[Cite as State v. Matosky, 2025-Ohio-5658.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO : : C.A. No. 30447 Appellant : : Trial Court Case No. 2024 CR 01417 v. : : (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas MAKAYLEY NEVAEH JADE MATOSKY : Court) : Appellee : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY & : OPINION
...........
Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on December 19, 2025, the judgment
of the trial court is affirmed.
Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.
Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately
serve notice of this judgment upon all parties and make a note in the docket of the service.
Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified
copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note
the service on the appellate docket.
For the court,
ROBERT G. HANSEMAN, JUDGE
EPLEY, P.J., and LEWIS, J., concur. OPINION MONTGOMERY C.A. No. 30447
ANDREW T. FRENCH, Attorney for Appellant CHARLES M. BLUE, Attorney for Appellee
HANSEMAN, J.
{¶ 1} The State of Ohio appeals from a judgment of the Montgomery County Court of
Common Pleas that granted the motion of Makayley Nevaeh Jade Matosky to dismiss her
indictment for carrying concealed weapons in violation of R.C. 2923.12(A)(2) and improperly
handling firearms in a motor vehicle in violation of R.C. 2923.16(B). The State claims the
dismissal of Matosky’s indictment was improper because the trial court erroneously
determined that R.C. 2923.12(A)(2) and 2923.16(B) are unconstitutional as applied to
Matosky. For the reasons outlined below, we disagree with the State and affirm the judgment
of the trial court.
Course of Proceedings and Relevant Statutory Scheme
{¶ 2} On August 8, 2024, a Montgomery County grand jury returned an indictment
charging Matosky with carrying concealed weapons in violation of R.C. 2923.12(A)(2), which
provides: “No person shall knowingly carry or have, concealed on the person’s person or
concealed ready at hand, . . . [a] handgun other than a dangerous ordnance.” Matosky was
also charged with improperly handling firearms in a motor vehicle in violation of
R.C. 2923.16(B), which provides: “No person shall knowingly transport or have a loaded
firearm in a motor vehicle in such a manner that the firearm is accessible to the operator or
any passenger without leaving the vehicle.” Matosky subsequently moved to dismiss the
charges on grounds that R.C. 2923.12(A)(2) and 2923.16(B) are unconstitutional as applied
to her because they violate her Second Amendment right to bear arms.
2 {¶ 3} In order to explain the basis of Matosky’s constitutional argument, we first note
that the prohibitions in R.C. 2923.12(A)(2) and 2923.16(B) do not apply to individuals with a
valid concealed handgun license. R.C. 2923.12(C)(2) and 2923.16(F)(5)(a); State v. Barber,
2025-Ohio-1193, ¶ 24 (1st Dist.). A person with a concealed handgun license is exempt from
criminal liability under these statutes. State v. Stonewall, 2025-Ohio-4974, ¶ 3 (1st Dist.).
{¶ 4} R.C. 2923.111 allows a “qualifying adult” to carry a concealed handgun
“anywhere in this state in which a person who has been issued a concealed handgun license
may carry a concealed handgun.” R.C. 2923.111(B)(2). “Qualifying adults” need not possess
a concealed handgun license to carry a concealed firearm and are “treated as though they
possess[ ] a concealed handgun license.” State v. Storms, 2024-Ohio-1954, ¶ 21 (1st Dist.).
As such, a “qualifying adult” is exempt from criminal liability under R.C. 2923.12(A)(2) and
2923.16(B). Barber at ¶ 26 (“[a]s a result of R.C. 2923.111, a ‘qualifying adult’ is deemed to
possess a valid concealed handgun license and is not subject to prosecution for a violation
of R.C. 2923.12(A)(2) or 2923.16(B)”).
{¶ 5} A “qualifying adult” is defined as a person who is all the following:
(a) Twenty-one years of age or older;
(b) Not legally prohibited from possessing or receiving a firearm under
18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) to (9) or under section 2923.13 of the Revised Code or
any other Revised Code provision;
(c) Satisfies all of the criteria listed in divisions (D)(1)(a) to (j), (m), (p), (q),
and (s) of section 2923.125 of the Revised Code.
R.C. 2923.111(A)(2)(a)-(c).
{¶ 6} At the time of the indicted offenses in this case, Matosky was approximately 10
weeks shy of her 21st birthday. For the purpose of Matosky’s motion to dismiss, the parties
3 stipulated that “Matosky met all requirements to be a ‘qualifying adult,’ as defined in
R.C. 2923.111(A)(2), with the sole exception being that Matosky had not yet attained the
age of twenty-one years.” (Emphasis added.) Stipulation for Motion to Dismiss. Because of
this, Matosky was not a “qualifying adult” and subject to prosecution under
R.C. 2923.12(A)(2) and 2923.16(B).
{¶ 7} In her motion to dismiss, Matosky argued that, as applied to her, the age-based
restriction applicable to violations of R.C. 2923.12(A)(2) and 2923.16(B) infringed her
Second Amendment right to bear arms. When ruling on Matosky’s motion, the trial court
applied the two-part test for analyzing Second Amendment challenges set forth in New York
State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). After applying Bruen’s two-part
test, the trial court found that R.C. 2923.12, 2923.16, and 2923.111 are unconstitutional as
applied to Matosky. Accordingly, the trial court sustained Matosky’s motion and dismissed
the concealed-carry and improper-handling charges against her.
{¶ 8} Under the authority of R.C. 2945.67(A), the State now appeals from the trial
court’s judgment dismissing Matosky’s charges and raises two assignments of error for
review.
Standard of Review
{¶ 9} “Generally, appellate courts conduct a de novo review of a trial court’s decision
concerning a defendant’s motion to dismiss all or part of an indictment based upon a
constitutional challenge to the statute under which the defendant stands indicted.” (Citations
omitted.) State v. Lawson, 2025-Ohio-2650, ¶ 5 (4th Dist.); State v. Shingleton, 2022-Ohio-
4740, ¶ 34 (2d Dist.) (“a decision on ‘whether a statute or ordinance is constitutional is a
question of law that we review de novo’”), quoting Cleveland v. State, 2019-Ohio-3820, ¶ 15;
State v. Hall, 2025-Ohio-1644, ¶ 29 (1st Dist.) (“[w]hether charges in an indictment should
4 be dismissed on constitutional grounds is a question of law, which this court reviews de
novo”). “In de novo review, we independently review trial court decisions and accord them
no deference.” (Citation omitted.) Coldly v. Fuyao Glass America, Inc., 2022-Ohio-1960, ¶ 9
(2d Dist.).
The Second Amendment and the Two-Part Test in Bruen
{¶ 10} The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “A well
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to
keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” The Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution makes the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms fully
applicable to the States. McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
{¶ 11} “[T]he right to keep and bear arms is among the ‘fundamental rights necessary
to our system of ordered liberty.’” United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 690 (2024), quoting
McDonald at 778. “‘Like most rights,’ though, ‘the right secured by the Second Amendment
is not unlimited.’” Id. at 690-691, quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626
(2008). That is, it is “‘not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner
whatsoever and for whatever purpose.’” Id. at 691, quoting Heller at 626. The right to bear
arms has always been subject to regulations. Id. However, “when the Government regulates
arms-bearing conduct, as when the Government regulates other constitutional rights, it
bears the burden to ‘justify its regulation.’” Id., quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 24.
{¶ 12} In Bruen, the United States Supreme Court set forth a two-part test that courts
must apply when determining whether a firearm regulation violates the Second Amendment.
Bruen at 8-22. Under the first part of the test, a court must determine whether “the Second
Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct.” Id. at 17. If it does, “the Constitution
presumptively protects that conduct” and the burden then shifts to the government to justify
5 the firearm regulation by demonstrating that “the regulation is consistent with this Nation’s
historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id.
{¶ 13} In making the historical-tradition determination, “the appropriate analysis
involves considering whether the challenged regulation is consistent with the principles that
underpin our regulatory tradition.” Rahimi at 692, citing Bruen at 26-31. To do this, “[a] court
must ascertain whether the new law is ‘relevantly similar’ to laws that our tradition is
understood to permit, ‘apply[ing] faithfully the balance struck by the founding generation to
modern circumstances.’” Id., quoting Bruen at 29. Central to this inquiry is “[w]hy and how
the regulation burdens the right.” Id., citing Bruen at 29. “For example, if laws at the founding
regulated firearm use to address particular problems, that will be a strong indicator that
contemporary laws imposing similar restrictions for similar reasons fall within a permissible
category of regulations.” Id.
{¶ 14} The “Bruen analysis is therefore, at its core, a comparative endeavor. It
compares the current ‘how and why’ against the historic ‘how and why’ to determine whether
the government’s modern firearm restrictions comport with the Nation’s tradition of Second
Amendment regulation.” Stonewall, 2025-Ohio-4974 at ¶ 50 (1st Dist.) (Kinsley, P.J.,
dissenting), citing Bruen, 597 U.S. at 29. However, “when a challenged regulation does not
precisely match its historical precursors, ‘it still may be analogous enough to pass
constitutional muster.’” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 692, quoting Bruen at 30. “[I]t need not be a
‘dead ringer’ or a ‘historical twin.’” (Emphasis deleted.) Id., quoting Bruen at 30.
{¶ 15} Bruen indicated that the founding era is a critical period from which to
determine the historical tradition of firearm regulation and that courts should prioritize
founding-era history. Bruen at 34-37; Worth v. Jacobson, 108 F.4th 677, 692 (8th Cir. 2024)
(“Bruen strongly suggests that we should prioritize Founding-era history”), cert. denied,
6 _ U.S. _, 145 S.Ct. 1924 (2025). Bruen recognized that “‘where a governmental practice has
been open, widespread, and unchallenged since the early days of the Republic, the practice
should guide our interpretation of an ambiguous constitutional provision.’” Bruen at 36,
quoting NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 572 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in
judgment). After Bruen, the United States Supreme Court in Rahimi further indicated the
importance of founding-era history where it stated that “[e]ven when a law regulates arms-
bearing for a permissible reason, . . . it may not be compatible with the right if it does so to
an extent beyond what was done at the founding.” (Emphasis added.) Rahimi at 692.
First Assignment of Error
{¶ 16} Under its first assignment of error, the State claims the trial court erred by
finding the concealed-carry statute, R.C. 2923.12(A)(2), unconstitutional as applied to
Matosky. In arguing that the statute is constitutionally valid, the State focuses on the second
prong of the two-part test in Bruen. The State asserts that age-based restrictions on the right
to bear arms are historically rooted in the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation
and that the trial court erred by finding otherwise. Based on this premise, the State claims
that Ohio’s age restriction on the ability to carry concealed weapons does not violate
Matosky’s Second Amendment right to bear arms. The State also claims that the Nation has
a historical tradition of restricting the right to carry concealed weapons as long as open carry
is still permitted, and argues that Ohio’s age restriction on concealed carry should be upheld
as constitutional because it does not prohibit Matosky from openly carrying a firearm in
public.
{¶ 17} The State does not challenge the application of the first prong of Bruen, which
is that the plain text of the Second Amendment covers Matosky’s conduct. As previously
discussed, the Second Amendment protects the right of “the people” to bear arms. The
7 United States Supreme Court has explained that “the people” is a term that “unambiguously
refers to all members of the political community, not an unspecified subset.” Heller, 554 U.S.
at 580. There is ample federal case law holding that individuals who are 18 to 20 years old
are among “the people” protected by the Second Amendment. See, e.g., Worth at 689;
Reese v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 127 F.4th 583, 595 (5th Cir.
2025); Lara v. Commr. Pennsylvania State Police, 125 F.4th 428, 437-438 (3rd Cir. 2025),
petition for cert. filed sub nom. Paris v. Second Amendment Found., Inc., No. 24-1329 (U.S.
June 26, 2025); Rocky Mountain Gun Owners v. Polis, 121 F.4th 96, 115-116 (10th Cir.
2024). Therefore, 20-year-old Matosky is among “the people” protected by the Second
Amendment and her conduct of carrying a firearm is covered by the plain text of the
amendment.
{¶ 18} The crux of this case is the second part of the Bruen test—whether Ohio’s age
restriction on carrying concealed weapons is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition
of firearm regulation. In proceeding with the historical-tradition analysis, we must determine
whether Ohio’s age-based restriction on carrying concealed weapons is relevantly similar to
laws that the Nation permitted during the founding era. In other words, we must determine
whether similar age-based restrictions were imposed during the founding era for similar
reasons.
{¶ 19} Several federal circuit courts have applied Bruen’s historical-tradition analysis
to contemporary age-based firearm restrictions. See, e.g., Reese; Worth,108 F.4th 677;
McCoy v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 140 F.4th 568 (4th Cir. 2025),
petition for cert. filed, No. 25-24 (U.S. July 3, 2025); Natl. Rifle Assoc. v. Bondi, 133 F.4th
1108, (11th Cir. 2025), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Natl. Rifle Assoc. v. Glass, No. 24-
1185 (U.S. May 16, 2025). The opinions of those courts, however, conflict. Some hold that
8 modern restrictions banning 18- to 20-year-olds from either possessing or purchasing
firearms are within the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation, while others hold the
opposite. See, e.g., Reese (holding that federal ban on commercial sale of handguns to 18-
to 20-year-olds violated the Second Amendment because the restriction was inconsistent
with the Nation’s historic tradition of firearm regulation); McCoy (holding that the same
federal ban on commercial sale of handguns to 18- to 20-year-olds discussed in Reese was
constitutional on grounds that the Nation’s tradition of firearm regulation permitted
restrictions on the sale of firearms to individuals under the age of 21); Worth (holding that a
Minnesota statute banning 18- to 20-year-olds from carrying handguns in public for self-
defense violated the Second Amendment because such a restriction was not within the
Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation); Bondi (holding that a Florida statute
prohibiting people between the ages of 18 and 21 from purchasing firearms was
constitutional because it was consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm
regulation); Lara (holding that Pennsylvania law preventing 18- to 20-year-olds from openly
carrying firearms during state- or municipal-declared emergencies was unconstitutional
because it was inconsistent with Nation’s historic tradition of firearm regulation).
{¶ 20} Although these federal cases conflict and do not specifically address age
restrictions on the concealed carry of firearms, they are helpful in that they provide an
abundance of relevant information regarding historical age-based firearm regulations. The
following is a non-exhaustive summary of the historical information that we gleaned from
these cases.
{¶ 21} “The common law ‘is part of the historical tradition that delimits the outer
bounds of the right to keep and bear arms.’” Worth at 695, quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 19.
“The ‘age of majority at twenty-one was early established at common law’ and evolved ‘from
9 the system of judicial combat and knight service, the age of knighthood being increased . . .
to the completion of twenty years.’” Bondi at 1117, quoting T.E. James, The Age of Majority,
4 Am. J. Legal Hist. 22, 30 (1960). “English law set the age of majority at 21 years of age
because of the relative lack of maturity and judgment of younger individuals.” Id., citing 1
William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 453 (George Sharswood Ed.
1893). “At English common law, a person under the age of 21 was considered an ‘infant’ for
purposes of contracting, and infants were not bound by their contracts.” McCoy at 575.
{¶ 22} “Like many common law principles, the infancy doctrine made its way across
the Atlantic, and early American courts routinely applied it.” McCoy, 140 F.4th at 575. “[T]he
colonies ‘adopted age twenty-one as the near universal age of majority.’” Bondi, 133 F.4th
at 1117, quoting Vivian E. Hamilton, Adulthood in Law and Culture, 91 Tul. L. Rev. 55, 64
(2016). Therefore, “[a]t the Founding, a person was an ‘infant[ ]’ or a ‘minor[ ]’ in the eyes of
the law until age 21.” Id., quoting 1 Zephaniah Swift, A System of the Laws of the State of
Connecticut, 213 (1795). “It was only once an individual ‘attain[ed] his majority at the age of
twenty-one years accomplished,’ that he came into ‘the full enjoyment of his civil and political
rights.’” State v. Reed, 2025-Ohio-4708, ¶ 13 (1st Dist.) (Crouse, P.J., concurring
separately), quoting 1 Bouvier, Institutes of American Law, § 363 (1854). “Prior to that time,
infants lacked the ability to participate in the legal and economic life of the community.” Id.
Accordingly, “[t]he infancy doctrine imposed a severe burden on a minor’s ability to purchase
goods, including firearms, during the founding era.” McCoy at 576.
{¶ 23} The Uniform Militia Act of 1792 was “passed shortly after the Second
Amendment was ratified” and it “required eighteen-year-olds to enroll in the militia, and militia
members were required to furnish their own weapons.” Reese,127 F.4th at 596, citing Act
of May 8, 1792, Ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271. “Because of the legal incapacity of individuals under the
10 age of 21, states enacted laws at the Founding to address minors’ inability to purchase
firearms required for their militia service.” Bondi at 1119. “By 1826, at least 21 of the 24
states admitted to the Union—representing roughly 89 percent of the population—had
enacted laws that placed the onus on parents to provide minors with firearms for militia
service.” Id. at 1120.
{¶ 24} “Mid-to-late-nineteenth-century laws . . . further establish that our law
historically precluded the purchase of firearms by individuals under the age of 21. In the
second half of the nineteenth century, 20 jurisdictions enacted laws that restricted access to
arms for minors. Most of those laws prohibited all methods of providing arms to individuals
under the age of 21. And only a few of these laws allowed parents to provide arms to their
children.” Bondi at 1121. The State included an extensive list of these laws within its
appellate brief.
{¶ 25} The foregoing non-exhaustive history indicates that the Nation has a historical
tradition of restricting or burdening the ability of minors to access and purchase firearms.
This historical tradition, however, “tells us, at most, that legal infancy was the status
permitting a restriction on infant’s rights and that 21 years was the age on which the
founding-era legislatures happened to settle at the time.” Reed, 2025-Ohio-4708 at ¶ 36
(1st Dist.) (Bock, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
{¶ 26} Currently, in Ohio, the “[a]ge of majority” is “[a]ll persons of the age of eighteen
years or more, who are under no legal disability.” R.C. 3109.01. These persons “are capable
of contracting and are of full age for all purposes.” Id. Therefore, “eighteen- to twenty-one-
year-olds . . . today are analogous to adults, not minors, at the time these [founding-era]
statutes were enacted.” Bondi, 133 F.4th at 1185 (Brasher, J., dissenting).
11 {¶ 27} Judge Crouse from Ohio’s First Appellate District aptly concluded in her
concurring opinion in Reed that “the age of majority, not age 21, provides the relevant
constitutional line,” because “[h]istory suggests that founding-era limitations on firearm rights
were imposed not because of any judgment that those under 21 years of age were
dangerous with arms, but because those under 21 were under the legal limitations inherent
in minority, and under the legal care and protection of a guardian or parent.” Reed at ¶ 17
(Crouse, P.J., concurring separately). Judge Crouse provides sound reasoning in support of
this conclusion:
First, . . . no state prior to the 1880s prohibited infants from
possessing guns. While it may have been difficult for founding-era 18-to-20-
year-olds to obtain weapons, they were generally permitted to have them if
they could get them. This suggests that the line drawn at 21 was not a
categorical determination of dangerousness, but an incidental effect of legal
minority and restrictions on economic rights.
Second, numerous legal writers in the 18th- and 19th-centuries
emphasized that the 21-year threshold for legal majority was not rooted in
hard-nosed assessments of danger with firearms. Instead, they
acknowledged the somewhat arbitrary product of tradition. Blackstone
noted that the age of majority was “merely arbitrary, and juris positivi [i.e.,
of positive law],” fixed “by the constitutions of different kingdoms . . . at
different times.” [1 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 452
(1765)]. New York Chancellor James Kent likewise described the 21-year
line more as an arbitrary legal threshold than a concrete determination
about maturity. See [2 Kent, Commentaries on American Law, 171 (1827)]
12 (“the age of majority . . . has been variously established in different
countries, but with us is fixed at the age of twenty-one”). And John Bouvier,
author of America’s first major legal dictionary, wrote of how the law “fixed”
an age of majority that was “uniform as to all,” despite the reality that “[t]he
age at which man no longer requires aid and advice for his conduct, is not
the same in every individual; some being precocious, and others slow at
arriving at maturity.” [1 Bouvier, Institutes of American Law, § 337 (1854)].
In fact, modern legal historians have suggested that the common law shifted
the age of majority from 14 or 15 years to 20 or 21 years during the medieval
period, not because of shifting conceptions of maturity, but in order to
accommodate the “weight of the arms” worn by adult knights. See James,
The Age of Majority, 4 Am. J. Legal Hist. 22, 30 (1960); see also Hamilton,
91 Tul. L. Rev. at 63-64.
Third, a close examination of the Uniform Militia Act of 1792 . . . and
accompanying state laws further reinforces that any firearms disabilities
experienced by those under 21 were not safety-related, but were legal
incidents of infancy . . . Compulsory enrollment of those under 21 suggests
that the Second Congress believed 18-to-20-year-olds could, at least in
certain circumstances, be trusted to keep and carry weapons. And this
generally meant trusting them to keep those arms in their homes, as militia
weapons were generally furnished, kept, and maintained by the individual
militiamen. See Cornell & DeDino, A Well Regulated Right: The Early
American Origins of Gun Control, 73 Fordham L.Rev. 487, 509-10 (2004);
15 Kopel & Greenlee, The Second Amendment Rights of Young Adults, 43
13 S.Ill.Univ.L.J. 496, 501 (2019) (“American militiamen were expected to keep
their own arms at home, and to be proficient with those arms.”).
...
In sum, the history suggests that individuals aged 18 to 20 were not
deemed too dangerous to bear arms at the founding. They were merely
hindered in securing arms by the limitations imposed on their legal and
economic autonomy, because of their age and dependence upon their
parents or guardians. The Uniform Militia Act showed that the founding
generation felt 18-to-20-year-olds could be trusted to keep weapons in their
homes, if only the State would help them to circumvent common-law
difficulties relating to legal minority.
Any tradition of firearm restrictions based on age and infancy,
therefore, should be viewed as tied to the line between minority and
majority, not to the line between 20 and 21 years. Minors today, like infants
at the founding, are in the custody of a parent and/or guardian. . . .
Individuals who . . . are between the ages of 18 and 20, are not
minors today. Such individuals enjoy effectively full legal rights and
autonomy. They can participate freely in the economic and legal life of the
community and have the right to vote. See U.S. Const., amend. XIX. Most
significantly, the law leaves 18-to-20-year-olds today only themselves to
depend upon for aid and protection.
Reed at ¶ 18-24.
{¶ 28} We agree with Judge Crouse’s reasoning and find that while there may be a
historical tradition of restricting minors’ access to firearms, Matosky was not a minor at the
14 time of the charged offenses. Rather, Matosky was at the age of majority—a legal adult—
and there is no analogous historical tradition of restricting a legal adult’s right to bear arms
based solely on the adult’s age.
{¶ 29} In Stonewall, the First District Court of Appeals recently upheld the
constitutionality of the concealed-carry age restriction in question. Stonewall, 2025-Ohio-
4974 (1st Dist.). In so holding, the court found that there is a historical tradition of prohibiting
the concealed carry of weapons so long as open carry is not similarly prohibited. Id. at ¶ 23-
24, citing Bruen, 597 U.S. at 52-55. The First District also found that the purpose behind the
historical tradition of banning concealed carry of weapons “was to reduce the risk of surprise
attacks from hidden weapons, while leaving untouched the right to carry openly for self
defense.” Id., citing Hall, 2025-Ohio-1644 at ¶ 57 (1st Dist.). The First District presumably
found that this historical purpose was consistent with the purpose behind Ohio banning
individuals under 21 from carrying concealed weapons, as it stated that the age restriction
“fit within our historical tradition and was constitutional.” Id. at ¶ 24. The court reached this
conclusion because the restriction did not prevent the 19-year-old defendant from exercising
his Second Amendment right to carry a handgun in public. Id. at ¶ 25. The court thus
determined that Ohio’s concealed-carry statute was constitutional as applied to the 19-year-
old defendant. Id. at ¶ 24-26.
{¶ 30} We agree that there is a historical tradition of prohibiting the concealed carry
of weapons. Bruen explained that historical evidence established “the manner of public carry
was subject to reasonable regulation” and that “States could lawfully eliminate . . . concealed
carry—so long as they left open the option to carry openly.” (Emphasis deleted.) Bruen at
59. However, as we previously discussed, a modern firearm regulation may not be
compatible with the historic tradition of firearm regulation if it goes “beyond what was done
15 at the founding.” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 692. Modern firearm regulations must be “‘relevantly
similar’ to laws that our tradition is understood to permit.” Id., quoting Bruen at 29. Therefore,
a modern firearm regulation will not offend the Second Amendment if it imposes restrictions
for similar reasons as founding-era regulations. Id. “Because Bruen required a modern law
to be relevantly similar to the Nation’s historical tradition in both how and why it restricts the
right to bear arms, if modern day laws do not regulate firearms for relevantly similar reasons,
those laws are unconstitutional under Bruen and Rahimi.” Reed, 2025-Ohio-4708 at ¶ 42
(1st Dist.) (Bock, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
{¶ 31} Under Ohio’s current statutory scheme, individuals under 21 years of age may
openly carry loaded firearms, but they do not have the right to carry concealed firearms.
“Ohio law therefore entrusts young adults with the responsibility of publicly possessing and
displaying loaded guns, but denies them the ability to transport those weapons in handbags,
pockets, or the passenger area of cars.” Stonewall, 2025-Ohio-4974 at ¶ 53 (1st Dist.)
(Kinsley, P.J., dissenting). In addition to the age restriction, there are other categories of
individuals who are prohibited from carrying concealed weapons. For example, fugitives
from justice, certain felons and misdemeanants, individuals deemed mentally ill per court
order, and individuals who are otherwise prohibited from legally possessing firearms under
state or federal law are other categories of individuals who are prohibited from carrying
concealed weapons because they are not “qualifying adults.” See R.C. 2923.111(A)(2).
{¶ 32} This statutory scheme indicates that: “Ohio does not regulate the right to carry
a concealed gun because it views doing so as dangerous; rather, it regulates specific
people’s right to carry a concealed weapon based on the State’s belief that certain people
are more dangerous than other people and therefore are not safe to carry a concealed
weapon.” (Emphasis in original.) Reed at ¶ 45 (Bock, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
16 part). The First District Court of Appeals has recognized that “by permitting most Ohio adults
to carry concealed weapons, without having to take any steps to obtain a concealed-carry
license, it is clear that Ohio has departed from the view that the simple act of carrying a
concealed weapon is itself dangerous.” Barber, 2025-Ohio-1193 at ¶ 55 (1st Dist.).
{¶ 33} From this we can discern that the “why” behind the age-based restriction at
issue is a presumption that individuals under 21 are more dangerous and cannot be trusted
to carry concealed weapons. This is markedly different from the “why” behind the historical
bans on concealed carry of weapons, which was to reduce the risk of surprise attacks from
hidden weapons carried by anyone. Accordingly, the “why” behind Ohio’s age-based
restriction on the concealed carry of weapons goes beyond the historical tradition in that it
bans concealed carry of weapons based on the perception of a category of people as
dangerous, not because the act of carrying concealed weapons is dangerous.
{¶ 34} Although Ohio may impose restrictions on Matosky’s Second Amendment
rights that are similar to restrictions imposed in historical laws, we find that that its justification
for the statutes in this case is not relevantly similar to the reasons behind the historical laws.
“No historic tradition supports presuming a category of persons to be dangerous and
nonetheless allowing them access to firearms, but limiting the methods by which they may
bear them.” Stonewall at ¶ 69 (Kinsley, P.J., dissenting). Accordingly, there is no historical
analogue.
{¶ 35} We note that in Rahimi, the United States Supreme Court determined that
“[o]ur tradition of firearm regulation allows the Government to disarm individuals who present
a credible threat to the physical safety of others.” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 700. The State in this
case, however, has failed to present any evidence establishing that adults 18 to 20 years
old, simply as a general age group, present a credible threat to the physical safety of others.
17 Accordingly, the ban on carrying concealed weapons for this age group cannot be justified
based on the dangerousness rationale in Rahimi. See Worth, 108 F.4th at 695.
{¶ 36} For all the foregoing reasons, we find that the State has failed its burden to
demonstrate that Ohio’s age-based restriction on carrying concealed weapons is consistent
with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Accordingly, we find that the
concealed-carry statute, R.C. 2923.12, and its counterpart, R.C. 2923.111, are
unconstitutional as applied to Matosky.
{¶ 37} The State’s first assignment of error is overruled.
Second Assignment of Error
{¶ 38} Under its second assignment of error, the State claims the trial court erred by
finding the improper-handling statute, R.C. 2923.16(B), unconstitutional as applied to
Matosky. In support of this claim, the State raises the same historical-tradition argument that
it raised under its first assignment of error.
{¶ 39} Matosky was subject to criminal liability under R.C. 2923.16(B) because she
was under 21 years of age at the time she was found to have an accessible, loaded firearm
in her motor vehicle. Matosky claims that Ohio’s age-based restriction on this conduct
violates her Second Amendment right to bear arms. The State, on the other hand, maintains
that the restriction is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation and
does not offend the Second Amendment.
{¶ 40} To address the State’s historical-tradition argument, we fully incorporate our
analysis set forth under the State’s first assignment of error. We again find that although
there may be a historical tradition of restricting minors’ access to firearms, Matosky was a
legal adult at the time of the charged offenses and there is no analogous historical tradition
of restricting a legal adult’s right to bear arms based solely on the adult’s age. We also again
18 find that the dangerousness rationale under Rahimi—that there is a historical tradition of
disarming individuals who present a credible threat to the physical safety of others—does
not apply because there is no evidence establishing that adults under 21 years of age
present a credible threat to the physical safety of others.
{¶ 41} Also, as motor vehicles did not exist during the founding era, the State
acknowledges that there is no historical regulation that is directly analogous to Ohio’s age-
based restriction on having a loaded, accessible firearm in a motor vehicle. The State also
acknowledges that there is a lack of historical stagecoach or wagon laws from the founding
era that regulated the transport of firearms. Nevertheless, the State argues that a “historical
twin” is not required, and posits that Ohio’s age-based restriction on having a loaded,
accessible firearm in a motor vehicle should be analogized to historical regulations that
pertain to the safe handling and use of firearms. Despite this argument, the State does not
cite any specific historical regulations pertaining to the safe handling or use of firearms, let
alone any regulation that mirrors the age-based restriction at issue. Instead, the State cites
federal case law that generally shows a historical tradition of firearm regulations designed
to protect public safety, such as regulations that require guns to be registered, gun owners
to attend training, and firearms and gun powder to be stored in a certain manner.
{¶ 42} We do not find that the types of historical regulations cited by the State are
relevantly similar to the age-based restriction at issue. The restriction prevents a category
of people perceived as dangerous based on their age alone from having or transporting a
loaded, accessible firearm in a motor vehicle. The restriction is markedly different from
general safety regulations on how to handle and use firearms. The specific conduct
regulated by the restriction is not the same, and the danger that it addresses is different as
well. The age-based restriction addresses danger posed by a category of people, whereas
19 historical firearm safety and use regulations address danger from the firearm itself. How and
why those historical regulations restrict the right to bear arms is not relevantly similar to the
statutes contested in this case.
{¶ 43} Because the State has not pointed to any relevantly similar historical
regulation, we find that the State has failed its burden to demonstrate that Ohio’s age-based
restriction on having and transporting accessible, loaded firearms in a motor vehicle is
consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. We conclude that the
improper-handling statute, R.C. 2923.16, and its counterpart, R.C. 2923.111, are
{¶ 44} The State’s second assignment of error is overruled.
Conclusion
{¶ 45} Having overruled both assignments of error raised by the State, the judgment
.............
EPLEY, P.J., and LEWIS, J., concur.