pennsylvania on the
night he was arrested. 214 Mayfield does not specify any ground for suppression of
that statement, nor does he cite any authority in support of suppression. Rather, he
leaves the Court to infer one based on his claim that he gave the statement “after he
212 Aff. John S. Malik, Esquire at 4 (June 18, 2024), D.I. 107. 213 Id. 214 Trial Tr. at 201:21-22 (Jun. 21, 2016). 38 sat for hours and while he was under the influence of benzodiazepines, and other
drugs.”215 Leaving aside the question of whether he was still under the influence of
drugs “after sitting for hours,” Mayfield provides not basis to believe he was under
the influence. Certainly, a review his statement does not. The only evidence
Mayfield cites is the fact that benzodiazepines were found in the vehicle in which he
was a passenger. 216 But, being in a car that had drugs in it is insufficient to raise an
inference Mayfield was under the influence of those drugs hours later when he gave
his statement.
Mayfield has cited neither facts nor law that would support a suppression
motion. Trial counsel cannot be faulted for performance deficiency for not moving
to suppress Mayfield’s statement if postconviction counsel fails to supply any factual
or legal basis for such a motion. Certainly he has given the Court no reason to
believe a suppression motion would have had a reasonable likelihood of success.
Further, Mayfield has not alleged that there is a reasonable likelihood the outcome
of the case would have been difference had a suppression motion been filed. This
claim fails both prongs of Strickland.
3. No Motions to Suppress Evidence from Search
During a search of Mayfield’s room at his grandmother’s house, the
Wilmington Police recovered what appeared to be a laser sight for a handgun.217
215 AMPCR at 31, D.I. 100. 216 Id. 217 Id. at 33. 39 Mayfield contends that trial counsel should have moved to suppress the laser sight
because there was no evidence a laser sight was used in this case. 218 Alternatively,
trial counsel should have moved in limine to exclude it as evidence of other bad
acts. 219 He also argues that trial counsel should have filed motions to preclude the
State from admitting other bad acts, “including photographs from a phone that
depicted guns and an alleged plan to buy guns, as well as a scope to a firearm that
was located on a search of Mayfield’s grandmother’s house.” 220 Finally, he claims
pre-trial motion practice would have put Mayfield in a better position to bargain for
a more favorable resolution of the case. 221
Mayfield’s claims are entirely conclusory and lack any real legal analysis.
The laser sight, which is a handgun accessory, was properly admitted as evidence
that Mayfield had access to a handgun. Failure to object, therefore, was not
performance deficiency. Further, Mayfield has not demonstrated how moving to
exclude the laser sight from evidence would have resulted in a reasonable probability
that the result of the trial would have been different. Moreover, his argument that
pretrial motion practice would have put him in a better plea negotiating position is
pure speculation. On this issue, Mayfield has failed to satisfy either of Strickland’s
prongs.
218 Id. 219 Id. 220 Id. 34. 221 Id. 40 4. Failure to Prepare and Use Expert Witness at Trial
Postconviction counsel represents that they have reviewed potential defense
expert Miller’s files, diagrams, and reports and attached them to the AMPCR as
Exhibit 13.222 The documents are not attached. There is nothing behind tab 13.223
They state that they have reviewed billing records and e-mail correspondence
between Miller and the Office of Conflict Counsel and attached those documents as
Exhibit 14. 224 But, Exhibit 14 is Miller’s curriculum vitae, not billing records and
e-mail correspondence. 225
As discussed in Section V. D. 1., supra, Mr. Malik stated in his affidavit that
Miller’s assessment that the forensic and pathological evidence contradicted
Mayfield’s version of events as set out in his statement to Det. Fox. Declining to
call an expert witness with that unhelpful opinion was a prudent decision and not
performance deficiency. Although Mayfield states that Miller’s work and diagrams
would have supported Mayfield’s defense, he offers no evidence of that conclusion.
Mayfield fails to meet either Strickland prong on this issue.
5. Failure to Interview Witnesses
Mayfield alleges trial counsel failed to interview five witnesses – two who
testified at trial and three who did not. 226 The two who testified were Mangrum’s
222 Id. at 35. 223 Id. at Ex. 13. Similarly, there is nothing behind tabs 4, 11, and 13. 224 Id. at 35. 225 Id. at Ex. 14. 226 Id. at 36-37. 41 aunt, Brittany Mangrum, who was examined by Mr. Witherell, and his grandmother
Dorothy Mangrum, examined by Mr. Malik.227 The three who did not were
Mayfield’s younger brother Whitley; purported eyewitness Burton, and Mayfield’s
grandmother. 228 In the case of the testifying witnesses, Mayfield says, it is “clear”
from the questioning that neither attorney had ever met their respective witness
before the witness testified. 229 With respect to Mr. Witherell, what made it “clear”
he had not spoken to the witness before was his apology for meeting her under the
circumstances.230 Beyond that, Mayfield offers nothing.
Both trial attorneys deny the allegation that they did not meet with the witness
they examined before trial. Although, their recollections differ about the
circumstances of the meetings. In his affidavit, Mr. Witherell states:
Counsel did meet with the witness(es) in the office prior to being identified as witnesses to confirm their present recollection and testimony would be consistent with the prior statement provided to the police. Both witnesses were very consistent with the prior statements. Both were very credible in identifying Broomer as the shooter. Counsel had ‘met’ Brittany before and the use of the word ‘meet’ is being taken out of context.231
Mr. Malik states in his affidavit:
Counsel recalls Mr. Monahan [a private investigator retained by the defense] accompanying both trial counsel to the scene of the shooting to photograph the area and to
227 Id. 228 Id. 229 Id. 230 Id. 231 Aff. Andrew J. Witherell, Esquire at 4-5 (July __, 2024), D.I. 106. 42 conduct witness interviews. Counsel believes that Dorothy Mangrum was interviewed by Mr. Monahan during this visit to the crime scene with both counsel. Counsel believes that it was during this interview that it was confirmed that Dorothy Mangrum advised that she witnessed Co-Defendant Michael Broomer shoot her grandson Raekwon Mangrum. Counsel also believes that Mr. Monahan interviewed Brittany Mangrum who related that immediately after the shooting, she went to her nephew, Raekwon Mangrum, to help him at which time he declared that Co-Defendant Michael Broomer had shot him.232
Mayfield’s subjective conclusion based on his interpretation of transcript is
insufficient to outweigh the attestations of trial counsel. The Court finds no
performance deficiency on either trial counsel’s part. Importantly, Mayfield does
not take issue with the substance of either witness’ examination. Rather, he
speculates that speaking to them earlier would have enabled trial counsel to help
negotiate a settlement of the case. But, such speculation does not constitute actual
prejudice under Strickland.
The Court now considers the three witnesses who were not interviewed.
Mayfield does not inform the Court what testimony or information his grandmother
would have provided. Accordingly, the allegation that trial counsel were ineffective
in not interviewing her is without merit.
Whitley is Mayfield’s brother. According to a summary of his interview with
investigators Fontello and Workman of True Blue Detective Agency on March 11,
232 Aff. John S. Malik, Esquire at 7-8 (June 18, 2024), D.I. 107. 43 2024, he is also Broomer’s cousin because “Jowan’s aunt adopted Broomer.”233
Mayfield claims his brother would have provided exculpatory information.234
Whitley did not see the shooting, but was with Broomer earlier when they
encountered Mangrum and Morris near McDonald’s.235 He provided some
information about the “beef” between Mayfield and Mangrum as well as what
appears to be hearsay information about a Glock .40 caliber handgun that Mayfield
sold. 236 Mayfield does not explain why Whitley, his brother, did not volunteer this
information to trial counsel. The Court finds Whitley had little if anything to say
that was exculpatory, but the information about a .40 caliber Glock that Mayfield
had possessed was potentially harmful. Further, it is not clear how trial counsel
would have known Whitley had any information at all to provide. Under these
circumstances, the Court finds no performance deficiency and no actual prejudice
because Whitley was not interviewed by trial counsel.
Burton also was interviewed by investigators from True Blue Detective
Agency. A summary of his interview is attached to the AMPCR at Exhibit 7. It
appears that Burton first spoke to Mayfield while they were both incarcerated at
Sussex Correctional Institution.237 Burton claimed to have witnessed the shooting.
In his telling, he was about 14 or 15 years old and was with his uncle (who is
233 AMPCR at Ex 6, D.I. 100. 234 Id. at 36. 235 Id. at Ex. 6. 236 Id. 237 Id. at Ex. 7. 44 currently incarcerated out of state in federal prison) in a parking lot near where the
shooting occurred.238 He saw a man standing outside a black car parked in the alley
pull a gun. 239 That man started shooting at the car, then ran through an alleyway and
disappeared. 240 There was return gunfire from the car. 241 The man that started
shooting was with the man who got shot. 242 He and his uncle ran to his
grandmother’s house in the 700 block of W. 2nd Street. 243 He has never spoken to
the Wilmington Police or any investigators (presumably including any investigators
for Broomer).244
It is difficult to ascribe performance deficiency to Mayfield’s trial counsel for
failing to locate Burton. He did not remain at the scene. He did not come forward
later. The Wilmington Police did not know of him. Broomer’s attorneys were
unaware of him as well. Mayfield does not provide an answer as to how his attorneys
were supposed to find him. Mayfield himself only became aware of Burton through
a chance prison encounter. Further, while the substance of Burton’s statement
indeed is exculpatory, he is unlikely to be an unimpeachable witness, having
remained silent for years and only telling his story after being incarcerated with
Mayfield. His contention that the man with Mangrum (Morris) initiated the shooting
238 Id. 239 Id. 240 Id. 241 Id. 242 Id. 243 Id. 211 Id. 45 by shooting at a car does not mesh seamlessly with the testimony of Brittany and
Dorothy Mangrum that Boomer shot Mangrum, or Mayfield’s own version that he
was “tussling” with Mangrum when the shooting began.245 Burton does not describe
a fight occurring outside of the car, nor, in fact, does he describe any of the car’s
occupants being outside of it.246 On balance, the Court does not find it a reasonable
probability that Burton’s testimony would have resulted in a different result.
Accordingly, the Court finds Mayfield has failed to establish either Strickland prong
regarding Burton.
6. Failure to Investigate Relationship Between Broomer and Mangrum
Mayfield states in his AMPCR that trial counsel were ineffective for failing
to investigate the trial in which Mangrum and Broomer were co-defendants. 247 Had
counsel investigated the trial, they “likely would have learned important information
about the history and behavior of co-defendant Broomer and Raekwon Mangrum
and the relationship between them.” 248 He claims that had such an investigation
been undertaken, it “would have provided important information towards preparing
Petitioner’s defense at trial, and would likely have put [him] in a better place in terms
of negotiation. Unfortunately, Mayfield does not tell the Court just what “important
information” trial counsel would have learned from the trial of Broomer and
245 Id. at Ex. 9 at 2. 246 Id. at Ex. 7. 247 Id. at 37 248 Id. 46 Mangrum, nor does he explain how this “important information” would have
assisted in preparing his defense. It is impossible to give any weight to this portion
of Mayfield’s claim.
Mayfield also argues that trial counsel should have attacked Broomer’s
character in front of the jury. He does not explain what admissible bad character
traits Broomer possessed, nor how attacking him would have benefited Mayfield.
Again, this argument carries no weight.
Next Mayfield characterizes Mangrum as a “young man with a very long
violent criminal history and faults trial counsel for not putting Mangrum’s
propensity for violence in front of the jury.249 Mayfield apparently finds it
unnecessary to share the details of that “very long violent criminal history” with the
Court beyond the fact that the jury was already aware that Mangrum had shot
Mayfield not long before the homicide. Nor he does provide a theory of
admissibility in light of the fact that a victim’s character is generally not an essential
element of a self-defense claim and DRE 405(b)’s general prohibition against the
admission of specific instances of conduct to show that a victim had a general
propensity for violence.250 Accordingly, Mayfield has not moved the ball towards
either performance deficiency of actual prejudice with this argument.
249 Id., at 38. 250 Wright v. State, 25 A.3d 747, 755 (Del. 2011). 47 Finally, Mayfield reviews the time records of both trial counsel. He makes
no argument based on this review, however.
7. Trial Counsel Were Ineffective for Failing to Conduct Forensic Testing
Here, Mayfield notes evidence was produced at trial showing that Mayfield
had the greatest concentration of GSR on him. 251 He argues that trial counsel should
have requested independent forensic testing prior to trial, including unspecified
testing of the Defendants’ car and “bullets and shell casings”.252 He notes that were
multiple guns and multiple people involved in this shooting incident, and then claims
without any evidentiary support, “it [sic] who would have likely provided
exculpatory evidence if the defense had in a timely manner requested defense
testing.”253 This contention is nothing more than surmise
There were only three people from whom possible GSR samples could have
been obtained for possible testing – Mayfield, Broomer, and Mangrum. Of those
three, GSR testing was done on Broomer and Mayfield. Retesting those samples
would have been pointless, as Mayfield admitted firing a gun in his initial statement
to Det. Fox. Only the bags covering Mangrum’s hands were not tested. His new
contentions regarding testing the car and the “bullets and shell casings” raised for
the first time in his Reply are to undeveloped and speculative to credit.
251 AMPCR at 39, D.I. 100. 252 Id.; Def’s Reply at 12-13, D.I. 112. 253 Id. 48 Curiously, postconviction counsel criticizes trial counsel for not conducting
GSR and ballistics testing while failing to have it done themselves despite seeking
delays in the case to have it done. On June 15, 2020, prior postconviction counsel,
Benjamin S. Gifford, IV, Esquire, moved to stay the proceedings “based on the need
to test bags that had been placed on the hands of Raekwon Mangrum to preserve
forensic evidence after he had been fatally shot for the existence of gunshot
residue.”254 Mr. Gifford retained McCrone Associates, Inc., a laboratory in Chicago,
to conduct the tests, but was uncertain when the testing could be done.255 On
November 12, 2023, current postconviction counsel also requested a delay in order
to retain forensic experts to conduct GSR testing prior to filing this AMPCR – “This
extension request is based upon Petitioner’s need to retain necessary forensic experts
prior to filing his Amended Rule 61 Petition, so that claims are pled with sufficient
particularity to demonstrate prejudice and the need for further fact development, or
the granting of relief in this case.”256 Current post conviction counsel were
communicating with potential expert witnesses requesting quotes for their services
and with the Office of Conflicts Counsel to secure funding as of June 17, 2022.257
On November 27, 2023, the Court granted Mayfield’s Motion for 90 Day Stay to
File Amended Rule 61 Petition so he could retain a ballistics expert. 258 Finally, on
254 Def.’s Mot. to Stay Proceedings, D.I. 76. 255 Id., at 140. 256 D.I. 83 at 1-2. 257 D.I. 91. 258 Motion, D.I. 94; Order, D.I. 95. 49 February 6, 2024, the Court signed an Order granting Mayfield’s motion to transport
two autopsy bags and one set of fingernail clippings to Microtrace Laboratories in
Elgin, Illinois for the purpose of GSR testing.259 In the end, the AMPCR contained
no reference to these efforts, nor to any post-trial GSR or ballistics test results. Two
reasons come to mind for this absence. Either no testing was done, or if tests were
done, the results were unfavorable to Mayfield. If no testing was done, the AMPCR
fails it explain how trial counsel were ineffective for not having independent forensic
testing done but postconviction counsel are not. If testing was done and the results
were unfavorable, postconviction counsel would be in no position to accuse trial
counsel of ineffectiveness. The Court assumes the former to be the case.
Even if the bags were tested, the value of testing for GSR is uncertain. The
GSR testing of the hands of both Mayfield and Broomer was done by “tabbing” their
hands with sticky strips.260 If there were GSR on Mangrum’s hands, it is unclear
how much, if any, would have been transferred to the bags. It is similarly unclear
whether any potential GSR on his hands had been transferred to any other objects
between when Mangrum was shot and his autopsy. It makes more sense for the
police to have put the bags on Mangrum’s hands to preserve his hands for future
“tabbing,” perhaps at autopsy, than to preserve the bags for future testing for GSR
259 Motion, D.I. 96; Order, D.I. 97. 260 Trial Tr. at 200:19-21; 202:17-23 (Jun. 14, 2026). 50 transferred to them from his hands. In other words, the utility of GSR testing of the
bags on Mangrum’s hands has not been established.
The Court concludes that this claim is conclusory as to both trial counsel’s
ineffectiveness and any actual prejudice Mayfield may have suffered.
8. Duty to Resolve Case Prior to Trial
Postconviction counsel represent that they have a “good faith belief that there
was no pretrial negotiation to resolve this case.” 261 Mayfield states that had trial
counsel engaged in pleas negotiations, “they likely would have been able to resolve
this case for a reasonable term of years. 262 Two problems with this claim are
immediately apparent. First, postconviction counsel’s “good faith belief” is not
evidence of the claim, and second, Mayfield fails to inform the Court what plea to
“a reasonable term of years,” he would have accepted. There is no reason the believe
the State would have agreed to what Mayfield deemed “reasonable.” The Court
finds this claim insufficient to allege both performance deficiency and actual
prejudice.
9. Failure to Object to Det. Fox Testifying as An Expert
This claim consists of a mere three sentences. The first relates that in one of
his many trips to the witness stand, Det. Fox discussed phone records extracted using
Cellebrite.263 The second states that Det. Fox testified that he had been trained in
261 AMPCR at 40, D.I. 100. 262 Id. 263 Id. at 40. 51 extracting and properly preserving cell phone records. 264 The third states that Det.
Fox testified he did not extract the information from the phone himself “although
there was no defense objection based on Crawford and the 6th Amendment right to
confront witnesses against him.”.265
Det. Fox testified that in order to extract information from a cell phone:
Basically what happens is you connect a power chord from the phone to the little computer, and a storage device, like a pen drive or a terabyte drive, to the other end of the computer. The computer reads the phone, tells you what kind of phone it is, and prompts you for a series of actions that you need to take in order to download the phone.
After you perform these actions that you’re prompted to perform by the computer, it extracts all the information on the – on the – from the phone onto your external drive. It includes pictures, text messages, SMS messages, Instagram, social media accounts, e-mail accounts, anything that’s stored on the phone.266
This claim does not develop any argument that Det. Fox testified as an expert and
the Court finds he did not. Despite being trained on extracting cell phone information
from the phone using the Cellebrite computer, mechanically connecting the phone
to the computer and following its prompts does not Make Det. Fox and expert.
The confrontation claim similarly is undeveloped. The Court finds Mayfield’s
confrontation rights were not violated. Det. Fox’s testimony did not violate
264 Id. at 40-41. 265 Id. 266 Trial Tr. 122:5-19 (Jun. 16, 2016). 52 Crawford v. Washington’s 267 ban on the admission of testimonial statements of non-
appearing witnesses because Det. Fox offered no such testimony. Moreover,
according to trial counsel:
[w]hether Detective Fox or another detective connected the cell phones in question to the Cellebrite program, the contents of the cell phones were produced in discovery and some of the cell phone records were introduced as exculpatory evidence during the course of the trial including text message exchanges involving Raekwon Mangrum shortly before the shooting transpired.268
Trial counsel made a strategic decision not to oppose the admission of the
information.269
Neither allegation establishes performance deficiency by trial counsel.
Neither allegation even attempts to demonstrate actual prejudice.
10. Failure to Prepare: Phone Records
Mayfield claims trial counsel was ineffective for failing to use certain phone
records provided in discovery showing “a constant back and forth between Broomer
and Mangrum in the hours and minutes leading up to the incident.” 270 He claims
that trial counsel was “woefully unprepared to deal with the cell phone records” to
his prejudice. 271 The defense wished to introduce a summary of certain phone
267 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 268 Affidavit of John S. Malik, Esquire at ⁋ 4i, D.I. 107 269 Affidavit of Andrew J. Witherell, Esquire at ⁋ 4h, D.I. 106. 270 AMPCR at 41, D.I. 100. 271 Id. 53 records. 272 Ultimately, the Court did not allow the introduction of the summary of
the phone calls and text messages in the format proposed by the defense, but
suggested that the parties reach a stipulation overnight. 273 The parties did reach a
stipulation which included a chart of cell phone transmissions and some additional
testimony from Det. Fox.274 Mayfield contends that trial counsel were ineffective
for failing to retain an expert to educate them on the cell phone records and possibly
present testimony.275 But, Mayfield fails take into account that all of the
conversation regarding a summary of the cell transmissions occurred outside the
presence of the jury.
Again, Mayfield is unable to state the alleged performance deficiency with
any particularity. And, his allegation of actual prejudice is speculative.
12. Failure to Humanize Petitioner Before Jury
During his summation, Mr. Malik misspoke and called Mayfield by
Mangrum’s name four times (although the AMPCR only cites to three times.)276
According to Mayfield, these slips of the tongue “disrespect[ed] both the deceased
young man and his own client.” 277 He claims that “This fatal error by Malik should
stand on its own as ineffective assistance at closing argument. This abject failure by
272 Trial Tr. at 153:10-17 (Jun. 22, 2016). 273 Id. at 158:15-160:23. 274 Trial Tr. at 3:4-49 (Jun. 23, 2016). 275 AMPCR at 42, D.I. 100. 276 Id. 277 Id. at 42. 54 Malik also speaks to lack of a relationship between trial counsel and their of counsel
and their client.”278
Mayfield is engaging in hyperbole. Three (or four) slips of the tongue in a
closing argument that lasted approximately 80 minutes 279 and spanned some 70
pages of transcript 280 in a 9-day trial hardly constitutes a “fatal error” or an “abject
failure.” 281 More importantly, Mayfield does not take issue with the substantive
arguments Mr. Malik presented in his summation. Mayfield has failed to
demonstrate either performance deficiency or actual prejudice in this IAC claim.
E. IAC Claims Against Appellate Counsel.
Mayfield alleges two claims of IAC against appellate counsel. Both have no
merit. The first alleges that appellate counsel failed to raise an argument regarding
the trial court’s denial of his request for lesser included offenses. 282 This claim fails
because it simply is wrong factually. Appellate counsel did raise that issue. 283
The second claim alleges appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise
the issue of “Detective Fox improperly testifying as an expert on cellular phone
extraction evidence.”284 Appellate counsel “need not (and should not) raise every
nonfrivolous claim, but rather may select from among them in order to maximize the
278 Id. 279 Trial Tr. 57:23-58:1; 59:20 (Jun. 23, 2016). 280 Id. at 59:20-129:5. 281 How many parents have called one of their children by another child’s name? 282 AMPCR at 44, D.I. 100. 283 State’s Resp. Ex. A (Appellant’s Amended Opening Brief), D.I. 109. 284 AMPCR at 44, D.I. 100. 55 likelihood of success on appeal.”285 A defendant faces a tougher burden of “showing
that a particular nonfrivolous issue was clearly stronger than issues that counsel did
present” where appellate counsel filed a merits brief, than in the case where appellate
counsel filed a no merit brief.286 Further, Mayfield must still show prejudice, “That
is, [the defendant] must show a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s
unreasonable failure [to raise a clearly stronger issue], he would have prevailed on
his appeal.” 287 In Section V.D.9., supra, the Court found no merit to this claim.
Mayfield has failed in his burden to show performance deficiency or prejudice in
this IAC claim as well.
F. Mayfield’s Mandatory Life Without Parole Sentence
This entire claim as stated in th AMPCR consists of a single sentence:
“Mandatory Life Without Parole Sentences violate the 8th and 14th Amendments to
the U.S. Constitution and the Delaware Constitution when imposed upon a 21-year
old with no prior violent history.”288 Because this claim presents no argument or
authority to support it, the Court declines to consider it. Even with the Reply’s
somewhat expanded argument, this claim is nothing more than wishcasting on
Mayfield’s part. He does not cites to a single example of his contention being
accepted anywhere. Were it to consider it, it would find it barred by Rule 61(i)(3).
285 Id. (citing Smith, 528 U.S. at 288). 286 Id. 287 Id. at 947 (quoting Smith, 528 U.S. 285). 288 AMPCR at 45, D.I. 100. 56 G. Mayfield’s Request for an Evidentiary Hearing.
The Court has carefully considered all of Mayfield’s claims and his arguments
in support of his request for an evidentiary hearing. The Court is not convinced such
a hearing is necessary. The Court finds no utility in flyspecking trial counsel’s
billing records, or cross-examining them about their investigation and trial strategy,
including their decision not to file pre-trial motions. None of that would change the
fact that Mayfield has failed to demonstrate that trial counsel’s performance, which
the Court witnessed firsthand, would have fallen below an objective standard of
reasonableness or that there was a reasonable likelihood that a different result would
have occurred at trial. Nor would the testimony of investigators from True Blue
Detective Agency or Burton. Presumably, Mayfield identified any significant issues
discovered by his investigators and presented them in his AMPCR. The Court is not
persuaded that any of the are significant enough to warrant granting Mayfield relief.
As for Burton, hearing from him would not remove the significant impeachment
baggage his testimony would carry. Mayfield has presented no persuasive reason to
re-litigate the testimony of Morris and Stevens. Finally, the Court finds claims
raised by Mayfield for the first time in his Reply to be untimely and speculative.
57 VI. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant Atiba Mayfield’s Amended
Motion for Postconviction Relief is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Ferris W. Wharton Ferris W. Wharton, J.
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
State v. Mayfield, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-mayfield-delsuperct-2025.